Wednesday, November 11, 2015
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court added 18 months to a three-year suspension for practice while suspended
Respondent received notice of Supreme Court's Order placing him on administrative suspension as well as correspondence from the Disciplinary Board alerting Respondent to the restrictions placed on administratively suspended attorneys. Nonetheless, shortly thereafter, in the Pennsylvania SEC matter, Respondent held himself out as an attorney to the SEC, using stationery with letterhead from his former law office, providing an address of a nonexistent law office, and including the professional designation of "Esq." after his name . The SEC informed ODC of Respondent's transgressions and ODC promptly sent Respondent a DB-7 Request informing Respondent that his conduct before the Pennsylvania SEC may have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Undaunted, Respondent again held himself out as an attorney to third parties and used both stationery and the escrow account from the "Elam Law Firm" in the Motion Picture Project matter. Even after the Supreme Court ordered that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years, Respondent continued to engage in the unauthorized practice of law, in that he knowingly continued to hold himself out to third parties as an attorney, engaged in prohibited law-related activities, and received a legal fee for doing so.
Respondent's repeated conduct of using stationery with the letterhead of the Elam Law Firm, an escrow account entitled "The Elam Law Firm," and the professional designation of "Esq." after his name was analogous to the deceitful conduct of the attorneys in Goldin-D:idinsky, Moeller, and Martin. Goldin-Didinsky and Moeller . both used legal stationery with a non-existent law office address, whereas Martin created a fee agreement for a non-existent law firm. These three formerly admitted attorneys, like Respondent, knowingly gave documents to third parties that falsely communicated that they were an.attorney in good standing.
The sanction was imposed by consent. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, November 10, 2015
Dan Trevas reports two disciplinary matters decided today by the Ohio Supreme Court
In separate disciplinary cases announced today, the Ohio Supreme Court indefinitely suspended two attorneys, each with more than 20 years of legal experience, from the practice of law.
- The Supreme Court indefinitely suspended with conditions Columbus attorney David C. Watson Jr.
- The Supreme Court indefinitely suspended with credit for time served Toledo attorney Deneen M. Marrelli.
Watson’s Violations Occurred While on Probation In Columbus Bar Assn. v. Watson, the Supreme Court noted that in 2012 it found Watson had committed multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and sanctioned him to a one-year suspension of his law license. That suspension was stayed with the condition he contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (OLAP) for help and serve a monitored probation. In February 2014, he completed his OLAP contract, but remained on probation. In September 2014, the Columbus Bar Association charged him with additional misconduct involving client matters, and a three-member panel of the Supreme Court’s Board of Professional Conduct found he violated two rules. The panel and the full board recommended the high court indefinitely suspend him with his reinstatement subject to several conditions.
In a per curiam decision, the Court found the charges against Watson, who was admitted to practice law in Ohio in 1985, stemmed from two incidents. In 2011 and 2012, he accepted multiple retainer payments from a couple who asked Watson to represent them in a real estate dispute. Watson deposited the payments into his general business account rather than into a required interest-bearing client trust account. The couple became dissatisfied with his representation and filed a grievance against him with the Columbus Bar Association. The parties arbitrated the case and it resulted in Watson refunding the couple $3,862. It also led to the Board of Professional Conduct finding Watson failed to comply with the rule requiring retainers be held in the client trust account separate from general business accounts.
In June 2012, Watson accepted a $3,500 retainer from a couple to represent them as potential creditors in a bankruptcy case, which he also failed to deposit in the client trust account. Watson filed two documents on behalf of the couple. Watson conceded one document could have been completed by a non-lawyer, and the second was a two-page objection to the debtor’s plan. It was rejected by the bankruptcy court because it was based on incorrect information mistakenly taken from an unrelated case. The bankruptcy court overruled the objection because Watson failed to appear as counsel for the couple. Based on his action, the board found Watson violated the rules for charging and collecting a clearly excessive fee.
When considering the board’s recommendation of an indefinite suspension with conditions, the Supreme Court considered the aggravating factors of Watson’s prior disciplinary actions, engaging in multiple offenses, and having a selfish motive. The Court also considered mitigating factors including his timely restitution payment when ordered and having a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings.
“Watson has demonstrated a pattern of the same misconduct in two separate disciplinary matters – namely, repeatedly failing to deposit client funds in his trust account. And even worse, when he engaged in the misconduct at issue here, his prior disciplinary case was either pending or he had already been placed on probation,” the Court wrote in the unanimous opinion.
