Wednesday, July 13, 2016
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that a difficult client (to put it mildly) did not by his behavior forfeit his right to counsel in a probation revocation proceeding.
The principal issue in this appeal is whether a Superior Court judge properly ordered the forfeiture of the defendant's right to counsel in a probation revocation hearing. The judge, faced with a defendant who admittedly engaged in a pattern of quarrelsome, confrontational, hostile, and threatening conduct toward a succession of nine different court appointed attorneys over the course of the trial and post trial proceedings, ordered forfeiture on those grounds. Subsequent to the forfeiture order, the defendant appeared pro se at the probation revocation hearing. A different judge found the defendant in violation of probation and sentenced him to State prison for a term of not less than seven years and not more than eight years, from and after the sentence he was then serving. The defendant appealed, claiming error in the forfeiture order and the probation revocation hearing...
Although we appreciate the imperative to force an end to the defendant's interference with the timely and fair disposition of the probation revocation matter, we are constrained to conclude that the forfeiture order must be reversed, as it does not comply with the strict guidelines we adopted in Means, supra. Therefore, we vacate the forfeiture order based on our conclusion that (1) the forfeiture hearing did not meet the procedural due process requirements of Means; and (2) the defendant's conduct, although egregious in many respects, did not warrant forfeiture under the guidelines established in Means.
The Means factors
The guidelines require consideration of four factors: (1) whether the defendant has had the services of more than one attorney; (2) the type of proceeding in which forfeiture is ordered; (3) the type of conduct offered as the basis for forfeiture; and (4) the availability of a less restrictive measure or whether forfeiture is a last resort.
It would be an understatement to say that over the course of the seven years between the defendant's arraignment and the forfeiture order, the defendant's turbulent relationship with his withdrawing attorneys demonstrated an extraordinary inability or unwillingness to cooperate with counsel. Therefore, we have no quarrel with the judge's frustration with what could have been a tactical ploy by the defendant to delay the resolution of the matter likely to result in the revocation of his probation and the imposition of a State prison sentence. And we recognize that cases in which defendants consistently find frivolous reasons to withhold their cooperation from appointed counsel can and must be dealt with appropriately...
We conclude, however, that the forfeiture order in this case was erroneous for two reasons. First, the defendant's conduct, consisting mainly of threats to report counsel to the board over a seven-year period, was not sufficiently "egregious" to warrant forfeiture. Second, even if the defendant's conduct met the threshold for forfeiture, the judge failed to consider whether forfeiture was in the interests of justice, the second prong of the two-part test for forfeiture.
Tuesday, July 12, 2016
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a legal malpractice case brought by a defendant who pleaded guilty to criminal charges but was later exonerated when the victim recanted her testimony.
On 2 March 2012, defendant was appointed by the Court to represent plaintiff on these charges. Plaintiff sent several notes to defendant. None of the letters in the record that were written by plaintiff to defendant include any assertion by plaintiff that he was factually innocent of the charged offenses or that he wanted a jury trial. Instead, all of plaintiff’s notes urgently requested defendant to negotiate a plea bargain that would enable plaintiff to be released from jail as soon as possible.
The attorney negotiated the plea per the client's instruction.
About a year after pleading guilty to taking indecent liberties, plaintiff obtained a signed statement from Tina stating that she and plaintiff had not had any sexual contact. Plaintiff retained defendant to prepare a motion for appropriate relief, and Mr. Patrick Currie was appointed to represent plaintiff in court. A hearing on plaintiff’s motion for appropriate relief was conducted by Judge Anna Wagoner on 13 May 2013, at which testimony was elicited from Ms. Thomas and Tina in support of plaintiff’s contention that in 2011 Tina had falsely accused him of having sexual relations with her. On 24 May 2013, Judge Wagoner entered an order granting plaintiff’s motion for appropriate relief, setting aside his guilty plea, dismissing all charges against plaintiff related to sexual contact with Tina, and removing plaintiff from the Sex Offender Registry.
The court rejected the ensuing claim of malpractice
It is undisputed that defendant repeatedly directed defendant to negotiate a plea bargain with the prosecutor, under the terms of which plaintiff would be released from jail and allowed to rejoin his family. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that plaintiff ever indicated any desire to resolve the charges against him at a jury trial. Consequently, the question raised by plaintiff’s complaint was whether defendant’s representation of plaintiff met the standard of care for an attorney representing a criminal defendant who has directed his counsel that his preference is to resolve the charges against him with a plea arrangement. The standard of care for an attorney representing a criminal defendant requires more extensive investigation and preparation for a jury trial than for entry of a plea of guilty. Nonetheless, we agree with plaintiff’s general proposition that a client’s preference for a plea bargain as opposed to a trial does not relieve the attorney of the duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence in negotiating an appropriate plea arrangement and representing the client’s interests in this regard...
On this record, we conclude that the charges against plaintiff were supported by adequate evidence to take the case to the jury. Defendant successfully negotiated a plea arrangement pursuant to the terms of which plaintiff pleaded guilty to one charge of taking indecent liberties, agreed to register with the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry, and would be released from jail, in exchange for which the State dismissed the numerous other serious charges against plaintiff. Given plaintiff’s insistence on pleading guilty, the seriousness of the charges against plaintiff, and the strength of the evidence supporting these charges, the plea bargain arranged by defendant appears to reflect a reasonable exercise of professional skill on defendant’s part.
The court found no other basis to sustain the action. (Mike Frisch)
Monday, July 11, 2016
The Virgin Islands Supreme Court vacated an order appointing the Chief Territorial Public Defender as counsel in a complex criminal case. The trial court may appoint the Office to a case but may not designate the particular attorney assigned.
The defendant initially had retained counsel
In 2008, Miller was charged with a litany of offenses, including violations of the Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 14 V.I.C. § 600 et seq. (“CICO”). Miller’s trial on these crimes commenced in May 2011, in which he was represented by the law firm of Dudley Clark & Chan, LLP. Following five days of deliberations, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, which resulted in the trial court declaring a mistrial on June 24, 2011.
The firm was thereafter permitted to withdraw for nonpayment of fees.
A public defender was appointed but withdrew due to a claimed conflict of interest.
The court did not find an actual conflict of interest, but nevertheless relieved Attorney Leycock from the case because it concluded that there existed a potential for a conflict of interest which warranted Attorney Leycock’s withdrawal. The court simultaneously ordered, “Chief Public Defender Samuel Joseph, Esq., is appointed to personally represent Defendant Miller.” (JA at 154.) Lastly, the court directed Attorney Joseph to create an “ethical wall” within the Office of the Territorial Public Defender to ensure that Miller received conflict-free representation.
At the beginning of the following year, on January 27 and 28, 2014, Attorney Joseph filed two motions to be relieved as counsel, raising substantially the same two issues. First, Attorney Joseph challenged the legal efficacy of the “ethical wall” which had been ordered by the court. Attorney Joseph argued that members of the Public Defender Administration Board and employees of the Office of the Territorial Public Defender had relationships with related defendants which gave rise to conflicts of interest, and he posited that those conflicts were imputed to the entire office. Attorney Joseph also contended that, under 5 V.I.C. § 3503(a), the Superior Court lacked the requisite authority to select an individual public defender to represent an indigent defendant, adding that such an order was disruptive to the operation processes of the Office of the Territorial Public Defender.
The court decided the appeal on its merits
In his brief, Attorney Joseph informs that Attorney Leycock is no longer employed by the Office of the Territorial Public Defender, and concedes that the conflict-of-interest issue pertaining to Attorney Leycock’s representation of Miller is now moot. (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) Therefore, we proceed to address the sole remaining issue submitted for this Court’s review: whether the Superior Court exceeded its authority by specifically assigning Attorney Joseph to represent Miller in the criminal proceedings attendant to this appeal.
