Thursday, December 18, 2014
The Florida Supreme Court has held that an attorney who has filed abusive pleadings is barred from filing pro se motions in his disciplinary matter.
This Court has chosen to sanction pro se respondents who have abused the judicial process and otherwise misused this Court’s limited judicial resources by filing frivolous, nonmeritorious, or otherwise inappropriate filings. Such respondents have been barred from further filings in this Court unless their pleadings, motions, or other requests for relief were filed under the signature of a member of The Florida Bar in good standing other than the respondents. The Court has found that limitations on the abilities of such respondents to submit any further filings in this Court were necessary to protect the constitutional right of access of other litigants, in that it permitted this Court to devote its finite resources to the consideration of legitimate claims filed by others...
Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is hereby instructed to reject any future pleadings, petitions, motions, documents, or other filings submitted by David Frank Petrano unless such filings are signed solely by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar other than Petrano. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.17(d). Counsel may file on Petrano’s behalf if counsel determines that the proceeding may have merit and can be brought in good faith.
The disciplinary matter involves the Bar's motion for interim probation. (Mike Frisch)
An attorney who allowed his escrow account to be used by his son, who was experiencing financial difficulty in operating a construction business, was publicly reprimanded by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
The court declined to order restitution to the son's aggrieved customer
There is no question that Attorney Steffes violated the trust account rules by allowing his son to use his trust account as a clearing house for his construction business. However, we are not convinced that this ethical failure per se obligates Attorney Steffes to reimburse his son's business client, R.W., for the loss R.W. incurred in his business dealings with G.S. and Steffes Construction. R.W. had a remedy for that loss and indeed availed himself of that remedy: R.W. sought and obtained a civil monetary judgment for $9,500 directly from Steffes Construction.
We reiterate that Attorney Steffes should not have permitted his son to deposit funds into Attorney Steffes's trust account. This conduct violated the ethics rules and warrants discipline. However, we are not persuaded under the facts of this case that the rules go so far as to require Attorney Steffes to essentially serve as guarantor for funds of his son's business client, R.W. While the court can appreciate that R.W. is aggrieved because he lost over $10,000 due to G.S.'s failure to complete a construction project, it remains true that R.W. obtained a judgment against G.S. in civil court.
The attorney's trust account will be monitored for six mobnths. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, December 17, 2014
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has reinstated an attorney convicted of felony manslaughter and misdemeanor DUI
On December 22, 2007, Morgan and his best friend and law partner, Andre Carolina, were having a few drinks after work. At one point in the evening the two decided to go to a different location. Morgan drove. The record indicates Morgan engaged in drag racing with another vehicle. It is alleged the other vehicle swerved into Morgan's lane causing him to swerve into oncoming traffic. A wreck ensued, injuring Morgan, some occupants of the oncoming vehicle and fatally wounding Mr. Carolina. The record reflects Morgan's blood alcohol level was right at the threshold of .08.
The court relied on trial panel findings
The Trial Panel unanimously found Morgan should be reinstated. Specifically, it found Morgan established by clear and convincing evidence he possessed good moral character sufficient to entitle him to be admitted to the OBA. This decision having come after its consideration of the severity and circumstances surrounding the offense shows the impact the evidence and testimony made on the Trial Panel. Testimony presented showed how remorseful Morgan was for the death of his friend and partner, Andre Carolina. After release from the hospital Morgan immediately went to Andre's widow who forgave him for the incident. The testimony shows Morgan has tried to look after and help the Carolina family and continues to financially help Andre's young daughter. He has kept in contact with the family members who also look after him when he frequently becomes depressed about the loss of Andre. Morgan and others testified he has refused to drink since the accident. After the accident, Morgan has many times voluntarily participated in speaking for the Victims Impact Panel. Testimony reflects he has done this since September 2008 and will whole heartedly continue to do so. Also, since September 2008, he has spoken on behalf of the Tulsa County Crash Court Program which holds sessions at high schools. Additionally, he has attended counseling sessions through Lawyers Helping Lawyers.
