Wednesday, April 24, 2013
From the web page of the Ohio Supreme Court:
The Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline no longer advises that a lawyer may not practice with more than one firm in Ohio at the same time, according to an advisory opinion.
Finding “substantial justification for a new perspective on practice in multiple firms” and considering “the context of current rules and modern practice,” the board concluded in Opinion 2013-1 that practice in multiple firms can occur in compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The board withdrew three previous advisory opinions on the issue. The reasoning behind the update includes, among other things, the fact that other jurisdictions have ruled that the practice is permissible, an expanded definition of “firm,” and financial considerations for lawyers in smaller communities who work more than one part-time job.
The opinion’s syllabus gives the following guidance.
“A lawyer who engages in simultaneous practice in multiple firms must recognize the potential ethical issues connected with such practice. The lawyer has to be diligent in avoiding conflicts of interest, and the imputation of conflicts will apply across all associated ‘firms.’ The lawyer is also required to scrupulously maintain client confidentiality and professional independence. As part of the lawyer’s duty to refrain from false, misleading, or nonverifiable communications about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services, the lawyer must inform his or her clients of all multiple firm associations."
Thursday, March 14, 2013
The New Jersey Supreme Court has issued an opinion that amends RPC 7.5 to allow the use of a law firm trade name "so long as [the name] describes the nature of the legal practice in terms that are accurate, descriptive, and informative, but not misleading, comparative, or suggestive of the ability to obtain results."
The court considered the trade name Alpha Center for Divorce Mediation, P.C. and concluded that all of the name was permissible save for the "Alpha." The rest of the name, along with the name of a managing New Jersey attorney, passes muster.
Alpha is impermissibly comparative, like (as the court had suggested) "Best Tax Lawyers" and "Tax Fixers" would be.
The court also directed that a committee be established to implement its new Rule.
The case had been remanded in 2009 and reargued twice after the remand.
Question: What if your last name is Best? What if I change my name to Mike Superlawyer? (Mike Frisch)
Thursday, February 21, 2013
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to an attorney in a suit for fees against a former client.
The attorney had represented the client in actions against her late father's estate for a 15% contingency fee.
After the claim was reduced to settlement, the attorney collected his fees as payments were recovered. The client later discharged the attorney and claimed no obligation to continue to pay.
The court found that the attorney's rights under the contingent fee agreement had fully vested when the underlying claim was settled. Although the client was free to discharge the attorney, such action "does not alter his entitlement to fees already earned." (Mike Frisch)
Monday, June 18, 2012
A plaintiff's verdict in a legal malpractice case has been reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court.
The court found error in the admission of expert testimony on causation:
...the second jury in a malpractice action is not deciding what the first jury would have done in the underlying case had the attorney not been negligent, but only what a reasonable jury would have done had the underlying case been tried without the attorney negligence alleged by the plaintiff. The second jury does this by independently evaluating the evidence in the underlying case as it should have been presented to determine whether it belives that the plaintiff has a winning case, not by deciding whether some prior jury may or may not have believed that the plaintiff had a winning case...the Court of Appeals was incorrect in its conclusion that the jury in a malpractice case was tasked with deciding an issue that could not be resolved by the average lay person. Because the jury in the malpractice case was not being asked to decide what a prior jury would have done, it was merely being asked to do what any jury in a discrimination lawsuit would do, which is, evaluate the evidence in the case and decide the case on the merits. This is a task solely for the jury, and that is not properly the subject of expert testimony.
The inadmissible testimony on the ultimate issue resulted in reversal of the judgment. (Mike Frisch)
Friday, June 15, 2012
From the Ohio Supreme Court:
Law firm letterhead and websites may list the names of non-lawyer employees if their status is clearly identified, according to a Supreme Court of Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline advisory opinion.
Opinion 2012-2 departs from a previous advisory opinion issued by the board, so Advisory Opinion 89-16 is withdrawn.
The board’s 1989 opinion did not discuss law firms communicating with clients and the public via their websites. The opinion did, however, find that the inclusion of non-lawyers on letterhead was prohibited, but their inclusion on business cards was proper.
