Friday, April 17, 2015
The Nebraska Supreme Court overturned the grant of a new trial to the plaintiff in a legal malpractice case and reinstated the verdict in favor of the defendant law firm.
Thomas Balames, filed this legal malpractice action against Robert Ginn and Brashear LLP, formerly known as Brashear and Ginn (collectively Ginn), the firm where Ginn practiced when the alleged malpractice occurred. Balames brings this action for himself and three other individuals for whom he serves as attorney in fact (collectively Balames). Balames claimed that Ginn negligently failed to obtain signatures on a guaranty for a loan that Balames made to a third party and failed to inform Balames of the missing signatures. When the third party defaulted, Balames could not obtain a judgment against the individuals who were the intended guarantors for the full amount of the third party’s obligation. The jury returned a general verdict for Ginn, but the court granted Balames a new trial.
The client sought to complete the transaction while the attorney was on vacation. The client had not previously advised the attorney that the situation was urgent and terminated his services shortly thereafter.
[Client] Balames admitted to being pressured by his bank to complete the transaction, and he insisted upon getting the documents to the bank as soon as humanly possible. [Attorney] Ginn’s evidence supported a reasonable inference that because Balames and his business associates had personally guaranteed the loan, they had an immediate need to show the bank that they had renegotiated the debt with Banopu. The crucial point here is that a client has the ultimate authority to determine the objective of a legal representation. Of course, an attorney should make reasonable efforts to explain the legal consequences of a course of conduct that a client insists upon taking. Yet, evidence regarding Ginn’s advisement raised a question of fact whether Ginn had breached a duty of care. That is, if the jury determined that Balames insisted upon closing without Ginn’s review, whether Ginn’s advisements were sufficient to inform Balames of the potential consequences was a question of fact.
The jury verdict sufficiently dealt with the issues
When the jury returns a general verdict for one party, a court presumes that the jury found for the successful party on all issues raised by that party and presented to the jury, particularly when the opposing party did not ask the court to give the jury a special verdict form or require the jury to make special findings. This is true both for Ginn’s failure-of-proof defense and his statute of limitations defense which barred Balames’ recovery even if he proved his malpractice claim. Because the court erred in concluding that plain error permeated the trial, this presumption controlled...
If the jury believed Ginn’s version of the facts, then Ginn did not breach a duty to ensure that the documents were signed before or after the closing. Instead, Balames’ injury was caused by his failure to follow Ginn’s advice, his failure to review the documents for the required signatures, and his misrepresentation to Ginn that the documents were signed.
Thursday, April 9, 2015
From the Indiana Supreme Court
The law firm Cohen & Malad, LLP ("C & M"), filed a quantum meruit claim for part of the contingent fees earned in cases that were handled first by C & M attorneys (including John P. Daly, Jr., when employed there as an associate) and later by Daly and his law firm after he left C & M. The trial court found that C & M attorneys – including Daly while employed there – worked a substantial number of hours on those cases and that most of those cases generated attorney fees. The court nevertheless denied C & M quantum meruit relief because it found Daly was not unjustly enriched where: (1) the client in each case at issue chose to continue with Daly when he left C & M, (2) C & M and Daly had no agreement about what would happen if they parted ways, (3) their employment agreement had no provision for file ownership and lacked a non-competition covenant, and (4) C & M made a "very shrewd deal" for Daly’s services when it employed him on a salary basis, and C & M was "very well compensated" for Daly’s time at C & M, as shown by the amount of fees Daly helped C & M generate on other cases while he worked there. (App. at 32-33.) C & M appealed. Citing the four enumerated findings above, the Court of Appeals affirmed, over Judge Crone’s dissent. Cohen & Malad, LLP v. Daly, 17 N.E.3d 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We grant transfer.