And from his partner's widow and the prosecutor
Ms. Carolina testified she believed Morgan was one of the most loyal and trustworthy people she knew and it was her desire for him to be reinstated to practice law. She testified Morgan was always there for her family and she did not foresee that this would change. Steve Kunzweiler, the prosecutor on Morgan's criminal case, also testified that Morgan demonstrated the requisite moral fitness to be an attorney. Since his resignation Morgan has repeatedly volunteered with the Victims Impact Panel and other organizations to help prevent others from drinking and driving. He has completely refrained from drinking and has sought counseling. In his testimony Morgan expressed his understanding of the seriousness of his crime and the disrepute it has brought upon the legal profession. He has also continued to keep abreast of current legal matters through his work, reading the bar journal and continuing legal education courses. Morgan further exhibited maturity in not only how he handled his case load after his suspension but how he took care of Andre's case load to ensure Andre's clients would have representation.
In sum, the court found clear and convincing evidence supported reinstatement.
NewsOK has this story on the incident that led to the suspension. (Mike Frisch)
An attorney who defaulted on allegations that he had misappropriated over $100,000 due to his law firm was disbarred by the New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department.
The Departmental Disciplinary Committee seeks an order disbarring respondent, pursuant to the Rules of the Appellate Division, First Department (22 NYCRR) § 603.4(g), because he has been suspended under 22 NYCRR 603.4(e)(1)(iii) and has not appeared or applied to the Committee or this Court for a hearing or reinstatement within six months from the date of the order of suspension, which was October 11, 2012. We suspended respondent from the practice of law for misappropriating over $100,000 belonging to his former law firm for his own personal benefit without permission or authority to do so.
The Committee served respondent with the instant motion by first-class and certified mail, return receipt requested, to his counsel, yet he have not submitted a response. Because more than six months has elapsed since this Court's October 11, 2012 order of suspension, and respondent has not sought a hearing or reinstatement, disbarment is warranted...
It seems entirely appropriate to me to act promptly to impose discipline when an attorney defaults on charges.
In the District of Columbia --where default in disciplinary matters is treated as if it were the Ebola virus -- a case like this would take years to bring to conclusion and eat up limited bar resources better devoted to matters where the attorney cares enough about the license to participate in the proceedings. (Mike Frisch)
The Ohio Supreme Court has imposed a stayed two-year suspension of an attorney who had filed the identical brief in 31 of 35 criminal appeals:
Since being admitted to the bar in 2001, respondent has been a solo practitioner. In recent years, his practice has consisted of court-appointed work, primarily in juvenile court. But from 2006 to 2010, the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas appointed Milhoan to handle 35 criminal appeals. Of those 35 cases, 31 involved appeals from guilty pleas. In each of those cases, Milhoan filed appellate briefs that were identical except for certain “case-specific modifications such as names, dates, crimes, sentences, and potential mitigation,” according to the stipulations.
The parties stipulated and the board found that each brief (1) was ten pages long, (2) repeated the same grammatical errors, (3) raised the same assignment of error—“The imposition of a prison sentence in this case imposes an unnecessary burden on state’s resources”—(4) failed to cite any case law in support of the assigned error, and (5) failed to include any information regarding the cost of incarceration or why the appellant’s sentence would burden the state’s resources. The briefs cited only one case (for the definition of clear and convincing evidence) and four sections of the Revised Code—three related to sentencing and one regarding appeal as a matter of right. And although these 31 briefs were virtually identical, in 29 of these cases, Milhoan requested at least three extensions of time to file his appellate briefs.
The court considered evidence of alcohol abuse and required the attorney to comply with the bar's assistance program. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Somehow I missed an order of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals amending to Rule XI, section I to extend disciplinary jurisdiction over
all new and visiting clinical professors providing services pursuant to Rule 48(e) (4).
The change is effective as of October 2.
Here's hoping there are no cases involving alleged ethics violations by this class of lawyers. (Mike Frisch)
The District of Columbia Office of Bar Counsel has informally admonished an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of Florida for conduct described in the letter of informal admonition
We find that you violated Florida Rule 4-8.4( c) which prohibits engaging in conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." This violation occurred when you falsely told a U.S. Magistrate Judge's secretary that you had obtained prior supervisory review and approval of a tracker warrant application that you were filing with the court, when you had not obtained such review or approval.
