Friday, December 6, 2013
The Iowa Supreme Court has suspended an attorney for at least one year, noting that he was "[n]ot the first Iowa lawyer who has become entangled in a deception with ostensible Nigerian connections."
The attorney had arranged for five clients to advance funds for a person who claimed to be the heir to a fortune. Charges that the attorney knowingly participated in the fraud were withdrawn.
Notably, among the violations found were lack of competence.
The court noted that a "cursory" search of the Internet would have alerted the attorney to the likelihood of a scam. (Mike Frisch)
Thursday, December 5, 2013
The Florida Supreme Court has rejected as unduly lenient a proposed 90-day suspension and instead ordered a one-year suspension for an attorney's misconduct in an immigration matter and subsequent malpractice suit:
Here, Respondent accepted a substantial fee from his client but did not perform notable work in furtherance of that representation. He also misused his client's funds by twice traveling to Brazil, once for no apparent case-related reason and once as unnecessary to obtain the information sought.
He also failed to ciommunicate with the clients. In the malpractice case, he failed to produce documents, did not appear for a deposition and filed frivolous interrogatory responses.
The court also held that denying costs to the Bar was an abuse of discretion. (Mike Frisch)
The Virginia State Bar is calling for comments on a new Rule 5.8, dealing with law firm departures.
The new rule would provide
a) Absent a specific agreement otherwise:
(1) Neither a lawyer who is leaving a law firm nor other lawyers in the firm shall unilaterally contact clients of the law firm for purposes of notifying them about the anticipated departure or to solicit representation of the clients unless, after bona fide negotiations, the lawyer and an authorized representative of the law firm have been unable to agree on a joint communication to the clients concerning the lawyer leaving the law firm; and
(2) A lawyer in a dissolving law firm shall not unilaterally contact clients of the law firm unless, after bona fide negotiations, authorized members of the law firm have been unable to agree on a method to provide notice to clients.
(b) When no procedure for contacting clients has been agreed upon:contain false or misleading statements, and shall give notice to the clients that the lawyer is leaving the law firm and provide options to the clients to choose to remain a client of the law firm, to choose representation by the departing lawyer, or to choose representation by other lawyers or law firms; and
(2) Unilateral contact by members of a dissolving law firm shall not contain false or misleading statements, and shall give notice to clients that the firm is being dissolved and provide options to the clients to choose representation by any member of the dissolving law firm, or representation by other lawyers or law firms.
(c) In all instances, notice to the clients shall provide information concerning potential liability for fees for legal services previously rendered, costs expended, and how any deposits for fees or costs will be handled.
(d) In the event that a client of a departing lawyer fails to advise the lawyer and law firm of the client’s intention with regard to who is to provide future legal services, the client shall be deemed to remain a client of the law firm until the client advises otherwise.
(e) In the event that a client of a dissolving law firm fails to advise the lawyers of the client’s intention with regard to who is to provide future legal services, the client shall be deemed to remain a client of the lawyer who primarily provided legal services to the client on behalf of the firm until the client advises otherwise.
A recent complaint filed by the Illinois Administrator alleges:
In late December 2012, Respondent traveled to California to visit some friends for the New Year’s holiday. During the visit, Respondent purchased 7.25 pounds of "sour diesel" marijuana from a friend, two pounds of which he intended to distribute to other friends in Illinois and a friend in Denver who had given Respondent money for the purchase. Sometime after January 1, 2013, Respondent began traveling from California in his grey Subaru Outback to his residence in Mount Morris, Illinois.
At or about 9:40 a.m. on January 3, 2013, Respondent was traveling eastbound on Interstate 80 through Winnemucca, Nevada, with the 7.25 pounds of marijuana, referred to in paragraph one, above, in his car. At that time, Respondent was stopped by the Humboldt County Sheriff’s office for speeding.
