Wednesday, May 16, 2012

Car Service Misconduct Justifies Termination

The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department has affirmed the grant of summary judgment to a law firm sued for discrimination by a terminated attorney:

In this discrimination action, plaintiff alleges that the defendant law firm terminated her because of her age and gender. The motion court properly determined that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing that she was discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff had met that burden, defendant law firm offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination since she had engaged in misconduct by, over a period of several years, using a car service hundreds of times in violation of defendant's policy. Plaintiff would commute to and from her home, and to her personal appointments and the office, and then charge those trips to various clients. Plaintiff failed to show that defendants' stated reasons for her termination were false or pretextual or that defendants were motivated by discrimination. (citations omitted)

The motion court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to add a claim under New York Judiciary Law § 487 and to add a partner at the law firm as a party. Plaintiff failed to allege facts demonstrating that the law firm or its partners intended to commit deception in a letter to the Departmental Disciplinary Committee reporting plaintiff's misconduct.

(Mike Frisch)

May 16, 2012 in Law & Business, Law Firms | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, May 8, 2012

New York Declines To Extend Wieder Exception

The New York Court of Appeals has declined to extend the Wieder exception to the doctrine of at-will employment and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to a defendant hedge fund company and its president, who had fired its chief compliance officer.

The plaintiff had claimed he was fired for reporting misconduct.

The Wieder exception involved an attorney who had been fired from his law firm for reporting unethical conduct.

Chief Judge Lippman dissented:

In the wake of the devastation caused by fraudulent financial schemes - such as the Madoff ponzi operation, infamous for many reasons including the length of time during which it continued undetected - the courts can ill afford to turn a blind eye to the potential for abuses that may be committed by unscupulous financial services companies in violation of the public trust and law. In the absence of conscientious efforts by those insiders entrusted to report such abuses of investors, such behavior can run rampant until a third part outside the company discovers it and takes action. The message that will be taken from the majority's decision is self-evident: if compliance officers (and other similarly situated) wish to keep their jobs, they should keep their heads down and ignore good-faith suspicions or evidence they may have that their employers have engaged in illegal and unethical behavior, even where such violations could cause or have caused staggering losses to their employer's clients. The majority's conclusion that an investment advisor like Peconic has every right to fire its compliance officer, simply for doing his job, flies into the face of what we have learned from the Madoff debacle, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the Court's precedent, and facilitates the perpetration of frauds on the public.

(Mike Frisch)

May 8, 2012 in Law & Business, Law & Society | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, April 27, 2012

No Arbitration in Law Firm Employment Dispute

The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department has held that a law firm employee is not bound by an earlier agreement to arbitrate:

The record shows that the parties entered into an employment agreement that contained a broad arbitration clause. The agreement also provided that it could not be extended except by a writing signed by both parties. At the time of plaintiff's termination, the employment agreement had expired by its own terms, and no written agreement signed by both parties had extended it. Although plaintiff continued to work for defendant law firm after the expiration of the agreement, evincing an agreement to extend some of the provisions of the contract, that was insufficient to extend the arbitration provision without a clearly expressed intention to do so. Accordingly, since no agreement to arbitrate existed at the time of plaintiff's termination, the court improperly stayed the proceedings and directed arbitration. (citation omitted)

(Mike Frisch)

April 27, 2012 in Law & Business, Law Firms | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

Mistaken For Jew, Employee May Sue

The New Jersey Appellate Division has reversed an order of summary judgment as to two of three defendants sued under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD").

The plaintiff (a truck driver) had claimed to be subject to regular anti-Semitic comments from the defendants, who mistakenly thought that he was Jewish. The trial court held that the fact that the plaintiff was not in fact Jewish barred the action.

The court here found that conclusion to be erroneous as a matter of law:

...the individual defendants, all of whom were plaintiff's supervisors, were motivated by their belief that plaintiff was Jewish, and thus engaged in "real discrimination and harassment" of the kind that the LAD seeks to eliminate...That their target happened not to be Jewish should not serve to excuse their conduct.