Watson told the board he is no longer practicing law, and the Court ruled that if he wants to seek reinstatement, he has to complete four tasks including adjusting the fee taken from the couple he represented in bankruptcy court and successfully completing his probation conditions.
Marrelli Previously Suspended In June 2013, the Mahoning County Bar Association filed a complaint with the Board of Professional Conduct charging Marrelli with seven rule violations arising out of her 2010 representation of man in a post-divorce custody matter.
The charges against her included charging a clearly excessive fee, dividing fees with lawyers who are not in the same firm without getting the client’s written approval, and not fully disclosing the identity of the other attorneys and the work they were doing.
Marrelli, who was admitted to practice law in Ohio in 1989, did not respond to the complaint brought by the bar association, and the Court imposed an interim default suspension. The board set a hearing for Marrelli to demonstrate why it should not transform the interim suspension into an indefinite suspension, and Marrelli was also charged with violating rules for not assisting in a disciplinary investigation or keeping the Court apprised of her residential and office addresses.
When considering a sanction, the board found that Marrelli was not acting with a dishonest or selfish motive and she refunded the client a portion of the retainer paid. But it also noted the client failed to appear at two court appearances where Marrelli was to represent him. The Court, in a unanimous decision, adopted the board’s recommendation that Marrelli should receive an indefinite suspension with credit for the time served under the interim default suspension.
Monday, November 9, 2015
A public reprimand has been imposed by the Indiana Supreme Court on these facts
A few days after the custodial mother of a five-year-old child died, maternal relatives consulted with Respondent regarding the maternal grandparents’ desire to obtain custody of the child and return with the child to the grandparents’ native Kenya following the mother’s memorial service in South Bend. The child’s father lived out-of-state, was in arrears on support, and had had very little contact with the child during the last three years.
Respondent filed a motion in the St. Joseph Probate Court seeking leave for the grandparents to intervene and an award of custody to the grandparents. Respondent did not serve the motion on the father. At Respondent’s request a hearing was held two days after the motion was filed. Respondent did not provide the father with notice of the hearing, nor did he request the court to postpone the hearing in order to give the father a chance to be heard. Respondent also did not allege that emergency judicial relief without written or oral notice to the father was authorized. See Trial Rule 65(B) (requiring, among other things, that an applicant’s attorney certify to the court in writing the efforts made to provide notice to an adverse party or the reasons why such notice should not be required). Following the hearing, the probate court awarded the grandparents custody of the child, and thereafter the grandparents returned to Kenya with the child.
The father later filed a motion to correct error and to set aside the order awarding grandparents custody. The grandparents returned from Kenya with the child for a hearing, after which the probate court granted the father’s motion and held that the father should be the child’s primary custodian. (In their briefs, the parties indicate that the father later chose to relinquish custody and that the child returned with the grandparents to Kenya, where he has remained).
The attorney admitted the facts. (Mike Frisch)
Friday, November 6, 2015
A rather interesting notice from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
October 29, 2015
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals is calling for public comments on proposed amendments to D.C. Court of Appeals Rule 46, which governs admission to the District of Columbia Bar.
The proposed revisions include:
Adopting the Uniform Bar Examination (UBE) and establishing the District of Columbia as a UBE jurisdiction;
Permitting law students to take the bar exam during the last semester of law school with certification by the law school; and
Imposing a limit on the number of times an applicant may sit for the bar exam, with the exception of extraordinary circumstances.
Written comments are due by December 28. Comments must be submitted in 10 copies to the Clerk, D.C. Court of Appeals, 430 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20001.
These are major changes. I wonder if the purpose of the"exam before graduation" proposal is intended to increase the number of test takers. (Mike Frisch)
Thursday, November 5, 2015
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Chief Judge Washington, Associate Judge Beckwith and Senior Judge Reid) heard oral argument yesterday in the bar disciplinary case of In re Layn Saint-Louis.
The matter involves misappropriation and a board recommendation for disbarment.
I was unable to attend but understand that Judge Reid asked a question that would have occurred to me (paraphrasing) and was an argument pressed by the accused attorney
Why did a case involving possible disbarment take so long?
When Bar Counsel (excuse me Disciplinary Counsel) decides to investigate a complaint, the matter is assigned a docket number. You can tell from that number the arc of the case.
Here the Docket Number is 2005- D217.
Because OB(D)C dockets about 500 cases a year, that means that the investigation began in the late spring of 2005 - more ten years ago.