When approached by the officer, Respondent handed him the vehicle registration and his business card, which identified Respondent as an attorney. The officer smelled marijuana in Respondent’s car and asked Respondent if he could search the vehicle. Respondent denied the officer’s request. When the officer then explained that he had a drug-sniffing dog in his car, Respondent stated that he did not have any drugs in the car.
Respondent’s statement to the officer was false. As Respondent knew, he was carrying 7.25 pounds of marijuana in his car and his statements and refusal to consent to a search were intended to conceal from the officer that he had 7.25 pounds of marijuana in his car.
The officer then brought a trained drug-sniffing dog from his police car and walked the dog around the perimeter of Respondent’s car. The officer told Respondent that the dog had detected marijuana in Respondent’s car. The officer then asked Respondent if his car contained drugs, to which Respondent stated, "not that I know of." The officer asked Respondent again if he could search the car and Respondent consented to a search of two pieces of luggage in his car but not to a search of the entire car.
Respondent’s statement to the officer that he did not know if his car contained drugs was false. As Respondent knew, he was carrying 7.25 pounds of marijuana in his car and his statements and refusal to consent to a full search were intended to conceal from the officer that he had 7.25 pounds of marijuana in his car.
The officer then obtained a warrant by phone to search Respondent’s entire vehicle. After searching the vehicle, the officer found a vacuum-sealing machine, supplies for the machine, vacuum-sealed brownies containing marijuana and eight separate vacuum-sealed bags of marijuana (totaling 7.25 pounds of marijuana) and $1,050 in cash. The officer then arrested Respondent.
On or about January 8, 2013, the Humboldt County District Attorney charged Respondent in the Justice’s Court of Union Township, Humboldt County, Nevada, with a felony count of transporting a controlled substance, and another felony count of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of sale. (State of Nevada v. Richard C. Folk, case number 13 CR 00016) A copy of the complaint is attached as Exhibit One.
On January 24, 2013, the Humboldt County District Attorney filed an amended complaint against Respondent which dismissed both felony counts described in paragraph seven, above, and charged Respondent instead with one misdemeanor count of possession of marijuana. On or about February 15, 2013, Respondent pled guilty in case number 13 CR 00016 to possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor, in violation of NRS 453.336(4)(a) and agreed to forfeit ownership of his Subaru to the Humboldt County District Attorney’s office.
On March 26, Judge Letty Norcutt entered an order in case number 13 CR 00016 sentencing Respondent to 19 days in jail with credit for time served, and ordered Respondent to pay a $250 fine. A copy of the docketing sheet order entry is attached as Exhibit Two.
Obviously, there are serious disciplinary violations here if the alleged facts are proven.
Notably, the Administrator alleges that lying to the police violated Rule 4.1. As the rule requires that the false statement be "in connection with the representation of a client," that may be an overcharge. (Mike Frisch)
From the web page of the Ohio Supreme Court:
The Ohio Supreme Court today determined that a former law school student and a real estate appraiser who are not attorneys engaged in the practice of law without being admitted to the bar or having appropriate certification.
One-time law student pretended to be an attorney and a legal intern Paige N. Casey was a law student at the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law until October 2010 when she was dismissed. She neither completed her law degree nor has ever been admitted to practice law in Ohio.
The next year, when Casey’s friend Jeremy Fishman received a traffic ticket, Casey told him she was an attorney and took his case. Despite being questioned by the Euclid assistant city prosecutor and a Euclid Municipal Court judge about whether she was legally authorized to represent Fishman, she contended that she was a certified legal intern who met the requirements to represent clients, and she continued to work on the case. Casey also filed a plea identifying herself as Fishman’s attorney and used email signatures listing the lawyer designation “J.D.” after her name.
In today’s unanimous decision, the court adopted the report of the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law and found that Casey engaged in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) because she provided legal services without being admitted or certified to practice law and she falsely represented to others that she was permitted to practice law.
