Tuesday, November 26, 2013
An attorney who was convicted of two criminal offenses and failed to notify the Bar was suspended for five years by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
The attorney had moved to West Virginia and did not (as required) provide a current address to the Kentucky Bar.
The first incident involved a fight with his wife. When she sought to leave with their four-year-old, the attorney "smashed a propane tank into the rear window of the vehicle." No one was hurt and the wife admitted that she had struck him with the car before he threw the propane tank.
He entered a plea to two counts of wanton endangerment.
The second incident involved a fight with a client who had come to his home office. The attorney claimed that the client "removed the front door and proceeded to hit [him] in the head with a piece of concrete." The client claimed the attorney struck him several times with a baseball bat.
The attorney pleaded guilty to felony unlawful wounding in the second degree.
The Trial Commissioner noted that the conduct took place when the attorney had "hit rock bottom" after two divorces and a drinking problem. He claims sobriety since 2010. (Mike Frisch)
Monday, November 25, 2013
The Maryland Court of Appeals has imposed an indefinite suspension of an attorney who was admitted in 1997.
The attorney had retired for medical reasons from the Office of the Attorney General. He then opened his own office.
The court found he had engaged in incompetent representation, lacked diligence and failed to communicate with clients in two matters. In one matter, he also had facilitated the unauthorized practice of law by a disbarred lawyer.
The court declined to impose disbarment in light of findings that the attorney suffers from depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress.
Thus, "indefinite suspension is the more appropriate sanction..." (Mike Frisch)
Sunday, November 24, 2013
An attorney who was disbarred in Florida received an indefinite suspension in Massachusetts with reinstatement conditioned on his readmission in the Sunshine State.
The decision of a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court notes that the attorney had engaged in a comflict of interest and a prohibited business transaction with an elderly client.
The attorney had served as "estate planner, trustee, financial products salesman. personal representative and attorney..."
The justice rejected the attorney's suggestion that the misconduct found in the Florida proceeding did not amount to a Rule 1.8(a) violation. (Mike Frisch)
Friday, November 22, 2013
Is there anyone out there who thinks a six-month suspension with all but sixty days stayed is a tad (or more) light given this summary:'
After a large judgment was awarded against his client, Schtul knowingly permitted the client to deposit over $120,000.00 of company funds into his law firm’s trust account, which resulted in those funds being hidden from the judgment creditor. Schtul then signed checks that were issued from the trust account to the client. After Schtul’s firm filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy for the client, the client revealed to opposing c0unsel that his company’s funds had been deposited in the law firm’s trust account and then had been withdrawn to pay wages and taxes and to distribute profits. Schtul’s actions led to the evasion and delay of collection efforts and also prompted the bankruptcy trustee to investigate the matter and lodge fraudulent transfer charges against Schtul, which were resolved in a confidential settlement. In this matter, Schtul violated Colo. RPC 1.15(c) (a lawyer shall keep disputed property interests separate until there is an accounting and severance) and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
In a second matter, Schtul neglected to adequately designate exhibits, failed to prosecute his client’s appeal, and filed a frivolous claim. That conduct violated Colo. RPC 8.4(d) as well as Colo. RPC 1.1 (competency), 1.3 (diligence and promptness), 1.4 (communication with clients), and 3.1 (frivolous claims). Schtul also failed to adequately communicate with clients in two additional representations, and in one of those matters he did not exercise reasonable diligence and promptness.
The Colorado Presiding Disciplinary Judge approved the sanction. (Mike Frisch)
A Nebraska attorney was suspended for violating the durt of confidentiality (see below).
A Colorado attorney got suspended for a year and a day, with all but six months stayed, for an excess of zeal.
The summary from the Colorado Supreme Court web page:
In a juvenile theft case, Lee believed her client, the defendant, had been misidentified by the victim. At trial, she arranged for her client to sit in the back of the courtroom and for a friend of her client to sit at counsel table. During her opening statement, Lee pointed to the client’s friend, saying "my client is innocent." This stratagem worked to her client’s detriment, since the victim accurately identified the defendant in the gallery. The judge found Lee in contempt and granted the defendant a new trial based upon Lee’s fraud upon the court.