Absent agreement otherwise, "a lawyer retained under a contingent fee contract but discharged prior to the contingency is entitled to recover the value of services rendered if there is a subsequent settlement or award[,]" and in that case, "the fee is to be measured by the proportion of the total fee equal to the contribution of the discharged lawyer’s efforts to the ultimate result[.]" Galanis v. Lyons & Truitt, 715 N.E.2d 858, 860 (Ind. 1999). The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law do not acknowledge Galanis or apply its standards. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to determine, in accordance with Galanis, what proportional contributions toward the results in the cases at issue were made by attorneys working for C & M, and to enter a corresponding judgment in C & M’s favor. We summarily affirm the part of the Court of Appeals opinion addressing whether C & M should have sued its former clients to recover attorney fees from them. see Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).
Opinion linked here. (Mike Frisch)
Thursday, December 4, 2014
We don't report on many (indeed any) worker's compensation cases but this one from the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals caught our eye.
The employee worked as a legal secretary for a law firm. She was diagnosed with carpel tunnel syndrome and cubital tunnel syndrome.
The court affirmed the findings below that the condition was not the result of her clerical work
This Court agrees with the reasoning of the Office of Judges and the conclusions of the Board of Review. Under West Virginia Code of State Rules § 85-20-41.5, clerical work is not a high risk job for producing or developing carpal tunnel syndrome, and Ms. Whitten does not have any of the contributing factors listed under § 85-20-41.5. Ms. Whitten also has a non-occupational risk factor of obesity. Dr. Mukkamala and Dr. Thaxton found Ms. Whitten’s condition was not related to her work duties. Dr. Bolano opined Ms. Whitten’s condition was occupationally related, but not until January of 2013 after he had already been treating Ms. Whitten for these diagnoses and symptoms since February 27, 2012. In addition, her symptoms began in November of 2010, but she did not mention that her symptoms were caused by her work or related to her job duties until January of 2013.
The work responsibilities did not include "[a]wkward wrist position, vibratory tools, significant grip force, and high force of repetitive manual movements" that can lead to the diagnosed conditions. (Mike Frisch)
Friday, November 14, 2014
The New Jersey Appellate Division has reversed a lower court order and dismissed a legal malpractice claim.
Under the facts of this case, [attorney] Ward argues that he is shielded from liability as a partner in a limited liability partnership ("LLP") and is therefore not vicariously liable for the alleged legal malpractice of his former partner, defendant John Olivo. Ward also contends that he is otherwise entitled to a dismissal of the complaint because plaintiff Mortgage Grader, Inc. ("MG") failed to serve an affidavit of merit ("AOM") on Ward or substantially comply with the AMS.
The primary issue is whether Ward loses his liability protection as a partner in an LLP if the LLP failed to purchase a tail insurance policy. We disagree with the motion judge that such a sanction is authorized and hold that when attorneys practice law as an LLP, and the LLP fails to obtain and maintain professional liability insurance as required by Rule 1:21-1C(a)(3), the LLP does not revert to a general partnership ("GP") under the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"),
if attorneys practice as an LLP, and the LLP fails to maintain malpractice insurance as required by the court rules, then the Supreme Court may terminate or suspend the LLP's right to practice law or otherwise discipline it. As currently written, however, the court rules do not authorize a trial court to sanction a partner of an LLP for practicing law as an LLP without the required professional liability insurance by converting an otherwise properly organized LLP into a GP.
Monday, July 28, 2014
The District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Committee has a new opinion on an important real-world issue
When a lawyer is seeking employment with an entity or person adverse to his client, or with the adversary's lawyer, a conflict of interest may arise under Rule 1.7(b)(4) if the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of the client will be, or reasonably may be, adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, business, property, or personal interests (for purposes of this Opinion, a lawyer’s own financial, business, property, or personal interests are collectively referred to as a “personal interest conflict”). Both subjective and objective tests must be applied to determine whether a personal interest conflict exists.
There is no “bright line” test for determining the point during the employment process when a personal interest conflict arises, and that point may vary. There are a number of factors to consider in determining whether a personal interest conflict exists, including whether the individual lawyer is materially and actively involved in representing the client and, if so, whether the lawyer’s interest in the prospective employer is targeted and specific, and/or has been communicated to, and reciprocated by, the prospective employer.
Where the prospective employer is affiliated with, but separate and distinct from, the entity adverse to the job-seeking lawyer's client, there may be no personal interest conflict in the first instance, because the adversary and the prospective employer may be separate entities for conflicts purposes.