In revisiting its 23-year-old advice, the board considered Rules 7.1 and 7.5(a) of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct and the standard that “law firm letterhead and websites cannot be false or misleading, or contain a non-verifiable communication about a lawyer or the lawyer’s services.”
The board reiterated that firm business cards may identify non-lawyer employees.
Read the complete text of the opinion.
Monday, June 11, 2012
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department held that a plaintiff stated a valid cause of action under the following circumstances:
The following facts are undisputed: In 2002, plaintiff, a newly admitted
attorney, placed an advertisement in the New York Law Journal seeking a
mentorship opportunity with an experienced solo practitioner in order to gain
trial experience. Defendant responded to the advertisement and the parties met.
Subsequently, plaintiff saw an advertisement in the Journal placed by a Bronx
solo practitioner looking to refer cases out to other experienced attorneys.
Defendant met with the Bronx practitioner and agreed to act as trial counsel for
the Bronx attorney's clients with a 40% referral fee payable to the Bronx
attorney. It is further undisputed that plaintiff referred at least two cases to
defendant's law office, and that he conducted some depositions for cases on
which defendant was working, and drafted some bills of particulars — even though
plaintiff had not litigated any personal injury cases prior to meeting
defendant. Plaintiff received some payments from defendant which defendant
characterized as mostly for per diem work. Eventually, however, according to
plaintiff, the payments ceased.
In August 2006, plaintiff filed a summons and complaint alleging 10 causes of
action as follows: (1) breach of an oral partnership agreement; (2) breach of an
oral agreement; (3) fraud; (4) an accounting; (5) unjust enrichment; (6) fraud
in the inducement; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; (8) estoppel; (9) contract
implied in the law based on past performance; and (10) quantum meruit.
Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that defendant had proposed that they should work
together as partners in a personal injury law practice with each having an equal
share of the profits gained from the cases they worked on jointly. Plaintiff
further alleged that between 2002 and 2005 he worked on more than 100 personal
injury cases for defendant, expended approximately 500 hours in connection with
these cases, and contributed $5,000 in capital to the partnership
The quantum meruit claim survives:
In the absence of a valid contract, plaintiff, however, does set forth a
prima facie case for recovery in quantum meruit. It is hornbook law that in
order to establish a claim in quantum meruit, a claimant must establish "(1) the
performance of services in good faith; (2) the acceptance of the services by the
person to whom they are rendered; (3) an expectation of compensation therefor;
and (4) the reasonable value of the services" (Soumayah v Minnelli, 41 AD3d 390, 391 ; see 22A NY Jur2d Contracts § 610;). Defendant agreed that plaintiff
worked for him in some capacity on a certain number of cases. Further, plaintiff
points to two e-mails purportedly sent by defendant to plaintiff in August 2005
acknowledging that defendant owes plaintiff certain fees on cases after they
"come to trial." Thus, plaintiff may recover based on quantum meruit for work he
performed without compensation on behalf of defendant.
Tuesday, May 29, 2012
The Idaho Supreme Court has affirmed the grant of a new trial to an attorney and his girlfriend who were found by special jury verdict to have breached fiduciary duties to a former client by purchasing half of his stock in a closely-held corporation for less than fair market value.
The stock was for a resort property on the shore of Lake Pend Orielle and was held in equal shares by two couples. The stock of one couple was purchased by a man with the wonderful name of Jerry Berry.
The attorney, who practiced bankruptcy law, visited the resort and made Mr. Berry's acquaintance. Berry consulted him about a possible bankruptcy but did not pursue that option. Later, Berry wished to purchase the other 50% of the stock, with money lent by the attorney in part and his girlfriend in part. The attorney thought he would be repaid on sale of the resort, but the sale did not happen.
Berry was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, triggering events that led Berry to transfer the stock to the attorney and girlfriend to repay the obligation and the attorney to take control of the corporation. Berry died in November 2006.