There were trust account violations in another count. (Mike Frisch)
The Nebraska Supreme Court has imposed an indefinite suspension of no less than three years of a criminal defense attorney who failed to respond to charges that she "disclos[ed] confidential information regarding criminal charges against a former client in order to ensure the client's conviction."
The attorney was retained to defend a client charged with first degree sexual assault. The client and his family hired another attorney and terminated her representation.
The attorney then called the prosecutor to discuss the case, told him "she knew that her former client was guilty, and that she wanted to make sure the prosecutor sent [him] to prison." She gave the prosecutor the names of witnesses and discussed the expected defense strategy.
The prosecutor called Disciplinary Counsel and informed the new attorney for the defendant.
The court declined to disbar the attorney, notwithstanding her failure to respond to the charges.
It is unfortunate that the attorney defaulted, as there must be a lot more to this story. A cursory google search suggests that there may have been mitigation evidence that did not get presented. (Mike Frisch)
As we used to say at Bar Counsel
Another day, another batch of disbarments.
Here's one from the Iowa Supreme Court that involves "an experienced real estate attorney, [who] is serving a three-year sentence in federal prison after a jury convicted him on nine felony counts, aleging bank fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy."
The crimes involved nine real estate transactions where the HUD - 1 statements" overstated the sales prices to secure inflated mortgage loans."
The attorney had offered to surrender his license if the conviction was affirmed. The court noted that he made no furtjher submission after it was affirmed and instead ordered license revocation. (Mike Frisch)
An attorney who misappropriated funds while serving as guardian of a now-deceased Brooklyn civil court judge was disbarred by the New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department.
The court applied collateral estoppel effect to findings in the guardianship matter:
Particularly, following a framed-issue hearing, Justice Ambrosio imposed the following surcharges: $197,416.08 for legal fees which respondent improperly withdrew from guardianship accounts without court authorization; $52,500 for fees respondent improperly took as a brokers commission in connection with the sale of estate property by court auction; $120,215.37 for dissipating guardianship funds by using said funds to renovate property not owned by Phillips' estate; $3,832.78 for using guardianship funds to pay her mortgage; and $29,184.63 for the unaccounted balance of a down payment from the sale of estate property located at 132-140 Herkimer Street in Brooklyn. Based on these surcharges, Judge Ambrosio granted the Phillips estate a judgment against respondent for $403,148.86, plus interest, and found that respondent forfeited all right to compensation due to the breach of her fiduciary duty.
The court rejected the attorney's claims:
At the hearing, respondent testified that her misconduct was the result of mistakes, and that there was no intent to defraud. Respondent acknowledged that she has not paid any of the $403,148.86 in surcharges imposed against her because, in her view, despite Justice Ambrosio's finding that she was not entitled to compensation, she is owed approximately $700,000 from Judge Phillip's estate based on quantum meruit. As evidence in aggravation, the Committee introduced a 2004 Admonition respondent received for improperly notarizing a surrender agreement in a real estate matter, and claimed that respondent engaged in the practice of law while suspended and lacked remorse for her misconduct.
An attorney who had misappropriated (that is to say, stole) insurance proceeds meant to pay for medical care of a severely injured client was disbarred by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The client had been struck by a car traveling a 50 miles per hour while raking leaves.
The client's family was forced to sue him after he delayed payment. The attorney also provided false documentation concerning his handling of the settlement proceeds.
This kind of situation is one where I would hope the bar's client security trust fund would make the victim whole. with full interest. (Mike frisch)
Thursday, November 21, 2013
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has ordered disbarment of an attorney convicted of obstruction of justice and other offenses.
The court held that the crime inherently involves moral turpitude, for which disbarment is mandated under governing federal statute.
Huffpost Crime had details of the offenses in this June 2012 post:
A U.S. lawyer who worked for some of the country's most prestigious firms was sentenced on Monday to a record 12 years jail for an insider trading scheme which lasted 17 years and netted more than $37 million between 1994 and 2011.
Matthew Kluger's sentence is the longest ever handed down in an insider trading case and is one year longer than the 11 year jail term imposed last year on Galleon Group hedge fund founder Raj Rajaratnam for insider trading charges.