The trial court exceeded its authority by appointed the Chief rather than the Office
Admittedly, the trial court was justified in being concerned about the history of counsel involved in the representation of Miller, and we acknowledge the Superior Court’s emphasis on providing conflict-free representation for Miller. Nevertheless, choosing a specific public defender was not the appropriate solution for addressing the court’s concerns, as the order superseded the role of the Chief Public Defender and violated the separation of powers doctrine. See State ex rel. Robinson, 48 S.W.3d at 69-70 (while the trial court had a legitimate interest in “break[ing] the chain of continuances made by withdrawing defenders,” and ensuring that defendant’s case proceeded to trial without further delays, “[t]he trial court acted in excess of its authority” when it appointed specific public defenders to represent the defendant). It is the Chief Public Defender—and not the court—who possesses statutory managerial authority, and is best positioned to assess the Office’s resources and experience of its lawyers, in achieving effective case management...
Upon a finding of a defendant’s indigence, the Superior Court may appoint the Office of the Territorial Public Defender as counsel. However, the court lacks the statutory authority to order that a specific public defender be assigned to represent a defendant. Accordingly, we vacate the court’s orders appointing Attorney Joseph to represent Miller in the underlying criminal proceedings and remand this case so that the Superior Court may appoint the Office of the Territorial Public Defender, leaving the determination as to the specific attorney to be assigned to Miller to be made within the discretion of the Chief Public Defender.
Thursday, July 7, 2016
Actual Innocence Required To Sue Defense Counsel For Malpractice; Sitting In Jail Extra 13 Months Not Enough
The Washington State Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant must establish actual innocence to sue the defense attorney for malpractice.
We find that the public policy concerns recognized in Ang require a plaintiff to prove actual innocence of an alleged crime when pursuing a criminal malpractice claim. Because any term of confinement Piris served was within the broad authority of the trial court, the argument for a Powell exception is inapplicable here. We need not overrule Powell but note it involved a unique and narrow set of circumstances where defense counsel and the court were evidently unaware of the class or level of crime to which Powell was pleading guilty. We expect defense counsel to know the level of crime for which a client is being sentenced. That circumstance in Powell is not present in Piris's case before us.
Justice Stephens dissented
Christopher Piris successfully obtained postconviction relief from a miscalculated sentence. But due to alleged attorney negligence, he was not timely resentenced and he spent more time imprisoned than his corrected sentence authorized. The majority holds that Piris cannot pursue malpractice claims against his defense attorneys unless he proves he is actually innocent of the underlying charges. I disagree. When a client wins postconviction relief for resentencing and attorney negligence results in the client's excessive imprisonment because the client did not timely receive the benefit of resentencing, it is no excuse to say that the client was subject to some imprisonment. Extending the "actual innocence rule" to the unique circumstances of this case serves only to perpetuate an injustice. I respectfully dissent...
Undoubtedly, Piris's criminal conduct was the "natural cause" of his 146- month sentence. But the additional 13 months he served on top of his lawful sentence was proximately caused by his attorneys' alleged negligence in not ensuring that he was timely resentenced. Piris should not have to prove his actual innocence as a precondition to seeking damages for these 13 months. From a practical standpoint, he is in the same position as the plaintiff in Powell; regardless of whether his excess sentence exceeded a statutory maximum or the confinement term the court imposed, it was unlawful. He should be entitled to proceed with his claim and attempt to prove that his harm resulted from his attorneys' negligence.
I would hold that a criminal malpractice plaintiff whose sentence is vacated and remanded but who does not timely receive the benefit of resentencing due to alleged attorney negligence need not prove he is actually innocent of the underlying criminal conduct to proceed with his criminal malpractice claim. Because the majority extends the actual innocence rule beyond its justifications in policy or causation principles, I respectfully dissent.
Note correction to our error in identifying the court. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, July 6, 2016
Experience teaches us that a typical response when a lawyer sues a former client for an unpaid fee is a counterclaim for legal malpractice.
That counterclaim effort failed in a case before the the New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department.
The representation was of a client married to Celeste Holm, recounted in this New York Times story.
The court here
Plaintiff law firm Gallet Dreyer & Berkey represented defendant Basile in connection with the December 21, 2009 settlement of a Surrogate's Court action brought in 2004 by his spouse, Celeste Holm, to revoke an irrevocable trust that she created in 2002. In this action brought by the law firm against Basile to recover outstanding legal fees, Basile has counterclaimed for attorney malpractice, taking the position that due to poor advice, factual omissions, and misinformation, he was persuaded to sign the stipulation in Holm's action to revoke her trust, which stipulation caused him (and Holm) to forfeit valuable assets and the right to pursue valuable claims without their receiving any corresponding benefit.
To sustain a cause of action alleging legal malpractice, a plaintiff must establish not only that the defendant "failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession," but also that "the attorney's breach of this duty proximately caused plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages" (Nomura Asset Capital Corp. v Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 26 NY3d 40, 49 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "An attorney's conduct or inaction is the proximate cause of a plaintiff's damages if but for the attorney's negligence the plaintiff would have succeeded on the merits of the underlying action, or would not have sustained actual and ascertainable damages" (id. at 50 [*2][internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "[M]ere speculation of a loss resulting from an attorney's alleged omissions . . . is insufficient to sustain a claim for legal malpractice" (Markard v Bloom, 4 AD3d 128, 129 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 706 ).
As a signatory to the settlement, Basile certainly had the right to be fully informed of the facts and provided with appropriate advice by his attorney before agreeing to its terms, and we cannot conclude as a matter of law on this record that the law firm's advice to Basile was complete and free of incorrect information. However, nothing in Basile's submissions shows that but for that claimed negligence, he "would not have sustained actual and ascertainable damages" (Nomura, 26 NY3d at 50 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
The irrevocable trust was created and funded with Holm's assets before Basile's marriage to Holm. Basile had no current interest in the trust's assets at the time of the settlement; he had, at best, a potential interest in those assets if the trust were to be set aside and the assets became part of Holm's estate, entitling Basile to an elective share. Similarly, the claims addressed in the stipulation regarding other, non-trust assets also concerned property that belonged to Holm alone, and Basile had no present possessory right to them. Notwithstanding Basile's residuary interest in Holm's eventual estate, and the possibility that if Holm reacquired property that was previously transferred she would gift him a present interest, he had no established right to make any disposition of that property, or to claim ownership of any portion of that property, while she was alive. His lack of a present possessory interest in the property at issue severely restricts any rights to claim that the law firm's alleged failures proximately caused him to experience a financial loss in relation to those properties.
More importantly, Basile has not presented an evidentiary showing supporting a claim to "actual and ascertainable damages," as Nomura requires (26 NY3d at 50 [internal quotation marks omitted]). In cases presenting a valid claim of legal malpractice, the claimed "actual and ascertainable damages" have been clearly calculable (see e.g. Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438 ). In contrast, summary judgment dismissing the legal malpractice claim has been granted where the asserted damages are vague, unclear, or speculative (see Bellinson Law, LLC v Iannucci, 102 AD3d 563, 563 [1st Dept 2013]). Here, Basile essentially speculates that the information he lacked would have provided him with better leverage in negotiations, but he fails to show exactly how, if counsel had properly informed and advised him, the outcome of the litigation would have been more favorable to him. This is particularly so since the settlement netted him a distribution in excess of $2,000,000, as compared to the $25,000 he would have received under the trust alone, in the absence of the stipulation. The submissions simply do not justify a conclusion that Basile would have achieved a more favorable result in the absence of counsel's claimed mistakes.
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim and third-party complaint brought against it by defendant Frank Basile was therefore properly granted.
Vanity Fair published this story after Ms. Holm's passing. (Mike Frisch)
Saturday, July 2, 2016
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendants in a legal malpractice case, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to establish the existence of an attorney-client relationship with the defendants.
In August of 2011, Hughes and Andrew Diges entered into a 50-50 partnership, under the name H-D Transport, to haul hydraulic fracturing fluid. Hughes contributed money to the partnership and Diges contributed his experience. The partners did not create a written partnership agreement. Sometime prior to October 21, 2011, disagreements arose between the partners concerning the operation and finances of the partnership. On October 21, 2011, Diges hired Michael D. Pogue, an attorney with Lawson, Laski, Clark & Pogue, PLLC, to draft a formal partnership agreement. Diges told Hughes that he had hired an attorney to prepare a partnership agreement, and on November 21, 2011, Pogue, Hughes and Diane Barker, the partnership bookkeeper, participated in a conference call regarding the partnership.
