Friday, March 6, 2015
The North Carolina State Bar has imposed a censure of an attorney who violated the duty of confidentiality.
From the order
Without either implied or express consent, you revealed the names of a child's adoptive parents to the child's biological mother and the child's former foster mother. This release of information constitutes a misdemeanor under NCGS § 48-10-105 that reflects on your trustworthiness as an attorney. You failed in your response to this grievance to recognize the real or potential harm of your conduct on the child and his adoptive family.
The censure is phrased in this manner
The Grievance Committee trusts that you will ponder this censure, recognize the error that you have made, and that you will never again allow yourself to depart from adherence to the high ethical standards of the legal profession. This censure should serve as a strong reminder and inducement for you to weigh carefully in the future your responsibility to the public, your clients,your fellow attorneys and the courts, to the end that you demean yourself as a respected member of the legal profession whose conduct may be relied upon without question.
Thursday, March 5, 2015
A reprimand was imposed by the North Carolina State Bar for this misconduct
You failed to timely submit your CLE Annual Report form to the Board of Continuing Legal Education, resulting in a late fee assessed against you. You requested a waiver of the late fee, and you were instructed by the State Bar to submit your original signed report form along with your waiver request. You subsequently submitted a form purporting to be the original when it was not. Your submission of a false Annual Report form constituted conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Further, in response to inquiries from the State Bar, you knowingly mischaracterized the circumstances surrounding your submission of the false Annual Report form. Your known false statements of material fact made in connection with a disciplinary matter violated Rules 8.1 (a) and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Bar's Grievance Committee was "greatly concerned" about the behavior but noted the attorney inexperience. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, March 4, 2015
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has reinstated an attorney suspended for two years as a result of a bribery conviction.
Kerr was admitted to the Oklahoma Bar in September 2006, and became an associate attorney with the firm of Ogle & Welch. He handled all misdemeanor cases for the firm. In the spring of 2007, Ogle & Welch undertook representation of a client who was charged in Oklahoma County District Court with driving under the influence. Kerr served as defense counsel for this client. The criminal matter was resolved with the client receiving a deferred sentence, but then was later scheduled for a driver's license revocation hearing with the Department of Public Safety. Attorneys at the firm of Ogle & Welch initiated a series of steps to offer a bribe to an Edmond Police officer in exchange for his absence at the hearing. The officer in question reported the bribery attempt to his superiors and a police investigation commenced.
He pleaded guilty to a felony.
Our primary duty is to protect the public, the judiciary and the legal profession. Therefore, we take our responsibility of passing on an application seeking reinstatement for one who has previously failed to meet the profession's standards with utmost seriousness. Before reinstating an attorney to the Bar, the Supreme Court must have a firm conviction that the lawyer will not engage in similar misconduct. Even considering the testimony of the three attorneys opposing reinstatement, the quality and quantity of evidence in favor of reinstatement convinces us that Kerr will provide, once again, valuable services to clients, the practicing bar, the judiciary, and his community.
A five-year suspension has been imposed by the New York Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department for an attorney's misconduct in litigation.
The findings came from a federal court suspension of seven years.
Specifically, respondent was suspended for instructing an associate in her law firm to alter deposition transcripts with work product for the purpose of preventing their discoverability and misleading the court as to the matter; copying the transcripts in intentional disregard of the court's orders; and using the transcripts in a federal action in Massachusetts in violation of the court's confidentiality order.
Respondent's misconduct arose out of a federal lawsuit commenced in 2007 by the law firm of Dorsey & Whitnesy on behalf of Wolstyers Kluwer Financial Services, Inc. (Wolsters). Respondent, then a partner at Dorsey & Whitney, was lead counsel in the matter. Wolsters alleged that three of its former employees had taken certain proprietary information and divulged it to their new employer. The district court granted a temporary restraining order and ordered expedited discovery. The parties exchanged discovery documents, and the individual defendants were deposed. While discovery was ongoing, the district court entered a Confidentiality Order providing in part that certain material — including all discovery material at issue here — "shall not be used in any other litigation proceeding," and that the district court's jurisdiction to enforce those restrictions would survive the lawsuit.
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants, all of them located in Massachusetts. The Dorsey attorneys then began to consider voluntary dismissal in New York and re-filing in the District of Massachusetts. Wolsters gave respondent permission to dismiss the suit. During a subsequent conference call with the court and opposing counsel, however, respondent did not mention the pending dismissal. Either during or shortly after the conference call, respondent (the partner in charge) instructed the junior partner on the case to file the dismissal; the junior partner sent notice of the dismissal by regular mail — though not electronically.
Despite the dismissal, respondent refused to return the discovery material produced by the defendants, including three CDs (containing 153,000 pages of documents) that were produced after the dismissal had been quietly effected. Despite repeated orders by the district court to return all discovery material, including copies of deposition transcripts, the return of discovery material was not completed until two weeks after the suit was dismissed. In the meantime, respondent filed a motion for temporary injunctive relief in the District of Massachusetts, appending 115 pages of material produced in New York that were subject to the Confidentiality Order.