From the June 27, 2014 Hearing Committee Report
There are no significant additional mitigating factors here. Thus, while Bar Counsel’s excessive and unjustifiable delay in bringing this action raises serious questions, under the Court of Appeals cases on Bar Counsel delay as mitigation, the delay does not reduce the appropriate recommended sanction in this case.
Assistant Bar Counsel Fox also publicly told the truth about the disciplinary system's most shameful secret. Once Bar Counsel completes an investigation and submits formal charges, those charges sit in the Office of the Board on Professional Responsibility for a full year awaiting review.
Thus, nothing can go forward for that year while witnesses move or die and the case gets harder to prove.
I was at Bar Counsel from 1984 to 2001. This never happened in those years. There is no excuse for BPR-induced delay in reviewing charges.
Neither the BPR or the hearing committees are understaffed to review and try these cases. There are twelve hearing committees and a huge roster of 52 alternates.
This delay only serves accused attorneys and prejudices the public's right to an honorable legal profession characterized by credible self-regulation.
The cases tend not to age well like a fine wine (to paraphrase former Bar Counsel Len Becker).
I have been asking Judge Reid's question for about a decade.
My earlier post on the case is linked here. (Mike Frisch)
Kathleen Maloney summarizes a discipline case on the Ohio Supreme Court web page
The Ohio Supreme Court today suspended Robert P. DeMarco for one year, with six months stayed, for making false statements to a Lucas County court.
While the lawyer disciplinary board had recommended a full one-year suspension, the Court determined in a 6-1 decision that a partial suspension was appropriate in this case.
Discovery Documents Not Given to Court While working on a civil case, DeMarco hired Jack Harper, a computer expert, in 2011. Lawyers for the defendants and DeMarco, who was representing the plaintiff, agreed to have Harper search the defendants’ electronic devices. Any possibly relevant documents were to be provided to the trial judge to inspect privately and to decide which materials should be sent to DeMarco.
Harper conducted the search, put the results on a disc, and gave it to DeMarco, who, disregarding the agreed-to protocol, reviewed the contents and decided none were helpful. He also neglected to submit the disc to the trial judge.
In March 2012, DeMarco told defense counsel at a pretrial conference that Harper had examined the documents and told him none were relevant to the case. After also denying to the defense that he had the disc, DeMarco called Harper and left a message indicating his lie to the court. DeMarco then gave the disc back to Harper.
Defense Requests Disc A few months later when the parties resolved the case, defense counsel asked Harper for the disc. The issue went before a court, and Harper said he had destroyed the disc. The court threatened to hold him in contempt. At a hearing, Harper testified that he had handed the disc over to DeMarco and later destroyed it after DeMarco told him the case was over.
DeMarco responded in the judge’s chambers and openly in court that he had never received the disc nor reviewed the contents. Harper stated that DeMarco had lied to the court in March 2012, but DeMarco claimed he never had lied and “would like to go outside with [Harper].” Harper then played the voicemail. The judge ended the hearing and later, with the defense counsel, alerted the Toledo Bar Association about DeMarco’s false statements.
Court Considers Whether Attorney Lacked Selfish Motive, Had Good Reputation During the disciplinary case, the parties agreed that DeMarco violated professional conduct rules, including knowingly making a false statement to the court and offering evidence that he knew was false. The Supreme Court agreed with the misconduct findings. But the Court disagreed with DeMarco’s request for a fully stayed one-year suspension.
“DeMarco engaged in a series of misrepresentations directly to the court in March and November 2012,” the per curiam opinion stated. “At the November 2012 show-cause hearing, he threatened to take his own expert ‘outside’ after the expert testified truthfully about giving the disc to DeMarco. And if Harper had not saved DeMarco’s voicemail, Harper might have been sanctioned by the court. Additionally, DeMarco admitted at the panel hearing that he was not remorseful for making the repeated misrepresentations until Harper played the voicemail.”
The disciplinary board had recommended an actual one-year suspension, and the Court noted that this type of conduct often leads to an actual suspension.
However, “the character references and character testimony indicate that his misconduct here was an aberration in an otherwise unblemished 45-year legal career,” the Court concluded. “We find that under these circumstances, staying a portion of the one-year suspension is consistent with prior cases.”
Justices’ Votes The majority opinion was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Terrence O’Donnell, Judith Ann Lanzinger, Sharon L. Kennedy, Judith L. French, and William M. O’Neill.
Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor dissented and would have imposed the board-recommended suspension of one year with no stay.
Wednesday, November 4, 2015
A Virginia State Bar Subcommittee has imposed a reprimand without terms for conduct at a deposition.