The attorney then had the locks to the resort changed and did not give a key to Mrs. Berry. He approached her the day after the memorial service with a proposed special resolution and shortly thereafter was elected corporation president by 2-1 majority vote of himself and the girlfriend, who was elected treasurer by the same margin.
As they say, litigation followed, initiated by Berry's widow.
The court here found that the trial court's instructions on the attorney-client relationship were "clearly inadequate." The district court "did not err in holding that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict that when [the attorney] purchased the stock he breached his fiduciary duty to Mr. Berry arising from an attorney-client relationship."
The court noted a dearth of evidence of an attorney-client relationship between Berry and the attorney after the 2000- 2001 consultation. The stock purchase took place in 2006.
The court and a concurring opinion were unimpressed by the attorney's "shabby" treatment of Mrs. Berry, which may have contributed to the jury's verdict.
Justice Jones, concurring, opines that while plaintiff's case raised "some smoke, it did not produce the actual fire necessary to support the verdict" against the attorney and the girlfriend. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, May 16, 2012
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department has affirmed the grant of summary judgment to a law firm sued for discrimination by a terminated attorney:
In this discrimination action, plaintiff alleges that the defendant law firm terminated her because of her age and gender. The motion court properly determined that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing that she was discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff had met that burden, defendant law firm offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination since she had engaged in misconduct by, over a period of several years, using a car service hundreds of times in violation of defendant's policy. Plaintiff would commute to and from her home, and to her personal appointments and the office, and then charge those trips to various clients. Plaintiff failed to show that defendants' stated reasons for her termination were false or pretextual or that defendants were motivated by discrimination. (citations omitted)
The motion court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to add a claim under New York Judiciary Law § 487 and to add a partner at the law firm as a party. Plaintiff failed to allege facts demonstrating that the law firm or its partners intended to commit deception in a letter to the Departmental Disciplinary Committee reporting plaintiff's misconduct.
Tuesday, May 8, 2012
The New York Court of Appeals has declined to extend the Wieder exception to the doctrine of at-will employment and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to a defendant hedge fund company and its president, who had fired its chief compliance officer.
The plaintiff had claimed he was fired for reporting misconduct.
The Wieder exception involved an attorney who had been fired from his law firm for reporting unethical conduct.
Chief Judge Lippman dissented:
In the wake of the devastation caused by fraudulent financial schemes - such as the Madoff ponzi operation, infamous for many reasons including the length of time during which it continued undetected - the courts can ill afford to turn a blind eye to the potential for abuses that may be committed by unscupulous financial services companies in violation of the public trust and law. In the absence of conscientious efforts by those insiders entrusted to report such abuses of investors, such behavior can run rampant until a third part outside the company discovers it and takes action. The message that will be taken from the majority's decision is self-evident: if compliance officers (and other similarly situated) wish to keep their jobs, they should keep their heads down and ignore good-faith suspicions or evidence they may have that their employers have engaged in illegal and unethical behavior, even where such violations could cause or have caused staggering losses to their employer's clients. The majority's conclusion that an investment advisor like Peconic has every right to fire its compliance officer, simply for doing his job, flies into the face of what we have learned from the Madoff debacle, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the Court's precedent, and facilitates the perpetration of frauds on the public.
Friday, April 27, 2012
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department has held that a law firm employee is not bound by an earlier agreement to arbitrate:
The record shows that the parties entered into an employment agreement that contained a broad arbitration clause. The agreement also provided that it could not be extended except by a writing signed by both parties. At the time of plaintiff's termination, the employment agreement had expired by its own terms, and no written agreement signed by both parties had extended it. Although plaintiff continued to work for defendant law firm after the expiration of the agreement, evincing an agreement to extend some of the provisions of the contract, that was insufficient to extend the arbitration provision without a clearly expressed intention to do so. Accordingly, since no agreement to arbitrate existed at the time of plaintiff's termination, the court improperly stayed the proceedings and directed arbitration. (citation omitted)
Wednesday, April 18, 2012
The New Jersey Appellate Division has reversed an order of summary judgment as to two of three defendants sued under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD").