Hughes contended that the partnership had retained attorney Pogue
The district court concluded that Hughes failed to establish that an attorney-client relationship existed between himself and Pogue. The district court explained that there was neither evidence nor any claim in the record that there was any express agreement between Hughes and Pogue. Thus, the district court reasoned that any attorney-client relationship would have to have been based upon an implied-in-fact contract. Based on the rule pronounced in Berry, the district court considered: “(1) Subjectively, did Hughes have a good faith belief that Diges hired Pogue and Pogue agreed to represent not only Diges’ interest but also the interests of Hughes and the Partnership?; (2) Objectively, was the belief of Hughes reasonable in light of the facts and record presented?”
Answering these questions, the district court explained that the evidence in the record showed that the “relationship between Diges and Hughes was very strained and that there was a great deal of distrust between the two of them.” Further, the district court reasoned that while Pogue had participated in a telephone conference with Hughes and the partnership’s bookkeeper, there was no evidence in the record as to the contents of that conversation or why that would lead Hughes to reasonably believe that Pogue was representing his interests or the interests of H-D Transport. Finally, the district court noted that Hughes himself admitted that on November 21, 2011, the same day as the telephone conference, Hughes “became aware that Pogue only represented the interests of Diges . . . .” The district court concluded that it was not “subjectively or objectively reasonable for Hughes to believe that Pogue was his attorney or representing his interest under the circumstances . . . .” On appeal, Hughes argues that the district court erred in the standard it applied and that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the existence of an attorney-client relationship...
Hughes’ testimony is unambiguous; no later than November 21, 2011, Hughes was aware that Pogue represented Diges, not him or the partnership. We find no error in the district court’s conclusion that it was not reasonable for Hughes to believe that he had an attorney-client relationship with Pogue.
Hughes must pay the law firm's appeals costs. (Mike Frisch)
Thursday, June 23, 2016
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department affirmed the dismissal of a legal malpractice claim against Boies Schiller.
Plaintiff failed to establish that defendants breached their duty by representing her despite a conflict of interest, in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105 [22 NYCRR 1200.24), the conflicts rule in effect at the time. Unlike current Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) rule 1.7, DR 5-105 did not require that client consent to a conflict be confirmed in writing. An issue of fact exists whether defendants' clients consented orally.
In any event, the violation of a disciplinary rule, without more, is insufficient to support a legal malpractice cause of action (Cohen v Kachroo, 115 AD3d 512, 513 [1st Dept 2014]). Since plaintiff cannot prove that she suffered damages that were proximately caused by defendants' alleged misconduct, her cause of action must be dismissed (see AmBase Corp. v Davis Polk & Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428, 434 ).
Nor can plaintiff prove that defendants proximately caused her any injury with respect to her underlying claim for unauthorized use of her image, since that claim was time-barred and had already been released by the time she engaged defendants (see CPLR 215; Nussenzweig v diCorcia, 9 NY3d 184 ).
As for her other, potentially meritorious, claims, plaintiff settled those, and offers no evidence that, but for defendants' negligence, the settlement awards would have been higher (see [*2]Fusco v Fauci, 299 AD2d 263 [1st Dept 2002]).
Indeed, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she suffered any harm at all as a result of defendants' alleged failings. Although defendants admittedly filed plaintiff's bankruptcy proof of claim one day late, the claim was accepted, and plaintiff received a substantial mediated settlement. Although she complains of defendants' alleged failure to join Elite S.A. as a party in one of the underlying actions, plaintiff nonetheless obtained a substantial settlement from that entity. Although plaintiff objects that she was not named as a class representative in one of the underlying actions, the deadline for adding class representatives had already passed by the time she engaged defendants, and nonetheless she received an incentive award for her active participation in the litigation.
Monday, June 13, 2016
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant attorney in a legal malpractice claim and directed that the plaintiff instead be awarded summary judgment.
The issue involved negligent title work that had led to serious repercussions.
Before turning to the arguments of the parties, we note that this case involves malpractice in the performance of transactional work (giving advice or preparing documents for a business transaction) as opposed to litigation malpractice...
The following example illustrates the proximate cause analysis utilized in a transactional legal malpractice claim.
If the client’s position is “my lawyer gave me bad advice that I followed, and it cost me money,” the client in effect is saying, “My lawyer gave me incorrect advice. I acted in reliance on this advice, and as a proximate result, I sustained $ x in damages. But for that advice, I would not have been damaged at all.” At times, the attorney’s negligence does not relate to decisions made in the course of litigation but involves some recommendation or guidance negligently given. Therefore, the “case within a case” will not entail the reconstruction of a trial or appeal; instead, the client must show alternative measures he could have taken “but for” the attorney’s faulty advice.
Richard H.W. Maloy, Proximate Cause: The Final Defense in Legal Malpractice Cases, 36 U. Mem. L. Rev. 655, 676 (2006) (emphasis added). The crux of Rubin’s argument is that the alternative measure here is obvious; had Mr. Morris alerted it to the declaration of pooling, Rubin would have availed itself of the substitution clause in its contract with WVE and avoided the losses at issue.
The court found that damages were established by the undisputed facts and that the plaintiff had mitigated the damages.
Applying this standard to the instant case, it is clear that Rubin took reasonable steps under the circumstances to mitigate its damages. After discovering the title defect, Rubin took responsible actions to minimize the liabilities arising from the problem, which is the essence of mitigation of damages. Rubin weighed the consequences to be avoided and assessed its overall exposure to liability at approximately $147,000 arising from Mr. Morris’s failure to alert it to the title defect.9 By contrast, Rubin negotiated a settlement with CNX that was much less expensive. Based on these facts, we find that Rubin’s decision to settle the matter with CNX instead of pursuing litigation on what it believed to be an unmeritorious affirmative defense of adverse possession was mitigation of damages. “Many settlements are a reasonable response to a difficult situation created by another’s negligence.”
The court also held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for lost profits.
Application of these principles in a legal malpractice action does not make an attorney an insurer of pie-in-the-sky expectations of the client. Rather, this tenet simply operates to restore the client to the economic position that he or she would be in but for the attorney’s negligence.
Wednesday, June 1, 2016
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the disqualification of local and national counsel in an action brought against O. F. Mossberg & Sons as a result of a brief consultation with the plaintiff.
The District Court disqualified Mossberg’s out-of-state counsel, Renzulli Law Firm, and its local counsel, Tarlow & Stonecipher, pursuant to Rule 1.20(c) of the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. The basis for the court’s disqualification order was a prospective client consultation that Luke Keuffer had with an attorney from Tarlow & Stonecipher, which was later used in a deposition of Stephanie Keuffer by John Renzulli of the Renzulli Law Firm. The court found that the continued involvement in the case by Mossberg’s counsel gave the Keuffers reason to question whether their case can proceed fairly and cause to question what they may have disclosed in the consultation to Tarlow & Stonecipher that may later be used against them in the current litigation. The court also found that Mossberg’s counsel’s actions undermine the public’s trust in the legal profession. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the District Court’s order disqualifying Renzulli and Tarlow & Stonecipher.
Luke and Stephanie were out hunting. She had a Mossberg rifle.
The Keuffers allege that the Mossberg rifle fell and struck Luke’s rifle and then discharged and shot Luke in the face, causing serious and permanent injury. On August 10, 2010, Luke called Tarlow & Stonecipher, PLLC, and spoke to attorney Margaret Weamer “regarding [Luke’s] possible claim against [a] gun manufacturer for injuries sustained in [a] hunting accident.” Weamer’s time record indicates that she spoke with Luke for six to twelve minutes. After discussing the case with Luke, Weamer advised him that Tarlow & Stonecipher would not be interested in taking the case.
