Wednesday, July 1, 2015
The Minnesota Supreme Court has suspended an attorney with no possibility of reinstatement for at least 120 days
The referee’s conclusions that the respondent attorney violated the rules of professional conduct by willfully disobeying a court mandate, making false or misleading statements to a tribunal, and committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on her fitness as a lawyer are supported by the record. Respondent’s misconduct is aggravated by her selfish motive, lack of remorse, and failure to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct.
The attorney represented a criminal client
At a January 21, 2011, pretrial conference, the district court established a May 2, 2011, trial date. On April 14, Tayari-Garrett filed a motion to continue the trial date, citing, among other reasons, an undefined personal commitment. Before the hearing on the motion, Tayari-Garrett purchased a nonrefundable plane ticket for travel to Paris from May 4 to May 9 to attend her brother’s wedding. The court ultimately denied the motion.
Tayari-Garrett failed to appear for the first day of trial, May 2. A lawyer who appeared on her behalf informed the court that Tayari-Garrett called him on May 1, told him that she was in the hospital in Dallas, and asked him to appear and request a continuance. The court continued the proceedings to the following day, May 3, and ordered Tayari-Garrett to provide documentation of her hospitalization; her prognosis, including her ability to travel and conduct trial; and the plans she had made for traveling from Dallas to Minneapolis for trial on May 2. At a hearing the next day,Tayari-Garrett failed to appear and did not produce the ordered documentation. The court again continued the proceedings, to May 5.
Tayari-Garrett later established that she had been admitted to the hospital around 9 a.m. on May 2 and released at approximately 3 p.m. on May 3. Shortly after her release from the hospital, Tayari-Garrett e-mailed the trial judge’s law clerk, stating, “Please inform Judge Howard that I have just been released from a hospital and will definitely not be able to attend a scheduling conference this Thursday [May 5]. Too soon.” The next morning, May 4, Tayari-Garrett flew from Dallas to Paris via a connecting flight at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. After the State brought a motion for an order to show cause, the court scheduled a hearing on May 5 and allowed Tayari-Garrett to appear by telephone.
Tayari-Garrett appeared by telephone from Paris for the May 5 hearing. She discussed her medical situation and prognosis, but made no mention of having traveled to France. During the hearing, the court scheduled a contempt hearing for May 9. In response, Tayari-Garrett stated, “I have a follow-up appointment next week so I cannot, and I believe the Court is aware of that, that I cannot be there on Monday [May 9].” Tayari-Garrett did not appear for the May 9 hearing either in person or by telephone. In fact, at the time of the May 9 hearing, Tayari-Garrett was en route from Paris to Dallas. By order dated May 25, the court found that probable cause existed to find Tayari-Garrett in constructive contempt of court. The court then referred the matter to prosecutors for further handling.
She was convicted on contempt of court and willful disobedience of a court order.
The conviction was affirmed on appeal.
In October 2010, appellant was hired to represent E.M.M., who was charged with theft by swindle in a $2.8 million mortgage fraud scheme. Appellant is an experienced criminal defense attorney who practices in both Texas and Minnesota. The case involved multiple defendants and was one of the largest cases that the complex crime division of the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office brought to trial in 2011. The district court set aside two weeks for the trial.
The court here found that the contempt merited a period of suspension. (Mike Frisch)
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has accepted an attorney 's resignation.
Such an action is "tantamount to disbarment."
NewsOK had this report
A Delaware County attorney known for saying to her friends she “was meant to be rich” was charged Friday in Delaware County District Court with attempting to steal away from her former boyfriend a million-dollar luxury Grand Lake residence.
Pitts is Cartwright’s daughter and Hogshooter is her former employee.
A $40,000 outstanding warrant was issued on Friday for Cartwright, a $10,000 outstanding warrant was issued for Pitts and a $10,000 outstanding warrant was issued for Cupp, court records show.
Sheriff Harlan Moore said he expects Cartwright and her daughter to surrender to authorities next week. Hogshooter surrendered to authorities Friday afternoon and is free on $10,000 bail, he said.
The women are accused of preparing a phony land deed and a bogus Oklahoma corporation to obtain ownership of a 5,500 square-foot waterfront residence that sits along an 18-hole golf course and has four bedrooms and 4.5 bathrooms.
The house is now listed for sale at $1.75 million, according to Duck Creek Realty.
Donna Ann Cupp, 59, of Sallisaw, another former employee, is charged with embezzlement. She is accused of stealing over $15,000 from Cartwright’s clients.
A $10,000 outstanding warrant was issued for Cupp, court records show. Sallisaw police are attempting to locate the woman, Moore said.