The defendants had initially denied the comments had been made until a DVD was produced by the plaintiff that had such expressions as "Jew Bag," "F... you Hebrew," "Jew Bastard," "If you were a German, we would burn you in the oven," and "Only a Jew would argue over his hours."

At his deposition, one of the defendants admitted that the DVD was accurate and that he "used the song Hava Nagila as the ring tone for calls on his cell phone from plaintiff." (Mike Frisch)

April 18, 2012 in Law & Business, Law & Society | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, April 17, 2012

Policy Limits

The Tennessee Court of Appeals has reversed and remanded an order dismissing a case against a law firm that had defended a personal injury claim against a commercial driver.

The plaintiffs settled for insurance policy limits of $500,000. As part of the seetlement, they signed a release of all claims against the law firm and insurance company as well as the defendants. The plaintiffs later discovered that defendants also had a substantial general insurance liability policy of a million dollars.

Plaintiffs then sued the attorneys for the defendants for fraud in the inducement of the settlement agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment based on the language of the release.

The court here held that the trial court erred in refusing to hear extrinsic evidence of fraud. (Mike Frisch)

April 17, 2012 in Law & Business, Law Firms | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, March 8, 2012

Staying On Sidelines Dooms Appeal

The Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimously (with the Chief Justice concurring and Justice Prosser not participating) held that the United States had failed to preserve appellate review of the case.

The question:

This case requires us to answer a threshold question concerning whether an appeal in this insurance company rehabilitation case may go forward.  The court of appeals granted the motion of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (Commissioner) to dismiss the appeal by the United States. The Commissioner had argued that the appeal should be dismissed either on the grounds that the notice of appeal was fundamentally defective such that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction or on the grounds that the United States had waived its right to appeal issues by failing to appear in the circuit court.  The United States Department of Justice attorney who signed the notice of appeal was not admitted to practice law in Wisconsin and had not obtained pro hac vice admission. The court of appeals concluded that the notice of appeal did not include a signature of an "attorney of record" as Wis. Stat. § 802.05 requires.  The court of appeals did not decide the waiver issue but dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.  The United States petitioned this court for review, which we granted.  We affirm the court of appeals on the basis of waiver.

The conclusion:

What is inescapable in reviewing the record in this case is the sense that the United States almost begrudgingly took steps "to preserve its right to appeal" in only the most technical sense while, ironically, overlooking fundamental appellate principles establishing what parties must do to preserve that right: raise their issues in the circuit court in the first instance.  The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on the basis of an unauthorized signature on the notice of appeal.  In reaching our conclusion, we focus not on the signature, but on the fact that the notice of appeal itself was the only effort by the United States to involve itself with the circuit court.  It did, as noted, attempt to remove this matter to federal court.  Despite its apparent outrage at the injunction (in one filing to the court of appeals it stated, "[W]e are not aware of any other creditor that was so mistreated"), it remained on the sidelines while the rehabilitation was proceeding in the circuit court and chose not to raise its objections until after the final order was entered. 

The United States conceded at oral argument that it made an intentional decision not to litigate any of the issues involved in the circuit court.  Our case law is clear and consistent——failure to preserve issues means that they are waived.  Applying well-established principles of law that apply equally to the government when it is a party, we hold that such a decision precludes the United States from pursuing relief in the court of appeals. We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals to dismiss the United States' appeal.

(Mike Frisch)

 

March 8, 2012 in Law & Business, Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

No Meeting Of Minds

A doctor whose bill for dog bite treatments was not paid filed a pro se lawsuit against the attorney who handled the underlying litigation. The doctor appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the attorney.

The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, finding a basis in the record to conclude that, although the doctor provided medical records to the attorney, there was no "meeting of the minds" between the two on the subject of the attorney's obligation to pay the doctor's bills. (Mike Frisch)

February 22, 2012 in Billable Hours, Law & Business | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, January 29, 2012

Hatfield on the History of Tax Lawyer Ethics

Michael Hatfield of Texas Tech has published to SSRN his study of the tax legal profession, in a historical context: "Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965:  Patriotism, Duties and Advice." Its abstract:

Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965: Patriotism, Duties and Advice provides a timely historical review of legal ethics and federal taxes. Focusing on the first two decades of the modern income tax (1945-1965), the Article reviews the ethics literature of the tax bar, which was mostly written by very prominent tax lawyers (a founder of Paul, Weiss; partners at Sullivan & Cromwell, Willkie Farr, etc.), tax professors (including the dean at Harvard Law School), and government officials (including key advisors to FDR, JFK, and LBJ). This seemingly forgotten literature provides a remarkable contrast to today’s anti-tax climate, especially given that the highest marginal individual tax rate during 1945-1965 was 94%. The writers of this period emphasized the patriotic duty to support the federal government by paying taxes, describing taxes, for example, as the price to maintain capitalism (Merle Miller) and a “blessing” (Erwin Griswold). Several stressed the ethical duty of lawyers to improve their clients’ respect for the tax system (Norris Darrell, e.g.). “Ethics” for these writers was not an issue of the ABA canons but rather a more general, philosophical reflection. For example, in 1949, the tax committee of the ABA issued a report on the importance of natural law jurisprudence in tax. In 1952, the discussion at the Tax Law Review banquet (which was nominally dedicated to discussing “Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners”) developed into a debate over whether or not Americans were more degenerate then than in the past (Edmond Cahn) or merely more self-conscious (Thomas Tarleau). But the ethics writers were also concerned with specific issues that endure to this day, such as when to disclose an arguable but uncertain tax position – some (Randolph Paul, e.g.) arguing almost any position the government was likely to question should be disclosed, others (Boris Bittker, e.g.) arguing against disclosure so long as the position was reasonable. There was wide disagreement as to whether or not tax lawyers owed a special duty to the system, but wide agreement that this theoretical debate was nearly moot given that conservative tax advice was usually not only the most ethical but the most practical. This pragmatic attitude – emphasizing that good tax practice, good tax ethics, and good tax advice tended to converge – reflected the “real world” orientation of these professionally accomplished writers, even though, by today’s standards, many of their statements seem idealistic. The salvaging of this forgotten literature is timely not only in its relevance to contemporary debates, but also its relevance to the increasing historical research of the income tax as its 100th anniversary approaches.

[Alan Childress]

January 29, 2012 in Abstracts Highlights - Academic Articles on the Legal Profession, Ethics, Law & Business | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

A Special Place For Lawyers?

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a legal malpractice claim (and a related breach of contract claim) dies with the client.

Justice Horton dissents on the contract claim:

The majority expresses its concern that "[a] holding to the contrary would create a per se breach of contract action in every legal malpractice action." I would first note that this is a gross overstatement. The position I espouse only applies in instances involving express contractual undertakings. In this case, no one forced [the attorney] to enter into a contract prescribing the manner in which he would represent the client. Had he not elected to identify the manner in which he would perform his services, his duty to his client would be imposed by law, this action would sound in tort, and I would be joining with the majority.

I, too, have a concern for the result of this appeal. There is a very real concern that the decision of this Court will reinforce the perception, shared by many in our society, that courts will go out of their way in order to protect members of the bar. My position, which I believe to be well-grounded in existing law, simply recognizes that lawyers do not hold a special place in society that insulates them from the type of liability that any other party to a contract would face.

The claim involved allegations that the attorney failed to properly advise the client (who had been rendered a quadriplegic in an accident) of the effect of a settlement and release. (Mike Frisch)

January 18, 2012 in Clients, Law & Business, The Practice | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, January 17, 2012

The Interest Of Justice

The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department has reinstated a legal malpractice case that had been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.

The pro se plaintiff had been represented in an arbitration claim. She filed her suit within the three-year limitation period but had trouble serving the law firm.

The court concluded:

Even if this case does not qualify for an extension under the "good cause" exception...we find that it qualifies under the "interest of justice" category. Under this prong of CPLR 306-b, the Court of Appeals has instructed that a court "may consider [plaintiff's] diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor . . ., including expiration of the Statute of Limitations, the meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff's request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant."

