Friday, September 16, 2016
The South Carolina Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a Magistrate
On May 18, 2011, respondent was appointed a magistrate. At the time, respondent's husband had retired from the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division and he did not hold any political offices. Respondent's husband later ran for and was elected Sheriff of Chester County.
South Carolina Court Administration forwarded a spreadsheet to ODC which indicated that, between July 1, 2013, and sometime in April of 2015, respondent's "judge code" was entered as having handled numerous traffic citations, arrest warrants, and bond hearings in Chester County Sheriff's Department cases. A total of 101 cases were identified with respondent's "judge code." In response to this information, Court Administration went to the Chester County Magistrate's Office and obtained a sampling of cases which corroborated respondent's involvement in cases involving the Chester County Sheriff's Department.
In mitigation, respondent states she attempted to follow the remittal of disqualification process on many of the matters, but now recognizes she did so incorrectly after having reviewed Section 3F of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 501, SCACR, with ODC. Respondent asserts she thought that she was complying with the remittal requirements by announcing her conflict before court and proceeding when no objections were voiced. She now recognizes that remittal requires that the disclosure be made on the record to each defendant, that each defendant be given time to consider the matter with counsel, and that the defendant's decision on the matter be placed on the record.
Respondent also incorrectly believed that when defendants requested she take their plea and/or knew her connection with the Sheriff's Department that the conflict was waived and she could take the plea. Respondent now recognizes that in these situations she was required to comply with the requirements of Section 3F of Canon 3. Respondent submits that she will comply with Section 3F at all times in the future.
In one instance, respondent mistakenly conducted a jury trial thinking that she could preside over the trial since the jury would decide the matter. Respondent now recognizes she must comply with Section 3F of Canon 3 in all jury trials.
In mitigation, respondent offers that no parties complained about the bonds that she set or the disposition of matters in question. ODC confirms it has received no complaints from the defendants in question.
Wednesday, September 7, 2016
The New York Commission on Judicial Conduct has admonished a judge for inappropriate discourteous remarks in three matters
Respondent has acknowledged that on three separate occasions he made inappropriate statements that were inconsistent with his obligation to be "patient, dignified and courteous" in performing his judicial duties (Rules, § 100 .3 [B][3 ]).
In the Swank case, respondent's comments about an alleged victim of statutory rape were insensitive and created the appearance that he was being critical of her. In a plea discussion with counsel as the jury was deliberating, respondent told the prosecutor that he was "a little surprised" by a proposed plea that would require the defendant to register as a sex offender since the victim, who was then age 16, was "apparently not upset at the whole incident, from her testimony." (The alleged crime had occurred two years earlier.) When the prosecutor said that the point of the statute was that a 14 year-old could not consent to sexual activity, respondent commented that the victim now had a baby (fathered by a different man) and added, "She's only 16 now. So the statute didn't save her, did it ... I don't think it's going to save her."
Our system of justice is designed to protect young teenagers from sexual abuse, and such individuals must be viewed with sensitivity and respect. While respondent has acknowledged that his comments were insensitive, he avers that he made the statements in an attempt to determine whether a plea disposition might be acceptable, a discussion that had heightened significance since the possibility that the jury was deadlocked had been raised. In plea discussions, blunt statements, opinions and speculation that would be inappropriate in other contexts may be part of the process in achieving an agreement. Although such a discussion at that stage might appropriately include a frank assessment of any factors that might be relevant to the likelihood of conviction and an appropriate plea, respondent's choice of words could be perceived as a harsh, judgmental statement about a young woman who was the alleged victim of a serious crime.
Remarks to prosecutors in two matters also crossed the line
Respondent's criticism of the handling of the case involving the District Attorney's relative was especially improper since (i) that case was not before him, (ii) he seemed to have little information about the matter, and (iii) some of his information was inaccurate (the relative was not A_'s "co-defendant," as respondent stated, and was never charged with a felony). By making such comments, respondent violated his duty as a judge to be an exemplar of dignity, courtesy and neutrality.
While respondent's comments in the Swank and Johnson matters, standing alone, might otherwise warrant a confidential caution, his statements in the matter set forth in Charge III, in our view, elevate this matter to public discipline.
Friday, September 2, 2016
[Posted by Alan Childress] As part of my Quid Pro Books project, announced first here in 2010 (has it been that long?!), we've released two compelling autobiographies. Judge William Norris wrote the prescient opinion striking down the ban on gays in the military (almost three decades before marriage equality), but also shares his time before and after serving on the Ninth Circuit. Judge Alex Kozinski blurbs:
Recounted in this remarkable book is a conversation Bill Norris had with Justice White following his opinion for the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, upholding Georgia’s sodomy law. Shortly after, Justice White visited the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference and Bill confronted him about the injustice of the decision. I witnessed the interaction. No one else was bold enough to challenge the Justice, though others harbored the same doubts. Justice White shrugged off Bill’s concerns as trivial, but Bill stood firm and I could see from his tone and look that he would have none of it. Soon, Bill set about undermining Bowers with his brilliant opinion in the Perry Watkins case. The theory in Watkins resulted, a decade and a half later, in the overruling of Bowers and, eventually, to marriage equality. This story, among many others, makes this personal history a gripping and fulfilling read.
The other new release is by Barbara Babcock--the first woman law prof at Stanford, the first director of the D.C. Public Defender, and one of the first Asst. AG's at the Justice Department. Her life of "firsts" includes candid reflections on a tough childhood, her emergence (somewhat reluctant or naive) into feminism, and her biographical authorship on Clara Foltz. And she answers "How can you defend guilty people?" Blurbist Dahlia Lithwick writes:
Life will afford you no better sherpa on the extraordinary journey women have taken in the legal profession than Barbara Babcock. This book should be required reading for anyone who isn’t certain that they have a place at the lawyers table. Babcock’s amazing life has made a space for so many of us. Her story will do the same.
Tuesday, August 30, 2016
A case scheduled for oral argument this week before the Ohio Supreme Court
Disciplinary Counsel v. Ronnie M. Tamburrino, Case no. 2016-0858
In a disciplinary case stemming from the 2014 election for judges on the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, the Board of Professional Conduct has concluded that Ron M. Tamburrino, a candidate in the race, approved and ran two television ads containing false statements, violating two judicial conduct rules.
Though the panel that reviewed the case proposed a stayed six-month suspension, the board noted Tamburrino has repeatedly refused to admit the content was false and continues to assert that the ads were appropriate. Given his perspective and its concern about “the chilling effect” false ads could have on the functioning of the judicial branch, the board recommends a one-year suspension with six months stayed.