According an arrest affidavit Cartwright and Tor Staubo, a professional boat racer from Norway, were involved in a romantic relationship from the summer of 2011 to August 2012. In July 2012, Staubo paid $1.2 million in cash for a luxury Grand Lake residence then spent another $250,000 to furnish the residence, the affidavit states.
After ending the relationship with Cartwright, Staubo left instructions the attorney was only to look after the property — not live there, the affidavit states. Six months later Staubo instructed Cartwright to put the house up for sale.
Cupp, who has been friends with Cartwright for 30 years, told authorities Cartwright said, “he bought it for me and it’s gonna be mine,” the affidavit states.
Staubo received an anonymous letter in May 2013 saying Pitts was the homeowner, the affidavit states.
When Staubo confronted Cartwright, she told him “he’d agreed to the property transfer,” the affidavit states. Cartwright said she would get the deed reversed but never did so, the affidavit states.
Hogshooter testified under oath Staubo signed a new deed in her presence on Oct. 29, 2012 and that she notarized his signature and filed the deed at the Delaware County Courthouse.
Problem was Staubo was not in Jay on Oct. 29, 2012 and that the bogus company was not formed until Nov. 1, 2012 and the deed transaction was filed Nov. 7, 2012, the affidavit states.
A handwriting expert confirmed neither Staubo nor Hogshooter signed the land deed, the affidavit states.
Staubo received several threatening emails from Pitts that said, “Don’t question anything about your house that is really mine or you will be deported never to return to my country again.”
Cupp also told investigators about minor inconsistencies Cartwright purposely did when preparing the fake company filing. She told investigators she overheard Cartwright give specific instructions regarding the bogus company filing and she wanted someone other than herself to go the courthouse and file the new company information because “it might draw attention to her,” the affidavit states.
In an unrelated matter, Cartwright prepared a letter for Sequoyah County District Attorney Brian Kuester outlining how Cupp embezzled from one of Cartwright’s guardianship cases.
Monies drafted from the guardianship case was taken and used to make payments on existing bank loans belonging to Cupp and Cartwright’s sister and to pay Cartwright’s monthly bills, according to the affidavit.
Some of the bank’s financial statements included notes saying, “Betty called and she advised Donna has authority for the transactions,” the affidavit states.
Cupp admitted to making the cash transfer for her own personal business, but it at the direction of Cartwright, the affidavit states.
In 2004, Cupp pleaded no contest to multiple counts of embezzlement in Sequoyah County and received a 5-year suspended sentence, court records show.
From the web page of the Ohio Supreme Court
The Ohio Supreme Court today suspended Deborah M. Marinelli of North Canton for two years, with one year stayed, for abandoning personal bankruptcy matters for 20 clients in late 2012 and in 2013.
Many of the clients had paid a bankruptcy filing fee and some or all of Marinelli’s retainer. But after her husband began divorce proceedings, Marinelli stopped communicating with clients. She also ceased paying her office rent and going to work at the office. Her office landlord sent her an eviction notice In March 2013, and the Stark County Bar Association took possession of her client files. She later paid full refunds to the 20 clients at a disciplinary hearing.
The attorney disciplinary board in the state found that Marinelli violated six professional conduct rules, including ones requiring competent representation and reasonable diligence. The board noted that Marinelli held onto her clients’ funds for several years while providing little in legal services to them and that she had not started counseling for her depression. The board also pointed out that she failed to answer multiple grievances filed against her by the bar association.
In a unanimous per curiam decision, the court adopted the board’s factual findings and legal conclusions. The second year of Marinelli’s suspension will be stayed if she meets specific conditions set out by the court, including treatment for her depression and following the recommendations of mental health professionals. If she abides by the conditions and is reinstated to practice law, she will be subject to two years of monitored probation.
A disbarred attorney who had misappropriated funds from two law firms over a 15 year period should be reinstated to practice, according to a recent recommendation of a Louisiana Hearing Committee.
The petitioner presented evidence from his psychiatrist that he had "made tremendous growth in his life..."
From the 2007 disbarment order
Based on our review of the record in its totality, we find Dr. Scrignar's conclusion that respondent's actions were beyond his control is at odds with many of the objective facts in this case. For example, although Dr. Scrignar testified respondent was not motivated by greed, the testimony of respondent's law partners uniformly established that it appeared respondent was living beyond his means and that his lifestyle was not consistent with the income he earned. Additionally, the record reveals respondent's methods of misappropriating funds evolved over time in order to allow him to avoid detection, suggesting his actions were not purely impulsive. See Stoller, 04-2758 at p. 12, 902 So.2d at 988 (“Respondent's repeated and deliberate actions over this lengthy period of time belie his contention that his misconduct was an aberration.”). Finally, respondent himself admitted that he knew his actions were wrong when he testified, “[y]ou mull it over in your head so much that you rationalize any the moral implications of something you know is wrong.”