The issue came to light at a deposition and led to a disqualification motion
The court found that Renzulli improperly used the Keuffers’ consultation against them during Stephanie’s deposition. The court found that the purpose of Renzulli’s questioning was to intimidate the Keuffers and create an impression they have a bad case. The court indicated the uniqueness of the situation as Renzulli did not use “information learned” from the consultation, but used the fact that the consultation occurred. The court concluded that this was equally a violation of the Rules because Renzulli used the consultation to intimidate and create an adverse inference about the Keuffers’ case. The District Court disqualified Mossberg’s counsel because their actions defeat the purpose of the Rules of Professional Conduct which threatens the public’s trust in the legal system.
In this case...Renzulli consciously used the information learned in Luke’s consultation with Tarlow & Stonecipher for tactical litigation purposes.
The majority concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in ordering disqualification.
Justice Beth Baker dissented
The District Court found that Mossberg’s counsel did not use or reveal information learned from the phone conversation in violation of Rule 1.20(b). The court concluded, however, that there was “no reason why the rule should not be equally applicable when an attorney uses the fact that they consulted with a party and declined to represent that party to intimidate that party or to create an adverse inference about that party’s case.” The court concluded further that “knowing that certain information was not disclosed may be just as harmful as information that was disclosed.” The District Court made no finding that Luke disclosed information that could be significantly harmful to him in the case, and acknowledged that “it is not clear what information was disclosed/learned during Luke’s 6-12 minute consultation with Weamer.” It found nonetheless that “defense counsel used the fact that a consultation even occurred against the [Keuffers] in a significantly harmful manner...
Here, Renzulli used Luke’s communication with Weamer during his deposition of Stephanie as a litigation tactic to imply that the Keuffers had a weak case. Renzulli’s questioning demonstrated a lack of professional, courteous, and civil attitude toward not only the Keuffers, but to the legal system. Renzulli’s attempt to harass and intimidate the Keuffers was out of bounds. Even though the District Court found as a matter of fact that Renzulli did not reveal any specific information that Luke divulged to Weamer, the District Court properly recognized that Luke’s communication to Tarlow & Stonecipher of “the facts” that prompted him to seek legal assistance was not to be “used” against him by counsel for the adverse party. Accord Perry, ¶¶ 29-30 (analyzing whether an attorney violated her duty of confidentiality to a prospective client). See also M. R. Prof. Cond. Preamble ¶ 18. Renzulli acknowledged that he was attempting to do just that by suggesting that the Keuffers had to shop the case around before they could find a lawyer who was willing to take it...
The interests of Renzulli’s client—about whom the Court is noticeably silent— also are entitled to consideration before disqualifying counsel of its choice. Recognizing that a party “must not be lightly separated from her counsel of choice,” we have suggested that disqualification of counsel should not be used for punitive purposes.
Justice Laurie McKinnon also dissented
In my opinion, the District Court abused its discretion in imposing the severe remedy of disqualification, particularly given that the relationship between a prospective client and a lawyer do not impose duties as stringent as between an actual and/or former client and his lawyer. Imposition of such a severe remedy as disqualification should be sparingly imposed, in light of its significant effect in disrupting litigation...Under the circumstances here, disqualification of Mossberg’s counsel was an abuse of discretion when the District Court could have simply precluded the offensive line of questioning by both Renzuilli and Tarlow & Stonecipher and thereby maintained the integrity of the proceeding. The public’s trust in the legal system in not undermined when a trial court perceives an abuse by counsel and corrects it by a fair, proportionate, and measured remedy.
Tuesday, May 31, 2016
The CEO of Blue Star Jets has lost his legal malpractice suit of claims brought against the attorneys who had handled his divorce from his first wife.
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department held that
This malpractice action arises from defendants' representation of plaintiff in a contentious divorce proceeding, and focuses primarily on the matrimonial court's purported improper valuation of plaintiff's interests in two marital assets: Blue Star Jets LLC (Blue Star) and International Star Investments Limited (ISI Ltd.). Plaintiff contends that, but for the negligence and malpractice of defendants, the court's valuation of his interest in Blue Star and ISI Ltd. would have been lower, and that he would have had to pay his ex-wife a lower distributive award.
Plaintiff failed to state a malpractice claim regarding defendants' failure to present independent expert testimony to rebut the court-appointed expert's valuation report regarding Blue Star, because the record shows that defendants' decision not to call such a witness was a strategic and reasonable one (Pouncy v Solotaroff, 100 AD3d 410, 410 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 21 NY2d 857 ). Plaintiff also has not alleged adequately that this decision was the proximate cause of his damages (Bender Burrows & Rosenthal, LLP v Simon, 65 AD3d 499, 499 [1st Dept 2009]).
Plaintiff failed to state a malpractice claim with respect to defendants' failure to move for a reappraisal or revaluation of Blue Star and ISI Ltd., since plaintiff failed to allege adequately that such a motion would have been successful (id.), particularly given the matrimonial court's discretion in determining valuation issues (see McSparron v McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 287 ).
Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action based on defendants' failure to move to reargue or reconsider the divorce judgment, since the decision of whether to make such a motion is a strategic one and plaintiff has not alleged adequately that such a motion would have been successful (Warshaw Burnstein Cohen Schlesinger & Kuh, LLP v Longmire, 106 AD3d 536, 536 [1st Dept 2013], lv dismissed 21 NY3d 1059 ).
The motion court correctly dismissed plaintiff's allegation that defendants failed to appeal from the divorce judgment, because the record shows that defendants informed plaintiff of his right to appeal, but that he chose not to do so in light of the cost and his minimal chance of success (Rodriguez v Fredericks, 213 AD2d 176, 177-178 [1st Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 812 ).
The motion court should have dismissed the allegations regarding defendants' failure to present "appropriate evidence" at trial to establish the correct value of plaintiff's interest in ISI Ltd. The record does not support plaintiff's allegation that defendants possessed this documentation but failed to submit it to the matrimonial court. In any event, the admission of this documentation would not have altered the matrimonial court's calculations and distributive award.
The motion court providently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for further discovery, since he failed to specify how additional discovery would enable him to state a sufficient claim with respect to the dismissed allegations (see CPLR 3211[d]; Putter v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 7 NY3d 548, 554 ).
Page Six had this story on the post -divorce litigation between the plaintiff and his ex-wife. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, May 25, 2016
The South Carolina Supreme Court overruled prior precedent and reinstated a legal malpractice claim that the lower court dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.
the client was an auto dealership sued by an unhappy customer who was awarded judgment.
[Client] Stokes-Craven filed a legal malpractice action against Respondents, alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in trial counsel's representation of Stokes-Craven both prior to and during the trial. Specifically, Stokes-Craven alleged that trial counsel failed to: adequately investigate the facts of the case; prepare or serve written discovery; depose witnesses; obtain copies of the plaintiff's experts' curricula vitae; prepare a pretrial brief, trial exhibits, voir dire, and requests to charge; preserve certain evidentiary issues for appellate review; notify Stokes-Craven's insurance carrier about the claims; and settle the case prior to the jury verdict. Based on these purported errors, Stokes-Craven claimed the jury returned the adverse verdict. Respondents generally denied the allegations and asserted several defenses, including that Stokes-Craven's claims were barred by the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations.
The court acknowledged that its minority position articulated in the Epstein case was problematic
The facts of the instant case present us with an appropriate opportunity to address the criticism and conflict that has arisen out of our decision in Epstein. As legislatively mandated, we begin our analysis with the well-established discovery rule. Pursuant to this rule, all legal malpractice actions must be commenced within three years after the claimant knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he or she had a cause of action...
As evidenced by this case, the key question is when the claimant's cause of action accrues to trigger the running of the three-year statute of limitations. The answer to this question is complicated by the seemingly endless factual scenarios surrounding the underlying claim of a legal malpractice cause of action. For example, legal malpractice claims may stem from matters involving litigation or negotiated settlements while others may arise out of matters involving the probate of a will or a divorce. Further complicating the determination of when a cause of action accrues is if the claimant pursues an appeal of an unfavorable ruling, such as in the instant case.