Teenage Drinking Ad
Tamburrino, who is seeking election to the Eleventh District again this year, ran against Judge Timothy P. Cannon in the 2014 race. On Oct. 28 or 29, an ad approved by Tamburrino began to air on local television. The ad showed a judge in a courtroom serving what seems to be alcohol to children. Along with words appearing on the screen, the narration stated:
“Everyone knows that a judge would never serve alcohol to kids in a courtroom. But appellate judge Tim Cannon did something almost as bad. In the case State versus Andrews, Cannon ruled that cops couldn’t enter a house to arrest a parent who was hosting a teenage drinking party, because he felt teenage drinking wasn’t a serious crime. Cannon doesn't think teenage drinking is serious. What else does he think isn’t serious? We can’t afford Tim Cannon’s bad judgment. Elect Ron Tamburrino to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals.”
Judge Cannon wrote a concurring opinion in the Andrews case, which involved the suppression of evidence obtained during a warrantless search by police of a Geauga County home, where teenagers were allegedly drinking at a party. The homeowner was charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
The board explains in its report that the court’s majority opinion and Judge Cannon’s concurring opinion concluded the police should’ve first obtained a warrant before searching the home. In neither opinion was there language indicating that teenage drinking isn’t a serious crime or that police couldn’t enter a house or arrest a parent hosting a teenage drinking party, the board notes.
Judge Cannon instead acknowledged concerns about underage drinking and stressed that he didn’t want to impede law enforcement’s efforts to address underage drinking. He added that the alleged activity was a misdemeanor, which he determined is a factor for police to consider when deciding whether exigent circumstances exist to justify an intrusion and search without a warrant.
The board concluded that Tamburrino’s ad contained several “patently false” statements and that Tamburrino knew they were false or acted with reckless disregard for whether they were false.
Travel Expense Disclosure Ad
The second ad, first broadcast in mid-October 2014, stated that “Cannon won’t disclose his taxpayer-funded travel expenses.” The board found that Tamburrino never asked Judge Cannon to disclose his travel expenses, nor did anyone else during the campaign. In addition, the board noted that the Ohio Supreme Court, not the Eleventh District, paid Judge Cannon’s expenses, which then had no effect on the appeals court’s budget. The implication that Judge Cannon didn’t produce his expense reports in violation of the state’s public records law was false, the board concluded.
“Tamburrino’s use of false statements in both of the ads to unfairly denigrate Judge Cannon is inconsistent with the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary,” the board wrote.
Tamburrino objects to the board’s conclusions and recommended sanction, arguing that all charges should be dismissed. He maintains that the ads’ statements identified by the board as false are instead true.
In the ad involving the Andrews decision, the majority opinion and Judge Cannon’s concurring opinion both ruled the police shouldn’t have entered the house without a warrant, Tamburrino states. The ad said that Judge Cannon concluded “cops couldn’t enter a house to arrest a parent who was hosting a teenage drinking party,” not that Judge Cannon said police could never enter a house to arrest any parent hosting an underage drinking party, Tamburrino asserts. Judge Cannon also wrote that he didn’t want the decision to deter police from taking action if an officer observed a “serious misdemeanor offense.” Judge Cannon then considers teenage drinking not to be a “serious misdemeanor offense,” and the ad fairly summarizes the judge’s view, Tamburrino alleges.
Tamburrino contends he has as much right as the dissenting justice in the case to criticize Judge Cannon’s ruling. Tamburrino also asserts that his ad was an expression of free speech protected by the U.S. Constitution. Citing a 1996 federal court opinion and a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Tamburrino argues that judicial candidates have the same free speech rights as other candidates for elected office.
As far as the “won’t disclose” ad, Tamburrino argues he meant that the Eleventh District wouldn’t post its budget, including expenses such as Judge Cannon’s travel costs, on the court’s website. While Judge Cannon didn’t refuse any direct request to disclose the information, Tamburrino was of the opinion that the judge wouldn’t publish such information in the future. This opinion is protected under the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment, Tamburrino concludes.
He adds that the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled earlier this year in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus that Ohio laws barring false statements in campaign materials during political campaigns were unconstitutional. The board found Tamburrino violated a judicial conduct rule that mirrors the statutes struck down in Anthony, he notes. In his view, Ohio’s disciplinary process for the legal profession regarding campaign speech is also unconstitutional.
Disciplinary Counsel’s Positions
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel, which filed the complaint against Tamburrino with the board, counters that the In re Campaign Complaint Against O’Toole 2014 decision from the Ohio Supreme Court presented a sound analysis upholding the constitutionality of the current judicial conduct rule prohibiting false campaign speech by judicial candidates. The Anthony ruling didn’t affect the O’Toole decision, the disciplinary counsel asserts.
In discussing the ads, the disciplinary counsel’s brief states that the teenage drinking piece “twist[s] Judge Cannon’s discussion of the Fourth Amendment into a referendum on Judge Cannon’s personal views regarding teenage drinking.” In the context of the ad specifically citing the Andrews ruling, and the larger context of the judicial campaign, the statements made “could only be interpreted as fact,” not as opinion, the disciplinary counsel wrote.
The disciplinary counsel adds that the “won’t disclose” ad also “can only be interpreted to mean that Judge Cannon refused to disclose his taxpayer funded travel expenses after having been asked to do so,” which was untrue.
Noting shared concerns with the board, the disciplinary counsel, however, suggests a stayed six-month suspension and maintains that any stayed discipline would be adequate to protect the public and deter this type of conduct in the future.
- Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Representing Ronnie M. Tamburrino: Donald Brey, 614.221.2838
Representing the Office of Disciplinary Counsel: Joseph Caligiuri, 614.461.0256
Oral argument will be heard tomorrow. (Mike Frisch)
Monday, August 22, 2016
The South Carolina Advisory Committee on Standards 0f Judicial Conduct has opined on the propriety of a magistrate's service on a museum board
A full-time magistrate judge has requested an opinion as to the propriety of a judge serving on the Board of Trustees for a local museum and cultural center dedicated to preserving the town’s history and heritage. The purpose of the museum is: 1) to collect, preserve, exhibit and document the past of the area; 2) to provide educational programs, activities and exhibits for all age groups; and 3) to promote art and culture that relates to and will enrich the lives of the present and future generations.
A full-time magistrate judge may be a member of the Board of Trustees for a local museum and cultural center provided that the judge does not participate in fundraising/soliciting funds.
With this limitation
Under the facts presented, one of the responsibilities of the Board of Trustees is a “commitment to fundraising.” As discussed, a judge is not permitted to actively solicit funds on behalf of an organization, although a judge may participate in the management of such funds. However, if, as member of the Board of Trustees of the museum, the judge is exempted from fundraising, this Committee sees no other prohibition to the judge serving as a member of the Board, provided that the judge shall not lend the title of his or her office to any of the museum’s activities.
Saturday, August 20, 2016
From the New Jersey Courts web page
The Supreme Court has adopted a revised Code of Judicial Conduct that sets clearer ethical standards for judges to follow.