The defendants moved for sanctions, and the district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing. The parties subsequently settled, and the defendants withdrew the sanctions motion; but the court, having its own concerns regarding the lawyers' conduct, proceeded with the hearing. After a five-day evidentiary hearing, during which respondent, represented by counsel, testified, on November 30, 2007, the district court imposed a total of 27 non-monetary sanctions..
The federal district court sanctions were affirmed by the Second Circuit
"[Respondent's] most serious failing involves the corruption of a young and inexperienced lawyer, over whom she had power and authority, and whom she ordered to commit conduct that could have ended with his own disciplinary hearing....[Respondent] exhibits no remorse for her inappropriate conduct; rather, she arrogantly persists in trying to salvage her reputation at the expense of the unfortunate [associate] - branding him and others at the Dorsey firm as liars when it is she who has consistently lied, both about what she did and about why she did it."
"Equally problematic is Respondent's habit of twisting the truth. At the hearing, [respondent] continually tried to shift blame to virtually every other person who came within arm's length of the Wolters Kluwer case....Respondent's flagrant mischaracterization of the record, and her meritless objections to [the Magistrate's] carefully crafted and amply supported findings, indicate that she has yet to accept any responsibility for what the Committee views as serious professional wrongdoing."
The incident took place in 2008. The attorney has not practiced law since 2010. (Mike Frisch)
A decision from the Maryland Court of Appeals
An attorney, admitted in Maryland, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia, was disciplined in Massachusetts (where the misconduct occurred) and then in the District of Columbia for seeking, over a 4 month period, reimbursement from her employing law firm for expenses that were personal in nature and for which she was not entitled to reimbursement, and for submitting falsified invoices in support of the same. In Massachusetts, the attorney was suspended for one year and one day. In the District of Columbia, the attorney was suspended, on a reciprocal basis, for a year and a day, nunc pro tunc as of 6 December 2013, with reinstatement contingent on a showing of fitness. Her misconduct warrants in Maryland a reciprocal sanction of an indefinite suspension, with the right to apply for reinstatement no sooner than when she is readmitted to practice in Massachusetts and the District of Columbia.
Tuesday, March 3, 2015
From the Idaho State Bar web page
On February 25, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court entered a Disciplinary Order suspending Nampa attorney R. Aaron Morriss from the practice of law for a period of five years, with all but two years of such suspension withheld, effective January 30, 2015.
The Idaho Supreme Court found that Mr. Morriss violated I.R.P.C. 1.7(a)(2) [Conflict of interest based on personal interests of the lawyer]; 1.8(j) [Sexual relations with a client]; and 8.4(d) [Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice]. The Idaho Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Order followed a stipulated resolution of an Idaho State Bar disciplinary proceeding in which Mr. Morriss admitted that he violated those Rules.
The formal charge case related to Mr. Morriss’s relationships with two female clients. With respect to the first client, Mr. Morris texted the client explicit pictures of himself and engaged in sexual relations with the client during his representation of her in a custody case. With respect to the second client, Mr. Morriss texted the client explicit pictures of himself, took explicit pictures of the client, and engaged in sexual relations with the client during his representation of her in a parental termination case.
The Disciplinary Order provided that upon reinstatement, if any, after the two-year period of imposed suspension, Mr. Morriss will serve a two-year period of probation with terms and conditions that include counseling and the immediate imposition of the withheld period of suspension if he violates the terms of his probation or admits or is found to have violated any Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct for which a public sanction is imposed for conduct that occurred during the probationary period.
The Illinois Review Board has recommended a three-year suspension of an attorney for misappropriation of entrusted funds.
The attorney's explanation was, to put it charitably, unchivalrous:
During the course of the Administrator's investigation, Respondent tendered to the Administrator falsified bank records purporting to show that he was properly holding the funds. When the fabrication was discovered, Respondent blamed his mother for the fabrication of the records. Respondent claimed his mother misappropriated the funds in question by transferring funds from his IOLTA account to his business account and then covered up the misuse of the funds in an elaborate scheme aided by a woman the mother met at an unspecified Kinko's copy shop.
The Hearing Board did not believe Respondent or his mother. In fact, the Hearing Board began its report by stating that they found "the testimony of Respondent and his mother, Selma Frazin, lacking in credibility and, in large part, untruthful," noting that "Respondent and Ms. Frazin have changed their stories so many times it is impossible to determine when, if ever, they are telling the truth." While Respondent claims that the Hearing Board erred in disbelieving him, we disagree. The Hearing Board was not required to accept Respondent's testimony.