Here, plaintiff's attempted March 2008 service, although ultimately deemed defective, was a diligent attempt by a pro se plaintiff to hire a process server to serve defendants at their law firm, within 120 days of the timely filing of a summons with notice. By the time the court ruled on the motions in the 2007 Action, the statute of limitations had expired, precluding the filing of a new action. In addition, defendants were aware of the 2007 Action and appeared to demand a complaint as early as April 2008 - they were not prejudiced by the service errors and were afforded full participation in discovery. Finally, construing the pleading in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as is required on consideration of a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, we find that it asserts actions and omissions by defendants that support viable claims for recovery. (citations omitted)

(Mike Frisch)

January 17, 2012 in Clients, Law & Business, Law Firms | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, January 13, 2012

Absent Disclaimer, Law Firm Liable For Reporting Services

The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that a law firm is liable to a court reporting service for the payment of fees for services.

The litigation involved services provided in five cases in a total amount of a tad below $6,000. The law firm had contended that their clients were the proper defendants. The court held that the firm was liable but not the contracting attorney as an individual under the particular facts.

The law firm had invoked agency law in support of its position.

The court responded:

As a practical matter, in today's legal system, an attorney dealing with those who provide legal support services acts less as an agent who relies on the client for authority to manage the case, and more as a "general contractor," who is responsible for supervising the various aspects of litigation. In that context, it is appropriate that the attorney, with superior knowledge and familiarity with the case and client, should bear the burden of clarifying his or her intent regarding payment. It is, in fact, a relatively simple matter foe an attorney to disclaim liability with a clear statement to that effect. And an attorney's liability for (and payment of) expenses of litigation is consistent with our ethical rules.

(Mike Frisch)

January 13, 2012 in Law & Business, Law Firms, The Practice | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, December 6, 2011

Fees For Non-Lawyer Referrals May Be OK

The Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar has just issued an opinion on the circumstances under which a lawyer may accept a fee for referring a client to a non-lawyer entity:

A lawyer who refers a client to a non–lawyer service provider such as a financial services firm may accept compensation from the provider for the referral so long as the criteria of Rule 1.7(c) and, if applicable, Rules 1.8(a) and 5.7 are satisfied. Those criteria are exacting, however, and the arrangement may be beyond the lawyer’s malpractice coverage even if permitted by the Rules.

The opinion overrules in part an earlier opinion of the committee.

The arrangement must comply with rules governing conflicts of interest (Rule 1.7), business transactions with clients (rule 1.8) and responsibilities regarding law-related services (Rule 5.7).

(Mike Frisch)

December 6, 2011 in Clients, Law & Business | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

I Could Write A Book

The Indiana Court of Appeals has reversed a murder conviction and ordered the appointment of a special prosecutor where the prosecutor had entered into a (now cancelled) literary contract for a book about the case. The contract "created an irreversible, actual conflict of interest with [the prosecutor's] duty to the people of Indiana...the trial court erred when it denied [the defendant's] petition."

The defendant was facing a third trial and second retrial on charges that he had murdered his wife and two children. The first conviction was reversed due to prejudicial evidence concerning the defendant's extramarital affairs. After the second conviction, he filed an interlocutory appeal seeking a special prosecutor in light of the book deal.

The Floyd County Prosecutor prosecuted the defendant in the second trial. He was contacted by a literary agency "hours before the jury reached a verdict..." He inked the deal before sentencing. The defendant got life without parole.

The book deal progressed under the working title, "Sacred Trust: Deadly Betrayal." The prosecutor received an advance payment of $1,700. After the conviction was reversed by the Indiana Supreme Court, Penguin (the publisher) decided to delay any decision about moving forward with the book. Eventually, the deal fell through. The prosecutor returned the advance to Penguin.

The prosecutor refiled the murder charges. The defendant sought to remove him and have a special prosecutor appointed because of the book deal. At a hearing on the motion, Dean Emeritus Norman Lefstein at Indiana University School of Law testified that there was a conflict of interest. The trial court nonetheless denied the motion in light of the cancellation of the contract.

The court here found that the book deal was "a bell that cannot be unrung" that "permanently compromised [the prosecutor's] ability to advocate on behalf of the people of the state of Indiana in this trial."

Thanks to my favorite Hoosier attorney - Don Lundberg - for sending me the case.