The code consists of seven canons that set judicial guidelines in areas such as political activity, conflicts of interest and the acceptance of gifts.
The revised code, which goes into effect on Sept. 1, maintains the existing high standards long followed by New Jersey’s judges while drawing upon language from recent Supreme Court decisions to set more clearly defined guidelines for avoiding the appearance of impropriety in both judicial and personal conduct. The revisions also include a more detailed guide for judicial disqualifications, spelling out the circumstances in which recusals are mandatory, discretionary or not needed.
Friday, August 19, 2016
From the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee
Opinion Number: 2016-13 (Election)1
Date of Issue: August 19, 2016
May a judicial candidate include the words “Vote for [CANDIDATE’S NAME] on August 30” in the candidate’s personal Facebook profile?
A judicial candidate seeking election during the 2016 cycle inquires whether the candidate may include the words “Vote for [CANDIDATE’S NAME] on August 30” or “Please Vote Aug. 30th” in the inquiring candidate’s personal Facebook profile .
The inquiring candidate does not seek to raise funds or solicit publicly stated support for the candidate’s election, which we previously addressed in Fla. JEAC Op. 2010-28 . The candidate seeks only to encourage voters to vote generally, and to cast their ballot for the candidate specifically. In this sense, a Facebook page is no different from a billboard or a television commercial. The heart of the democratic process is candidates stumping for votes. Nothing in Canon 7 prohibits a judicial candidate from asking the electorate to vote for him or her - whether on Facebook, in person, or through the mass media.
At the dawn of the Internet age, we concluded that “nothing in the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits the use of an Internet web site for campaign purposes. A web site may be used for campaign purposes, consistent with the use of any other type of campaign literature or media advertising.” Fla. JEAC Op. 1999-26. The explosive growth of the Internet in the intervening years has changed our society, but not the Committee’s view that judicial candidates may use a web site to campaign for elections so long as their communications do not otherwise run afoul of the Canons.
Tuesday, August 16, 2016
An Albany City Court judge has resigned and will not seek future judicial office, according to a decision and order of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct.
He made these remarks to a prosecutor on the record as reflected by this stipulation.
In a raised and angry voice, Respondent then stated: "I'm so pissed off. Unfucking- believable. I'm not supposed to swear on the record, but Jesus Christ, if other people can work out these ridiculous arrangements up in the county without a judge involved and then come down here and effectively blackmail me down here relative to doing something that I do not want to do...."
In another case
Respondent complained about the plea bargain process and said in a raised, agitated voice, "Now, listen, I realize I am a pain in the fucking ass. I realize I am driving people crazy. I'm sorry. I don't give a damn."
...During a lengthy diatribe, Respondent stated in a raised voice, "I participated in this insane system with my eyes closed, just like everybody else. I'm not doing it anymore. I don't give a damn that nobody likes it. I don't give a damn that it drives people crazy. I'm just not doing it anymore."
On or about May 22, 2012, Deputy Chief Assistant District Attorney Cheryl Fowler and Assistant Public Defender Julianne Girard appeared before Respondent in Shultis. ADA Fowler requested an adjournment and a continuance of bail.
Respondent asked to speak privately with Ms. Fowler and Ms. Girard in the jury room next to the courtroom. In the jury room, Ms. Fowler attempted to explain the reasons for her request to continue bail and adjourn the case. Respondent became irate and yelled profanities, including the word "fuck," at Ms. Fowler for several minutes.
Among other things, Respondent yelled, in sum or substance, "Who the fuck are you to make me keep [the defendant] in jail while you do this?"
In a conference room, after a brief discussion about the plea proposal, Respondent criticized the ethics and practices of the District Attorney's Office and District Attorney David Soares in an angry, loud voice for several minutes. Respondent repeatedly used profanities, including the word "fuck." When ADA Grome asked Respondent to stop, Respondent said, in sum or substance, "If you don't fucking like the way things are going in this fucking courtroom, then don't come back."
There is more but you get the general idea. (Mike Frisch)
Saturday, August 13, 2016
A Tennessee General Sessions Judge has been suspended by the Board of Judicial Conduct in the wake of her indictment on charges of official misconduct.
WATE.com reported on the charges and suspension
A Campbell County judge was suspended Wednesday after being indicted on counts of official misconduct.
General Sessions Judge Amanda Sammons, 41, faces four counts of official misconduct after investigators say she intentionally tried to harm three women. TBI Special Agents began investigating Judge Amanda Sammons. During the course of the investigation, Agents developed information that from September 2014 to January 2015, Sammons made rulings that exceeded her official power as a General Sessions Court Judge.
Krista Leigh Smith was criminally charged by Sammons. Investigators say the charge nor the bond were not based on information in Smith’s warrant, record or hearing.
Also, an order to show cause was made by Sammons against Kristie Anderson and Julie Lester on why they should not be held in contempt for not appearing in court. Investigators say these actions were also based on information not in their records.
Sammons is on interim suspension and will not be able to preside over a court, issue warrants or any other judicial duty until the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct says otherwise.
Wade Davies, the attorney for Judge Sammons released the following statement:
I have been informed that Judge Sammons was charged. While this is disappointing, Judge Sammons is prepared to show she has not committed any offense. Judge Sammons will plead not guilty, and we will work to get this case tried quickly so that she can go back to carrying out the job the people of Campbell County elected her to do. We understand the judge will be temporarily suspended on the basis of being accused. Judge Sammons is eager to get this resolved and not to disrupt the work of the court.
Sammons turned herself in to the Campbell County Jail and was released. She is scheduled to be in court on Thursday, August 18 for her arraignment.
Sammons ran for office in 2014, calling herself a "blue-eyed assassin" with a "low tolerance for foolishness." She has presided over many hearings in court since then, but Monday she was the center of a legal proceeding – specifically, her conduct in the case of 26-year-old Krista Smith, of Jacksboro.
Thursday, August 4, 2016
The Indiana Supreme Court reprimanded a senior judge
On the evening of Tuesday, November 17, 2015, Respondent was involved in a motor vehicle collision in Mooresville, Indiana when he made a wide right turn and collided with another vehicle that was waiting for traffic to clear. At the scene, police observed that Respondent appeared to be under the influence of alcohol, and Respondent failed or could not complete field sobriety tests. Respondent told police he had consumed one vodka on the rocks about two hours prior to the accident, and a preliminary breath test showed a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.14%. Respondent was transported to a hospital for a voluntary blood sample, the toxicology report of which reflected a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15%. En route to the hospital, Respondent asked the police officer, “Will you just take me home and forget about the drinking and driving?” At the hospital, Respondent made other statements reflecting that he did not want to be arrested and simply wanted to go home; and while the officer inventoried Respondent’s wallet, Respondent stated that he is a senior judge for the Court of Appeals. Respondent was arrested and subsequently charged with Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated Endangering a Person, a Class A misdemeanor, see Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(b), and Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor, see Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(a). He self-reported his arrest to the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications on November 19, 2015 and indicated that he already contacted the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (JLAP).