The attorney called the case "crap" at the outset of the proceeding. He later told opposing counsel that he had "only asked three pertinent questions during the 45-minute deposition" and again called the case "crap."
He called opposing counsel's position "nonsense" and "baloney."
The conduct violated the rules governing fairness to opposing counsel and parties as well as the rules requiring respect for the rights of third persons. (Mike Frisch)
A Louisiana Hearing Board has recommended three years probation of attorney Patrick Henry.
Based on the evidence submitted and the testimony of the parties, the Committee finds that Patrick Henry, by clear and convincing evidence, failed to adequately advise Kevin Hambrice of the financial arrangements that had or had not been made with the Shockey firm. The Committee further finds that Patrick Henry misrepresented to the Shockey Law Firm the arrangement that he had made with Kevin Hambrice. These misrepresentations were knowingly made and negligent due to the mental and emotional condition of respondent at that time.
The hearing board found that the conduct was attributable to emotional problems and mental impairment and proposes treatment conditions as part of the probation. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, November 3, 2015
The Maryland Court of Appeals has accepted the consent disbarment of an attorney who admitted multiple ethics violations.
A Maryland attorney who lied to his client for years and eventually fabricated a phony settlement after botching her medical malpractice case escaped disbarment on Friday after a divided appellate court ordered that he be indefinitely suspended.
Despite finding he had committed a laundry list of professional conduct violations, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stopped short of granting the state attorney grievance commission’s recommendation that attorney Eugene Alan Shapiro be disbarred.
Shapiro stood accused of failing to preserve client Diana Wisniewski’s medical malpractice claim from statutory expiration, then continuously lying to her over the next five years about the status of her case. He subsequently concocted a bogus settlement that he unsuccessfully tried to pay out of his own pocket, all while failing to direct Wisniewski to obtain independent counsel once he realized she would have a malpractice claim against him, according to the order.
The decision came over the dissent of two members of the seven-judge panel, who argued that Shapiro’s lies constituted a pattern of deceitful conduct rather than an isolated incident, and should therefore result in his disbarment.
“Although Shapiro’s violations do not involve multiple clients and cases, his misconduct spans a multiple-year period,” the dissent said. “Respondent only told Wisniewski the truth about her case — that it had been dismissed, that the statute of limitations had passed, and that no settlement occurred — after she filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission.”
The case began in 2004, when Wisniewski underwent knee surgery at St. Agnes Hospital that ostensibly resulted in an infection, leading her to retain Shapiro in pursuit of a medical malpractice claim, according to the opinion.
Shapiro claims he then forwarded her medical records to several outside medical experts, but had difficulty obtaining a certificate of merit. He subsequently filed Wisniewski’s claim with the Health Claims Arbitration Office, but the case was dismissed because it did not include a certificate to support the claim, the order said.
By this point, the statute of limitations on Wisniewski’s cause of action had expired. Although Shapiro admits that he failed to inform his client of either the dismissal or the expiration of her claim, he continued to represent her despite the conflict of interest his deception had created, the order said.
In the fall of 2012, Shapiro concocted a bogus story about a settlement in an apparent bid to cover his tracks, but when he failed to produce Wisniewski’s share of the supposed deal she filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, according to the order.
In response to that complaint, Shapiro put together a handwritten “settlement agreement” promising to pay her $12,500, followed by monthly payments that would total a combined $66,000 — the amount Shapiro alleges Wisniewski would have accepted in the event of an actual settlement in her medical malpractice claim, according to the order.
The court noted that despite his claims to the contrary, nowhere on Shapiro’s handwritten settlement agreement with Wisniewski was it indicated that he had advised her of her right to seek independent counsel.
In considering what punishment to dole out to Shapiro, the court noted that he had been the subject of a previous disciplinary reprimand regarding lapses in tax withholding, but also noted that Shapiro’s misdeeds did not necessarily appear to stem from dishonest or selfish motives.
“Not wishing to admit his mistakes to her, Shapiro created a lie that snowballed over time,” the order said.
The Indiana Supreme Court has accepted the resignation of a criminal defense attorney who got caught up with drugs.
WLKY reported on the case
Leah Fink was arrested in Corydon on Aug. 16, 2011, on charges of manufacturing meth, maintaining a common nuisance and possession of meth and marijuana.
Harrison County deputies said they raided the home she shared with her mother at the time, finding meth and other paraphernalia.
During her sentencing hearing Thursday, witnesses shed some light on what troubles might have caused the drug abuse.
From dealing with Crohn's disease and a crumbling marriage, family testified that Fink was in and out of the hospital after her arrest, which delayed the case four years.