Inspiration for the title to the post: Frank Sinatra. (Mike Frisch)

November 16, 2011 in Law & Business, Law & Society | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, October 13, 2011

Bank Not Liable When Law Firm Scammed

A law firm that was scammed by a Hong Kong company that had e-mailed the firm purportedly to seek representation sued two banks when they lost nearly $200,000. The scam involved receipt of a $10,000 retainer and the remitting of $197,500 to the "client."

The law firm claims that a partner was told be a bank employee that an incoming check had "cleared." In reliance, he wired out $187,500. The incoming check was a counterfeit. By the time the bad check was discovered, the law firm had been fleeced.

The New York Court of Appeals (over a dissent) affirmed the entry of summary judgment to the banks. The dissent would allow a claim of negligent misrepresentation to proceed. The justice would find a triable issue in the "check cleared" assurance.

A cautionary tale here. (Mike Frisch)

October 13, 2011 in Law & Business | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, September 15, 2011

Promises Promises

The New Hampshire Supreme Court has affirmed and reversed in part the dismissal of an action brought by the wife of a Manchester attorney against Nixon Peabody and an attorney there named Regina Rockefeller.

The Manchester attorney had handled an estate matter. The Nixon Peabody attorney accused him of misappropriation and threatened to report him to criminal and bar authorities if he did not repay the estate.

The wife claimed that these threats forced her to execute a reverse mortgage on her family home. The defendants reported him anyway. Suit was brought and the home was foreclosed.

The wife sued on a variety of claims stemming from her alleged resulting severe emotional and physical distress.

The court here found that the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation was sufficiently pled:

The writ alleges that in reliance upon the defendants’ promises not to report her husband’s misconduct, the plaintiff agreed to execute a reverse mortgage on, and release her homestead interest in, the family home in Manchester and the settlement agreement dated April 2, 2007. In her prayer for relief, the plaintiff states that her payments were made to the defendants involuntarily and as a result of fraud. We read the facts set forth in the writ as alleging that the defendants either intended or had reason to expect that the promises made to Attorney Tessier would be communicated to the plaintiff and would influence her decision to enter into the settlement agreement with Dr. Jakobiec.

The trial court also erred in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend claims of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.

 Because the court reversed the trial court's dismissal of some of the claims against the individual attorney, claims against the firm survive on the basis of respondeat superior. The failure to supervise claim against the firm was properly dismissed.

The Manchester attorney consented to disbarment.  (Mike Frisch)

September 15, 2011 in Law & Business, Law Firms | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, July 18, 2011

Meat Samosa Litigation Continues

The New Jersey Appellate Division has reversed in part the grant of summary judgment to a caterer  defendant on the following allegations:

Plaintiffs, sixteen Hindu vegetarians, appeal from an order of summary judgment entered against them dismissing their action premised upon allegations of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, consumer fraud, products liability, and breach of express and implied warranties arising when defendant Asha Enterprises, L.L.C. d/b/a Moghul Express & Catering Co. (Mogul Express), an Indian restaurant, filled their order for vegetarian samosas with meat-filled samosa causing spiritual injuries resulting in damages.

The court held that pre-discovery judgment could not be granted on the breach of express warranty claim. (Mike Frisch)

July 18, 2011 in Law & Business, Law & Society | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, July 1, 2011

Solitude Is Hard To Find

The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that an attorney's representation of a subdivision violated conflict-of-interest rules but that the issue had not been timely raised.

The person (defendant) who claimed the conflict had retained an attorney to assist in a dispute with the Solitude subdivision located in Teton County over the interpretation of a protective covenant. She later complained about the attorney's bill to the Bar.

When the subdivision brought a claim against defendant, it retained her former attorney's partner. The litigation involved the covenant's application to defendant's erected screens, brush, log piles and fencing.

The court here held that the matters involved the same protective covenants and were thus substantially-related matters. The partner should have been disqualified by operation of the imputed conflict rule.

The court did not approve of the behavior of the attorneys for either side:

This case is an example of how resolution of a simple dispute can become
unduly complicated, expensive and delayed by the attorneys’ conduct. The record
on appeal discloses endless and unseemly jousting between the attorneys about
virtually every aspect of the case. Discovery requests that should have been
responded to quickly were unnecessarily opposed by both sides for every little
reason imaginable. It took over two years to reach summary judgment, even
though there was no real dispute about the facts of the alleged covenant violations,
because of the constant bickering between the attorneys. We can only imagine the
frustration experienced by the district court, including the two different judges
who sat on this case.