The plaintiff (a truck driver) had claimed to be subject to regular anti-Semitic comments from the defendants, who mistakenly thought that he was Jewish. The trial court held that the fact that the plaintiff was not in fact Jewish barred the action.
The court here found that conclusion to be erroneous as a matter of law:
...the individual defendants, all of whom were plaintiff's supervisors, were motivated by their belief that plaintiff was Jewish, and thus engaged in "real discrimination and harassment" of the kind that the LAD seeks to eliminate...That their target happened not to be Jewish should not serve to excuse their conduct.
The defendants had initially denied the comments had been made until a DVD was produced by the plaintiff that had such expressions as "Jew Bag," "F... you Hebrew," "Jew Bastard," "If you were a German, we would burn you in the oven," and "Only a Jew would argue over his hours."
At his deposition, one of the defendants admitted that the DVD was accurate and that he "used the song Hava Nagila as the ring tone for calls on his cell phone from plaintiff." (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, April 17, 2012
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has reversed and remanded an order dismissing a case against a law firm that had defended a personal injury claim against a commercial driver.
The plaintiffs settled for insurance policy limits of $500,000. As part of the seetlement, they signed a release of all claims against the law firm and insurance company as well as the defendants. The plaintiffs later discovered that defendants also had a substantial general insurance liability policy of a million dollars.
Plaintiffs then sued the attorneys for the defendants for fraud in the inducement of the settlement agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment based on the language of the release.
The court here held that the trial court erred in refusing to hear extrinsic evidence of fraud. (Mike Frisch)
Thursday, March 8, 2012
The Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimously (with the Chief Justice concurring and Justice Prosser not participating) held that the United States had failed to preserve appellate review of the case.
This case requires us to answer a threshold question concerning whether an appeal in this insurance company rehabilitation case may go forward. The court of appeals granted the motion of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (Commissioner) to dismiss the appeal by the United States. The Commissioner had argued that the appeal should be dismissed either on the grounds that the notice of appeal was fundamentally defective such that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction or on the grounds that the United States had waived its right to appeal issues by failing to appear in the circuit court. The United States Department of Justice attorney who signed the notice of appeal was not admitted to practice law in Wisconsin and had not obtained pro hac vice admission. The court of appeals concluded that the notice of appeal did not include a signature of an "attorney of record" as Wis. Stat. § 802.05 requires. The court of appeals did not decide the waiver issue but dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. The United States petitioned this court for review, which we granted. We affirm the court of appeals on the basis of waiver.
What is inescapable in reviewing the record in this case is the sense that the United States almost begrudgingly took steps "to preserve its right to appeal" in only the most technical sense while, ironically, overlooking fundamental appellate principles establishing what parties must do to preserve that right: raise their issues in the circuit court in the first instance. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on the basis of an unauthorized signature on the notice of appeal. In reaching our conclusion, we focus not on the signature, but on the fact that the notice of appeal itself was the only effort by the United States to involve itself with the circuit court. It did, as noted, attempt to remove this matter to federal court. Despite its apparent outrage at the injunction (in one filing to the court of appeals it stated, "[W]e are not aware of any other creditor that was so mistreated"), it remained on the sidelines while the rehabilitation was proceeding in the circuit court and chose not to raise its objections until after the final order was entered.
The United States conceded at oral argument that it made an intentional decision not to litigate any of the issues involved in the circuit court. Our case law is clear and consistent——failure to preserve issues means that they are waived. Applying well-established principles of law that apply equally to the government when it is a party, we hold that such a decision precludes the United States from pursuing relief in the court of appeals. We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals to dismiss the United States' appeal.
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
A doctor whose bill for dog bite treatments was not paid filed a pro se lawsuit against the attorney who handled the underlying litigation. The doctor appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the attorney.