In mitigation, [the parties] agree that Respondent immediately self-reported his misconduct and voluntarily contacted JLAP; that he is compliant with all JLAP requests and regularly attends Alcoholics Anonymous meetings; that he has been fully cooperative with the Commission throughout its investigation; and that he is remorseful for his conduct. Finally, they agree that under the circumstances, the appropriate sanction is a public reprimand. The Court agrees with the parties.
Saturday, July 30, 2016
A Vermont assistant judge has been charged with violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics relating to his dealings with an elderly relative.
In approximately October, 2009 Katherine ("Kay") Tolaro, who is Respondent's father's brother's second wife, moved into Respondent's home in Westminster, Vermont. She was 82 at the time and showing signs of dementia.
The charges allege misconduct both before and after Ms. Tolaro's death.
Perhaps the most unsavory charge
On July 31, 2015 Respondent filed a manifestly implausible claim against Ms. Tolaro's estate for $833,292.51. Among other things, Respondent's wage calculation left only 4 hours per week for Respondent to work, sleep or do anything other than care for Ms. Tolaro. Given that he was employed at the time, that is not possible. Asserting such a manifestly unsupportable claim does not comport with high standards of integrity and candor expected of judges by the Judicial Code.
He also is charged with giving "not entirely truthful" testimony in the related probate proceeding described below.
Seven Days has a detailed story on the situation and the history of so-called Side Judges.
Paul Kane filed a motion to try to avoid testifying in Windsor County Probate Court, but a judge ordered him to talk. As soon as he took the witness stand last November, it was obvious why he'd been reluctant. For 90 minutes, an attorney grilled Kane about whether he'd bilked an elderly woman with Alzheimer's disease of roughly $500,000.
Brattleboro attorney Jodi French asked Kane why, after the ailing Catherine Tolaro granted him power of attorney, he purchased an $180,000 annuity with her money and named himself the beneficiary.
Under French's questioning, Kane claimed that he did so with Tolaro's interests in mind...
Despite his apparent discomfort throughout the hearing, Kane knows his way around the courtroom. In fact, he's a Windham County assistant judge who was elected two years ago. But like most of Vermont's 27 other assistant judges, who advise regular judges in civil and family court cases and occasionally preside over minor cases, Kane does not have a law degree.
Nonetheless, attorneys in the Tolaro estate case say Kane, 63, may have flouted laws and regulations when he converted the funds of the elderly woman he called his "aunt." They are considering whether to refer the case for further investigation to the Department of Financial Regulation, a state agency that regulates bank transactions, once the estate is settled.
Kane has claimed that any irregularities in his handling of Tolaro's estate were due to mistakes and poor understanding of relevant laws. He says he is the victim of "character assassination."
As to Side Judges
The ongoing case is the latest controversy involving assistant judges, colloquially known as "side" or "lay" judges, who retain an antiquated role in the Vermont judiciary despite repeated attempts to strip them of power.
In recent years, side judges in Vermont have been caught directing taxpayer money to their own charities, shoplifting from local stores, doling out bonuses to themselves from public budgets and accusing each other of assault.
Those embarrassing episodes, along with concerns that side judges lack legal training and operate with almost no oversight, have fueled arguments against preserving their positions.
Their harshest critics tend to be traditional judges, some of whom believe that "these people aren't really adequately trained and prepared, and they ought not participate on important decisions in people's lives," said Vermont Law School professor Peter Teachout, who has consulted for the Vermont judiciary. "A prevailing view — not a unanimous view — in the judiciary is that they couldn't be relied upon to perform even a limited judicial function. There's been clear hostility to allowing lay judges to have any legal function."
VTDigger.com reported on the recently-filed ethics allegations.
The events leading up to the complaint filed against Paul Kane, of Westminster, began in October 2009, when Kane moved into the Westminster home of his uncle’s second wife, Catherine Tolaro, who was 82 at the time and showing signs of dementia. That same month, Tolaro executed a “Limited Power of Attorney For Finances” granting Kane and his wife the ability to obtain financial information on her behalf. One month later, Tolaro executed a will that gave 30 percent of her assets to charity and distributed the rest to six beneficiaries, one of whom was Kane. At the time, Tolaro’s net worth was $767,500. Over the next six years, Tolaro’s estate dwindled away, as Kane issued a pair of loans and made claims against the state for the costs of Tolaro’s care.
In July 2015, Kane filed a written statement of claim against Tolaro’s estate, claiming $833,292.51 was owed to him, including $722,740 for caring for her at $18 per hour, 159 hours per week (a week contains a total of 168 hours) for 135 weeks. This amounted to around the clock payment except when a home care nurse was there for two to three hours three times per week.
The claim also included $20,925 for 31 months of room and board calculated at $675 per month, $7,800 due to (Kane) and his wife for financial and property management and $31,827.51 for “expenses advanced to the estate by Paul Kane from April 21, 2012 to July 31, 2015.”
Tuesday, July 26, 2016
The Columbus Dispatch has a story of a judge's reinstatement to the Ohio Bar.
Former Franklin County Judge Harland H. Hale's license to practice law was reinstated today by the Ohio Supreme Court.
Hale's license was suspended in 2014 for six months for fixing a speeding ticket for a fellow lawyer and for attempting to cover up his action. He did not seek reinstatement until June this year. The court approved the reinstatement today.
Justices voted 5-2 in Nov. 2014 to suspend the license of the former environmental court judge who occasionally was assigned to municipal court to handle traffic cases.
The court first rejected a recommendation by the disciplinary counsel that six months was too lenient a suspension, but later accepted the same sentence, with Chief Justice Maureen O'Connor and Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger dissenting that it was not harsh enough.
Hale admitted improperly dismissing a 2011 speeding ticket issued to Patrick M. Quinn, a lawyer whose firm was defending Hale in a sexual-harassment case, later settled out of court. Hale also falsified a court entry stating that the prosecutor had dismissed the ticket. Quinn pleaded guilty to speeding and paid $171 in fines and costs.
The Dispatch revealed that Hale fixed the speeding ticket. Hale resigned from the court, but still wants to practice law.
The court cited Hale for "serious violations of his ethical duties as both an attorney and judge" as well as "efforts to cover his tracks."
Earlier coverage from the Columbus Dispatch.
Former Franklin County Environmental Court Judge Harland Hale argues he already has paid a big price for fixing a speeding ticket.
The ex-judge shed tears yesterday as he talked about resigning on May 24 in response to a charge that he dismissed a ticket issued to a lawyer whose firm was defending Hale against sexual-harassment lawsuits.