Fink had a total of nine surgeries during those four years, spending more than 60 days in the hospital, her family testified.
Fink was arrested in 2014 after police conducted a search warrant and found active meth labs at a home in Jeffersonville.
The news report indicates that she had been a judicial candidate in 2008.
Civil War fans will recognize Corydon as the only battlefield in Indiana per Wikipedia
Corydon was the site of the only Civil War battle fought in Indiana. On July 9, 1863, Confederate cavalry led by Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan, aided by the citizens of Brandenburg, Kentucky, crossed the Ohio River into Indiana to begin what is known as "Morgan's Raid". Morgan's 2,500 men were opposed by 400 hastily assembled home guard at the Battle of Corydon. The Union troops were quickly defeated and the town surrendered. Corydon was sacked in retaliation for Union looting in Kentucky. The town's treasury of $690 was seized, and the inmates of the jail were released. Gen. Morgan demanded from $600 to $700 from each mill and shop owner; otherwise, their buildings would be burned. Tradition says one Corydon miller overpaid by $200; Morgan promptly returned it to him
For those interested in the story of Morgan's Raid, I suggest this book. (Mike Frisch)
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has imposed a six-month suspension of an attorney it had disbarred in 1989 and reinstated in 1999.
He has been reprimanded twice since reinstatement.
Here he engaged in conflicts of interest such as
In February of 2005, at [client] Ms. MacComb’s request, Attorney Campbell drafted a second will for her. The provisions of the 2005 will diminished the scope of the testamentary trust originally created in Ms. MacComb’s 2004 will, and devised Ms. MacComb’s livestock (eight sheep) jointly to Attorney Campbell and his friend, whom he later married...
Ms. MacComb also devised her interest in real estate previously bequeathed to her by Ethel Foley, together with an additional two acres of land, to Attorney Campbell. Attorney Campbell states that he believed that drafting the instrument was appropriate because he had been asked to do so by his client, and she had been given the opportunity to consult independent counsel.
There were further bequests and a resulting will contest.
He engaged in a conflict of interest in an unrelated criminal matter.
Disclosure: I handled his D.C. disbarment for a marijuana distribution conviction
The Board, viewing our prior decisions as dispositive, rejected respondent's argument that for purposes of assessing moral turpitude there is a meaningful distinction between cocaine, heroin and marijuana. It relied on In re Roberson, supra, 429 A.2d at 530 (unspecified narcotic drug); In re Gates, No. D-32-79 (D.C.App. Nov. 7, 1979) (heroin) (published at 532 as appendix to In re Roberson), and In re Davis, No. M-92 (D.C.App. Nov. 18, 1981) (cocaine), in which the court concluded that a conviction for the crime of possession, with intent to distribute, of a controlled substance involved a crime of moral turpitude. The Board acknowledged that marijuana is listed by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as a Schedule I non-narcotic drug and carries a lesser penalty than do narcotic drugs such as cocaine or heroin, but reasoned that the difference in sentencing *1061 for narcotic and non-narcotic drugs is insignificant for purposes of assessing moral turpitude because marijuana distribution is still treated as a serious criminal offense.
Monday, November 2, 2015
The California State Bar Court Review Department proposes disbarment as the sanction for a second disciplinary offense
The hearing judge in this proceeding found Wittenberg culpable of violating rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by engaging in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) in 300 to 400 trademark matters before the United States Patents and Trademark Office (USPTO).
He had been convicted of insider trading
As a result of his felony conviction, Wittenberg was placed on interim suspension in California in 2001 and disbarred in Virginia in 2002. In 2003, the USPTO Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) filed a complaint against him. Subsequently, he submitted a resignation affidavit, which the USPTO accepted. In June 2004, the USPTO ordered that Wittenberg "be excluded on consent from practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office," and ordered the OED to publish a notice in the "Official Gazette," which stated that Wittenberg had been excluded from practice before the USPTO "in patent and trademark law cases beginning July 1, 2004." The USPTO final decision also recited that Wittenberg’s resignation affidavit contemplated that he will pursue the USPTO’s formal reinstatement process should he wish to later have the exclusion lifted; and, in that process, the USPTO Director of OED will conclusively presume certain facts as to the complaint against him.