Our decision regarding the accrual date must also take into consideration the preservation of the attorney-client relationship as well as the public policy that is fundamental to the efficient management of our judicial system. Clearly, if a client files a legal malpractice cause of action while the client is still represented by counsel during an appeal, the attorney-client relationship is compromised and there are simultaneous lawsuits advocating conflicting positions.
Here, the statute of limitations did not commence until the case was lost on appeal. Thus, the malpractice claim was timely. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, May 17, 2016
Dan Trevas reports a case decided today by the Ohio Supreme Court
When attorney-fee billing statements with detailed information about the tasks undertaken by a law firm representing a city are intertwined with summaries of the legal work performed, the detailed information is not a public record, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled today.
The Supreme Court voted 5-2 to affirm a Ninth District Court of Appeals decision to release redacted copies of invoices from a law firm representing Avon Lake to James E. Pietrangelo II. The records are connected to pending litigation between Avon Lake and Pietrangelo. In a per curiam decision, the Court majority reasoned that Pietrangelo may acquire information useful in his litigation strategy against the city if provided more details than what the Ninth District permitted to be released.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sharon L. Kennedy wrote that only the narrative summary portion of the bills describing the work the firm did can be withheld and that Pietrangelo is entitled to more information as well as damages from Avon Lake.
Detailed Information Sought
Pietrangelo requested from the city and its law director the invoices from a law firm for services it rendered concerning his lawsuit. The city provided copies of invoices with the name of the firm, the general matter for which services were provided, the date of the invoice, the total fees billed for the period, and itemized expenses.
The city redacted the remaining information on the invoices citing exemptions for attorney-client privilege and attorney-work product. The information that was redacted included narrative descriptions of the particular legal services rendered, the name of each attorney in the firm providing services along with the service provided, the time spent, the billing rate, the total number hours billed, and the total fee attributed to each attorney.
Pietrangelo filed a writ of mandamus with the Ninth District to compel the city to provide unredacted invoices and requested statutory damages and attorney fees. Pietrangelo and Avon Lake both filed for summary judgment, but the Ninth District determined it could not side with a party without more information and ordered the city to file unredacted copies of the billing statements for the judges to review under seal.
After review, in March 2015 the Ninth District concluded the city disclosed all the records not exempt from disclosure by the Ohio Public Records Act, which is R.C. 143.43, except for one portion. The Ninth District found the part of the invoice titled “professional fee summary,” that described the hours, rates, and money charged for services was not exempt. It ordered the city to provide Pietrangelo with copies of the billing statements that included the professional fee summary.
The Ninth District denied Pietrangelo’s request for the fully unredacted records plus damages and attorney fees. He appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Extent of Attorney-Client Privilege at Issue
Citing its 2011 State ex rel. Dawson v. Bloom-Carroll Local School Dist. decision, the Court’s opinion explains that narrative portions of itemized attorney billing statements containing descriptions of legal services are protected by attorney-client privilege and are not public records.
Pietrangelo argued that based on the Court’s 2012 State ex rel. Anderson v. Vermillion decision he is entitled to all the dates legal services were performed along with the hours and rates of services, which is more than what is provided in the professional fee summary. The Court in Anderson stated that “the general title of the matter being handled, the dates services were performed, and the hours, rates and money charged for the services,” on an attorney billing statement need to be disclosed.
The Court explained that Anderson was the former mayor of Vermillion and was seeking the billing statements regarding the legal services provided to the new mayor. His entire request was denied. The Court ordered Vermillion to turn over all of the billing statements, ruling only the narrative portions were exempt from the public records act by attorney-client privilege.
Avon Lake argued the situation with Pietrangelo is similar to the Dawson case where a parent sought billing statements for legal services provided to the school district regarding pending litigation between the district, the parent and her children. The district provided summaries with the attorney’s name, invoice total, and the matter involved, but withheld the actual invoices because they contained confidential information.
The Court allowed the district to withhold the invoices because the information in the invoices was “either covered by attorney-client privilege or so inextricably intertwined with privileged materials as to also be exempt from disclosure.”
“Like Dawson, the records that Pietrangelo seeks relate to the pending litigation between the parties. If disclosed, Pietrangelo may acquire information that would be useful in his litigation strategy against the city, whereas in Anderson, any harm from disclosure of attorney-client communication was remote and speculative,” the Court stated. “To the extent that Pietrangelo requests the dates, hours, and rates not identified in the professional-fee summary, they are inextricably intertwined with the narratives of services that are privileged materials. Such information is exempt from disclosure.”
Pietrangelo also sought $1,000 in statutory damages and attorney fees because the Ninth District found the city did not fully comply with the public records law. The Court affirmed the Ninth District’s denial of Pietrangelo’s request because Avon Lake reasonably believed it was entitled to withhold the information it did.
Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor and Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Terrence O’Donnell, Judith Ann Lanzinger, and William M. O’Neill joined the opinion.
More Disclosure Required, Dissent Maintains
In her dissent, Justice Kennedy stated she would order the redaction of only the narrative services information and release all the other information on the billing statements to Pietrangelo in accordance with the Ohio Public Records Act.
She further disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the relevant distinction between Dawson and Anderson regarding what information is subject to disclosure is whether litigation is pending between the record requestor and the government entity. Instead, Justice Kennedy wrote that the fact the records requestor is involved in litigation against the government body should have no bearing on whether the records are public.
“Whether a public-records requestor and a government entity are engaged in litigation is irrelevant to the question of whether the information in an itemized attorney-fee billing statement is privileged and exempt from disclosure. Instead, our case law mandates the proper focus is on the information sought and whether that information is privileged,” she wrote.
The relevant distinction between the two cases was that the school board in Dawson reduced the nonexempt information to a summary and released it, whereas the city in Anderson denied the request and failed to provide an alternative record.
Justice Kennedy recognized that the narrative portions of a billing statement containing descriptions of legal service are protected by the attorney-client privilege and not subject to disclosure. She explained that the billing statements at issue contain summary information on the first two pages, and that all subsequent pages contain four independent columns divided into the categories of date, name, services, and hours. Each billing statement concluded with the total number of hours invoiced, a professional fee summary, disbursements and expenses, and a total invoice amount.
She wrote the majority’s reliance upon Dawson to conclude that the date, name, and hours information was inextricably intertwined with the narrative of the services was disingenuous. She noted that Dawson offered little discussion of how the billing statements were constituted, whereas the format used in the statements to Avon Lake separated the information about the attorneys providing the services and the hours billed so that they “are not intertwined with the narrative services column.”
Justice Kennedy reasoned that the ability to redact the narrative services column mandated all remaining portions of the billing statements be released. By affirming the appellate court's decision not to release the remaining non-exempt portions of the billing statements the majority created a new “redundancy” exemption not authorized by the General Assembly she concluded.
Justice Kennedy would have also granted Pietrangelo damages because after Anderson decision it should have been clear to Avon Lake what information in a billing statement was privileged and what must be disclosed.
“Subsequently, no well-informed public office could reasonably believe that any portion of an attorney-fee billing statement, other than the narrative description of the legal services performed, is subject to redaction,” she wrote.
Justice Judith L. French joined the dissent.
Sunday, May 15, 2016
Counsel for a hedge fund may be liable to investors for losses based on assurances provided by them, according to a recent opinion of the New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department
The evidence shows that plaintiffs requested a letter from defendants, who were outside counsel to a hedge fund in which plaintiffs had invested, regarding the implications of certain Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) inquiries into the fund. Defendants responded with a letter, addressed to plaintiffs, specifically answering plaintiffs' questions by characterizing the SEC inquiry as part of a new routine the SEC would be following under the newly passed Dodd-Frank legislation. Plaintiffs allege that, based upon defendants' assurances, they did not withdraw their investment in the fund. About a year after receiving the letter, the SEC instituted administrative cease and desist proceedings against the fund's managers, and the SEC ultimately prevailed in the proceedings. Plaintiffs allege that they lost their entire investment as a result of their reliance on defendants' false and misleading statements. Under the circumstances, plaintiffs adequately pleaded and showed the required "privity-like" relationship for their negligent misrepresentation claim (J.A.O. Acquisition Corp. v Stavitsky, 8 NY3d 144, 148 ; see Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 80 NY2d 377, 382-385 ).