Respondent expressed no remorse for the harm he caused. The Hearing Board considered Respondent's attempts to portray everyone else as wrongdoers as aggravating. Indeed, instead of accepting responsibility for his misappropriations, Respondent embarked on a path of lies and misrepresentations in an effort to blame others, including his own mother, for his own misdeeds.
Respondent's conduct was egregious and cannot be countenanced. The Court has long held that the intentional conversion of client funds warrants disbarment, absent mitigating circumstances.
The recommendation would require the attorney to petition for reinstatement. (Mike Frisch)
From the web page of the California Bar Journal
[An attorney] was suspended from the practice of law for two years and ordered to take the MPRE and comply with rule 9.20 of the California Rules of Court. He was also placed on three years’ probation and faces a three-year suspension if he does not comply with rule 9.20 of the California Rules of Court. The order took effect Oct. 4, 2014.
Osborn was suspended following convictions in seven different matters. Six were convictions related to his driving on a suspended license. In the seventh, he pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree commercial burglary and one count of possession of burglary tools, both misdemeanors.
On July 1, 2013, Osborn covered the front license plate of his car with a plastic bag and walked into a Target store in Seal Beach intending to steal a laptop cord. Osborn had a folding box cutter with him. Target loss prevention officers noticed him acting suspicious in the electronics department and saw him put the laptop cord down the front of his pants. After he left the store without paying, loss prevention personnel recovered the item from him in the parking lot. Police later contacted him at a nearby hotel, where he was staying.
In mitigation, Osborn entered into a pretrial stipulation with the State Bar. He received limited mitigation for receiving treatment for a drug abuse problem he had at the time of his misconduct.
Amy Yarbrough of the California Bar Journal reports
In a first-of-its-kind case, a Northern California lawyer has been reprimanded for making false statements about a judge during his campaign to unseat him.
On Feb. 5, the Review Department of the State Bar Court publicly reproved Clint Edward Parish, 43, [bar #211982] for falsely accusing his opponent in a June 2012 judicial campaign of being involved in a bribery and corporate fraud scheme.
In finding Parish culpable of violating rule 1-700 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, the three-judge review panel concluded he made accusations against sitting Yolo County Superior Court Judge Daniel Maguire “with reckless disregard for the truth.” In doing so, the panel disagreed with a hearing judge’s recommendation that Parish receive a lesser order of admonition.
“Instead, we find Parish’s reckless statement implicating a judge with bribery requires public discipline to maintain the integrity of the legal profession and to preserve public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary,” the panel wrote.
Parish, who now practices in Sonora, was a Yolo County prosecutor when he ran against Maguire with the assistance of adviser Kirby Wells and two political consultants. In March 2012, the campaign began preparing two mailers targeting Maguire, who had worked as a deputy legal affairs secretary for Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger until the governor appointed him to the bench in 2010.
Among other dubious claims, one of the mailers accused Maguire of being involved in a “sordid case of corporate fraud that involved the payment of bribes in Russia.” The court said Parish could have easily determined the claim false before sending the mailer. As a result of his misstep, Parish’s key supporters withdrew support for his campaign, and Parish stopped actively campaigning and fundraising. He was solidly defeated, receiving only 23 percent of the vote.
In making its decision to publicly reprove Parish, the panel noted his remorse and recognition for his wrongdoing and the apology he made to Maguire during his discipline trial.
“We are cognizant that Parish has already paid a heavy professional price for the campaign mailer, and that his misconduct was neither malicious nor intentional,” the panel wrote, noting that his misconduct was unlikely to occur.
“Even so, Parish’s reckless decision to implicate Judge Maguire in bribery and corporate fraud warrants public discipline,” it wrote.
Although the Review Department issued its opinion early last month, either side has 60 days to appeal it to the California Supreme Court.
Monday, March 2, 2015
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the consent disbarment of a convicted attorney.
A former Pennsylvania prosecutor and his wife pleaded no contest on Monday to charges of endangering the welfare of two children they adopted from Ethiopia.
Douglas Barbour 34, and Kristen Barbour, 32, agreed to the plea in exchange for the dismissal of other criminal charges, including assault, during a court appearance in Pittsburgh.
They were arrested in 2012 on suspicion of starving their 5-year-old adopted son and mistreating their 13-month-old daughter, both of whom were adopted from Ethiopia.
The Barbours also had two biological children at home.
Douglas Barbour, who was a deputy state attorney general at the time of his arrest, resigned from the post last year. He is likely to face probation at his sentencing on September 15 for two misdemeanor counts of child endangerment, prosecutors said.
Kristen Barbour could face prison time for two felony counts of child endangerment, the Allegheny County District Attorney's office said.
Her attorney told reporters outside the courtroom that he agreed with the judge's assessment that the Barbours' adoption of two children from a poverty-stricken African country had been an "act of charity gone awry."