Considering all these facts, we are unable to find that respondent's mental condition was the sole cause or even a principal or substantial cause of his misconduct. While respondent may have used his “lack of fulfillment” as a moral justification for his misappropriation, the record does not support the conclusion that there is any significant causal nexus between any mental disability and the misconduct. Accordingly, pursuant to ABA Standard 9.32(i), we give little weight to respondent's alleged mental disability.
Reduced to their essentials, respondent's actions demonstrate a fundamental lack of honesty which falls far below the standards expected of attorneys admitted to the bar of this state. We are particularly disturbed by the fact that after being dismissed from Lowe Stein, respondent sought employment at Sessions Fishman without disclosing the reason for his discharge. After the facts came to light, respondent represented to his law partners that “it would never happen again.” Of course, this representation turned out to be a lie.
Notably, the hearing committee public member did not favor reinstatement.
It is notable, in my view, because public members may see things from the perspective of a potential future client.
Too often lawyers see things from the view that "there but for the grace of God go I." Mike Frisch)
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department has disbarred an attorney for misappropriation of entrusted funds.
The court has previously ordered an interim suspension
In September 2013, the [Departmental Disciplinary] Committee opened an investigation into respondent's professional conduct after receiving a complaint from a buyer in a real estate transaction who alleged that respondent failed to refund his $65,000 down payment in an aborted transaction...
we find that the record presents evidence that respondent misappropriated and/or converted third-party funds, improperly made repeated ATM cash withdrawals from his escrow account, and commingled personal funds with client funds while $200,000 in tax liens loomed over any funds that he maintained outside of his escrow account. Such conduct constitutes professional misconduct that immediately threatens the public interest, thereby warranting his immediate suspension from the practice of law.
In New York, a failure to respond to a notice of disbarment for six months results in the entry of a disbarment order. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, June 30, 2015
An attorney who had "essentially abandoned" a client in a civil matter before the Maryland Court of Appeals was suspended for 30 days by the state's Court of Appeals.
Respondent, a member of the Bar of Maryland, agreed to represent Kevin Wilson (“Wilson”) as the appellant in an appeal in a civil case. Shuler failed to appear before the Court of Special Appeals at the oral argument that had been scheduled in Wilson’s case. On that morning, Shuler telephoned the Office of the Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals to state that she felt too ill to travel that morning and to request that oral argument be rescheduled. Sometime afterward, Shuler telephoned the Office of the Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals to check the status of Wilson’s case. Shuler failed to take any further action in Wilson’s case. For example, Shuler failed to file a written explanation for her absence or a written request that oral argument be rescheduled. After the Court of Special Appeals treated Wilson’s case as “submitted on brief” and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, Shuler failed to inform Wilson that he had not prevailed in the appeal. Wilson filed a complaint against Shuler with the Attorney Grievance Commission (“the Commission”), Petitioner.
The medical issues
Shuler testified that she has cardiomyopathy and that, on both the day before and the day of oral argument in Wilson’s case, she was vomiting and experiencing diarrhea. Consistently, in her exceptions, Shuler asserts that, from December 2012 through February 2013, she was “continuously ill” and “had the flu, sinus infections[,] and [a] stomach virus.”
She lived in Richmond and relied on public transportation.
As to sanction
we suspend Shuler from the practice of law in Maryland for thirty days, with a condition precedent to reinstatement that Shuler satisfactorily demonstrate, by the report of a health care professional (acceptable to the Commission and, ultimately, this Court) or other appropriate evidence, that she is mentally and physically competent to resume the practice of law.
Judge Battaglia noted the attorney's lack of remorse and would impose an indefinite suspension.
The attorney was informally admonished in the District of Columbia for similar misconduct. (Mike Frisch)
A Virginia attorney has consented to license revocation in the wake of a recent criminal conviction
The Bristol Herald Courier had this report on the crimes
Hutchinson, a bankruptcy attorney, worked for a law firm in Bristol, Virginia. After the firm’s Bristol office closed, Hutchinson worked in the firm’s Kingsport, Tennessee office. Hutchinson was the only lawyer in the firm who actively practiced bankruptcy law and the bankruptcy practice was somewhat separate from other operations of the firm.
When clients retained the law firm for the purpose of filing bankruptcy petitions on their behalf, Hutchinson collected initial payments from clients ranging between approximately $500 to $1,000, according to the statement.
Those payments were supposed to be used to pay bankruptcy filing fees, among other things.