In deciding to issue this letter of Informal Admonition rather than institute formal disciplinary charges against you, we have taken into consideration that you took this matter seriously, that you cooperated with our investigation, that you admitted the misconduct soon after it occurred, that you have no prior discipline, and that you have accepted responsibility for your misconduct including by accepting this Informal Admonition.
The full letter may be found at this link by inserting the name of the attorney, Brent S. Tantillo. (Mike Frisch)
Monday, December 15, 2014
Disbarment should be imposed on an attorney who violated several ethics rules, according to a recent report and recommendation of the Illinois Review Board
The [disciplinary] cases were consolidated for purposes of oral argument. In 2010PR00153, the Hearing Board found that Respondent engaged in misconduct involving several clients, including 1) improperly taking money from a charitable fund set up to benefit his clients and lying about his use of the money, 2) engaging in a conflict of interest by representing multiple clients in a criminal case, 3) failing to refund an unearned fee and creating false billing records and lying about his services in an effort to justify the fee, 4) engaging in a conflict of interest by representing a wife in a divorce case while representing the husband in criminal charges and civil litigation, 5) misappropriating funds belonging to a client. The Hearing Board recommended disbarment.
In 2012PR00123, the Hearing Board found that Respondent in a foreclosure matter, rented the property of his clients without their knowledge, improperly kept the rental income, and lied to his clients and others. The Hearing Board also found that Respondent failed to return an unearned retainer in a second matter and in a third matter, failed to deposit a retainer into his client fund account and then used the retainer for his personal purposes and failed to return the unearned portion of the fee. The Hearing Board recommended that Respondent be suspended for three years and until further order of the Court.
The attorney filed exceptions to the hearing board reports but failed to appear for oral argument. (Mike Frisch)
The Alaska Supreme Court has disbarred an attorney who misappropriated the funds of a deceased client's estate and concealed the thefts through lies over a three-year period.
An attorney misappropriated a deceased client’s funds — rightfully belonging to the decedent’s estate — and hid this misappropriation through deception while providing legal services to the estate’s personal representative. Throughout more than three years of disciplinary proceedings, the attorney maintained that the funds had been gifted to her and that she was following the decedent’s wishes in deceiving the estate. The Alaska Bar Association’s Disciplinary Board found that no gift had been intended or accomplished and that, among other violations, the attorney committed the criminal act of theft, misappropriation, or wrongful conversion. The Board recommends that we disbar the attorney. After independently reviewing the record, we agree with the Board and impose the recommended sanction.
The attorney, who was admitted in 1989, had claimed that the funds at issue had been gifted to her by the now-deceased client.
The client and attorney met when he built her a fence as a handyman.
The client had died unexpectedly without a will and with his mother as his sole heir.
The attorney claimed that the client had given her a business account with approximately $20.000 on deposit.
The court affirmed findings below that there was no gift. (Mike Frisch)
Friday, December 12, 2014
The Louisiana Supreme Court has found that an attorney violated ethics rules by engaging in a sexual relationship with a current client.
The court ordered a six-month suspension with three months stayed.
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel had charged the attorney with misconduct by having consensual sex with five other women who at one time or another had either retained his services or consulted with him.
The attorney's practice was almost exclusively devoted to family law matters.
The court rejected the ODC's contention that the "no sex" rule applies to relations with former clients and prospective clients who choose not to retain an attorney:
We find no support for this position in the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Justice Knoll concurred but "strongly disagreed" with the holding that the attorney did not violate ethics rules in having sex with former clients while their domestic matter remains pending.
She concludes that the attorney's
sexual involvement with numerous female clients evidences a pattern of conduct by means of his practice which degrades his obligations to the clients and demeans a time-honored profession.
Justice Weimer agreed with Justice Knoll and would find the conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. (Mike Frisch)
The Nebraska Supreme Court has suspended an attorney for 30 days followed by a year of supervised probation for an attorney's mishandling of a guardianship and probate matter.
There were record-keeping violations as well.
The attorney contended that the referee erred in declining to consider post traumatic stress disorder resulting from his status as a combat-wounded Vietnam veteran in mitigation.
The court agreed that the misconduct was not caused by PTSD, citing a letter from the attorney's own psychiatrist that declined to find a causal link between the condition and the ethical violations.