If a personal interest conflict arises, there are three possible courses of action that may be available to the individual lawyer, each of which is subject to applicable requirements of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct: (a) disclosing to the client the existence and nature of the personal interest conflict and the possible adverse consequences of the lawyer's representation of the client and obtaining the client's informed consent to the representation; (b) withdrawing from the representation; or, (c) discontinuing seeking employment with the client's adversary or the adversary's lawyer until all pending matters relating to that potential new employment have been completed.
The personal interest conflict of an individual lawyer in a law firm, nonprofit, or corporate legal department is not imputed to the other lawyers in the law firm, nonprofit, or corporate legal department, so long as the personal interest conflict does not present a significant risk of adversely affecting the representation of the client by such other lawyers. The imputation rule does not apply to a government agency.
A subordinate lawyer who discusses a potential personal interest conflict with his supervisory lawyer, and acts in accordance with the supervisory lawyer's reasonable determination of whether the subordinate lawyer has a personal interest conflict and follows the supervisory lawyer's recommended course of action, will not be held professionally responsible even if it is subsequently determined that the supervisory lawyer's determination of whether there was a personal interest conflict, and/or the recommended course of action, were incorrect under the Rules.
I have found this issue to arise with some frequency. Guidance always is helpful. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, July 1, 2014
The New York Court of Appeals has answered a question posed by the United States Court of appeals for the Second Circuit as follows
We hold that pending hourly fee matters are not partnership "property" or "unfinished business" within the meaning of New York's Partnership Law. A law firm does not own a client or an engagement, and is only entitled to be paid for services actually rendered.
The litigation involved trustee claims against Thelan and Coudert Brothers.
The notion that law firms will hire departing partners or accept client engagements without the promise of compensation ignores commonsense and marketplace realities. Followed to its logical conclusion, the trustees' approach would cause clients, lawyers and law firms to suffer, all without producing the sought-after financial rewards for the estates of bankrupt firms.
Treating a dissolved firm's pending hourly fee matters as partnership property, as the trustees urge, would have numerous perverse effects, and conflicts with basic principles that govern the attorney-client relationship under New York law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. By allowing former partners of a dissolved firm to profit from work they do not perform, all at the expense of a former partner and his new firm, the trustees' approach creates an "unjust windfall," as remarked upon by the District Court Judge in Geron (476 BR at 740)...
Ultimately, what the trustees ask us to endorse conflicts with New York's strong public policy encouraging client choice and, concomitantly, attorney mobility...
Thursday, June 26, 2014
A longtime Kansas City Royals baseball fan who lost a jury verdict for an eye injury allegedly sustained during the "Hotdog Launch" by team mascot Sluggerrr gets a new trial.
The plaintiff was at a sparsely attended game with the Tigers.The court noted that the Royals won.
He and his father had moved down into choice seats nearthe dugout. He claimed he was struck by a hand-tossed hotdog but did not report any injury at the time. In fact, he attended the next night's game.
He sought medical attention and claimed the toss caused a detached retina. He advised the Royals of his claim eight days after the incident.
Sluggerrr had no memory of the event.
The jury found the plaintiff 100% at fault.
From the web page ofthe Missouri Supreme Court
Monday, May 12, 2014
An interesting decision last week from the Georgia Supreme Court on disqualification premised on a non-attorney employee
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that a conflict of interest involving a nonlawyer can be remedied by implementing proper screening measures in order to avoid disqualification of the entire law firm. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that a nonlawyer’s conflict of interest can be remedied by implementing proper screening measures so as to avoid disqualification of an entire law firm. In this particular case, we find that the screening measures implemented by the nonlawyer’s new law firm were effective and appropriate to protect against the nonlawyer’s disclosure of confidential information. However, we remand this case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the new law firm promptly disclosed the conflict.
The case involves a wrongful death action brought by the estate of a person who was shot and killed at an apartment complex. The paralegal was the plaintiff 's primary contact and worked on the fact investigation before moving (with an intervening stop at another job) to the firm that represented the defendant apartment complex.