“The evidence before us clearly demonstrates that Casey provided advice regarding a legal matter, prepared and filed legal pleadings, and attempted to communicate with opposing counsel on behalf of Fishman,” the per curiam (not authored by a specific justice) opinion stated. “The evidence also demonstrates that Casey held herself out as a licensed attorney to Fishman and that she represented to … employees of the Euclid Municipal Court that she had the authority to practice law as a certified legal intern.”
The court barred Casey from providing legal services and conveying, indirectly or directly, that she is authorized to perform those services in Ohio, unless she is admitted to practice law in the state. In addition, the court fined her $1,000 plus costs.
Consultant not permitted to cross-examine witnesses at property tax hearings
In a second UPL case, the court unanimously held that a real estate appraiser who questioned a witness during a hearing of the Wayne County Board of Revision had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
John D. Cleminshaw, who is not an attorney, was hired by the board of revision as a consultant appraiser. During a hearing before the board, Cleminshaw cross-examined a witness who appraised an Orville Shopping Center.
The UPL board recommended that the court adopt a proposed consent decree, which is a judgment that all the parties in a case agree to. The decree states that Cleminshaw was unaware he was improperly practicing law at the hearing, he has not repeated such conduct since he was informed of the investigation in January 2011, he cooperated fully with the investigation, and he harmed no third parties by his actions. Cleminshaw agreed that he will not question witnesses or take part in any other UPL activities during future board of revision hearings. The decree notes that Cleminshaw is permitted to act as a consultant to the board of revision, give advice to board members, and attend the board’s hearings.
The court, in a per curiam opinion, approved the consent decree.
Wednesday, December 4, 2013
The Illinois Administrator has charged a prosecutor with improper appeals to racial prejudice in a criminal case.
The defendant and the victim were African-American. All of the jurors were Caucasian.
From the prosecutor's opening statement
"And you will see, ladies and gentlemen, that there are some, not all-there are many good people in the black community, but basically you will see that there are a few in the black community who refuse to cooperate with the police even when a murder happens right under their nose, and those people have a habit of intimidating, harassing, sometimes threatening anybody who they think is cooperating with the police. That’s what makes this case so difficult, ladies and gentlemen."
And from the closing
But I think what is most crucial in deciding this case, in deciding the credibility of Jodie Lacy and Crystal Blye, and in deciding most of the other issues in this case, is to understand the culture of the black community here in Marion.
"Please, you have to keep in the back of your mind how many people in that community feel about law enforcement. You have to understand and keep in mind how they react to the police and to the prosecutors. Sometimes for people like us, that’s hard to understand. People were brought up to believe that the police were their friends; that when something happens, when we are in trouble, that the police are our friends. And that’s where we go to get help from is the police when bad things happen.
"But in the black community here in Marion, it’s just the opposite. Most-for whatever reasons, most of these people were raised to believe that the police and prosecutors are the enemy; that for some reason, we are always out to get them. In their mindset, the biggest sin that you could-that you can commit is to be a snitch in the community. The biggest sin that you could commit is to ever cooperate with the police on anything. It’s a sin to even cooperate when one of your own people gets brutally gunned down and is left to bleed to death.
"And I am not saying that the whole black community is like that, ladies and gentlemen. There are some very good law[-]abiding citizens in that community here in Marion. But the evidence has shown that again, for whatever reasons, there is an intense dislike and even hatred for the police. And this group of people who feel that way make it extremely hard on the people who are law-abiding and want to do what is right and who are willing to come forward and give information that they have when a crime has been committed . . .
"Now, in our white world, ladies and gentlemen, our automatic reaction in that type of situation, if somebody gives a statement to the police and then later on changes their story, the automatic response would be that that person is not trustful and that there is a problem with their credibility.
"But again, please look at their testimony and what they did and what they didn’t do through the eyes of the people who are raised, again, to feel that the police are always against them and that they cannot trust the police."
The first degree murder conviction was reversed
On September 13, 2013, the Fifth District Appellate Court issued its opinion in Marshall’s case, 2013 IL App (5th) 110430. In the opinion, the Appellate Court reversed Marshall’s conviction, finding that the State’s "use of race was an egregious and consistent theme throughout the trial," and finding that Marshall had been denied the right to a fair trial.