The court did consider his long years of unblemished practice in rejecting the referee's proposed 90 day suspension.
One thing that the casual reader might overlook stood out to me.
The charges were filed in November 2013. The referee heard the case in February and March of this year. The court has now decided it by the end of the year.
That promptness reflects well on the Nebraska bar discipline system.
There are plenty of jurisdictions (hello, D.C.) where the idea of moving a bar discipline matter from initial report to final resolution in a single calendar year is unfathomable.
Believe it or not, in the District of Columbia, it takes about a year for charges filed by Bar Counsel to be reviewed and approved for a formal hearing. It can then take as long as six months to schedule a hearing.
What's worse, no one in a position of authority seems to care. (Mike Frisch)
A three-year suspension has been imposed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court for an attorney 's misconduct in converting entrusted funds and falsely telling the client that the funds were invested.
In fact, a generous share had used by himself and on behalf of a third party.
There are many aggravating factors. Attorney Carter's conduct involved much more than simple negligence. His conduct was reckless and highly unprofessional. In answer to N.N.'s repeated requests for her funds——over $70,000 of which he had converted——Attorney Carter wove elaborate stories of investment instruments in which he had supposedly placed her money. These supposed investments were pure fiction. Not long after N.N. objected to Attorney Carter's supposed investment scheme, Attorney Carter took action to create leverage over N.N.: he sent her a $43,400 legal bill. He refused to release the remainder of N.N's funds in trust until they reached an agreement on his fees. He accused N.N. of trying to take advantage of him by not insisting that he prepare a written fee agreement listing his hourly rate. These forms of deception and subterfuge are highly damaging to the public's confidence in the integrity and trustworthiness of the bar.
There are mitigating factors as well. Attorney Carter has had no previous disciplinary troubles over the course of his long legal career. He has earned a solid reputation among his peers and in the community. It appears he repaid most, and perhaps all, of the money he misappropriated from N.N. (The record is unclear as to whether he ever accounted for the $5,000 fee payment he withdrew from his trust account without N.N.'s knowledge.) He has admitted his wrongdoing, pled no contest to all 11 counts of misconduct, and expressed shame and remorse.
The mitigating factors were deemed sufficient to avoid license revocation.
Nor did the court accept this contention
We pause to remark briefly on Attorney Carter's claim that at his age (he was born in 1943), a three-year suspension——which will require him to petition this court for reinstatement under SCR 22.28(3)——might effectively end his career. Attorney Carter generally maintains that it is sad for an otherwise untarnished career to potentially end this way. We agree with this sentiment: this is an unfortunate case involving anomalous behavior from an otherwise ethical lawyer, and we do not relish deciding it. But we decline to transform this sentiment into anything more than what it is——a sentiment, not a principle of law. This court cannot countenance a rule that would soft-pedal the discipline owed to attorneys who lie to and misappropriate funds from their clients so long as they do so in the twilight of their careers.
Thursday, December 11, 2014
We posted a report the other day about an attorney who was convicted of robbing three banks.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has suspended a member of its bar as a result of a conviction for robbing a gas station.
Steve Marroni reports
An attorney who pleaded guilty to robbing a Lebanon County gas station will be temporarily suspended from practicing law in Pennsylvania.
The temporary suspension from the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for Kathy L. Yeatter, 51, whose office is located in Rexmont, was issued Wednesday, several months after she was convicted in Lebanon County Court of one count of robbery.
Yeatter was charged in the Nov. 12, 2013 robbery of the Sunoco A-Plus Market on Route 72 in West Cornwall Township. Police said Yeatter stole an undetermined amount of cash from the gas station.
An officer responding to the Sunoco passed Yeatter's Volvo on Route 419 and arrested her without incident, police said.
Court records indicate Yeatter pleaded guilty to one third-degree felony count of robbery on March 27. She was sentenced May 21 to 23 months in the Lebanon County Intermediate Punishment Program, which includes 26 days of credit for time served and credit for inpatient treatment. The rest of her sentence will be served on probation with continued treatment and random drug and alcohol testing, according to court records.