The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, finding a basis in the record to conclude that, although the doctor provided medical records to the attorney, there was no "meeting of the minds" between the two on the subject of the attorney's obligation to pay the doctor's bills. (Mike Frisch)
Sunday, January 29, 2012
Michael Hatfield of Texas Tech has published to SSRN his study of the tax legal profession, in a historical context: "Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965: Patriotism, Duties and Advice." Its abstract:
Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965: Patriotism, Duties and Advice provides a timely historical review of legal ethics and federal taxes. Focusing on the first two decades of the modern income tax (1945-1965), the Article reviews the ethics literature of the tax bar, which was mostly written by very prominent tax lawyers (a founder of Paul, Weiss; partners at Sullivan & Cromwell, Willkie Farr, etc.), tax professors (including the dean at Harvard Law School), and government officials (including key advisors to FDR, JFK, and LBJ). This seemingly forgotten literature provides a remarkable contrast to today’s anti-tax climate, especially given that the highest marginal individual tax rate during 1945-1965 was 94%. The writers of this period emphasized the patriotic duty to support the federal government by paying taxes, describing taxes, for example, as the price to maintain capitalism (Merle Miller) and a “blessing” (Erwin Griswold). Several stressed the ethical duty of lawyers to improve their clients’ respect for the tax system (Norris Darrell, e.g.). “Ethics” for these writers was not an issue of the ABA canons but rather a more general, philosophical reflection. For example, in 1949, the tax committee of the ABA issued a report on the importance of natural law jurisprudence in tax. In 1952, the discussion at the Tax Law Review banquet (which was nominally dedicated to discussing “Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners”) developed into a debate over whether or not Americans were more degenerate then than in the past (Edmond Cahn) or merely more self-conscious (Thomas Tarleau). But the ethics writers were also concerned with specific issues that endure to this day, such as when to disclose an arguable but uncertain tax position – some (Randolph Paul, e.g.) arguing almost any position the government was likely to question should be disclosed, others (Boris Bittker, e.g.) arguing against disclosure so long as the position was reasonable. There was wide disagreement as to whether or not tax lawyers owed a special duty to the system, but wide agreement that this theoretical debate was nearly moot given that conservative tax advice was usually not only the most ethical but the most practical. This pragmatic attitude – emphasizing that good tax practice, good tax ethics, and good tax advice tended to converge – reflected the “real world” orientation of these professionally accomplished writers, even though, by today’s standards, many of their statements seem idealistic. The salvaging of this forgotten literature is timely not only in its relevance to contemporary debates, but also its relevance to the increasing historical research of the income tax as its 100th anniversary approaches.
Wednesday, January 18, 2012
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a legal malpractice claim (and a related breach of contract claim) dies with the client.
Justice Horton dissents on the contract claim:
The majority expresses its concern that "[a] holding to the contrary would create a per se breach of contract action in every legal malpractice action." I would first note that this is a gross overstatement. The position I espouse only applies in instances involving express contractual undertakings. In this case, no one forced [the attorney] to enter into a contract prescribing the manner in which he would represent the client. Had he not elected to identify the manner in which he would perform his services, his duty to his client would be imposed by law, this action would sound in tort, and I would be joining with the majority.
I, too, have a concern for the result of this appeal. There is a very real concern that the decision of this Court will reinforce the perception, shared by many in our society, that courts will go out of their way in order to protect members of the bar. My position, which I believe to be well-grounded in existing law, simply recognizes that lawyers do not hold a special place in society that insulates them from the type of liability that any other party to a contract would face.
The claim involved allegations that the attorney failed to properly advise the client (who had been rendered a quadriplegic in an accident) of the effect of a settlement and release. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, January 17, 2012
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department has reinstated a legal malpractice case that had been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.
The pro se plaintiff had been represented in an arbitration claim. She filed her suit within the three-year limitation period but had trouble serving the law firm.
The court concluded:
Even if this case does not qualify for an extension under the "good cause" exception...we find that it qualifies under the "interest of justice" category. Under this prong of CPLR 306-b, the Court of Appeals has instructed that a court "may consider [plaintiff's] diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor . . ., including expiration of the Statute of Limitations, the meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff's request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant."