The Appellate Court decision is linked here.
Remarkably, defense counsel raised no objection to the racially inflammatory arguments.
The Appellate Division condemned the injection of race prejudice into the case, noting a 1977 decision where a conviction was reversed when a prosecutor made similar references to "white society" in a criminal prosecution.
The accused is the elected States Attorney for Williamson County. The linked Wikipedia page has these numbers from 2000 for the county:
The racial makeup of the county was 95.34% White, 2.49% Black or African American, 0.27% Native American, 0.50% Asian, 0.03% Pacific Islander, 0.38% from other races, and 0.98% from two or more races. 1.24% of the population were Hispanic or Latino of any race. 18.1% were of German, 18.1% American, 13.7% English, 12.9% Irish and 6.6% Italian ancestry.
"Our White World" indeed. (Mike Frisch)
An attorney admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, but not in Delaware, was suspended for one year by the Delaware Supreme Court.
The attorney had engaged in unauthorized practice in representing approximately 75 personal-injury plaintiffs in Delaware.
The attorney met the clients in a doctors office and never advertised or solicited for Delaware clients, which comprized about 10-15% of his practice. He either settled the cases or had suit filed by Delaware counsel. He never actually appeared in a Delaware court or pleading.
The court rejected the attorney's claim that he should have been prosecuted by the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law rather than the Board on Professional Responsibility. The court also rejected claims that the sanctions recommended violated Equal Protection and the "goals of attorney discipline."
The order also prohibits the attorney from providing advice to any Delaware clients for a year and seeking pro hac admission for three years.
The court noted that there was "no harm" to any client. (Mike Frisch)
The web page of the District of Columbia Bar has an announcement
The D.C. Bar Web site will get a new look later this month. With its streamlined navigation, new online storefront, and improved search features, the site provides Bar members and the public greater access to important legal information.
The dynamic visual design will point users toward the latest, most relevant news and offer a more interactive experience while conducting legal research, registering for their next course, or searching for pro bono opportunities around the District of Columbia.
In addition, the new Marketplace serves as a one-stop shop for members to buy or download materials made available from some Continuing Legal Education and Sections programming, and numerous publications such as the Practice Manual. Users also can register for events in one easy transaction.
Need information while waiting on the platform for the Metro? No problem. The new site renders in a mobile-friendly interface to make browsing seamless on any device, from your tablet to your smartphone.
I hope that the new design will provide ready access to all public information regarding the disciplinary process.
For starters, there should be links to all charges and responses. This information is clearly public but not available on the present web page. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, December 3, 2013
An attorney who instructed his support staff to sign and falsely notarize his name to multiple affidavits in mortgage foreclosure filings was suspended for 90 days by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Judge Adkins concurred and dissented, concluding that the misconduct was somewhat less serious than in a prior case where an attorney had not reviewed falsely signed affividavits. Here, the attorney had reviewed each documents.
Judge Adkins noted the volume of false affidavits and the attorney's "cavalier" attitude. (Mike Frisch)
There is an interesting recent report of the District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility directing Bar Counsel to informally admonish an attorney for neglect of a client matter.
The attorney had agreed to act as local counsel as a favor to a friend, who was later disbarred. The underlying civil case was dismissed. The client complained to Bar Counsel.
In the disciplinary case, the attorney contended that the "local counsel" status did not create an attorney-client relationship and that, as a result, there could be no ethical violation. The Board firmly rejected the suggestion that the attorney's local counsel status in any manner diminshed his ethical obligations to the client.
The Board also rejected a number of procedural objections, only one of which is worthy of note.
He claimed a right to voir dire the hearing committee members as to possible bias. The board held that he had no right to use a voir dire procedure to inquire about possible bias.