Defendants are correct that this Court can affirm on alternative bases argued to, but not reached by, the motion court (Nickerson v Volt Delta Resources, 211 AD2d 512, 512 [1st Dept 1995], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 86 NY2d 860 ), and that they cured their improper submission of the attorney defendant's affirmation by submitting the same affirmation in affidavit form on reply (see Berkman Bottger & Rodd, LLP v Moriarty, 58 AD3d 539, 539 [1st Dept 2009]). Nevertheless, they are not entitled to dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiffs adequately pleaded the other elements of their negligence claim, and defendants failed to establish as a matter of law that there were no false statements in the letter, that plaintiffs' reliance on defendants' statements was unreasonable, or that the alleged false statements did not proximately cause plaintiffs' alleged losses (see generally J.A.O. Acquisition Corp., 8 NY3d at 148).
Thursday, May 12, 2016
The Washington State Court of Appeals has held that a trial court exceeded its authority in reducing an award of wages to a former in-house counsel
Following a month-long jury trial, attorney Geoffrey Chism was awarded $750,000 for breach of two compensation contracts by his former employer, Tri-State Construction, Inc., and exemplary damages for unlawful wage withholding. The trial court then dramatically reduced Chism's recovery, premised on findings that Chism violated Washington's Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs) during his time as Tri-State's in-house general counsel. By ordering disgorgement of Chism's wages based on novel interpretations of several RPCs, the trial court exceeded the disciplinary authority delegated to it by our Supreme Court. Moreover, the trial court disregarded the strong legislative policy preference in favor of payment of earned wages by failing to even acknowledge that, unsupported by precedent, it was ordering disgorgement of an attorney's wages, as opposed to an attorney's fee. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's challenged rulings and remand the cause for entry of judgment consistent with the jury's verdict.
The question presented arises at the intersection of judicial power over the practice of law and legislative power over the conditions of employment. Our Supreme Court has offered some guidance about resolving such situations, stating, "While we should jealously protect our prerogatives, if the legislative power is not limited by the constitution, it should be unrestrained." Demopolis, 103 Wn.2d at 65. As previously stated, in the area of attorney wages, the Supreme Court has taken no action, but the legislature has enacted a broad policy in favor of the payment of employee wages. Given this stark contrast, we defer to the strong legislative policy in this area.
This conclusion is consequential for how we view the application of the disgorgement sanction to attorney wages. As has been described, disgorgement does not require proof of either causation or damage, only misconduct. This is unlike other, related claims, including breach of fiduciary duty and restitution, both of which require such proof. Because there is no standard measure for a disgorgement order, nor a requirement that it be imposed as a compensatory measure, it poses a significant threat to the legislative policy in favor of the consistent payment of employee wages.
This threat is illustrated by the trial court's order in this case. Herein, Tri-State chose to pursue only disgorgement from Chism, not a separate claim for damages or restitution. Accordingly, Tri-State was never required to prove that it suffered any injury as a result of Chism's alleged misconduct. Nevertheless, the trial court ordered Chism to disgorge $550,000 in wages (plus another $550,000 in exemplary damages for wage withholding).
The trial court exceeded its disciplinary authority by ordering Chism to disgorge a significant portion of the wages otherwise owed to him without either acknowledging that itwas disgorging wages, not fees, or accounting for the strong legislative preference in favor of employers paying earned employee wages. Therefore, the trial court's order was improper as a matter of law.
Thanks to Alan Kabat for sending this opinion to us. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, May 11, 2016
A divorcing spouse was properly granted summary judgment in claims brought against her by her deceased husband's attorney, according to a decision of the New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department.
Beginning in September 2008, the plaintiff represented Daniel Sitomer (hereinafter the husband) in a matrimonial action commenced by his wife, Sheila Sitomer (hereinafter the defendant), pursuant to a retainer agreement dated September 15, 2008. The retainer agreement stated that the plaintiff would provide the husband with an itemized statement of charges every 60 days, and in the event that he discharged the plaintiff, or the plaintiff was relieved, the plaintiff reserved the right to seek to have a charging lien fixed "on the proceeds realized by you from the litigation."
In January 2009, the plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 1201 and 1202 to have a guardian ad litem appointed for the husband on the ground that "he had proven to be incapable to assist us so as to adequately defend his rights in [the] matter." The husband hired another attorney to oppose that application and paid that attorney over $32,000 in legal fees, and sought to discharge the plaintiff as his attorney. On June 5, 2009, the court relieved the plaintiff as counsel for the husband, at the husband's request.
The plaintiff moved to fix its attorneys' fees, and the husband opposed the motion on the ground that the plaintiff never provided him with periodic invoices every 60 days pursuant to their retainer agreement. Nevertheless, on August 24, 2010, the plaintiff and the husband entered into a so-ordered stipulation, fixing the husband's obligation for legal fees at the sum of $100,000, to be satisfied by a charging lien on "any and all equitable distribution proceeds" following satisfaction of the first $50,000 of a charging lien in favor of the husband's former attorney. The stipulation provided that in the event that the plaintiff provided no further services to the husband, the "charging lien shall serve in full satisfaction for all the [plaintiff's] claims for fees and services."
In September 2010, the husband died, and the divorce action abated. Therefore, there were no equitable distribution proceeds to satisfy the plaintiff's charging lien. In May 2011, the plaintiff commenced the instant action against the defendant, seeking to recover $100,000 in legal fees under a theory of common-law necessaries.
The court below properly ordered summary judgment
Under the common-law doctrine of necessaries, a spouse who receives necessary goods or services is primarily liable for payment. A creditor seeking to recover a debt against the nondebtor spouse must demonstrate that the primary debtor was unable to satisfy the debt out of his or her own resources, that necessaries were furnished on the nondebtor spouse's credit, and that the nondebtor spouse has the ability to satisfy the debt (see Gilberg v Lennon, 212 AD2d 662, 663; Medical Bus. Assoc. v Steiner, 183 AD2d 86). Legal services provided to a spouse in a matrimonial action have been considered necessaries (see Jordan v Jordan, 226 AD2d 349, 349; D'Agostino v Genovese, 190 AD2d 773, 774; Fernandes v Rucker, 186 AD2d 171, 172).
Here, the defendant established that the plaintiff's services were not furnished on her credit. Rather, the services were furnished in the expectation of "the proceeds" of the litigation, specifically articulated in the charging lien. Since the action abated, there were no proceeds of the litigation. Further, it is clear from this record that, although the husband may have had sufficient resources to pay the plaintiff, which included marital assets appropriated by him and court-ordered spousal support, he was unwilling to voluntarily pay the plaintiff, owing to their adversarial relationship.
In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Tuesday, May 3, 2016
The Washington State Court of Appeals Division II has held that a trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendants
Roff and Bobbi Arden appeal the trial court’s summary judgment order dismissing their claims against Forsberg & Umlauf, PS, and attorneys John Hayes and William “Chris” Gibson (collectively Forsberg) for breach of fiduciary duties and legal malpractice. Property and Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford (Hartford), the Ardens’ homeowners’ insurance company, retained Forsberg to defend a lawsuit filed against the Ardens. Hartford provided the defense under a reservation of its rights to deny coverage for any judgment entered against the Ardens.
First, the Ardens argue that Forsberg breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty to them by defending them in a reservation of rights context while also representing Hartford in other cases. We hold as a matter of law that Forsberg’s representation of the Ardens while it also represented Hartford did not create a conflict of interest and that Forsberg had no obligation to notify the Ardens that they represented Hartford in other cases. We also hold that there is no evidence that Forsberg breached its duty of disclosure regarding the potential conflicts of interest between Hartford and the Ardens.