Here, plaintiff's attempted March 2008 service, although ultimately deemed defective, was a diligent attempt by a pro se plaintiff to hire a process server to serve defendants at their law firm, within 120 days of the timely filing of a summons with notice. By the time the court ruled on the motions in the 2007 Action, the statute of limitations had expired, precluding the filing of a new action. In addition, defendants were aware of the 2007 Action and appeared to demand a complaint as early as April 2008 - they were not prejudiced by the service errors and were afforded full participation in discovery. Finally, construing the pleading in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as is required on consideration of a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, we find that it asserts actions and omissions by defendants that support viable claims for recovery. (citations omitted)
Friday, January 13, 2012
The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that a law firm is liable to a court reporting service for the payment of fees for services.
The litigation involved services provided in five cases in a total amount of a tad below $6,000. The law firm had contended that their clients were the proper defendants. The court held that the firm was liable but not the contracting attorney as an individual under the particular facts.
The law firm had invoked agency law in support of its position.
The court responded:
As a practical matter, in today's legal system, an attorney dealing with those who provide legal support services acts less as an agent who relies on the client for authority to manage the case, and more as a "general contractor," who is responsible for supervising the various aspects of litigation. In that context, it is appropriate that the attorney, with superior knowledge and familiarity with the case and client, should bear the burden of clarifying his or her intent regarding payment. It is, in fact, a relatively simple matter foe an attorney to disclaim liability with a clear statement to that effect. And an attorney's liability for (and payment of) expenses of litigation is consistent with our ethical rules.
Tuesday, December 6, 2011
The Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar has just issued an opinion on the circumstances under which a lawyer may accept a fee for referring a client to a non-lawyer entity:
A lawyer who refers a client to a non–lawyer service provider such as a financial services firm may accept compensation from the provider for the referral so long as the criteria of Rule 1.7(c) and, if applicable, Rules 1.8(a) and 5.7 are satisfied. Those criteria are exacting, however, and the arrangement may be beyond the lawyer’s malpractice coverage even if permitted by the Rules.
The opinion overrules in part an earlier opinion of the committee.
The arrangement must comply with rules governing conflicts of interest (Rule 1.7), business transactions with clients (rule 1.8) and responsibilities regarding law-related services (Rule 5.7).
Wednesday, November 16, 2011
The Indiana Court of Appeals has reversed a murder conviction and ordered the appointment of a special prosecutor where the prosecutor had entered into a (now cancelled) literary contract for a book about the case. The contract "created an irreversible, actual conflict of interest with [the prosecutor's] duty to the people of Indiana...the trial court erred when it denied [the defendant's] petition."
The defendant was facing a third trial and second retrial on charges that he had murdered his wife and two children. The first conviction was reversed due to prejudicial evidence concerning the defendant's extramarital affairs. After the second conviction, he filed an interlocutory appeal seeking a special prosecutor in light of the book deal.
The Floyd County Prosecutor prosecuted the defendant in the second trial. He was contacted by a literary agency "hours before the jury reached a verdict..." He inked the deal before sentencing. The defendant got life without parole.
The book deal progressed under the working title, "Sacred Trust: Deadly Betrayal." The prosecutor received an advance payment of $1,700. After the conviction was reversed by the Indiana Supreme Court, Penguin (the publisher) decided to delay any decision about moving forward with the book. Eventually, the deal fell through. The prosecutor returned the advance to Penguin.
The prosecutor refiled the murder charges. The defendant sought to remove him and have a special prosecutor appointed because of the book deal. At a hearing on the motion, Dean Emeritus Norman Lefstein at Indiana University School of Law testified that there was a conflict of interest. The trial court nonetheless denied the motion in light of the cancellation of the contract.
The court here found that the book deal was "a bell that cannot be unrung" that "permanently compromised [the prosecutor's] ability to advocate on behalf of the people of the state of Indiana in this trial."
Thanks to my favorite Hoosier attorney - Don Lundberg - for sending me the case.
Inspiration for the title to the post: Frank Sinatra. (Mike Frisch)