The conflict was not discovered when the paralegal first moved to the defendant's firm, as suit had not yet been filed and the paralegal did not know that the firm represented the defendant.
Screening was implemented after the conflict was discovered.
The court set forth a test for disqualification under the circumstances
...the new firm will be disqualified where (1) the nonlawyer has already revealed the confidential information to lawyers or other personnel in the new firm; (2) screening would be ineffective; or (3) “the nonlawyer necessarily would be required to work [or has actually worked at the new firm] on the other side of the same or a substantially related matter on which the nonlawyer [previously] worked.”
Justice Nahmias concers but has concerns about the state of screening in Georgia
It should be noted... that this is yet another case that raises questions about whether Rule 1.10, and in particular its implicit rejection of the use of screening measures to avoid imputed disqualification of an entire law firm when one of their lawyers would be disqualified, should be reconsidered and amended or at least clarified. After all, the rules already allow the use of screening to avoid conflicts imputed from some lawyers – former government lawyers, judges, and arbitrators. See Rules 1.11 (a) and 1.12 (c). And many of the factors that the Court discusses in support of our conclusion that screening measures, rather than imputed disqualification, may be appropriate for nonlawyers also apply to many other lawyers – especially associates. In addition, we should acknowledge that, as in the rest of our economy, it is becoming far less common for lawyers and their nonlawyer assistants to remain with the same firm for an entire career, whether by choice or due to layoffs or merger and dissolution of firms. This Court can continue deciding – or avoiding deciding – the impact of Rule 1.10 on a case-by-case basis, but the process for amending the Bar Rules provides opportunities for greater and broader input from those whose interests may be affected by imputed disqualification as well as consideration of facts and circumstances beyond those presented in the record of a particular case. That seems a preferable way to address these issues.
Tuesday, May 6, 2014
A law firm's suit for defamation was dismissed by the New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department:
In this action for defamation, plaintiffs, a law firm and its two members, allege that defendant, the chief executive of a party named as a defendant in a law suit brought by plaintiffs on behalf of their client, NDTV, defamed them in an interview conducted by a journalist in India and published in an online Indian financial publication. Among the allegedly false and defamatory statements made by defendant were that the plaintiff firm is a two-lawyer, Florida-based law firm specializing in restaurant law, that it accepted cases on a contingency basis, and that it broached the topic of settlement with their client's adversaries in an attempt to "extort" money from them.
The motion Court properly found that plaintiffs failed to state a valid cause of action for defamation. Given the overall context in which the statements were made, a reasonable reader would conclude that they constitute hyperbole and convey non-actionable opinions about the merits of the lawsuit and the motivation of NDTV's attorneys, rather than statements of fact.
Wednesday, April 30, 2014
The Minesota Supreme Court has remanded the order that had disqualified Covington & Burling in civil litigation
This case presents several issues regarding disqualification of legal counsel because of a violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(a) arising from a conflict of interest with a former client. These issues include who has standing to appeal a district court order granting a motion to disqualify, the legal standard for determining whether Rule 1.9(a) has been violated, and whether the right to seek disqualification can be waived. Appellant State of Minnesota retained appellant Covington & Burling, LLP (Covington) to represent it in a natural resource damages (NRD) case against respondent 3M Company involving the manufacture and disposal of perfluorochemicals (PFCs). Covington previously had represented 3M in legal and regulatory matters related to 3M’s fluorochemicals (FC) business from 1992 to 2006. Covington first appeared on behalf of the State in this action in January 2011. In October 2012, the district court granted 3M’s disqualification motion. Both the State and Covington appealed. The court of appeals dismissed Covington’s appeal for lack of standing and affirmed the disqualification of Covington. We granted Covington’s and the State’s respective petitions for review. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court.
Here, the district court concluded, based on the evidence in the record, that Covington obtained confidential information in its prior representation of 3M, and the district court presumed that the information was shared with all Covington attorneys. But the district court did not meaningfully assess Covington’s claims that this information was no longer confidential either because the information had been disclosed to regulatory authorities and the public or because 3M waived the attorney-client privilege by initiating a separate, concurrent lawsuit against Covington for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. The district court also did not analyze whether there is a substantial risk that any remaining confidential information would materially advance the State’s position in the NRD case. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider all legally relevant factors before concluding that the matters are substantially related...