Hutchinson was required to deposit those initial payments into the firm’s trust account and then used the money to pay bankruptcy filing fees. However, beginning in approximately 2013, Hutchinson received the initial payments from clients as cash and blank money orders, did not deposit the funds into the trust account, did not record the payments on the firm’s books, and used most of the money for his personal purposes.
To keep the scheme going, Hutchinson used the firm’s credit card account to pay the client’s bankruptcy filing fees in the bankruptcy court for the Western District of Virginia. Through the scheme, Hutchinson fraudulently used the firm’s credit card for more than $70,000 in bankruptcy filing fees that should have been paid from the initial payments collected from clients.
In approximately January 2015, based on insufficient return on its investment, the firm decided to close down the bankruptcy practice. Hutchinson was instructed to close down the bankruptcy practice and not take on any more clients. Unbeknownst to the firm, Hutchinson continued to take on new clients, collect initial payments from clients, and to not record receipt of these payments on the firm’s books. Hutchinson fraudulently retained those funds for his personal use, failed to pay any filing fees for those clients, and failed to file bankruptcy petitions for those clients.
United States District Judge James P. Jones scheduled sentencing for August 12 at 10:30 a.m.
A former prosecutor who is serving a prison sentence for child pornography and flight offenses had his resignation accepted by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.
The Portland Press Herald reported on the criminal case
Cameron spent a year behind bars after being convicted in 2010 of 13 counts of child pornography before he was released on bail during part of his appeal to the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
He fled Maine in November 2012 and was arrested on a warrant Dec. 2, 2012, in New Mexico following a nationwide manhunt that lasted about two weeks.
He has been held since then, apparently at one point in a New Hampshire facility. There Beneman says in the sentencing memo, “Jim was attacked and suffered a broken shoulder. … As a former drug prosecutor he is at higher risk of physical assault while incarcerated.”
...Cameron spent 18 years as an assistant attorney general. He became the target of an investigation after the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children reported that Yahoo! found multiple images of child pornography in an account belonging to Cameron’s wife.
Cameron was fired from his state job in April 2008 and indicted on the child pornography charges Feb. 11, 2009. He was convicted by Woodcock following a nonjury trial in federal court in Portland in August 2010.
The resignation affidavit was "impounded" and will be made public only if he seeks reinstatement.
He was disbarred in Michigan. (Mike Frisch)
Monday, June 29, 2015
Disciplinary charges against a criminal defense attorney were dismissed by the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar.
The attorney was alleged to have provided incompetent representation and failed to communicate with his client
While the Panel heard testimony regarding office practices that could be strengthened (such as file organization, office coverage, phone issues and itemized bills for time spent on non-court appointed cases), the Panel is convinced from the testimony, including the testimony of Carrie Linthicum, the prosecutor in Mr. Adams' case, that Mr. Pickering provided competent representation to Mr. Adams and that he acted with reasonable diligence and promptness in that representation. Therefore, the Panel finds no violation of M. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1 and 1.3.
The Board further contends that the fact that Mr. Pickering did not give Mr. Adams a paper copy of the discovery produced in the case is a violation of M. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4(a). Although it may be a good practice in most cases, the Board did not cite a rule or any authority at the hearing which requires or even recommends that attorneys provide criminal defendants with actual paper copies of the discovery turned over by the prosecution. Mr. Pickering cited a good example of when providing such copies could be harmful to the criminal defendant. There was no evidence that Mr. Adams requested copies of the discovery prior to his sentencing. Nevertheless, it is clear to the Panel that Mr. Pickering reviewed the discovery with his client to prepare his theories and strengthen his ability to negotiate for a plea bargain during their conferences in Mr. Pickering’s office and at the Caribou courthouse. Mr. Pickering would not have known of the absence of a knife when Mr. Adams was arrested without that review. He would not have known about Mr. Madore's wife's apology without that review. He would not have known the details set forth in the Alford plea had it not been for that review and those conversations. (Exhibit #10, p.7; Exhibit #11, pp. 8 - 15) Mr. Pickering's system of communicating with his client, while not perfect, resulted in Mr. Adams being present at the many court dates scheduled during the pendency of the case. It resulted in Mr. Pickering having the necessary information from his client to be able to negotiate a very favorable plea deal with the prosecutor. Although the sentence imposed was harsher than usual for the charges, the Panel is satisfied that Mr. Pickering's communication with his client was not in violation of M.R. Prof. Conduct. 1.4(a). Likewise, Mr. Pickering’s conduct did not violate M.R. Prof. Conduct. 8.4(a)(d).
A petition for reinstatement was denied by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.