Second, the Ardens argue that Forsberg breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty to them during settlement negotiations. We hold that (1) as a matter of law, Forsberg had no duty to the Ardens to persuade Hartford to accept the claimants’ initial settlement offer; (2) there is no evidence that Forsberg breached a fiduciary duty regarding the Ardens’ interest in a swift resolution of the lawsuit; (3) a question of fact exists as to whether Forsberg breached its duty to consult with the Ardens before rejecting settlement demands, but there is no evidence that any breach injured the Ardens; and (4) even if Forsberg had a duty to consult with the Ardens before making settlement offers, there is no evidence that Forsberg breached any such duty regarding its first settlement offer and that the breach of any duty for the second settlement offer injured the Ardens.
Third, the Ardens argue that Forsberg was negligent in requesting an extension of the start of settlement negotiations when they had an interest in a prompt settlement. We hold that there is no evidence that Forsberg was negligent regarding its judgment decision to extend the start of settlement negotiations.
The Ardens and Wade and Anne Duffy were neighbors in Shelton. In December 2011, Roff Arden shot and killed the Duffys’ puppy. He claimed that the shooting occurred after the puppy and another dog chased him and Bobbi down their driveway. The Mason County Sheriff’s Office investigated, and referred the investigation to the prosecutor’s office to pursue animal cruelty charges...
The Duffys filed suit against the Ardens in May 2012 after settlement negotiations broke down. The lawsuit apparently alleged that the Ardens were liable for (1) willful conversion of the dog, (2) malicious injury, (3) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (4) gross negligence and willful or reckless property damage. The Ardens requested insurance coverage for the lawsuit from Hartford under the liability portion of their homeowners’ insurance policy. Hartford initially refused to defend the lawsuit based on an intentional act exclusion in its policy.
We assume, without deciding, that an attorney representing an insured in a reservation of rights case has an obligation to consider the insured’s “personal” interests, even though they may not directly affect the merits of the case. Under Tank, only the insured is the defense attorney’s client, and a defense attorney arguably cannot disregard his or her client’s interests. However, a client may have many, sometimes competing, interests that the attorney must consider in the exercise of his or her professional judgment in defending the case. Under the attorney judgment rule, the question is whether an attorney’s particular judgment decision is within the range of reasonable alternatives or whether the attorney was negligent during the decision-making process. Clark County Fire, 180 Wn. App. at 704.
Here, the Ardens had an interest in the prompt settlement of the case. However, they were not willing to settle unless Hartford funded the settlement. Therefore, the Ardens’ predominant interest was having Hartford fund any settlement. When the Duffys made a settlement demand before providing their discovery responses, the Ardens’ two interests conflicted. Without discovery responses, Hartford did not have enough information to evaluate the settlement demand. Therefore, without an extension of time there was no possibility that Hartford would agree to fund the $55,000 settlement demand.
The evidence shows that Forsberg made a judgment decision about the best way to obtain a settlement of the Duffy lawsuit with Hartford funding that settlement. Forsberg determined that the best strategy was to obtain an extension of time for responding to the Duffys’ settlement demand until after Hartford had enough information to determine the settlement value of the claim. The Ardens presented no evidence that this decision was outside the range of reasonable alternatives from the perspective of a reasonable, careful, and prudent attorney in Washington or that Forsberg somehow failed to exercise reasonable care in making that judgment decision. Accordingly, we hold that there is no evidence that Forsberg was negligent in delaying the beginning of settlement negotiations.
Friday, April 29, 2016
The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that a legal malpractice case may go forward
In 2011, the district court dissolved the marriage of Brenda R. Rice and Dale E. Rice. Attorney Terrance A. Poppe represented Brenda in the dissolution action. Later, Dale died and Brenda made a claim for the death benefits under life insurance policies owned by Dale. The court determined that Brenda was not entitled to the benefits, because she waived her beneficiary interest under the property settlement agreement. Brenda sued Poppe for legal malpractice, alleging that he had failed to advise her that the property settlement agreement waived her beneficiary interest in Dale’s life insurance policies. The trial court sustained Poppe’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that Poppe had no duty to advise Brenda of the legal effect of an unambiguous agreement. We conclude that Poppe, the summary judgment movant, did not establish a prima facie case entitling him to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
In August 2011, the district court dissolved Brenda and Dale’s marriage. The court approved the property settlement agreement and incorporated it into the decree.
Dale died a week later. Brenda tried to claim the death benefit for two term life insurance policies owned by Dale, only one of which, with a death benefit of $250,000, concerns this appeal. The personal representative of Dale’s estate argued that Brenda had waived her right to the death benefits in the property settlement agreement. The trial court agreed and ordered Brenda to withdraw her claim. Brenda appealed.
We affirmed the determination that Brenda had waived her interest as a beneficiary of Dale’s life insurance policies in Rice v. Webb. There, we explained that divorce does not affect a beneficiary designation in a life insurance policy. But a spouse may waive a beneficiary interest in the divorce decree. Synthesizing paragraphs VI, IX, and X of the property settlement agreement, we concluded that Brenda unambiguously gave up her right to claim the death benefits...
As to potential malpractice
Brenda argues that Poppe committed malpractice by not asking what her and Dale’s intentions were concerning their life insurance beneficiary designations and failing to explain the effect that the property settlement agreement would have on those designations. She contends that the “intricate rules of construction which may render a written settlement agreement that has been incorporated into a decree ‘unambiguous’ to members of the Nebraska Supreme Court do not apply equally to the uninitiated layperson.” Poppe responds that he had no duty to inform Brenda that she was waiving her beneficiary status, because the “fact she was doing so was readily apparent from the clear language of the Agreement.”
Poppe owed Brenda a duty to reasonably advise her about the property settlement agreement’s effect on her interests. And, as the summary judgment movant, he had the burden to produce evidence that he did not breach that duty. The general standard of an attorney’s conduct is established by law, but whether an attorney’s conduct fell below the standard in a particular case is a question of fact. Expert testimony is generally required to show whether an attorney’s performance conformed to the standard of conduct. An attorney moving for summary judgment must generally make a prima facie case by producing expert testimony that his or her conduct did not fall below the standard of care.
The court surveyed cases from other jurisdictions
These cases show that attorneys are not always insulated from malpractice liability because their clients read or ought to have read the documents themselves. Instead, they “stand only for the proposition that for purposes of determining when an action for alleged legal malpractice begins to run, a client must know what lay persons of ordinary intelligence are deemed to know.” We would not have discussed the statute of limitations at all in Interholzinger and Nichols if the fact that the plaintiffs signed the documents was an absolute bar to recovery. A rule that insulates attorneys from liability as a matter of law on the theory that clients ought to know what they are signing ignores the fact that laypersons often hire attorneys because they lack the knowledge and skills needed to understand the transaction.
We conclude that reasonable minds could disagree concerning whether Poppe’s failure to advise Brenda about the effect of the property settlement agreement on beneficiary designations was the proximate cause of Brenda’s loss.
Sunday, April 24, 2016
An opinion from the North Carolina Court of Appeals
This appeal presents the question of whether a party to litigation who engages her friend as an agent to participate in meetings with her attorney waives the protections of attorney-client communications and attorney work product for information arising from the meeting with her attorney and any work product created with the assistance of or shared with the agent as a result of those meetings. Based on our caselaw and the record here, the answer in this case is no.
The procedural posture
Defendant-Appellant Melissa Berens (“Defendant”) appeals the interlocutory order denying her request for a protective order and her motion to quash Plaintiff Appellee Michael Berens’s (“Plaintiff’s”) subpoena duces tecum to Brooke Adams Healy (“Ms. Adams”) compelling production of all documents relating to Ms. Adams’s communications with Defendant; her communications with the Tom Bush Law Group (“the law firm”), the firm representing Defendant in her divorce; and her communications with any third party regarding “one or more members of the Berens family” and the legal proceedings that are the subject of the underlying divorce case. On appeal, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s subpoena to Ms. Adams seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and by the work product doctrine because Ms. Adams was Defendant’s agent. Consequently, according to Defendant, Ms. Adams’s presence during Defendant’s meetings with her attorney did not waive the privileges nor did her involvement in the preparation of materials for litigation defeat the privileges.