Yeatter's suspension is effective Jan. 9. According to the disciplinary board, a petition for discipline will likely be filed against her, as well, which could result in further suspension or disbarment.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has agreed with its Disciplinary Review Board that a six-month suspension is appropriate for conduct that amounted to witness tampering.
The attorney had been previously reprimanded. The misconduct here involved a failed attempt to induce a witness to give false evidence to undo the reprimand.
The DEC found that respondent’s conduct in this matter "was borne out of a self-serving interest, because Respondent rejected the prior finding that misconduct." Specifically, instead of filing a petition for review of our decision, as provided in R~ 1:20--16(b), respondent sought to have Hartzell, his former client and friend, sign the April 2011 letter and affidavit that respondent prepared and that contradicted Hartzell’s testimony and documentary evidence that we and the Court found reliable, in reprimanding respondent.
The DRB considered this submission
Exhibit R-30 is a veterinary bill for the 2012 euthanization of "Dusty," respondent’s cat, a few days before the DEC hearing below. Although its evidentiary value is limited, we saw no harm in permitting its inclusion in the record to demonstrate that respondent was mourning the loss of his cat, at the time of the DEC hearing.
The District Ethics Committee had proposed a censure. (Mike Frisch)
A two-year suspension has been recommended by an Illinois Hearing Board for two attorneys based on misconduct found in connection with a debt relief business.
The Administrator alleged Respondents formed a debt settlement law firm, Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC (LHDR) and contracted with nonattorney debt settlement companies to enroll LHDR clients and perform much of the work on client matters. The Administrator charged Respondents with failing to consult with clients about the means by which the objectives of the representation are to be pursued, failing to explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary to allow clients to make informed decisions about the representation, collecting unreasonable fees, failing to supervise the nonattorney employees of the debt settlement companies and assisting nonattorneys in the unauthorized practice of law.
The Hearing Board found Respondents engaged in most of the charged misconduct and recommended that both Respondents be suspended for two years. The recommendation took into consideration the scope of the misconduct, the substantial harm to vulnerable and unsophisticated clients, Respondents' significant financial gain and their failure to appreciate the actual harm they caused.
The attorneys let the non-lawyers do the work
Respondents do not dispute that very little or no direct communication between an LHDR attorney and LHDR clients occurred, either about the means by which the objectives of the representation were to be pursued or to explain the scope of the representation to the extent necessary for clients to make informed decisions. Instead, Respondents rely on the scripted presentations nonattorneys made to LHDR clients, the written materials provided to clients and the advice Respondents received from ethics experts to refute the charges they violated Rules 1.2(a) and 1.4(a)(2) and (b).
We find the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence Respondents failed to consult with clients about the means by which the objectives of the representation were to be accomplished. The language of Rules 1.2(a) and 1.4(a)(2) pertaining to consultation is specifically directed to "a lawyer." We interpret "consult" to require two-way communication between lawyer and client and find no support in the language of the Rules or the case law that allows a lawyer to delegate all or virtually all client communications to a nonattorney. There are times when a nonattorney may relay information from a lawyer to a client or vice versa but we cannot envision a scenario in which it would be acceptable for a nonattorney to take over the lawyer's duties of communication with a client. This is especially true in this case, when the nonattorneys responsible for communicating with clients were not Respondents' employees and were not under Respondents' direct control.
We...find clear and convincing evidence that Respondents violated Rule 5.3(a). As equity partners of LHDR, Respondents had managerial authority that required them to make reasonable efforts to ensure LHDR had measures in place giving reasonable assurance that the conduct of the nonattorneys associated with LHDR was compatible with Respondents' professional obligations. For the following reasons, LHDR's measures for monitoring the nonattorneys did not provide the necessary reasonable assurance that they were acting consistently with Respondents' professional obligations. Nor were Respondents' efforts in this regard reasonable.
Respondents delegated the task of supervising the strategic alliance partners to Jason Searns. Searns did not directly supervise the nonattorney case managers and negotiators who handled LHDR client files. Rather, they reported to nonattorney supervisors within the strategic alliance partners. Searns' supervisory efforts consisted of providing the nonattorneys with scripts, policies, and procedures and conducting quarterly compliance reviews.