I do wonder how much information is made available to accused attorneys about the lawyers and laypersons who act as their judges. While perhaps voir dire is not the answer, I believe that the disciplinary system has an obligation to make available sufficient information concerning the professional backgrounds of hearing committee and board members to both the public and attorneys charged with offenses.
I also favor greater transparency on the selection process for hearing committee positions, as they inevitably are the group from which Board on Professional Responsibility members are chosen.
The attorney was admitted in 1967 and had no prior discipline. One of his character witnesses was Thomas Henderson, who hired me as an Assistant Bar Counsel in 1984.
The case is In re Thomas Fortune Fay and can be accessed at this link. (Mike Frisch)
Monday, December 2, 2013
The web page of the illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission reports recent disbarments of two former state prosecutors.
Mr. Hogan, who was licensed in Illinois in 2008, was disbarred. While employed as an assistant state’s attorney in Carroll County, he pursued a personal relationship with a 19-year-old woman he had prosecuted as a criminal defendant. He also pursued a personal relationship with a 17-year-old girl who was the victim in a child pornography case he prosecuted on behalf of the State, and he engaged in criminal conduct with the victim. He did not participate in his disciplinary hearing. He was suspended on an interim basis on March 28, 2013.
Mr. Terronez, who was licensed in 1997, was disbarred. While serving as the State’s Attorney of Rock Island County, he furnished alcohol to a minor and then lied to police authorities who were investigating the matter. The minor had been the victim of sexual assault by one of her teachers. Mr. Terronez had prosecuted the girl’s teacher but then began a personal relationship with the girl that included sending her sexually-charged text messages. He was suspended on an interim basis on October 12, 2011.
The Illinois Review Board has recommended a six-month suspension with reinstatement only on further court order in a matter involving frivolous litigation and false accusations against a judge in a post-dissolution matter.
The board noted that it had vacated a default and remanded the matter on the issue of sanctions:
The remand provided the Respondent the opportunity to explain his conduct and provide some assurances that he can conform his conduct to appropriate standards. This he did not do. Instead he would have us assume that he will. Unfortunately, there is no basis for such an assumption. Like the Hearing Board, we conclude that the Respondent was gaming the system. His answers to the Complaint were not forthright, his failure to show up for the hearing and his failure to follow-up promptly after he did not show up, are clear indications that he does not value his professional responsibilities. We are also troubled by the motion he filed after the first hearing in which he suggested he was discharged to bed rest for ten days when in fact, he was discharged in good condition, with no instructions and physical findings no worse than a "dry cough."
This type of active disregard of this process is not something that precedent shows should be tolerated.
An attorney who had failed to timely advise his clients in a guardianship matter of criminal charges against him was suspended for three years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
...just one day prior to the guardianship hearing, Attorney Moore finally advised M.K. and B.K. of the criminal charges against him, although he told them that the charges were unfounded. Given the lack of time prior to the guardianship hearing, M.K. and B.K. were unable to make a fully informed decision on whether they should continue to be represented by Attorney Moore or hire a different attorney to replace him.
Later that same day, Attorney Moore advised M.K. and B.K. that he was too emotionally distraught to be able to represent them at the guardianship hearing the next day. He then filed a motion to adjourn the hearing, claiming that the filing of the criminal complaint and other occurrences had caused him to suffer a temporary mental condition that was impairing his ability to represent his clients. The circuit court granted the motion and rescheduled the hearing...
The criminal charges involved the attorney's attempt to purchase marijuana from a client, about which the court expressed concern
Attorney Moore's ethical violations are serious breaches of his obligations as an attorney. Not only did he conspire with another to violate the criminal law of this state, he directed his own client, a young man already facing multiple criminal charges, to break the law again to serve Attorney Moore's own personal cravings. Instead of helping his client to gain a respect for the laws of this state, Attorney Moore demonstrated to his young client his own disdain for the rule of law. Moreover, when confronted by his client's parents, Attorney Moore lied to them, first by essentially claiming that his client was a liar and then by trying to spin a story of an alleged "good faith buy" to cover his own criminal acts. In the other matter, Attorney Moore showed a troubling lack of diligence to address a clear problem that he had caused. His failure to take relatively simple steps to cure the jurisdictional defect his premature filing had caused cost his clients their opportunity to seek a legal role in the upbringing of their granddaughter. A lengthy suspension, with the accompanying requirement that Attorney Moore must prove his character and fitness to resume the practice of law, is an appropriate result of this professional misconduct.