The court 's analysis
Plaintiff argues that Ms. Adams was not functioning in the capacity of an agent but was “merely Defendant-Appellant’s friend” and that the presence of a friend during attorney-client communications and giving her access to work product defeats the claim of privilege under our state’s established caselaw. Defendant argues that Ms. Adams’s presence during and access to attorney client communications and work product as a “friend, agent, and trusted confidant” did not destroy the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine because Ms. Adams was acting as Defendant’s agent. In support of this argument, Defendant cites the written confidentiality agreement providing that Ms. Adams was acting as her “agent and personal advisor to specifically assist her in this litigation” and that Ms. Adams’s presence and involvement in attorney-client communications “is necessary for the protection of [Defendant’s] interest.”
Defendant does not contend, and did not contend before the trial court, that she and Ms. Adams had an attorney-client relationship. Rather, she contends that because Ms. Adams was her agent for purposes of this litigation, the privileges and protections arising from her attorney-client relationship with the law firm within the context of the confidentiality agreement remained intact despite the sharing of attorney communications and work product with Ms. Adams...
In failing to address the confidentiality agreement and other evidence of the agency relationship between Defendant and Ms. Adams, the trial court misapprehended the law regarding the extension of the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine to communications with a client’s agent within the context of the litigation and confidentiality agreement.
The error below
The trial court failed to conduct the essential analysis as to whether the affidavit, confidentiality agreement, and other evidence established an agency relationship. We are aware of no caselaw, nor has Plaintiff cited any authority, that being a client’s “good friend” and being a client’s agent are mutually exclusive. Nor does our caselaw prohibit a non-practicing attorney from acting as an agent for purposes of assisting another person in communications with legal counsel. Our holding would be the same if Ms. Adams had been a friend trained as an accountant, a psychologist, or an appraiser who agreed to assist with the litigation without charge. Consequently, we must reverse the trial court’s order concluding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply in this case.
Plaintiff’s subpoenas requested all documents relating to all of Ms. Adams’s communications with Defendant, all documents relating to her communications with the law firm, and all documents relating to her communications with any third party regarding the ongoing legal proceedings during a specified time period. While we have held that the record evidence established an agency relationship between Ms. Adams and Defendant, it is unclear whether all the requested materials fall within the scope of the attorney-client privilege by satisfying the five-factor Murvin test. For example, communications between Ms. Adams and third parties outside the law firm may not fall within the protection of the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, we must remand for the trial court to determine whether the attorney-client privilege applies to the requested communications, using the five-factor Murvin test and considering Ms. Adams as Defendant’s agent. Unless the trial court can make this determination from other evidence such as a privilege log, it must conduct an in camera review of the documents...
We also are unable to determine based on the limited record whether the documents requested, or any of them, are subject to the work product doctrine. This determination is necessary only for documents which Defendant asserts are work product and which the trial court concludes are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Tuesday, April 19, 2016
Summary judgment was properly granted to a law firm but not the individual attorney sued for legal malpractice, according to a decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
This is the second appeal of this case and many of the underlying facts and procedural history are set forth in our prior decision, Yager v. Clauson, 166 N.H. 570 (2014). The client’s legal malpractice claim stems from the defendants’ representation of him in two timber trespass actions. See id. at 571. The first action was brought against Mighty Oaks Realty, LLC (Mighty Oaks) in 2007 (the Mighty Oaks action). Id. Summary judgment was granted to Mighty Oaks, in part, because the client failed to prove that Mighty Oaks was the entity that cut the timber. Id.
The second action was brought against D.H. Hardwick & Sons, Inc. (Hardwick) in 2008 (the Hardwick action). Id. In that action, the client alleged that Hardwick was the entity that cut the timber. Id. Summary judgment was granted to Hardwick because the action had been filed more than three years after the timber cutting had ceased and, thus, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id. We affirmed the trial court decisions in both actions. Id.
In this case, the trial court concluded that a legal expert was necessary for the plaintiff to prove "what result should have occurred" had the Hardwick action been timely filed. Carbone, 151 N.H. at 528 (quotation and ellipsis omitted). The client argues that this was error because he could have used the "trial-within-a-trial" method to prove this. We hold that, to the extent that the trial court determined that the trial-within-a-trial method was unavailable to the client, as a matter of law, the trial court erred. See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 165-66 (2003); Witte v. Desmarais, 136 N.H. 178, 189 (1992).
Recreating the underlying case is "[t]he traditional means of resolving what should have happened" had an attorney’s negligence not occurred. Mallen & Smith, supra § 33:3, at 626; see Garcia v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini, 845 A.2d 602, 611-12 (N.J. 2004). "Recreating the underlying action requires calling and examining those persons who would have been witnesses and presenting the demonstrative and documentary evidence that would have been presented but for the attorney’s negligence." Mallen & Smith, supra § 37:15, at 1510. "This process then becomes in essence a trial within a trial." Witte, 136 N.H. at 189; see McIntire, 149 N.H. at 165; see also Mallen & Smith, supra § 37:15, at 1511. In the "trial within a trial," the jury in the legal malpractice action "substitute[s] itself as the trier of fact" in the underlying action and "determine[s] the factual issues presented on the same evidence that should have been presented to the original trier of fact." McIntire, 149 N.H. at 165 (quotation omitted). The trial-within-a-trial approach is "regularly employed in most jurisdictions" in legal malpractice cases, Garcia, 845 A.2d at 612, and has been employed in New Hampshire, see McIntire, 149 N.H. at 165-66; Witte, 136 N.H. at 188-89...
Here, to the extent that the trial court ruled that the client could not use the trial-within-a-trial method to prove "what result should have occurred" had the Hardwick action been timely filed, the trial court erred. Carbone, 151 N.H. at 528 (quotation and ellipsis omitted). This method was an acceptable means of proving proximate cause in the client’s legal malpractice claim. See McIntire, 149 N.H. at 165-66.
The law firm was dismissed due to the plaintiff's discovery lapse. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, April 13, 2016
A client who retained an attorney to draft a prenuptial agreement stated a claim that survived summary judgment, according to a recent opinion of the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
The issue came to light in the ensuing divorce and issues relating to enforceability due to disclosure of assets
Plaintiff agreed that he selected the attorney but that he also believed that Defendant represented him and Wife. He said that Wife had access to his filing cabinet and that he never prohibited her from viewing the documents in the cabinet. He claimed that she retrieved documents from the cabinet on occasion. He admitted that he was a "fairly private person" and that they had not engaged in specific discussions concerning financial issues prior to signing the Agreement.
Following the hearing, the trial court set aside the Agreement, finding that the Agreement failed to conform to the requirements set forth in Randolph because a reasonable disclosure of assets had not been made and because Wife did not possess independent knowledge of the same. The court granted Wife‟s request for pendente lite support. Plaintiff and Wife later entered into a marital dissolution agreement.
As to disclosure, plaintiff testified that
He provided that he kept his financial information in a filing cabinet that she could have easily accessed. He believed she accessed this information because she always searched the residence to discover the identity of gifts he purchased for her birthday or Christmas.
In the malpractice case
The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the undisputed material facts negated an essential element of Plaintiff‟s claim. In so finding, the court held that Defendant had not breached the applicable standard of care because the Agreement was sufficiently drafted in that it provided that the parties possessed knowledge of one another‟s assets. The court continued that Wife had also signed the Agreement, thereby affirming her knowledge of the assets. This timely appeal followed.
The court here disagreed
The record reflects that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Wife possessed independent knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of the holdings as evidenced by the conflicting testimony presented by the parties. Likewise, genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Defendant breached the applicable standard of care in drafting the Agreement. With these considerations in mind, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. In so concluding, we express no opinion as to whether Defendant actually breached the applicable standard of care or as to the extent of Plaintiff‟s damages, if any.