He talked of losing his seat on the bench and his fear of what the epitaph on his grave marker might read, of disappointing dirt-poor parents who only ever asked that he do what was right.
The Ohio Supreme Court order is linked here. (Mike Frisch)
Sunday, July 24, 2016
A judicial ethics opinion from South Carolina Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct answers the following question
A family court judge has been requested to fill out a detailed questionnaire, on behalf of a family member, for use in an annulment proceeding within the Catholic Church. The questionnaire seeks information as to the judge’s opinion of the strengths, weaknesses, traits, and honesty of the judge’s relative and the relative’s former spouse. The questionnaire also seeks detailed facts as the courtship, wedding, marriage, and breakdown of the marriage. The response is required to be notarized. The information will be used by the Catholic Church in determining whether the judge’s relative is entitled to an annulment. The judge inquires as to whether it would be proper, under the Code of Judicial Conduct, to complete such a survey.
The detailed questionnaire here seeks the judge’s opinion, in part, as a character witness regarding the judge’s relative and the relative’s former spouse. In addition, the judge’s completion of the questionnaire could be considered a use of the judge’s position to gain an advantage for his relative’s claim in the annulment proceedings. Thus, it would not be proper for the judge to serve a witness (by completing the questionnaire) to the tribunal.
Thursday, July 21, 2016
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has sanctioned a judge charged with misconduct in
statements he made in a letter to counsel regarding a court proceeding in which he was a party, and based on his judge-related Internet and social media activity.
The letter violated canons of judicial conduct; the social media activity did not.
...because of the seriousness of this violation, we impose a public censure and reprimand, and a thirty-day suspension from the performance of his duties as judge of the York County Probate Court.
The social media issues
Two of the charges filed by the Committee are based on information that Judge Nadeau posted on the Internet—specifically, a website and a Facebook page—in association with his 2012 election campaign. We address those allegations in turn.
After Judge Nadeau was re-elected to judicial office in 2012, a marketing and media consultant retained by Judge Nadeau either created a new website or modified an existing one so that it was entitled, “York County Probate Judge Robert Nadeau.” That website, which showed Judge Nadeau wearing a judicial robe, was his personal website and not an official website of the York County Probate Court. It also provided a link to the website of his private law office. By using that link, a person who viewed Judge Nadeau’s personal judicial website could then move directly to the website for Judge Nadeau’s private law office. In Count 1 of its report, the Committee alleges that Judge Nadeau violated Canon 2(B), see supra n.8, by using the judicial office for personal gain...
As the Hearing Justice found, Judge Nadeau provided the link to the website of his private law office on the judicial website for the purposes of eliminating confusion within the general public and preventing instances where a person who wanted to contact him in his capacity as a lawyer mistakenly contacted the Probate Court. The link did not actually generate any business for Judge Nadeau’s law office. Further, Judge Nadeau promptly removed the link to his private law office as soon as a complaint was made, effectively resolving the Committee’s concerns about the issue. In this matter of first impression, these circumstances weigh against a formal finding of judicial misconduct.
Word to the wise
When a part-time judge, acting in a judicial capacity, establishes a pathway on a judicial website for a user to contact the judge with the prospect of a remunerative benefit to the judge, the judge may create the perception of using the judicial office held in public trust as a means to create a private, commercial advantage. Any such conduct by a judge must be preceded by a careful and sensitive consideration of the requirements of the Canons and the critically important goals they are designed to achieve.
In 2013, while a judge but in his personal capacity, Judge Nadeau commenced an action in the Maine District Court for protection from harassment against his former girlfriend, who lived in Massachusetts. Judge Nadeau was not represented by counsel in that proceeding, but an attorney represented his former girlfriend. In his complaint for protection from harassment, Judge Nadeau alleged that the former girlfriend improperly disclosed confidential or otherwise private medical and other information about him. While the case was pending, Judge Nadeau wrote a letter to the former girlfriend’s attorney of record, stating,
You know that, putting aside your training and evident desire to simply argue and advocate, you need to advise your client to pull her book and internet advertising immediately, at a minimum, under the circumstances. This is a matter of, at the minimum, clearly protected medical privacy. The consequences of not doing so can be devastating, not only for her and her best friend, but probably even for you, and their former or current [Massachusetts] lawyer. . . . You can posture all you want in the interest of advocacy. But absent immediate, legitimate responsibility and cooperation designed to achieve amicable, nonmonetary resolution of whatever issues your client and I apparently have, I respectfully submit this is going to become very bad for your client, you and your law firm.
A footnote in the letter
I am incidentally in possession of a hard copy of an email from [an attorney] of your firm to [York County Probate] Register Lovejoy in which [the attorney] snidely referred to me as “his eminence.” If that was not meant to be pejorative or disrespectful of me as a jurist and an ethical violation, I request [the attorney’s] full explanation within 10 days from the date of this letter.
His comments about the judge did not violate judicial ethics
we conclude that because Judge Nadeau’s disparaging comment about another Maine judge was not public and concerned a case in which he was a litigant, it was not prohibited by the Code. We acknowledge, however, the concerns underlying the Committee’s argument.
The judge had been sanctioned both as an attorney and a judge
this is now the third time that Judge Nadeau has been found to have violated professional ethical standards. In Judge Nadeau’s capacity as a lawyer, a Single Justice of this Court determined that he violated the Maine Bar Rules by making “discourteous and degrading” statements to a judge. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Nadeau, BAR-05-03 (March 2, 2006) (Alexander, J.). The Justice publicly reprimanded Judge Nadeau and ordered him “to conduct himself in the future so as to avoid further occasions of professional misconduct.” Id. Then, in a judicial disciplinary proceeding, we found that Judge Nadeau violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by lying about an electoral opponent during a campaign for judicial office. See In re Nadeau, 2007 ME 21, ¶¶ 2, 18-19, 26, 914 A.2d 714.
The same court issued an opinion in the judge's divorce case that did not shower praise on him
In a detailed and strongly−worded decision, the [lower] court found that Robert had a “self-centered and insensitive world outlook” and had engaged in “self-destructive behavior that has caused the break-up of his marriage, the break-up of his law firm, and a significant amount of litigation.”
...Robert contends that the court’s criticism of him in its findings rises to a sufficient level to constitute bias. The court’s findings that were critical of Robert were based on competent evidence, are not clearly erroneous, and do not establish improper bias. In addition, the record reflects that the trial judge demonstrated evenhandedness and patience with both parties throughout a highly contentious trial process.
Thursday, July 7, 2016
The Florida Supreme Court had to judge a judge
In this case, we review the revised consent judgment entered into by the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) and Seminole County Judge Jerri Collins. The revised consent judgment imposed the following sanctions on Judge Collins: a public reprimand before this Court, completion of an anger management course, and attendance at the domestic violence course offered during Phase II of the Florida Judicial College. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 12, Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we approve the revised consent judgment.