Kluger was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Katharine Hayden of Newark federal court. Hayden also sentenced stock trader Garrett Bauer to nine-years jail for his role in the scheme and a third person, Kenneth Robinson, is scheduled to be sentenced on Tuesday.
"The severe sentences imposed today are a warning to anyone trying to game the financial markets for their own enrichment," said New Jersey U.S. Attorney Paul Fishman in a statement.
An attorney for Kluger said he planned to appeal against the sentence. "It is unduly harsh and fails to reflect that Mr Kluger received only a fraction of the proceeds from the offense," said attorney Alan Zegas.
An attorney for Bauer did not return a call seeking comment.
Federal prosecutors and securities regulators accused the trio of trading on inside information ahead of at least 11 corporate deals.
The three men used merger secrets gathered by Kluger while he worked as a corporate attorney for prominent law firms, including Cravath Swaine & Moore; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; and Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati.
In one instance, Kluger tipped Robinson on Oracle Corp's impending acquisition of Sun Microsystems Inc in 2009. In another, the trio traded ahead of Intel Corp's takeover of McAfee Inc in 2010.
Bauer kept the majority of the proceeds, using some of the profits to buy a $6.65-million condominium on Manhattan's Upper East Side and an $875,000 home in Boca Raton, Florida.
Robinson acted as a middleman between Kluger and Bauer in an elaborate scheme that involved the use of public payphones and prepaid disposable cell phones in an attempt to hide their activities from law enforcement. Prosecutors said the men netted more than $37 million between 1994 and 2011.
The three men have agreed to pay back their ill-gotten gains plus interest. Bauer agreed to pay $31.6 million, Kluger will pay $516,000 and Robinson settled for $845,000, an amount regulators said reflected his willingness to aid authorities.
Both Bauer and Kluger pleaded guilty in December to one count each of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering and obstruction of justice. Robinson pleaded guilty in April 2011 to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and two counts of securities fraud.
While the court noted that the concept of moral turpitude is not subject to precise definition, obstruction of justice fits comfortably into the court's jurisprudence that defines the concept. (Mike Frisch)
An attorney who had cashed four refund checks from courts that were client funds was indefinitely suspended by the Ohio Supreme Court.
The bar matter arose after his legal assistant sent him an e-mail inquiring about a refund check for $2,644.74 from the Lorain County Court. He was confronted by two of his law firm partners, had no satisfactory explanation, and was fired:
He was escorted back to his office and then was escorted out of the building with only his briefcase; he was not permitted to remove any other items from his office.
The attorney remitted the amount of the check and the firm filed a bar grievance. Three other instances of similar conduct were uncovered. One involved a $5 check.
The other misconduct involved the attorney's failure to pay for five CLE seminars. He had attended seminars and told bar staff that he had preregistered and prepaid. In fact, he had not. He claimed credit for the seminars and bounced checks for two sessions.
He eventually paid by bank check and explained that he was employed as a golf caddy and that his cash flow was "pretty tight."
The disciplinary panel found that the CLE situation amounted to theft of services.
The court agreed. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, November 20, 2013
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has denied reinstatement to an attorney disbarred in 2007 for conviction in a health care fraud.
The court concluded that there were "multiple deficiencies" in his reinstatement effort.
Perhaps the most concerning factor to this Court is that there is no question that Golden, at the time he engaged in the underlying scheme, was a bright, talented, up-and-coming professional who had to understand that his misconduct made a hypocrisy of the legal profession. Based on their knowledge of the applicant during the period when the misconduct occurred, without exception, the judges and fellow attorneys testifying on Golden's behalf praised his legal skills, his learning of the law, and the way he presented himself in the courtroom, in negotiations with fellow attorneys, and to the public. Each and every individual thought that the applicant presented himself as an outstanding representative of the profession. At the same time these opinions were being formed, Golden was both participating in an unethical and illegal scheme and in law-related activities which undoubtedly made him hyper-sensitive to the criminal activities he participated in and facilitated.
The court allowed for the possibly of reinstatement in the future.