Jonas graduated from law school in 1974. That same year, he was admitted to the bar of Pennsylvania, and was then admitted to the bar of New Jersey in 1975. He engaged in private practice in Pennsylvania, and then in New Jersey.
In 1987, Jonas took and passed the Maine bar exam and was admitted to the Maine bar. Shortly thereafter, he and his wife separated. A contentious and protracted series of divorce proceedings followed, spanning multiple decades and several jurisdictions. It is Jonas’s conduct during these proceedings that ultimately led to his professional disciplinary troubles.
The Board of Bar Overseers noted that "[u]ntil 1995, his law practice was primarily in New Jersey, where he was an active and successful civil litigator, with a number of large commercial clients."
The misconduct was committed after the attorney's divorce in 1990.
In 1995, a series of decisions that Jonas had made was discovered, changing the course of his life. Apparently tired of being required to pay what he considered to be an unfair amount of spousal support, Jonas took action to undermine the divorce judgment, avoid his support obligations, misrepresent his financial status, and interfere with [ex-wife] Linda’s contact with the children.
...Jonas attempted to explain his actions in 1995, 1996, and 1997 by asserting that he believed the [New Jersey] court was either biased against him or actually corrupt, and that he was suffering from depression and anxiety. If Jonas had not compounded the lack of judgment and integrity he demonstrated from 1995 until 1997 through his actions over the next twenty-plus years, I would have little trouble accepting Jonas’s explanation and his acknowledgement of responsibility and remorse. As the following recitation shows, however, Jonas continued with his single-minded and grossly erroneous belief that he did not have to comply with court orders. His admission that he is “persistent and bull-headed,” although not inaccurate, does not justify his subsequent behavior...
The historical facts reproduced here represent just a small and simplified sampling of the most significant moments in Jonas’s litigation history; that history displays a complexity that anyone would be loathe to describe in full. In total, dozens of jurists in the trial, intermediate appellate, and appellate courts of five states and eight federal jurisdictions for more than two decades have considered and rejected Jonas’s arguments regarding his divorce.
The story involved actions he had taken from Montana to Florida with stops in between and a persistent disregard for court rulings.
That Jonas has, from time to time, found lawyers to make his arguments for him does not insulate his actions. Whether with or without counsel, he has demonstrated a level of contempt for courts and their authority that is breathtaking. In sum, Jonas’s litigation history, though all relating to his personal affairs, reflects a pattern of conduct that could not possibly meet any definition of integrity. Indeed, a small sampling of the terms that have been used to describe Jonas and his filings and actions in court include the following: vexatious, defiant, subversive, disruptive, guerilla warfare, wasteful, single-minded, adamant, obstinate, dogged retaliatory, duplicative, abusive, especially egregious, unnecessary, unrelenting, specious, deliberate, frivolous, bad faith, improper, ill-advised, retributive, ongoing, expensive, impertinent, delaying, invalid, needless, unsupported, and contemptuous. Jonas has mischaracterized, misrepresented, refused to appear, failed to obey, feigned ignorance, manipulated, and harassed his way through the last twenty-five years, and in every such incident, he has ignored his own conduct, failed to acknowledge any wrongdoing, and expressed no remorse or contrition.
Notably, the Board of Bar Overseers had favored reinstatement, finding misconduct to be "very unlikely to be repeated in the future."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently granted reinstatement to an attorney sanctioned in Delaware for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law
Nadel is not a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware. He was admitted to the Bars of the State of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1982. Nadel currently practices in a private firm located in Cherry Hill and Pennsauken, New Jersey.
From April 2009 through September 21, 2012, Nadel engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Delaware...
Nadel knew that he could not actively represent Delaware clients in court, but he failed to determine any limits on the pre-litigation assistance he thought he could provide. Further, he had every opportunity to learn this information. Nadel regularly worked with licensed Delaware attorneys when a client needed to file a claim in court. Moreover, the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules and the case law interpreting those rules are also publicly available—something an experienced attorney from any state would know.
Pennsylvania had imposed reciprocal discipline based on the Delaware action.
Our earlier coverage is linked here.
The attorney had represented Delaware residents in more than 100 matters over a seven year period. The cases involved motor vehicle accidents that occured in Delaware.
Some of the cases were referred to the attorney from a Wilimington doctor. The attorney met with some of the clients in the doctor's office. Other cases came from "television advertisements which targeted Delaware residents." The attorney met with some of these clients in the Delaware office of his law firm.