The nonattorneys were responsible for virtually all communications with clients, yet neither Searns nor any LHDR attorney had direct knowledge of the nonattorneys' communications or other important aspects of the nonattorneys' daily activities. Scripts and lists of policies and procedures provide some helpful information to nonattorneys but they are not a substitution for an attorney's actual observation and communication. LHDR attorneys had very minimal if not zero knowledge whether the nonattorneys adhered to LHDR's scripts and procedures. Nor did they have the ability to enforce adherence given the vast numbers of clients.
As to sanction
Having found misconduct, we must determine the appropriate sanction to recommend. There are significant aggravating factors that impact our recommendation. Respondents' misconduct affected 2,200 clients in Illinois and thousands more in other states. Respondents exposed clients to unreasonable risks of harm and caused actual harm to many clients. See In re Lewis, 118 Ill. 2d 357, 515 N.E.2d 96 (1987). Clients came to LHDR because they were under financial pressures. In many instances, their involvement with LHDR caused them to experience even greater financial problems as well as emotional distress. After ending their relationships with LHDR, many clients had to file for bankruptcy and incur additional attorney fees. Respondents' misconduct is further aggravated by the fact it was focused on clients who were vulnerable and, in many instances, unsophisticated. See Lewis, 118 Ill. 2d 357.
Respondents placed more importance on their own success and financial gain than they did on their clients' interests. The Panel heard no expressions of remorse for the harm their clients suffered. Additionally, in the opinion of this Panel, Respondents did not sufficiently contemplate the ethical problems that LHDR's model and operations caused and ultimately did not acknowledge the gravity of these problems.
In mitigation, we consider Respondents' cooperation in these proceedings and lack of prior discipline. We also consider the evidence of Respondents' good character, including good reputations for truth and veracity and involvement in charitable activities. However, the mitigating evidence pales in comparison to the scope of the misconduct. LHDR made restitution to Illinois clients, but that occurred primarily as a result of the Attorney General's action against LHDR. Moreover, some clients, such as Jennifer Green and Charles E. Powell, did not receive restitution of the full amount they paid to LHDR.
The Delaware Supreme Court has reinstated an attorney on the conditions that he may not engage in solo practice, act as a managing partner responsible for firm books and records and notify any employer of the conditions.
He also must be monitored by the bar's lawyer assistance program and cooperate with disciplinary counsel's efforts to make sure he is in compliance with the conditions.
The ODC may file a petition directly with the court if the attorney is alleged to be in cviolation of the conditions. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, December 10, 2014
A five-year suspension was imposed on an attorney who misappropriated funds entrusted by his next-door-neighbor client by the New York Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department.
In or about March 2003, the respondent referred Kathryn Cerullo to an attorney, John P. Garvey, with whom the respondent had an existing business relationship, to assist Kathryn Cerullo with, among other things, estate planning and the creation of a trust.
On or about March 28, 2003, Kathryn Cerullo executed an irrevocable trust (hereinafter the trust) prepared by Mr. Garvey. Pursuant to Article 4 of the trust, the primary beneficiary was the Church of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary in Southampton (hereinafter the Sacred Hearts Church). Pursuant to Article 5 of the trust, the alternate beneficiaries, in the event that the Sacred Hearts Church no longer existed at the time of Kathryn Cerullo's death, were Kathryn Cerullo's nieces and nephews, including, among others, Mary Linda Goleski, Michael Cerullo, and Judith Ann Cerullo Kossow. The respondent was appointed trustee of the trust, subject to removal as provided by Article 7, Section 2, of the trust. The respondent executed the trust, as trustee, on or about March 28, 2003.
the respondent took advantage of his longtime relationship of trust with Kathryn Cerullo to unjustly enrich himself from the funds she entrusted to him, as a fiduciary, without her knowledge or consent. As Kathryn Cerullo's attorney, attorney-in-fact, and the trustee of a trust established for her benefit, the respondent established a putative "trust account" in his own name, which he manipulated to garner over 75% of Kathryn Cerullo's funds for his own use and benefit. As the Special Referee correctly found, the respondent disbursed to himself amounts that were as "facially outrageous" as the activities for which they purportedly were paid. Under the totality of the circumstances, we find that the respondent engaged in willful misappropriation, and that charge one was properly sustained.