The disbarment order is linked here. (Mike Frisch)
Another summary of a recent bar sanction from North Carolina:
In 2005 Rex Gore of Shallotte was the elected district attorney in the 13th prosecutorial district. He entered into an agreement to hire Elaine Kelley of Linden to serve as a senior assistant district attorney. In addition to salary, Gore and Kelley agreed that Kelley would be compensated by reimbursement of mileage she did not incur. After entering into this agreement, Kelley submitted 63 expense reports containing false certifications of mileage and received purported reimbursement of $14,190.39 for mileage she had not driven. Gore pled guilty to the criminal charge of willful failure to discharge the duties of his office. As part of his plea agreement, he was suspended for six months by the Brunswick County Superior Court.
The North Carolina State Bar web page reports a recent disbarment:
[An attorney] of Hickory pled guilty in Catawba County Superior Court to two counts of misdemeanor communicating threats and one count of common law obstruction of justice. The DHC concluded that he engaged in a sexual relationship with a client who was a victim of domestic violence; asked the client to lie and deny the sexual relationship so [he] could defend against an alienation of affection lawsuit threatened by the client’s husband; when she refused to lie, threatened the client with using information he had obtained during the attorney-client relationship to cause her to lose custody of her children; threatened to kill his legal secretary after she refused to lie about her knowledge of the sexual relationship; filed a verified complaint in support of a frivolous lawsuit against his client alleging falsely that he did not have a sexual relationship with the client and alleging that the client defamed him by saying otherwise; revealed confidential client information in the defamation lawsuit; and made false statements to the Grievance Committee. The DHC announced its decision to disbar [him].
A criminal defense attorney had been publicly reprimanded by the Wisconsin Supreme Court for ethics violations in the repesentation of clients.
The court agreed with the referee that a non-suspensory sanction was appropriate notwithstanding a prior private reprimand:
The referee acknowledges that Attorney...previously received a private reprimand, but noted the misconduct in this case occurred at a time when Attorney...faced multiple outside pressures including dissolution of his small law firm, divorce, financial pressures, and an excessive caseload. The referee explicitly noted that "[f]rom the testimony, these pressures and distractions are behind him." The referee noted that character witnesses described Attorney...as a highly experienced criminal lawyer who is "competent, dignified and respected." The referee was mindful that "[a] suspension at this time and the resulting closure of his sole practitioner office for several months could be devastating to his law practice." We agree.
The court ordered that the attorney make restitution to a client and pay full costs of his bar prosecution. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, November 19, 2013
The Delaware Supreme Court approved the recommendation of its Board on Professional Responsibility and imposed a public reprimand of an attorney.
One unusual aspect of the court's order: the attorney must either seek inactive status within 30 days or undergo a mental health evaluation and monitoring by the Bar's treatment program.
He must also pay late fees to the Continuing Legal Education Committee and costs of the disciplinary prosecution.
The disciplinary problems stemmed primarily from failure to complete CLE obligations and a false registration statement. (Mike Frisch)
A decision from the Ohio Supreme Court is summarized by Chris Davey on the court's web page:
Gallia County Common Pleas Court Judge David Dean Evans has received a one-year stayed suspension from the Ohio Supreme Court for failing to disqualify himself from a case in which he had a conflict with defense counsel.
In a 5-2 per curium decision (not authored by any particular justice) announced today, the court rejected the sanction of a six-month stayed suspension that has been recommended by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline and instead imposed a full year stayed suspensions.
Robert W. Bright practiced before Judge Evans representing indigent criminal defendants for the Gallia County public-defender commission. In the case that resulted in this disciplinary complaint, Bright represented a defendant who had initially agreed to enter into a plea agreement but later changed his mind during the plea hearing before Judge Evans. Moments later, the defendant changed his mind again, and Judge Evans refused to accept the plea. Three days later, Judge Evans again refused to accept the plea agreement even though Bright and the county prosecutor jointly agreed to it.
Bright then filed an 18-page motion requesting that Judge Evans accept the plea agreement and stating that the judge’s refusal to do so was “an abuse of discretion” and “unreasonable and/or arbitrary and/or unconscionable.” Bright also criticized some of Judge Evans’s other courtroom practices.