The Pennsylvania court accepted a joint petition for reciprocal discipline
An attorney resigned from practice in Massachusetts and admitted conversion of estate proceeds that the decedent had donated to charity
In May of 2009, the respondent filed a petition for probate of a will and appointment of an executor with the Probate Court. He contacted a Florida charity and informed it that the decedent had left her real estate to the charity. The CEO of the charity informed the respondent of the charity’s desire to sell the home and use the proceeds to further their charitable purposes. The property was sold in November of 2009, and the respondent deposited the proceeds to his IOLTA account. Net of various fees and commissions, the amount owed to the Florida charity was $179,106.65.
The respondent failed to promptly disburse the funds due the charity and failed to hold the funds in a separate interest-bearing account. Between November and December 2009, the respondent intentionally misused approximately $100,000 of the charity’s funds for purposes unrelated to the estate.
In February 2011, by letter to the charity, the respondent enclosed a check for a partial distribution in the amount of $75,000. In the letter, the respondent falsely stated that he had been engaged in an attempt to settle a claim against the estate, and as soon as that was resolved, the balance of the distribution would be paid.
The charity was still owed at least $104,106.65. By letters in April and July 2012, counsel for the charity requested that the respondent provide a status of the estate, an inventory and an accounting of the estate.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court accepted the resignation as a disciplinary sanction. (Mike Frisch)
The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with a special master that an attorney had failed to show a basis to vacate a default and ordered the attorney disbarred for her mishandling of a personal injury matter
Starling faxed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to the special master, but she did not file it with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board or serve it on Bar counsel. The special master found that the motion, which was not supported by a brief, does not set forth a legally sufficient explanation for Starling’s failure to file a timely answer. Although she mentioned health problems, she did not provide any documentation in support...
Because Starling’s client suffered the loss of her claim due to Starling’s failure to take action to meet or preserve the statute of limitations, and lost any opportunity for reimbursement of her medical expenses due to Starling’s failure to convey the insurer’s offer, the special master deemed her a danger to the public and recommended in his September 8, 2014 report that she be disbarred.
As to sanction
The special master concluded that Starling displayed a consistent inability or unwillingness to comply with the disciplinary rules and the Georgia Civil Practice Act, and that her failure to do so when her own license to practice law is at issue reflects an inability to competently represent others and mirrors her complete lack of diligence to her client’s great detriment in this matter. For those reasons, the special master denied the motion for extension and request to open default, and affirmed the recommendation in his report that Starling be disbarred.
Sunday, June 28, 2015
An attorney who had disputed the extent of his culpability for his law partner's fraudulent scheme was reinstated from a three-year suspension imposed by the New York Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department.
From the court's suspension order
Fonte became a partner in the law firm of Bellettieri & Fonte in March 2004. The firm became known as Bellettieri, Fonte and Laudonio (hereinafter BF&L) in or about April 2004, when Laudonio joined the partnership. Fonte was a partner in the firm until November 17, 2006.
BF&L engaged almost exclusively in a transactional real estate practice, representing buyers, sellers, and lenders at residential and commercial real estate closings. From sometime on or before the date of its inception, BF&L maintained one or more attorney special accounts at J.P. Morgan Chase Bank. All of the named partners as well as Peter Dengler, an associate, were fully authorized signatories on one or more of those attorney special accounts at all times between March 1, 2005, and November 17, 2006.
Beginning in or about March 2005 and continuing through November 2006, partner Anthony Bellettieri engaged in a pattern of dishonest and fraudulent manipulation of BF&L’s attorney special accounts which resulted in the misappropriation, larceny, and/or conversion of more than $17 million from those accounts. The respondent failed to make an adequate effort to review or supervise the operations of those accounts during this period and failed to discover Belletieri’s fraud and larceny at a time when it could have been either mitigated or prevented.
it bears noting that he was no stranger to the real estate and mortgage business. Far from being a business novice, he had an accounting background and had worked for an accounting firm for about three years after graduating from law school. He thereafter worked for a Manhattan law firm which handled real estate matters, where he was trained to represent buyers and sellers in residential and commercial transactions before starting his own practice and eventually entering a partnership with Bellettieri. He was comfortably drawing approximately $7,000 per week from BF&L during the period in question and knowingly permitted Bellettieri's commingling in order to allow BF&L to continue operating. The respondent's disciplinary history consists of one letter of caution...
In determining an appropriate measure of discipline to impose, the Grievance
Committee has expressed strong disagreement with the Special Referee’s conclusion and the
respondent’s contention that he was a victim of Belletieri’s fraudulent scheme. The respondent’s
position is that Bellettieri acted alone, without his knowledge, and that he acted to hide his
misconduct from the respondent. He submits that had he been able to obtain Bellettieri’s testimony at the hearing, the extent of the obstruction he created to prevent the respondent from finding out what he was doing would be revealed. The division of labor at BF&L was such that the respondent and Laudonio attended closings, while Belletieri ran the office, particularly the escrow accounts. The respondent issued checks at closings only after confirming that the requisite funds were in BF&L’s escrow account. He maintains that he had no reason to suspect criminal behavior on the part of Bellettieri, who was the firm’s founder and “a pillar of the community.” Moreover, the high volume of transactions engaged in on a daily and weekly basis, together with the onerous schedule of closings the respondent was required to attend, would have made it a practical impossibility for him to reconcile the firm’s accounts while continuing to meet his duties to clients.