Wittenberg was an experienced practitioner before the USPTO, yet he continued to represent numerous trademark clients for nearly six and a half years after he was excluded from practice before the office. He never sought reinstatement, although the regulations in effect at the time of his exclusion and thereafter required such a process before resuming practice before the USPTO. The affidavit he executed regarding his exclusion also referenced such a process. We agree with the hearing judge that Wittenberg, as a long-time practitioner in his field, knew or should have known about the regulatory scheme and that he was engaging in UPL. However, rather than carefully determining what, if anything, he was required to do before resuming his practice, he assumed that his 2005 relief from actual suspension in California allowed him to resume practice before the USPTO. This exhibits, at best, a cavalier attitude toward compliance with the regulations that apply to practitioners in the field of law to which he has devoted much of his career.
WCHS8 has this report on the suspension of a West Virginia prosecutor from his job
A Logan County assistant prosecuting attorney has been suspended indefinitely after a bizarre incident involving a pistol and fake spiders.
According to Logan County Prosecutor John Bennett, assistant prosecutor Chris White was suspended on Wednesday due to an alleged incident that happened in early October.
White has been with the office for more than five years, according to Bennett.
"I never saw it coming, that's for sure. Obviously, I wouldn't have even hired him if I had seen it coming. And the fact that he's been there five years and we haven't had any incidents like this also, to me, is a pretty good indication it's certainly out of the ordinary," Bennett said.
The alleged incident happened on October 5th after several secretaries in the office decorated for Halloween. The decorations included many fake spiders that were throughout the office. Apparently, White has arachnophobia and became irate over the decorations.
"He said they had spiders everyplace and he said he told them it wasn't funny, and he couldn't stand them, and he did indeed get a gun out. It had no clip in it, of course they wouldn't know that, I wouldn't either if I looked at it, to tell you the truth," Bennett explained.
Bennett says it's his understanding that White didn't point the gun at anyone or wave it around but did threaten to shoot all of the spiders. Bennett says the incident caused quite the scare for the three secretaries that witnessed it.
"Quite naturally, the ladies were concerned, as I would have been. Anybody would be, I would think, with a gun no matter where it was," Bennett said.
Shortly after the incident, Bennett says he sent a memo banning firearms from the office with the exception of the gun their investigator carries.
Logan County Chief Deputy M.A. Mays tells Eyewitness News he has seen surveillance video of the incident and is continuing to question several people.
Mays confirms there is an open criminal investigation, but says it's not concluded. Mays said he "didn't anticipate" charges being filed, but said that could change depending on the outcome of more interviews.
Bennett says it's a possibility White could be terminated, but at this time, he doesn't intend to fire him.
White could not be reached for comment.
Friday, October 30, 2015
I assume that most of us try to give our law students a sense of what professional discipline really involves from the point of view of an accused attorney.
Teaching that aspect of professional responsibility has been greatly enhanced (in my view) by videos of state supreme court oral arguments.
If you want a first-rate 26 minute exposure to the reality of bar discipline, watch (and show) this case decided today by the Kansas Supreme Court.
The attorney was a public defender who lost her job and career in a series of criminal matters caused by her alcoholism. She has now been sober for 4 1/2 years and works in a grocery store.
Disciplinary Counsel and her attorney argued for a stayed suspension and immediate probation.
The attorney takes the lecturn for the last ten minutes. If you want to teach about the dangers of addiction to a practicing attorney, there is no better source. It will move the viewer to tears.
The court adopted the proposed sanction.
The misconduct involved a series of arrests, conviction and failures to report to the Bar
the respondent failed to comply with Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 203(c)(1) on four occasions. First, the respondent failed to inform the disciplinary administrator that she had been charged with a felony (possession of cocaine) in 2010 in Kansas City, Missouri, within 14 days. Next, the respondent failed to inform the disciplinary administrator of the disposition of the possession of cocaine charge within 14 days. Third, the respondent failed to inform the disciplinary administrator that she had been charged with a felony (driving under the influence of alcohol) in 2011 in Johnson County, Kansas. Finally, the respondent failed to inform the disciplinary administrator of the disposition of the felony driving under the influence of alcohol charge within 14 days. The respondent did not make any disclosures required by the rule until July 13, 2014. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 203(c)(1).
The arguments also introduce the role of state bar lawyer assistance programs (link to the Kansas program here) in aiding distressed and addicted attorneys. Also note that Kansas, like many bars, offers help to law students.
Having stood in the shoes of disciplinary counsel, I applaud the fine arguments of Deputy Disciplinary Administrator Michael R. Serra and Amy E. Elliott of Overland Park, Kansas.
Also note how respectful the court is of counsel. The justices sit patiently while counsel fully argues and ask questions only when counsel is done. (Mike Frisch)
The Iowa Supreme Court has imposed an indefinite suspension of not less than 60 days of an attorney whose bipolar condition contributed to her misconduct.