Judge Evans issued an entry overruling Bright’s motion and removing Bright as counsel in the matter. The entry stated in part:
The Court finds that while Defense Counsel’s attitude toward the Court as expressed in the instant motion may not rise to the level of Professional Misconduct or to the level of being contemptuous, it certainly is not acceptable behavior. By such conduct he has created conflict with the Court whereby in this case or for that matter any other case in the future, when he does not agree with a decision or ruling by the Court, instead of being critical by accusation of being arbitrary, unreasonable, unconscionable or of abusing discretion, he simply may accuse the court of being bias [sic] or prejudice [sic] as it relates to him. The Court must not only avoid any impropriety, bias or prejudice but must avoid any appearance of such. The expressions and attitudes of Defense Counsel as exhibited and announced in the instant motion toward this Court compromises [sic] the Court’s ability to avoid any appearance of bias [or] prejudice, or to be fair and impartial as it relates to Defense Counsel regardless [of] how hard it tries or what strides it makes toward guaranteeing that there would be no bias, prejudice and that it would be fair and impartial.
Judge Evans subsequently filed entries removing Bright as appointed counsel in 63 other criminal cases—even though none of the defendants in any case had requested Bright’s removal as their counsel. The entry in each case stated that “Attorney Robert W. Bright is relieved of further obligation due to the conflict he has created with the Court” and “due to the Court’s inquiry to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio regarding Mr. Bright’s conduct.”
Judge Evans’s actions removed Bright’s entire caseload, and within a month of the judge’s entries, the Gallia County public defender terminated Bright’s employment, reasoning that it had “no other options,” since Bright could not practice in Judge Evans’s courtroom. Disciplinary counsel ultimately decided against filing any charges against Bright based on Judge Evans’s grievance.
The Ohio State Bar Association brought a complaint against Judge Evans. The parties submitted a consent-to-discipline agreement recommending that Judge Evans be publicly reprimanded. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline rejected the agreement and remanded the matter for further proceedings before a three-member panel of the board. On remand, the parties waived a hearing and submitted stipulations of fact and misconduct and jointly recommended a stayed six-month suspension. The panel, and later the board, adopted the parties’ stipulations and recommended sanction. No objections were filed before the Supreme Court.
All parties agreed that Judge Evans’s conduct violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 (requiring a judge to disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including circumstances in which a judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s counsel) and Gov.Bar R. V(11)(E) (requiring that all proceedings and documents relating to review and investigation of grievances be private).
In today’s decision, the court wrote: “Given the judge’s serious ethical violations and the significant harm caused by his misconduct, we impose a fully stayed one-year suspension … Accordingly, Judge David Dean Evans is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he commit no misconduct during the suspension. If Judge Evans fails to meet this condition, the stay will be lifted and Judge Evans will serve the entire one-year suspension. Costs are taxed to Judge Evans.”
Joining in the majority were Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor and Justices Judith Ann Lanzinger, Sharon L. Kennedy, Judith L. French, and William M. O’Neill.
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer wrote a dissenting opinion in which he said that Judge Evans faces a particular set of challenges as a judge in a smaller jurisdiction that should be taken into account in setting the sanction in this case.
“When a judge in a large county has an irreconcilable conflict with an attorney, that attorney’s cases can be assigned to another judge. In smaller counties, especially those like Gallia County that have only one judge in the general division of the court, that simple resolution is not possible,” Justice Pfeifer wrote. “In the circumstances before us, it is more sensible for the attorney to give way than the judge. Judge Evans was elected by the people of Gallia County to serve as their sole judge; however highly skilled, attorney Bright is an at-will employee. Surely, when an irreconcilable conflict prevents them from working on cases, the elected judge should supersede the at-will employee.” Justice Pfeifer said he would impose the original sanction of a public reprimand that had been agreed to by the parties.
Justice Terrence O’Donnell indicated that he would impose the six-month stayed suspension that the parties agreed to after the case was remanded.
The opinion is linked here. (Mike Frisch)
An attorney convicted of federal felonies was disbarred by the New York Appellate Division for the Fourth Judicial Department:
Respondent, as in-house counsel to two investment firms, participated in a fraudulent investment scheme that resulted in investor losses exceeding $6 million. This Court has repeatedly held that, "when an attorney uses his law license to commit crimes and to aid another in the commission of crimes, the appropriate sanction is disbarment."