The attorney had given $400 to his eighteen-year-old client for an ounce.
The client (who was charged with several felonies and out on bond) told his employer and his father of the deal. The father confronted the attorney and found new counsel for his son. (Mike Frisch)
An attorney who had been suspended and reinstated was disbarred by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
The attorney had neglected matters, lied to her clients and demanded fee payments knowing that the clients' matters had not been pursued.
The court: "[the attorney] was intentionally deceitful, woefully incompetent, and otherwise in flagrant disregard of several [ethical eules]. These circumstances - combined with her failure to turn over a new leaf since her previous suspension and reinstatement - convinces us that the public would be at risk if [she] were to continue to practice law in Maryland." (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, November 27, 2013
An attorney was suspended for two years and a day by the Oklahoma Supreme Court as a result of a drug conviction.
NewsOK reported on the situation:
Soderstrom's eight-year sentence was deferred, pending successful completion of Lincoln County Drug Court, the state Supreme Court said.
Soderstrom was accepted into the drug court on Nov. 24, 2012, and less than a month later tested positive for methamphetamine, the state Supreme Court said.
Soderstrom told a professional responsibility tribunal that he visited friends he thought were “clean,” but found them smoking methamphetamine when he arrived. Soderstrom told the tribunal he put the pipe in his mouth, but did not light it, resulting in the positive drug test.
A couple of months later, on Feb. 13, Soderstrom showed up at the drug court under the influence of Percocet without a prescription, the state Supreme Court said.
The court imposed the suspension so that the attorney could establish a sustained period of recovery prior to any reinstatement effort. (Mike Frisch)
An attorney who engaged in a pattern of bad faith litigation tactics and false allegations against judicial officers and others was indefinitely suspended with no possibility of reinstatement for nine months by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
The court rejected a referee's findings that the attorney's cooperation and lack of prior discipline were mitigating factors.
The conduct took place over eleven filings in five matters on behalf of a single client - the Dr. R.C. Samanta Roy Institute of Science and Technology.
Among other allegations, the attorney called a Wisconsin judge part of a "secretive racist society."
The pleadings also made reference to "black robed bigots," "dirty Catholics," and compared the justice the client received to justice meted out to Jews by Hitler.
The Southern Poverty Law Center has information about the underlying dispute.
Above the Law had this earlier coverage. (Mike Frisch)
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department imposed a public censure as reciprocal discipline for an attorney's deficient handling of immigration appeals before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
In or about November 2007, the Second Circuit directed respondent to show cause why he should not be subject to disciplinary or other corrective measures based on his pattern of submitting deficient and untimely briefs in connection with petitions for review that he filed in immigration cases. In response, respondent stated, inter alia, that his deficient performance stemmed from his inexperience and unfamiliarity with the applicable rules, his heavy caseload as a solo practitioner, and the pressing deadlines in his various cases. Respondent also stated that he had retained an attorney with experience in immigration appeals and that he would refrain from representing individuals in immigration appeals without his assistance.
By order entered on May 27, 2008, the Second Circuit publicly censured respondent. The court found:
"that a reasonable person in [respondent's] position would have familiarized himself with the applicable rules and known that his briefs did not satisfy various important Rule 28 requirements; that his behavior put his client's interests in significant peril; and that his briefing deficiencies and his scheduling defaults caused significant inconvenience to the judges and staff of this Court. Although the conduct described n our prior order generally would warrant a significantly greater sanction, we conclude that a lesser sanction is appropriate in light of the circumstances described in [respondent's] response to that order and the other corrective measures [imposed by the court]."