She had been in solo practice.
While coping with the stress of [her husband's] immigration issue and the bipolar disorder, [the attorney] drank alcohol heavily and frequently in October 2013. Her life very quickly spun out of control, and by December her daily routine consisted only of buying alcohol, drinking alcohol, and sleeping. She did not open her mail, and she stopped responding to all communication from clients, opposing attorneys, court staff and judges, and the Board.
In January 2014, [she] sought medical assistance for detoxification. She received inpatient alcohol treatment in Waterloo and outpatient treatment in Decorah. In August 2014, [she] moved to West Des Moines so that she could be closer to a more robust support system and live in a bigger market for legal employment. She attends weekly support group meetings and has become an active church congregant there. She has also received helpful assistance from the Iowa Lawyers Assistance Program (ILAP). She has not consumed alcohol in over a year and has not practiced law since fall 2013. She currently holds a part-time job in retail customer service, but she hopes to resume practicing criminal law in the near future as an assistant county attorney, a private criminal defense attorney, or a public defender.
There were four counts of misconduct
The [disciplinary] commission found [her] lack of disciplinary history, alcoholism, and bipolar disorder to be significant mitigating factors. It also commended her for taking full responsibility and expressing remorse.
The court noted that a dozen clients had been affected by the ethics lapses. She must comply with treatment conditions to secure reinstatement. (Mike Frisch)
A lawyer already suspended for misconduct and other reasons got a nine-month suspension from the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
In 2005, Attorney Smoler asked the S.s if they would loan her $50,000 so that she could pursue a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of another client, C.J., that would be brought against one of the same doctors involved in the S.s' case. The S.s agreed to loan the $50,000 to Attorney Smoler. To memorialize the loan, Attorney Smoler drafted a document entitled "Loan/Promissory Note" which set forth the terms of the loan. The loan called for five and one-half percent interest annually or statutory interest as awarded by the court. The loan was for two years. Attorney Smoler did not put any language in the note providing the S.s with an opportunity to speak with alternate counsel about the loan. The loan was signed by the parties on August 31, 2005. Attorney Smoler was paid $50,000 on September 13, 2005. She deposited the money into her business checking account.
Two years passed without Attorney Smoler making a payment to the S.s on the loan. The S.s agreed to extend the terms of the note one more year at Attorney Smoler's request. By October 2009, no payments had been made on the loan. The S.s hired an attorney who demanded payment. Attorney Smoler failed to pay the loan in response to a demand letter from the S.s' counsel.
She responded to the bar matter by asserting an inability to repay the loan. There were misconduct findings in another medical malpractice case.
The referee was puzzled
In discussing the appropriate sanction, the referee noted that Attorney Smoler apparently practiced at a very competent and accomplished level for many years. The referee said, "No facts of record explain her sad story. It is as though she imploded all at once, without warning, and without reason." The referee went on to comment, "For an attorney with an otherwise unblemished record, Smoler's slide into the dark side seems incredibly unfortunate. . . . . Smoler's failure in general to supply information to OLR in the course of the investigation into both client matters does not help the situation and only further indicates her inability to function at a very basic level."
The court ordered restitution. (Mike Frisch)
Thursday, October 29, 2015
A North Carolina attorney has been charged with ethics violations in three counts, the last of which is worthy of note.
The attorney is alleged to have filed a civil complaint on behalf of a client, responded to a motion to dismiss and handled an appeal to the state Court of Appeals.
He is alleged to have made a number of statements in the pleadings, accusing the court of "overwhelming incompetence and ignorance... I felt just as I imagine I would have over a century ago arguing to said court that slavery was bad labor relations policy... [the court showed] a stubborn arrogance and ignorance...[a judge] literally threw a temper tantrum...As I felt like I was attempting to teach physics to a class of unruly third graders."
In another brief: "the lack of intellectual functioning and overt partiality of this panel...being readily apparent but, acting like mentally challenged cheerleaders, knowing they wanted to motivate their team to victory, but not sure how to accomplish the goal... [the judge] was assuming the role of 'house negro' for purposes of this matter...Sounding more like 'Beaver Cleaver' than any person has a right to..."
And another brief: "the instant panel will glad [sic] play thee [sic] blind mice and [Judge] will serve the historical role played by Monica Lewinsky for President Clinton for the current governor of North Carolina... if these judges are intent upon making the [court] a literal 'whippin boy' for special interests, they are welcome to kiss my red white and blue American male ass."