The court found no substantial mitigating factors. (Mike Frisch)
Monday, November 18, 2013
An attorney who ran for a circuit court judge position has been charged with running a false advertisment by the Illinois Administrator:
Between 1980 and 1995, [the attorney's opponent] Judge Lopinot was a part-time public defender for the St. Clair County Public Defender's office, and he had no supervisory duties over other part-time or full-time defenders in that office.
The front side of Respondent's campaign mailer referred to a 1989 case in St. Clair County in which Rodney Woitdke ("Woidtke") had been convicted of murder. The mailer stated that Woidtke spent 12 years in prison for a murder that he did not commit, and it cited an opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court for 5th Judicial District in 2000 that reversed the denial of Woidtke's post-conviction petition and remanded for his case for a new trial, on the basis of a conflict of interest on the part Woidtke's trial counsel, then-Assistant Public Defender Brian Trentman ("Trentman"). Respondent's mailer then stated the following:
"Supervising Public Defender VINCENT J. LOPINOT and his Assistant, Brian Trentman ‘were NEGLIGENT in their representation of Mr. Woidtke in a 1989 criminal proceeding that resulted in his wrongful conviction of murder of Audrey Cardenas.' (Source: Woidtke v. St. Clair County, St. Clair Public Defenders Office, Brian K. Trentman and Vincent Lopinot, No. 02-4223, May 2003) (sic)"
In the above-quoted text, Judge Lopinot's name was in a very large font and all capital letters, while Trentman's name was in a very small font and with only the first letters capitalized. See Exhibit One.
On the mailer, accompanying the above-quoted text, was a photograph of Judge Lopinot that bore the epigraph "NEGLIGENT" and was imposed over a larger photograph of a man whose wrists and mouth were bound with duct tape. See Exhibit One.
Respondent's representations that Judge Lopinot had supervised Trentman in the Woidtke case, and that Judge Lopinot was negligent in the case, were false. Judge Lopinot had no involvement in the Woidtke case in 1989.
Respondent knew that his representations that Judge Lopinot had supervised Trentman in the Woidtke case, and that Judge Lopinot was negligent in the case, were false, or he made the representations with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.
Judgepedia reports that Judge Lopinet nonetheless prevailed. . (Mike Frisch)
An Illinois attorney is alleged to have engaged in a sexual relationship with a court-appointed criminal client and then lied about it to a judge and the Bar.
The complaint alleges that the attorney served as the Marion County Public Defender and was appointed to represent a client who was placed on probation with participation in a treatment program.
The sexual relationship is alleged to have started after the client went into treatment. The attorney thereafter represented her in revocation proceedings.
When allegations surfaced, the complaint alleges
...Judge Mark Stedelin, the resident Circuit Judge of Marion County, and Judge S. Gene Schwarm, the Chief Judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, met with Respondent and confronted him with information they had received about Respondent’s relationship with [the client].
During the meeting, Respondent denied having sexual relations with [the client] while [her] case was pending in Drug Court, and told the judges that he began sexual relations with her shortly after she was released from the Illinois Department of Corrections in April 2012.
Respondent’s statement that he did not have sexual relations with [the client] while her case was pending, and that he began sexual relations with [her] in April 2012 was false, in that Respondent began sexual relations with [her] in September 2011, while he was her counsel in case number [redacted]
Respondent knew his statements were false.
On April 22, 2013, Respondent formally resigned his position as Marion County Public Defender.
The petition states that his later false statements to the ARDC were corrected by a truthful affidavit.
Observation: I am a tireless (if often ignored) advocate for transparency in bar discipline and often cite Illinois as a prime example of one of the very best web pages in that regard.
Having said that, Illinois may be the only place where the allegations of misconduct are too detailed. Here, I have redacted the name of the client and question whether the client should be identified by name or case number.
Further, I note that the charges include this:
At the time the sexual relationship began, Respondent was 54 years old and [the client] was 23 years old.
That fact, if proven, may be relevant. Does it need to appear in the charging document? (Mike Frisch)