The Grievance Committee maintains that the respondent displayed a long-term, near
total ignorance of his fiduciary duties as attorney and escrowee. He ignored multiple warning signs and blatantly apparent indicators of criminality which could have forestalled such a massive escrow fraud by Belletieri. These included the $900,000 defalcation in BF&L’s former escrow account...
While the respondent was, to some extent, victimized by Bellettieri, he was also uniquely positioned to put an end to Bellettieri’s scheme and thereby minimize damage to clients who had entrusted funds to BF&L. In this regard, he failed to uphold his nonwaivable fiduciary duty.
Under the totality of circumstances, the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years.
Because of the fitness requirement, the three-year suspension lasted for five years. (Mike Frisch)
An attorney who had been suspended for two years and never reinstated has been indefinitely suspended by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
the respondent began working at his prior firm, unpaid, as a “settlement consultant.” For the following ten weeks or so, the respondent reviewed files, valued cases, determined demand amounts, negotiated settlements with insurance adjusters, and communicated with clients about settlement offers, without any adequate supervision. In handling and settling personal injury cases without supervision, the respondent was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Further, to the extent that the respondent was engaging in paralegal work, he failed to obtain permission from the Supreme Judicial Court to work as a paralegal...
In his conversations with insurance adjusters, the respondent falsely identified himself as “Jeffrey Kriger” in order to conceal his identity as a suspended attorney. At times, the respondent also either identified himself as “Attorney Kriger” or failed to correct any misunderstanding that he was an attorney at the firm.
He had been reprimanded before suspension number one for his
intemperate remarks during mediation and his use of vulgar and insulting language was intended to disrupt a tribunal and was prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h), and his use of profanity and his verbal abuse of opposing counsel and insurance claims representatives...
Saturday, June 27, 2015
A frustrated Massachusetts attorney was reprimanded for altering a form insurance letter that he had received for one client for the benefit of a second client.
The respondent had previously represented another client with both Med-Pay and BCBSMA coverage. In that case, BCBSMA provided the respondent with a standard-form letter stating that whenever a claimant has Med-Pay coverage, BCBSMA considers the Med-Pay coverage to be primary.
He tried to deal with insurance reps at BCBSMA to no avail and then
altered a Med-Pay letter he had received from BCBSMA for another client by redacting the other client’s information and inserting the current client’s name, her BCBSIL identification number and date of injury on the letter. The respondent forwarded the altered letter to the automobile insurer in an effort to have them cover the client’s medical expenses through its Med-Pay coverage.
The agreed sanction was approved by the Board of Bar Overseers.
Dealing with insurance companies can certainly be a source of major frustration. This does not alter the fact that altering a document is not the solution. (Mike Frisch)
Friday, June 26, 2015
The Nebraska Supreme Court has affirmed the dismissal of claims against an attorney pressed by his late friend and client's former husband
The present litigation involves [attorney] Larson, who was a friend of Judy’s. Judy and Larson met in the early 1990’s when both represented different defendants in a federal criminal case. Over the years, Larson assisted Judy in various legal matters, including continuing legal matters relating to her divorce from [plaintiff] Gallner. Larson, who resides in another state, would also periodically visit Omaha for personal and professional activities. On those visits, Larson would sometimes stay at Judy’s home. Judy attended Larson’s wedding and also attended Larson’s wife’s funeral. Judy introduced Larson to her parents. Jordan testified that Larson was a close friend of Judy’s and that he, Jordan, telephoned Larson upon Judy’s eventual death.
Judy named Larson as her successor trustee and beneficiary. His representation of her involved unrelated matters.
He received over $236,000 after her death.
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the business transaction rule created liability to his benefit
The record clearly shows that at the time Judy made Larson a beneficiary on the American Family policy, he was representing her in legal matters. It is axiomatic that the relationship between attorney and client is a fiduciary or confidential one, and there is nothing that suggests the informality between Judy and Larson makes the relationship less so. We conclude that because Larson was Judy’s attorney, he has the burden to show that the gift from Judy was fair.
We conclude that Larson has met his burden. As the district court noted, Judy was herself a lawyer. She did not suffer from any diminished mental capacity and was not elderly or incapacitated. She understood the consequences of her designation...