Because we conclude that the district court did not consider legally relevant factors in conducting its disqualification analysis under Rule 1.9(a) and we conclude that a party can waive the right to seek disqualification of opposing counsel, we remand this case to the district court for its full consideration of these issues in a manner consistent with this opinion. The decision whether to reopen the record on remand rests within the discretion of the district court.
The ABA Journal had reported the trial court's order. (Mike Frisch)
Monday, February 24, 2014
The Virginia State Bar seeks comment on a proposed revision to the Imputed Conflicts Rule:
Pursuant to Part Six: Section IV, Paragraph 10-2(C) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Virginia State Bar’s Standing Committee on Legal Ethics (“Committee”) is seeking public comment on a proposed amendment to Rule 1.10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
This proposed Rule amendment is intended to avoid a situation in which a lawyer avoids the imputation of a conflict of interest by avoiding the knowledge that another lawyer in the firm has a conflict as to the representation. Under the current standard of “knowing” that another lawyer in the firm is prohibited from undertaking the representation, a lawyer can avoid the application of Rule 1.10(a), which would impute a conflict to him, by willfully failing to learn the information that establishes the existence of the conflict. The proposed Rule amendment imputes a conflict if the lawyer “knows or reasonably should know” that another lawyer in the firm is prohibited from representing the client. The proposed amendment adds a new Comment [2a] to explain that the failure to maintain or use a system for identifying conflicts may be deemed a violation of Rule 1.10(a), if proper use of the system would have identified the conflict.
My comment --a good idea. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, February 11, 2014
The Virginia State Bar has put out for comment a proposed ethics opinion
This proposed opinion addresses a hypothetical situation in which lawyers Smith and Jones practiced together in the firm Smith & Jones P.C., which used the URL smithjones.com. After Smith withdrew from the firm and began practicing with another firm, Jones changed the firm’s name to “Jones Law Office, P.C.” and established a new website at the URL “joneslawoffice.com.” Jones proposes to automatically redirect anyone who attempts to access smithjones.com to joneslawoffice.com, or alternatively, to put a notice on the smithjones.com website that Smith & Jones, P.C. has now become the Jones Law Office because of Smith’s withdrawal from the firm, providing the date of Smith’s withdrawal and a link to joneslawoffice.com.
In this proposed opinion, the Committee concluded that both of Jones’s proposed alternatives are misleading in the absence of additional information about Smith’s withdrawal from the firm and his continued practice of law. The proposed notice, which would say that Smith & Jones, P.C. “has now become” the Jones Law Office, is misleading without the additional information that Smith continues to practice law, and automatically redirecting website visitors to joneslawoffice.com without providing some explanation is misleading for the same reason.
Comments are due by February 28. (Mike Frisch)
Thursday, January 30, 2014
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has affirmed an abritration award that resolved a dispute over the allocation of attorneys' fees in a class action suit that had been litigated in California.
The arbitration involved several attorneys and law firms, most based in the District of Columbia. After receiving the arbitrator's award, appellants... unsucessfully attempted to reopen the attorneys' fees issue in the California trial court. When that efort failed on procedural grounds, [they] filed a motion in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his powers and committed misconduct by denying them due process.
The class action case involved discrimination claims by television writers over the age of 40.
Senior Judge Reid wrote for the unanimous court in affirming the trial court judgment. (Mike Frisch)
Friday, November 8, 2013
A single retainer agreement sufficed to cover a second matter and entitled counsel to legal fees, according to a decision of the New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department:
The record establishes plaintiff's entitlement to recover the unpaid legal fees that arose from its representation of defendants in two underlying actions. Contrary to defendants' contention, the subject retainer agreement governs plaintiff's work on both underlying matters. In compliance with 22 NYCRR 1215.1, which mandates that retainer agreements contain an "explanation of the scope of the legal services to be provided" (22 NYCRR 1215.1[b]), the agreement specifies that plaintiff's services "will include legal representation and advice with respect to specific matters that you refer to the Firm." Although defendants initially sought plaintiff to represent them in only one of the underlying actions, it is undisputed that they requested plaintiff's services with respect to the other action, shortly thereafter. Plaintiff's representation of defendants in the latter matter therefore falls within the ambit of the retainer.