As to sanction
In determining an appropriate measure of discipline to impose, we note the testimony of the respondent's witnesses as to the respondent's good reputation in the community, his participation in "numerous charitable undertakings for the poor in the community," and his work as a Deacon in the Roman Catholic Church of Saints Philip and James. The Court also has considered, as requested by the respondent's counsel, the following: the respondent has been a member of the Bar since 1977, having first been admitted in the State of Florida and then, in April 1978, pro hac vice in the Second Department, before being admitted to the New York Bar on November 28, 1978. Moreover, he is admitted to practice in the United States District Court for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, as well as the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He has served as an arbitrator in the Eastern District, and was appointed by the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein to the Discovery Committee of the Eastern District, for the purpose of reconciling the inconsistencies between the rules of the Eastern and Southern Districts. However, we note that the respondent himself failed to offer proof of any mitigation at the hearing. Rather, he testified solely and consistently that his defense was that he did nothing wrong. To that end, the Special Referee found, and we agree, that "the respondent was evasive and not forthcoming in any way." The Special Referee's finding relative to the respondent's credibility is entitled to great weight.
The Colorado Presiding Disciplinary Judge has accepted a proposed disposition of a suspension of a year and a day with all but three months stayed for misconduct in three matters.
One of the matters is somewhat noteworty
In a third matter, Escamilla requested discovery from the Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office in a criminal matter. Escamilla agreed to pay $1,568.00 for the materials. Escamilla picked up the discovery materials and tendered a check written from his COLTAF account for the full amount. Escamilla’s check was returned for insufficient funds. Although a member of the district attorney’s office wrote three letters and made multiple calls to Escamilla requesting payment, he did not respond. Escamilla paid for the discovery materials only after the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel began its investigation.
The wrong payee to bounce a check off of is the District Attorney's Office. Mike Frisch)
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has accepted the consent to disbarment of Jane Orie as a result of her criminal conviction.
WTAE News 4 reported on the downfall of the former state senator and her two sisters, one who had served on the same court that imposed disbarment
Orie's conviction marked the beginning of the end of the conservative Republican family's influence in western Pennsylvania.
Orie was acquitted of charges that she also made her staff to work on the 2003 and 2009 Supreme Court campaigns of her sister, Joan Orie Melvin, who was then a Superior Court judge. But Melvin, 58, was later charged, tried and convicted separately of conspiring with Orie to have the Senate staffers work on Melvin's judicial campaigns.
Melvin was also convicted last year of misusing her Superior Court staff during the same campaigns. A third sister, Janine Orie, who worked as Melvin's court aide, was also convicted.
Melvin has been removed from the Supreme Court seat she won in 2009. Her conviction and most of her sentence, including three years' house arrest and $55,000 in fines, was upheld by the Superior Court last month.
And from Huffington Post on the criminal case
A former Pennsylvania state senator has been sentenced to prison on charges that she illegally used her legislative staff to do campaign work and then forged documents to cover it up.
Republican Jane Orie was ordered to serve her 2 1/2- to 10-year state prison sentence immediately Monday and was taken from the courtroom.
The 50-year-old suburban Pittsburgh attorney was convicted of five felony counts involving theft of service and conflict of interest for using her state-funded staff to perform political fundraising and campaign work, and nine related misdemeanors. She resigned from the Senate in May.
Tuesday, December 9, 2014
The Michigan Attorney Discipline Board has denied a petition to resign of an attorney convicted of stealing $2.7 million from clients over a seven-year period.
The board interpreted the rule that provides that a "resignation may not be accepted while a request for investigation or a complaint is pending, except pursuant to an order of disbarment."
Recently, the Board has had cause to examine the meaning, effect, and application of this rule. For example, in order to process the instant filing certain questions must be answered. Is this matter to be assigned to a hearing panel? If so, what procedures should the panel follow? What prerequisites must be fulfilled prior to the entry of an order allowing resignation and imposing disbarment?
After reviewing the history of uneven application of the rule, the board concluded that it "does not create an independent mechanism for entry of an order of disbarment" and denied the petition to resign without prejudice to a disciplinary proceeding against the attorney. (Mike Frisch)