The judge engaged in misconduct
when she berated and belittled a victim of domestic violence for failing to respond to a subpoena issued by the State Attorney to testify in the trial against her abuser, who is the father of her child. As a result of the victim’s failure to appear, the State was unable to proceed with the trial. Consequently, the State dismissed a charge against the defendant for dangerous exhibition of a weapon and the defendant accepted a plea to a reduced charge of simple battery.
Judge Collins issued an order to show cause why the victim should not be held in contempt of court for violating the trial subpoena by failing to appear for trial. When the victim appeared before Judge Collins, the judge instituted direct criminal contempt proceedings in which the victim was not represented by counsel nor advised of her right to present evidence or testimony on her own behalf. During the contempt proceedings, Judge Collins was discourteous and impatient toward the distraught victim. The victim apologized for failing to appear, citing anxiety, depression, and a desire to move on from contact with her abuser as reasons why she did not appear for trial. Meanwhile, Judge Collins raised her voice, used sarcasm, spoke harshly, and interrupted the victim. Judge Collins found the victim in contempt of court and sentenced her to spend three days in jail even though the victim pleaded with the court that she needed to take care of her one-year-old child.
Furthermore, Judge Collins’ behavior created the appearance of partiality toward the State. After pressing the victim about the veracity of her statements to police, Judge Collins rebuked her for failing to appear to testify, declaring “You disobeyed a court order knowing that this was not going to turn out well for the State.” Judge Collins noted that the victim previously indicated to the State Attorney that she was not going to show up. The victim further disclosed that at a domestic abuse class she asked them to drop the charges because she was trying to move on with her life. Moreover, the victim declared that she was “not in a good place,” a remark to which Judge Collins responded, “and violating a court order did not do anything for you.”
The court had rejected an earlier proposed consent reprimand
The revised consent judgment subsequently entered into by the JQC and Judge Collins includes terms more appropriate to address the acts of misconduct in this case. Thus, we approve the terms of the revised consent judgment requiring Judge Collins’ appearance before this Court for a public reprimand, completion of an anger management course, and attendance at the domestic violence course offered during Phase II of the Florida Judicial College. We recognize that Judge Collins completed an anger management course on April 29, 2016, satisfying the sanction imposed by the revised consent judgment.
Tuesday, July 5, 2016
The Indiana Supreme Court took action to remove a judge in a contract case
This Court has exclusive, original jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of jurisdiction by other Indiana courts. See Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4; Ind. Original Action Rule 1. The Court’s participating members have reviewed and discussed the filed materials. The Court’s majority concludes the State is entitled to a change of judge. Accordingly, the Respondents, the Marion Superior Court and the Hon. David J. Dreyer, are ordered to vacate all orders issued in the underlying case on or after May 6, 2016, and to grant the change of judge. Judge Dreyer is prohibited from exercising jurisdiction in the underlying case except that necessary to comply with this opinion and effectuate the change of judge. This opinion is final and effective immediately; petitions for rehearing or motions to reconsider are not allowed. See Orig. Act. R. 5(C).
The Journal Gazette has some details in this May 2016 post
A Marion County judge on Friday issued a bombshell ruling refusing to give any damages to the state even though the Indiana Supreme Court found in March that IBM breached its $1.3 billion welfare contract with Indiana.
The case was remanded to Marion County Judge David Dreyer to determine an appropriate amount of compensation. Indiana had claimed $175 million in damages.
“The court largely finds the state fails to prove damages by a reasonable certainty,” Dreyer said in his decision. “The evidence is insufficient because of its hearsay and speculative nature.”
He added later that many of the costs for which the state sought reimbursement are costs that were the state’s responsibility and therefore may not be recovered.
For instance, Dreyer said the state sought $30 million it paid in salaries for new state staff but the evidence shows the staff – many of whom were hired before the termination – were hired for reasons that had nothing to do with IBM.
Dreyer’s ruling came without a hearing or briefs filed by the parties, and just hours after the Indiana Supreme Court had certified the case.
Certification essentially closes a case out and sends it back to the lower court to act on the appellate ruling.
“Respectfully, we believe the trial court’s surprise order Friday morning was mistaken and also exceeded its jurisdiction,” said Peter Rusthoven, one of the state’s lawyers in the case. “We are confident that this latest ruling, like the earlier rulings ordering that Governor (Mitch) Daniels be deposed and then holding that IBM had not materially breached its contract, will not be allowed to stand.”
The ruling is the latest volley in a six-year dispute over whether IBM failed to deliver its part of a deal to privatize Indiana’s welfare system.
Rusthoven said Dreyer’s new decision came before a 10-day period for the state to move for a mandatory judge change.
That motion was filed Friday afternoon and Barnes & Thornburg LLP “will promptly take steps seeking to have the trial court’s ruling set aside,” a statement said.
Clint Roswell, spokesman for IBM, said “it’s unfortunate that the private attorneys representing the state in the case have decided to prolong this case, all at the great expense of Indiana taxpayers.”
The state has paid Barnes & Thornburg more than $11.5 million in the legal battle with IBM.
In March the Indiana Supreme Court overturned Dreyer’s 2012 decision finding IBM didn’t breach its contract with the state.
The trial before Dreyer lasted six weeks and included more than 130 hours of testimony and 100 witnesses.
“Neither party deserves to win this case,” he ruled then. “This story represents a ‘perfect storm’ of misguided government policy and overzealous corporate ambition. Overall, both parties are to blame and Indiana’s taxpayers are left as apparent losers.”
The 4-0 Indiana Supreme Court decision found IBM “failed to perform satisfactorily … consistently failed to meet certain timeliness metrics, and failed to assist the state in achieving its policy objectives.”
Dreyer did issue a ruling that agreed with the Indiana Supreme Court ordering the state to pay IBM $40 million in assignment fees and $9.5 million in equipment fees. A third component of the suit regarding contract change orders was not yet decided.
Indiana had planned to modernize the welfare system by moving to a “remote eligibility” system, in which Hoosiers seeking food stamps, Medicaid and other public assistance no longer would have face-to-face meetings with case managers but would instead apply online and through call centers.
Daniels canceled the contract after three years of complaints about the automated system. Indiana had paid IBM $437 million. The state then created a hybrid system.
Indiana sued IBM in May 2010, and IBM countersued.
Friday, July 1, 2016
A Louisiana judge was suspended for a year without pay for misconduct that included on-the-bench comments that displayed a joking attitude to domestic violence victims
While presiding over Mr. Williams’s criminal case, Respondent made an inappropriate comment and displayed a joking, jovial attitude toward women who had been abused by men. After being told that Mr. Williams was charged with domestic abuse by strangulation, Respondent and Assistant District Attorney Ken Fabre took part in the following exchange:
The Court: That’s what it was? All right. Domestic abuse battery by strangulation. Is she alive? Yes indeed. Now the victims know exactly what to say. [Assistant District Attorney]: Exactly. The Court: It’s amazing. But, anyway, I digress.... (Emphasis added.)