The client did not challenge the invoices when rendered and could thus not attack the reasonableness of the fees. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, October 23, 2013
The Washington State Court of Appeals, Division II has reversed and remanded a trial court order denying an attorney's motion to withdraw from the representation of the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice case.
The clients, after an initial payment, had failed to satisfy obligations under the fee agreement to pay costs. The attorney had advanced significant sums for experts and depositions in the litigation.
Further representation would result in an unreasonable financial burden on [the attorney] and that with their dispute over fees and the resulting professional conflict, the [clients] rendered [the attorney's] representation unreasonably difficult...This is not one of those rare cases where [the attorney's] withdrawal would have harmed the efficiency of the judicial system, and we do not see that her withdrawal would have had a materially adverse effect on the [clients'] interests. Trial had not been set and there were no dispositive motions before the court when [the attorney] moved to withdraw.
The attorney had given notice of her intent to withdraw with ample time to secure new counsel. In fact, successor counsel was eventually retained.
That fact did not moot the withdrawal issue, according to the court.
The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw and remanded for entry of an order granting withdrawal as of June 15, 2012. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, October 15, 2013
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has reversed and remanded an order dismissing claims brought against a Washington, D.C. attorney by a Memphis law firm.
The D.C. attorney sought the assistance of the Memphis firm in connection with a lawsuit filed in Maryland. A contract was entered into for the attorney and the firm to serve as co-counsel.
The Memphis firm sued the attorney for not paying one-half of the expenses, as provided for in the contract.
The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court here disagreed and reinstated the suit. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, October 1, 2013
A former colleague at the Office of Bar Counsel brought a 2010 decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to my attention.
The case - Bergman v. District of Columbia, et al. , - raises some interesting questions concerning the ethical obligations of attorneys who solicit clients in the District of Columbia.
Historically, enforcement of solicitation restrictions has been the lowest of priorities in D.C. The Court of Appeals did not adopt ABA Model Rules 7.2 through 7.4 and seeded in its Rule 7.1 a provision that permits in-person solicitations that do not involve false statements or undue influence.
As a result, prosecutions for improper client solicitation rarely, if ever, take place.
In one reciprocal case I handled, the court declined to impose any discipline on an attorney sanctioned in Maryland for approaching a potential client as he was leaving a courthouse. The case is In re Roger Gregory.
The Bergman case involved a suit by a D.C. Bar member challenging the validity of a City Council act that, among other thing, makes it unlawful for an attorney to solicit business from a potential motor vehicle accident client within 21 days of an accident.
In an opinion authored by Senior Judge Frank Schwelb, the court upheld the provision and rejected the contention that the act contravened the court's exclusive authority to regulate the legal profession. The court relied on United States Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of attorney solicitation, primarily Ohralik v. Ohio and Florida Bar v. Went For It.
Rather, the power is inherent but not exclusive: "we believe that it would be an inappropriate exercise of judicial power to restrict the legislative authority of our elected representatives in the manner that Bergman suggests...we are dealing here with uninvited attempts to secure employment for renumeration - a classic example of a business transaction."
The court gave short shrift to the attorney's First Amendment claims: "this case...is not about the benign democratic ideal of opposing views competing for public acceptance. Rather, it is about practitioners aggressively seeking to secure potentially profitable employment."
So, as a result, in the District of Columbia, attorneys are forbidden by legislative act from a form of solicitation that is not in any manner in violation of the court's own ethical rules.
Are D.C. lawyers now subject to bar proceedings if they violate the statute but not the ethics rules?
Should the ethics rules be amended to harmonize with the now-governing law?
Will the City initiate criminal prosecutions of soliciting attorneys?
I will confess myself a bit surprised to see the court's embrace of Ohralik and Went For It given the state of its own disciplinary rules.