These corrective measures directed respondent not to file new appeals or documents in pending cases unless an experienced attorney appeared as cocounsel; to notify the panel of every case before the court in which respondent would perform legal services within a specified time period, and to provide the panel with copies of all future briefs and certain motions filed with the court within a specified time period. Respondent was also warned that future deficient performance before the court could result in further disciplinary action and/or corrective measures and strongly encouraged to attend CLE courses in appellate practice, legal writing, and immigration law if he continued to file appeals or to practice immigration law.
Tuesday, November 26, 2013
The Medina (Ohio) Gazette Online reports
The Ohio Supreme Court on Thursday revoked the law license of a Wadsworth attorney convicted last month of trafficking in a dangerous drug.
Harry E. Jackson, 65, of 5534 State Road, is spending four years at Lorain Correctional Institution in Grafton on a charge of aggravated drug trafficking and two counts of complicity in aggravated drug trafficking involving bath salts. The charges are second- and fourth-degree felonies.
Jackson, who was convicted after pleading guilty to the charges in Summit County Common Pleas Court, owns The Odd Corner — a tobacco supplies store at 360 E. Exchange St., Akron. Undercover police reported they bought bath salts from a store clerk there on March 23, 2012.
At the time of his conviction, Jackson was not practicing law and his law license is listed as inactive on several online directories of lawyers.
In addition to prison time, Jackson was fined $25,000 and his driver’s license was suspended for five years at his Oct. 11 sentencing hearing before visiting Judge Judy Hunter.
Jackson had three codefendants — Daniel I. Dearment, Dannielle L. Hileman and Eugene B. Hoover — and all have been convicted.
The investigation was completed by University of Akron police in conjunction with city police.
Jackson’s attorney, Kirk Migdal, is appealing the conviction.
Wikipedia has information about bath salts.
The order of interim suspension (not revocation, as reported above) is linked here. (Mike Frisch)
A three-year suspension is the sanction for an attorney convicted of armed robbery, imposed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Attorney Hubatch was admitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin in 2004. His law license was suspended effective October 31, 2007, for failure to pay State Bar dues. His license remains suspended. Attorney Hubatch has not previously been the subject of professional discipline.
The stipulation states that on January 11, 2013, Attorney Hubatch donned a Bucky Badger hat and robbed a Madison, Wisconsin, credit union of $500 while in possession of a toy gun. Within the following week, after being spotted publicly wearing the Bucky Badger hat, Attorney Hubatch confessed to a Madison detective that he had robbed the credit union.
Attorney Hubatch was charged with one count of armed robbery in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.32(2) in Dane County Circuit Court Case No. 2013CF117. Attorney Hubatch pled guilty to the charge on February 21, 2013. On April 16, 2013, the circuit court sentenced Attorney Hubatch to two years in prison, followed by three years of extended supervision. Attorney Hubatch is currently incarcerated at the Oshkosh Correctional Institution.
Wikipedia on Bucky Badger.
There are some places where a conviction for armed robbery will result in disbarment. (Mike Frisch)
An attorney who was convicted of two criminal offenses and failed to notify the Bar was suspended for five years by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
The attorney had moved to West Virginia and did not (as required) provide a current address to the Kentucky Bar.
The first incident involved a fight with his wife. When she sought to leave with their four-year-old, the attorney "smashed a propane tank into the rear window of the vehicle." No one was hurt and the wife admitted that she had struck him with the car before he threw the propane tank.
He entered a plea to two counts of wanton endangerment.
The second incident involved a fight with a client who had come to his home office. The attorney claimed that the client "removed the front door and proceeded to hit [him] in the head with a piece of concrete." The client claimed the attorney struck him several times with a baseball bat.
The attorney pleaded guilty to felony unlawful wounding in the second degree.
The Trial Commissioner noted that the conduct took place when the attorney had "hit rock bottom" after two divorces and a drinking problem. He claims sobriety since 2010. (Mike Frisch)