In his post-hearing brief, Respondent states that he was “simply asking a question in order to better understand the law and to determine whether the charge was a felony and was also pointing out an anomaly, or internal inconsistencies, in the law of domestic battery...” In his judicial misconduct hearing, Respondent testified that he was genuinely confused about the meaning of strangulation in the context of domestic abuse.
In another case
While presiding over Mr. Braxton’s criminal case, Respondent made inappropriate comments and displayed a joking, jovial attitude toward women who had been abused by men.
There were similar comments in a second domestic violence case
While presiding over Ms. Williams’ criminal case, Respondent made insensitive, discourteous, and injudicious comments, leading to outbursts of laughter. Ms. Williams was charged with, among other offenses, theft of goods from a Wal-Mart store. After Respondent was informed that Ms. Williams had confessed to taking Aveeno lotion, he asked her: “What’s wrong, you was ... What, your skin was ashy? [Laughter] You were ashy trying to get your skin right with some Aveeno?” The comments caused audible laughter in the courtroom. Respondent continued: “Come on ... What was it? ... What did you need that lotion for?
There were a number of similar incidents.
In his brief to the Commission and at his appearance before the Commission, Respondent apologized if his use of slang and facetious language and otherwise unnecessary comments “has either personally offended anyone or offended the dignity of the proceedings in his courtroom.” He explained it was never his intention to be disrespectful of women who are abused. In his brief to this court, Respondent offers his clear, unequivocal, unconditional, and heartfelt apology for his language and his use of slang. He states it was never his intent to offer a conditional apology and, if there has been any confusion in this regard by the use of the word “if,” blame should be placed on his counsel.
The court noted the judge's prior discipline
After considering the Chaisson factors, some of which may be regarded as aggravating and some as mitigating, the Commission recommended Respondent be suspended without pay for one year. We, too, have considered those factors, and after reviewing the record agree that a one-year suspension without pay is appropriate in this case. We also accept the Commission’s recommendation that Respondent be ordered to reimburse and pay to the Commission $11,098.68 in hard costs.
consistency in sanctioning suggests that the one-year suspension imposed by the majority is overly punitive in nature and that a lesser sanction is warranted under the facts of this case, particularly since the charges in this case do not involve misconduct that occurred following the sanction imposed in the prior case of In re Free, 14-1828 (La. 12/9/14), 158 So.3d 771.5
Justice Clark also would impose a lesser sanction. (Mike Frisch)
The Louisiana Supreme Court suspended a judge without pay for 15 days for his early termination of the probation of a member of his church.
This matter concerns Judge Best’s handling of a motion to terminate the probation of Antonio Garcia. In June 2009, based on having exchanged a series of lewd and lascivious texts and emails with a sixteen-year-old student at the school where Mr. Garcia taught, Mr. Garcia plead guilty to indecent behavior with a juvenile and was sentenced to five years of active supervised probation. Mr. Garcia’s prosecution was handled by the Attorney General’s office because the District Attorney’s office recused itself.
On May 17, 2011, a little less than two years into his five-year probation, Mr. Garcia, without the assistance of an attorney, filed a motion to terminate probation. The Attorney General’s office did not receive a copy of the motion. The motion to terminate probation did not include an order or rule to show cause by which the matter could be set for hearing.
At some point after Mr. Garcia’s sentencing, Judge Best had become personally acquainted with Mr. Garcia through their mutual involvement with the church they both attend, as well as through Judge Best’s work as the director of the church choir and Mr. Garcia’s membership in the choir. When Mr. Garcia filed his motion to terminate probation, Judge Best told him, outside of court and through their social connection, that he had received the motion and that it could not be set for hearing without an order to that effect. Judge Best told Mr. Garcia that he should seek legal advice and then provided him with the names of several attorneys who could possibly assist him, including the name of David Marquette, an attorney with whom Judge Best shared a close social relationship.
After receiving the motion filed by Mr. Garcia, Judge Best engaged in ex parte communications with Mr. Garcia’s probation officer concerning the merits of the motion that were designed to influence his judicial action. Judge Best asked the probation officer to contact the victim’s family to find out the family’s position regarding the proposed early termination of Mr. Garcia’s probation. When the probation officer informed Judge Best of the opposition expressed by the victim’s father, Judge Best asked the probation officer to locate the victim, who was now an adult. Judge Best also discussed the merits of Mr. Garcia’s motion with the District Attorney and with the Livonia Chief of Police.
On December 15, 2011, Mr. Marquette enrolled as Mr. Garcia’s counsel and moved to have the matter set for a hearing. Judge Best signed the order and set the hearing for January 6, 2012. Judge Best also ordered the clerk of court to subpoena the probation officer to appear at the hearing. On January 6, 2012, after Judge Best finished his drug court docket, Mr. Garcia’s case was called for hearing. At that time, the District Attorney’s office informed Judge Best that it had recused itself from prosecuting the case and that the Attorney General’s office had not been served with the motions filed by Mr. Garcia or his counsel, nor had it been notified of the hearing date.
The judge told the prosecutor to just be a court-watcher for the hearing.
During the hearing, Judge Best: (1) questioned the probation officer regarding the opinions of others concerning the early termination of Mr. Garcia’s probation; (2) stated that the father of the victim was “indifferent” towards the proceedings even though the probation officer’s unrebutted testimony was that the victim’s father opposed the early termination of Mr. Garcia’s probation; and (3) made statements concerning his own personal observations of Mr. Garcia’s character gained through his interaction with Mr. Garcia at church and further indicated that those personal and out-of-court observations provided some basis for terminating Mr. Garcia’s probation early. At the conclusion of the January 6, 2012 hearing, Judge Best issued an order terminating Mr. Garcia’s probation.
When the order was reported in the media, the judge reinstated the probation.
Chief Justice Johnson
I am deeply troubled by the favoritism shown to Mr. Garcia by Judge Best. Not only did Judge Best engage in misconduct by using the power of his office to terminate a criminal defendant’s probation without giving the prosecuting agency notice or an opportunity to participate in clear violation of La. C. Cr. P. art. 822,1 I find his actions in doing so were motivated by his personal feelings towards Mr. Garcia and his family. In my view, Judge Best’s actions demonstrate actual bias towards Mr. Garcia, such that recusal was likely warranted.
The Chief Justice would suspend for 30 days.