In addition, at the time Judy first contacted Larson regarding the American Family policy, she had already also engaged the services of another lawyer for estate planning purposes. She did not seek Larson’s advice with regard to the drafting of the unexecuted trust or with respect to the change in beneficiary on the American Family policy. Larson did not seek the designation as beneficiary and was unaware of it until after the designation was made. And because Larson had done much uncompensated legal work for Judy, the designation seemed reasonable to Larson.
The ethics rules do not create a cause of action
we note that Gallner essentially argues that Larson violated the disciplinary rules applicable to Larson as an attorney, and therefore breached a duty to Judy. But as we note above, the rules are designed to provide guidance and “not designed to be a basis for civil liability.”
Nor did an asserted malpractice case exist under the circumstances
there is simply no evidence of an employment relationship regarding estate matters upon which to base a malpractice claim. Larson plainly did not represent Judy on any estate planning matter. Nor can Gallner show a neglect of duty. We concluded above that Larson showed on these facts the designation of him as beneficiary was fair. Finally, Gallner cannot show any loss, because as noted above, Judy’s father, not Jordan or the estate, was the contingent beneficiary on the American Family policy. We find no merit to this argument.
The District of Columbia Office of Bar Counsel has informally admonished an Assistant United States Attorney
We find that you violated Rules 8.4(c) which prohibits engaging in conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." This violation occurred when you responded, as a representative of the United States, to a question from a Superior Court judge with a misleading answer. When the court asked if the family of a homicide victim had asked to be heard at the plea hearing, you responded by stating that they had not asked to be heard at the plea. When you made this response, you were aware that the family had not asked to be heard at the plea hearing because they were not aware of it and you were aware that it was your responsibility to notify them of the hearing, either directly or through the victim's advocate from your office.
An attorney may reject an informal admonition, in which case Bar Counsel files charges that proceed in the normal course.
My understanding is that these admonitions are not published until after the time to reject the sanction has expired.
The case is In re Charles Cobb. (Mike Frisch)
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that an attorney had violated the terms of a previously-imposed probation and suspended him for a year and a day.
He was required to cooperate with a sobriety monitor
Mr. Lefevre's testimony was credible and persuasive. He noted that from the beginning of the probation period, Respondent never completely complied with all conditions of probation. Mr. Lefevre discussed his concerns with Respondent in May of 2014 and noted improvement on Respondent's part, but never full compliance. At a certain point, Mr. Lefevre stopped hearing from Respondent altogether. From December 4, 2014 to December 29, 2014, Respondent had no contact with Mr. Lefevre. There was contact on December 29, 2014, but Mr. Lefevre felt that Respondent's attitude regarding his significant lapse in communication was cavalier. After December 29, 2014 until April 18, 2015, Respondent had no contact with Mr. Lefevre. Mr. LeFevre attempted to contact Respondent on two occasions in February of 2015, with no success. The April 18, 2015 voice mail from Respondent to Mr. Lefevre indicated that Respondent, by his own admission, had relapsed from his sobriety. Mr. Lefevre attempted to contact Respondent but was unsuccessful and has not had any communication with Respondent since that voicemail.
The Disciplinary Board viewed the violation as a "serious matter." (Mike Frisch)
Kathleen Maloney reports this discipline decision on the web page of the Ohio Supreme Court
In a unanimous ruling, the Ohio Supreme Court suspended Rodger W. Moore of Fort Mitchell, Kentucky, for two years with one year stayed because he had shoplifted on seven occasions and later lied about it to the Cincinnati Bar Association.
Admitted to practice in Ohio in 2001, Moore was arrested the same year in Atlanta, Georgia, for allegedly stealing 12 bottles of wine from a grocery store. The wine averaged a little more than $12 per bottle. He agreed to do 65 hours of community service.
In March 2012, Moore again was caught shoplifting three bottles of wine – more expensive vintages this time – along with olive oil at a Cincinnati grocery store. Instead of walking out with the items, he brought UPC codes for less pricey items with him and scanned those at the self-checkout. The false UPC codes reduced the price of the groceries by $359.10.
Moore pled guilty and was allowed to enter a diversion program. He also confessed he had taken expensive bottles of wine this way from the same store five other times.
His lawyer advised him to report the March 2012 charge to the bar association. In correspondence, as well as an interview, with the bar association during an investigation, Moore made false statements about the incident and did not disclose his other thefts.
In imposing the sanction, the court noted that Moore showed an unwillingness to take responsibility for his misconduct. The decision set out specific conditions the attorney must follow to have one year of the two-year suspension stayed and described other requirements for his reinstatement.