The court remanded the case on the issue of attorney's fees, as the defendant should not have to pay the other side's fees for matters relating to the conflict issue. (Mike Frisch)

July 1, 2011 in Clients, Law & Business | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, June 21, 2011

Non-Binding

The Washington Court of Appeals has held that two attorneys had not agreed to resolve their disagreements through arbitration.

The two attorneys had both a personal and professional relationship in which one was an associate in the other's law firm. Both relationships ended and the former associate filed suit for both equitable distribution of property and on employment claims.

The court here agreed with the trial court that the two had not entered into an arbitration agreement. Rather, the parties had agreed only to non-binding arbitration in order to try to settle their dispute. "Non-binding" was given its ordinary meaning by the court in reaching its result. (Mike Frisch)

June 21, 2011 in Law & Business | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, May 4, 2011

Client May Be Liable To Court Reporter

The New York Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department held that a client may be responsible for paying a court reporter after the law firm that contracted for the services (Dreier LLP) declared bankruptcy.

The court sets out the issue:

On this appeal, we are asked to determine whether a court reporting agency may recover payment for services rendered directly from the client instead of being limited to pursuing the attorney who, as the client's agent, engaged the agency. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that although a court reporting agency may obtain payment for services rendered directly from the attorney who engaged it, a court reporting agency is not precluded from recovering those fees directly from the client.

Holding:

Here, the plaintiff contended that it was not a party to the defendants' engagement letter with Dreier, LLP, and should not be bound thereby. The plaintiff maintained that the defendants are responsible for paying its fees related to services obtained by Dreier, LLP, on their behalf, inasmuch as General Business Law § 399-cc was never intended to allow a client, such as the defendants, to evade responsibility for paying the reporter and that the ultimate responsibility for the reporting fees lies with the client.

The defendants, in response, relied upon the Dreier, LLP, engagement letter and the payments they made thereunder. Thus, they contended that any payments owed to the plaintiff were or should have been paid from the monthly payments received by Dreier, LLP, from the defendants.

Given that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract by alleging all of the essential elements; to wit, the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's performance pursuant to that contract, the defendants' breach of their obligations pursuant to the contract, and damages resulting from that breach (see JP Morgan Chase v J.H. Elec. of N.Y., Inc., 69 AD3d 802; Furia v Furia, 116 AD2d 694), and General Business Law § 399-cc does not prohibit the plaintiff from seeking its fee directly from the defendants as the clients, it was improper for the Supreme Court to have, in effect, granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the complaint...

(Mike Frisch)

May 4, 2011 in Law & Business | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

Tax Lawyer In Tax Trouble

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conclusion that an Indiana couple fraudulently understated their 2001 income. The court forewarns the reader of the opinion:

Appellants [husband and wife] (a married couple from Brownsburg, Indiana) ran into trouble with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 2003, when a revenue agent began auditing their 2001 joint tax return. Through this audit, the agent discovered a web of corporate and partnership entities serving dubious purposes, undocumented financial transactions, and inconsistent reports regarding the [couple's] income. Incongruously, although [the husband] engineeered much of the financial and legal tangle that landed him and [his wife] in hot water with the IRS, [he] is a licensed Indiana attorney with a practice focused on business planning and tax matters. We outline the confusing maze of entities and financial dealings below, but be forewarned that much of it makes little business or legal sense as the [couple] fail to dispel the perception underlying the Tax Court's finding that the perplexing arrangements served as nothing but the after-the-fact attempts to avoid taxation on the substantial income [he] earned in 2001.

The court held that the Tax Court's reliance on a number of "badges of fraud" was not clearly erroneous. These factors included  the couple's education and experience, the omission of over $2.5 million in income, the failure to maintain records, commingling business and personal assets,  and the absence of a business purpose in moving funds around. (Mike Frisch)

March 29, 2011 in Law & Business | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)