WAFB 9 reported on the crime and the judge's actions. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, June 28, 2016
The West Virginia Record has a story on an ongoing bar discipline case
The state Lawyer Disciplinary Board has asked the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to disbar a Morgantown attorney it claims violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Edward R. Kohout faces four counts with several charges of rule violations under each of them, according to the amended formal statement of charges filed Dec. 11 with the state Supreme Court.
On Nov. 20, the JIC determined that Kohout was engaging in serious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, according to the statement of charges.
The JIC concluded that Kohout engaged in a pattern of egregious and notorious verbal abuse that is likely to cause irreparable harm to others and on the judicial system.
“Of critical importance, because the effect of his wrongful activity is unlikely to cease during the pendency of the 2016 judicial campaign, the only procedural method available to stop him is injunctive relief from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,” the statement of charges reads.
The JIC unanimously determined that probable cause existed to formally charge Kohout with violations of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct and the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct.
Kohout, who has been practicing law in West Virginia since 1987, filed pre-candidacy papers in June 2015 for Monongalia circuit court judge. In July 2015, a Facebook page was made for the campaign and the majority of the posts on the site referred to his judicial campaign.
On Sept. 2, counsel for the JIC informally inquired about an undated Facebook solicitation and Kohout responded that the solicitation was accidentally posted to his personal page and had been corrected and that no one had sent funds. After he was questioned about the inappropriate solicitation, Kohout removed it and assured JIC counsel that he would refrain from personally soliciting campaign contributions in the future.
After the ethics complaint was filed, revealed two more solicitations from July and August, Kohout responded that he had no role in the two posts soliciting funds and that there was no functional difference in his committee putting a posting on the Facebook page asking for donations than what other candidates were doing.
While Kohout denied many any personal solicitations, he never said who made the posts and JIC’s counsel made the point to the Commision that the person who has a Facebook page is normally the only one who can access it and make posts unless that person gives someone else privileges by either providing them with the e-mail account and password or assigning them administrative rights.
In the posts, Kohout speaks in the first person and one of the posts was made after he became the sole administrator of the campaign Facebook page.
“It is for these reasons that the JIC has concluded that Edward R. Kohout has not been truthful in his representation to our counsel,” the statement of charges reads.
The second charge against Kohout involves his campaign bank account. The account was created on June 24, 2015, for “Ed Kohout for Judge” at the Morgantown branch for BB&T. Kohout gave $20 to open the account and the balance has remained at $20 with no deposits or withdrawals from its inception through Oct. 30.
A judicial candidate cannot be on the signature card, according to JIC Advisory Opinion 2/15/95. Kohout also declined to address the makeup of his campaign bank account in his Nov. 2 response to the ethics complaint, despite specifically being requested to do so by JIC counsel.
The third charge against Kohout involves maintaining dignity appropriate to judicial office. Between July and November, Kohout made derogatory and hateful comments, including describing government receptionists as “dumbass coloured women” and stating that “too many women taking men’s jobs trying to be men when they oughta be home taking care fo [sic] the kids.”
He also described people of middle eastern descent as “Ahab,” “Arab,” “camel bangers” and “ragheads.”
“In yet another supercilious post he said that ‘many black men beat their women’ and ‘so many run off’ leaving ‘single while women and their white parents to raise the babies.’ He also said that ‘white women who date black men are trash and ruined.’”
On Jan. 15, Kohout and the Judicial Disciplinary Counsel entered into a written agreement in which Kohout agreed to never again seek judicial office by election or appointment in West Virginia, according to a Feb. 5 stipulation and recommended discipline document.
In a March 15 order from the Judicial Hearing Board, the board recommended that Kohout receive a public censure for his violations; that in lieu of a fine, he be ordered to pay the ultimate costs of the investigation and prosecution in the amounts of $3,307.95 as of Jan. 28 and at a rate of $200 per month beginning 30 days after the conclusion of proceedings; and that Kohout be barred from ever seeking any judicial office again.
W.Va. Supreme Court of Appeals case number: 15-1190
The attorney had been suspended by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for two years in 1995.
The misconduct involved, in part, his failure to disclose to the University of Pittsburgh Law School that he had been suspended from the Cumberland School of Law of Samford University as a result of an accusation of selling stolen law books. He also had failed to disclose the suspension in his bar admission application. (Mike Frisch)
Friday, June 17, 2016
The Iowa Supreme Court has opined on a magistrate's marketing of wedding services
A magistrate maintained a website where he posted information regarding his availability to perform marriage ceremonies at locations other than the courthouse for a fee. The website included some photos of the magistrate wearing his robes while performing such ceremonies. The magistrate self-reported his conduct to the Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications after becoming concerned that this website might violate our ethics rules for judicial officers. The Commission found that the magistrate violated the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct and filed an application for the imposition of judicial discipline. The Commission recommended the magistrate be publicly reprimanded.
After the Commission issued its recommendation but before the matter was submitted to us, the magistrate resigned. Because of the importance of the underlying issues, we will address whether any violations of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct occurred. We conclude the code does not per se bar a judicial officer from publicizing his availability to perform marriage ceremonies, but some aspects of the advertising here violated the code.
...we conclude Magistrate Martinek committed violations of Canon 1 and rules 51:1.2 and 51:1.3 by (1) including advertising about performing marriage ceremonies on his private law practice website, (2) including photos of himself in his judicial robes on his private law practice website, and (3) not disclosing in his advertising that he would perform weddings for no charge during his regular office hours at the courthouse.
Justice Zager concurred
I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to voice my disagreement with what I see as the majority minimizing the violation of our rules. In my opinion, a judge placing a marriage tab on a private law practice website is clearly an "abuse [of] the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge." Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:1.3. The only reason that a private attorney would have such a tab on his or her website is because he or she is a judicial officer who can perform marriage ceremonies. In other words, the ability to perform marriage ceremonies is a prestige of judicial office...
...I would adopt the rule endorsed by the Colorado Judicial Ethics Advisory Board, which advised Colorado judicial officers that "a judge may not send fliers to wedding planners or otherwise advertise [his or] her availability to perform weddings, such as through a personal website or yellow pages advertisement." Colo. Judicial Ethics Advisory Bd., Op. 2007-05, 2007 WL 7603068, at *1 (2007). This is a commonsense, bright-line rule all judicial officers should be expected to follow. Here, as in many jurisdictions today, a judicial officer may have his or her name and contact information displayed on a court’s official website or posted at the courthouse. See id. at *2. The judicial officers are also generally free to make whatever arrangements are convenient for them and for members of the public who request their services. See Iowa Code § 595.12(1). Unlike the majority, I perceive judicial officers advertising services they are able to provide due to the prestige of judicial office to be a serious problem—even if the advertising is not associated with a private law practice. Do we really want our judicial officers advertising for wedding services on the Internet or through the yellow pages? I think such advertising amounts to a violation of our canons and rules—even when it is not connected to a private law practice. For these reasons, I specially concur.