The opinion is linked here. (Mike Frisch)
Thursday, September 19, 2013
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has affirmed an order to arbitrate a dispute between a former partner of K &L Gates and the firm.
The attorney had filed suit against the firm in California. The firm invoked arbitration and forum selection clauses in the firm partnership agreement, and moved in the D.C. Superior Court to compel arbitration.
The Superior Court ordered the parties to arbitrate the dispute. The attorney appealed the order.
The court here entertained the appeal and concluded that the dispute must be arbitrated.
The attorney had signed a supplement to the firm's partnership agreement when Kilpatrick & Lockhart merged with Preston, Gates & Ellis that bound him to the agreement "as amended."
The attorney (who was a partner at the Preston firm) agreed to the supplement when he chose to become a K &L Gates partner. The agreement provided for arbitration of disputes that arose between him and the firm and chose the District of Columbia as the forum.
The court rejected a host of contentions, including the suggestion that the firm engaged in fraud in having the agreement signed. The court held that the arbitration agreement broadly covered all issues in dispute between the attorney and the firm.
Associate Judge McLeese wrote the opinion. There are concurring opinion from Senior Judge Ferren, joined by Associate Judge Easterly.
The issue of the concurrences involved footnote four of the opinion. The concurring opinion proposes an alternate version.
Judge McLeese defended the footnote in a concurring opinion. (Mike Frisch)
Friday, August 16, 2013
The New Jersey Appellate Court has issued a 105 page opinion in a case involving former friends and business partners who "pursued their respective claims against each other with the same passion and zeal that once characterized their success in business."
The defendant and plaintiff met in 1997. At first, defendant was plaintiff's personal attorney. He later became the chief operating officer as well as general counsel to business entities of the plaintiff.
The court notes that he was also an entertainment lawyer who had represented Bette Midler, Rod Stewart, Neil Sedaka, Andrew Lloyd Webber and the Bee Gees.
The plaintiff has risen from a limited eduction to great success. The defendant (who is admitted in New York but not New Jersey) was alleged to have engaged in self-dealing as well as lavish personal spending on the company dime.
In particular, the court describes a three-night, all expenses paid (by the company) trip to Las Vegas.
While the lesser mortals stayed elsewhere, the defendant had a penthouse at the Bellagio Hotel. He brought the gang back from dinner (where he let the company pick up the tab), along with "three young ladies" that he introduced as his "friends."
At the penthouse, the friends performed with, as a witness testified, "nothing on, nude show, did things to each other, that sort of stuff..." The witness was particularly impressed by the fact that the penthouse had a grand piano.
The court affirmed the rescission of the defendant's ownership interests in three entities. Further, the court affirmed legal malpractice and civil fraud claims against the defendant as in-house and general counsel as well as personal attorney for the plaintiff. Awards of counsel fees and punitive damages to the plaintiff were reversed.
The court squarely rejected the defendant's contention that RPC 1.8(a) (the business transactions with clients rule) did not apply to him as an in-house counsel.
As a sidelight, the litigation also led to the censure of the first trial judge.
The censured judge had violated judicial ethics by attending court proceedings after his recusal, a situation that did not create an issue for the court:
...we are satisfied that Judge Nugent's role as fact-finder and legal arbiter was not compromized by [former] Judge Perskie's conduct. Although we have disagreed with some of the legal rulings he made in the case, Judge Nugent's integrity as a jurist is beyond reproach.
The court departed from its usual pratice of not identiying the trial judge by name and noted that the judge had already been named in publicity generated by the case. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, June 19, 2013
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled in favor of an attorney in a fee dispute with a client.
The attorney represented the client pursuant to a 1/3 contingency fee argeement for "all monies paid" in the case.
The representation spanned 13 years and resulted in a judgment in excess of $6 million. The client had retained another law firm to recover the attorneys fees.
The issue was whether the agreement allowed payment of the stated percentage of the award of attorneys fees as well as the judgment.
The court held that the ageement was "unambiguous" and complaint with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Thus, the attorney was entitled to his 1/3 cut of the attorneys fees. (Mike Frisch)