An Illinois Hearing Board proposes a reprimand
Respondent, an Assistant State's Attorney, was charged with making false statements and failing to disclose exculpatory information to the defense. In an interview with Respondent, about two weeks before trial, the State's key witness stated that, in a prior description of the incident, he exaggerated the defendant's participation because of threats from gang members. Respondent did not inform defense counsel of that statement, although defense counsel learned of that statement, from another source, the day the trial began and was aware of other inconsistent statements by the witness. At trial, when the witness referred to gang threats, Respondent stated she was hearing about such threats for the first time. After trial, the defendant was acquitted.
Respondent testified she had forgotten about the statement the witness made during the interview. The attorney representing the witness testified that when he reminded her of the statement Respondent appeared genuinely surprised. The defendant's attorney, who was present at the time, concurred. Both attorneys believed Respondent's misstatement was inadvertent.
The Hearing Board concluded the Administrator did not prove Respondent knowingly made false statements to the court or intentionally engaged in any dishonest conduct. The Hearing Board found Respondent improperly failed to disclose exculpatory information to the defense by not informing defense counsel of the statement made during the interview.
The Hearing Board determined a violation occurred that warranted some discipline. Given all the circumstances, including Respondent's state of mind, the lack of prejudice and the significant mitigating factors, the Hearing Board concluded Respondent should be reprimanded.
No suspension because
there are significant mitigating factors. Based on the evidence presented and our observations of her at the hearing, Respondent impressed us as an ethical attorney, decent and hard-working, committed to serving the public who has a good understanding of the responsibilities her role entails. Testimony leading to that impression came not only from Respondent's supervisors, but also from attorneys who had regularly opposed her in litigation over time. We considered that testimony very significant in mitigation. See Kakac, 07 SH 86 (Review Bd. at 20). We do not regard this incident as representative of Respondent's usual conduct. We also believe this experience has indeed been a difficult one for Respondent and that she is highly unlikely to engage in misconduct in the future.
From the web page of Pennsylvania's Disciplinary Board
By a 2-1 decision, the Commonwealth Court ruled that the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review erred in applying the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement to prevent a suspended lawyer from representing a client in an administrative hearing before an unemployment compensation referee.
In the case of Powell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, the claimant appeared at the first hearing with a suspended attorney, who was allowed to represent the complainant consistent with 43 P.S. §774, which states, “Any party in any proceeding under this act before the department, a referee or the board may be represented by an attorney or other representative.” Neither the employer nor the referee objected to the suspended attorney’s participation. The hearing was continued due to an issue with subpoenas.
Before the hearing resumed, the employer retained counsel who notified the Board that he objected to the suspended attorney’s involvement, citing Rule 217(j)(4) of the Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, which prohibits a formerly admitted attorney from “appearing on behalf of a client in any hearing or proceeding or before any judicial officer, arbitrator, mediator, court, public agency, referee, magistrate, hearing officer or any other adjudicative person or body.” When the hearing was rescheduled, the suspended attorney and the claimant were notified the former attorney would not be allowed to appear on behalf of the claimant, who was given thirty days to obtain a new attorney. At the resumed hearing, the claimant appeared with a new representative, who was also a suspended attorney. The new representative was allowed to attend as an advisor but not to represent the claimant. The claimant presented his own case and received an adverse decision. He appealed to the UCBR, which upheld the decision, concluding that Rule 217(j)(4) prohibits a suspended attorney from representing a client before a UC referee.
The Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded the case to the UCBR, in a decision written by Judge P.Kevin Brobson. The opinion noted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled in the case of Harkness v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 920 A.2d 162 (Pa. 2007), that representation in unemployment compensation proceedings is not the practice of law. The Commonwealth Court then ruled that only the Disciplinary Board and the courts have the power to enforce the Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, and that the UCBR could not apply the Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement to override 43 P.S. §774 as to the particular class of nonlawyer representatives who are formerly admitted attorneys.
The Ohio Supreme Court has publicly reprimanded an attorney
disciplinary counsel, charged Broyles with professional misconduct. Broyles had represented The Bank of New York Mellon (“NY Mellon”) at a default hearing in a foreclosure case and obtained a judgment against Felix and Barbara Aponte. Approximately nine months later, Broyles was retained by the Apontes to defend them in the foreclosure action filed by NY Mellon. Broyles subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment and other pleadings in the case, arguing that the default judgment he had previously obtained against the Apontes should be vacated. NY Mellon did not give informed consent to allow Broyles to represent the Apontes.
The conduct violated Rule 1.9. (Mike Frisch)