"These two wanted to adopt children from a third world country to try to give them a better life," Robert E. Stewart said. "I think it was just a matter of being overwhelmed."
The attorney has been suspended since October 2013. (Mike Frisch)
A recent decision from the Rhode Island Supreme Court
The Georgia Supreme Court has accepted the voluntary resignation of an attorney convicted of criminal offenses.
The Record Herald reported on the criminal charges
A Georgia doctor accused of faking his credentials is expected to plead no contest to charges that he gave false testimony as an expert witness in multiple DUI cases across the state — including one in Franklin County, according to District Attorney Matthew Fogal.
Dr. Joseph Citron, 68, a board certified ophthalmologist from Atlanta, Ga., had been charged with 33 counts of perjury and false swearing for court cases in six Pennsylvania counties.
By pleading no contest Citron will face nine counts of felony perjury, one count for each trial, and one count of unsworn falsification to authorities.
Citron will receive a seven-year sentence of intermediate punishment, with the first 60 days of the sentence to be served on house arrest with electronic monitoring, according to Fogal.
“Obviously the most important piece is that he will never be able to testify again,” Fogal said in a written statement.
Information on the resulting no contest plea from Lancaster Online is linked here.
In Georgia, this sanction is "tantamount to disbarment. " (Mike Frisch)
Saturday, February 28, 2015
An unusual reciprocal discipline case will be argued in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on April 9th.
The attorney was disbarred in Alabama.
The D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility has recommended a 90-day suspension with fitness based on its conclusion that disbarment would amount to a "grave injustice."
Because the disbarment imposed by the Alabama Disciplinary Board is so disproportionate to the sanction that would otherwise be imposed in this jurisdiction, we conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that an obvious miscarriage of justice would occur if Respondent were disbarred...
...the Board finds that Respondent’s misconduct is most analogous to those cases where the Court has imposed 60-day suspensions for contempt of court. Specifically, the Board finds Breiner and Powell to be the most comparable. In Breiner, the respondent was held in contempt multiple times for a pattern of disrespect to the court, as a result of his excessive zeal in representing a criminal defendant. Similarly, in Powell, the respondent was held in contempt and caused a mistrial, harming his criminal defendant client. The findings of the Alabama Disciplinary Board encompass all of the elements of Breiner and Powell and thus warrant a sanction at least as serious. However, the Alabama Disciplinary Board found that Respondent also failed her client, and engaged in equally troubling conduct towards witnesses and the Assistant District Attorney. Given the extreme nature of her contumacious conduct and her failure to recognize it, insofar as she continued to press her grievances outside the courtroom on television, Respondent’s misconduct is somewhat more egregious than the 60-day suspension cases. Given these additional factors, the Board recommends that the Court impose a 90-day suspension.
And this may be played a role in the Alabama sanction.
After the trial, the attorney made a comment to a television station "that there was an intolerance by white judges to show respect to black attorneys and that the judge was embarrassed by all the lies the State told during the trial."
Bar Counsel has appealed the board recommendation.
As reflected in this earlier post, this is a rare instance where my sympathies lie with the board. (Mike Frisch)
The Delaware Supreme Court imposed a public reprimand of a criminal defense attorney who violated the terms of a protective order that he had a hand in drafting.
For the reasons meticulously outlined by the Board[on Professional Responsibility], the record supports a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Koyste knowingly violated the PO in Benn’s case. Koyste actively participated in drafting the PO, understood its terms, and specifically acquiesced to the clause prohibiting him or his agents from using the discovery material to identify or contact witnesses. The terms of the four-paragraph PO were clear and unambiguous. Koyste had a signed copy of the Superior Court’s and never forgot that Benn’s case was governed by a PO. Despite several reminders from the prosecutor about the terms of the PO, Koyste made no effort to review the Superior Court’s order or take any measures to determine his compliance with the PO before instructing his investigator to show the discovery materials to Benn and his wife.
The court concluded that "the Board properly found that [the attorney's] violation of the PO caused potential injury to the vulnerable, teenage victim in Benn’s case and caused actual injury to the legal system." (Mike Frisch)
Friday, February 27, 2015
A stayed three-year suspension with probation has been imposed by the Kansas Supreme Court on an attorney appointed to defend a felony driving under the influence case.
The attorney was concerned that a witness that the prosecution had under subpoena had moved out of state and was not there for trial.
The court ruled against the Respondent's position on the Motion in Limine and precluded [S.R.]'s preliminary hearing testimony from being offered by the Respondent. The Respondent was frustrated and angry at the court's decision, and he believed the prosecution had deliberately engaged in an obstructive tactic by making it appear that [S.R.] had been subpoenaed to appear at the trial, and then releasing him from his subpoena, without notifying the Respondent.
After counsel had argued their positions on the Motion in Limine, as the Respondent was returning to his seat at counsel table, the Respondent called Ms. Britton a 'dirty bitch.' The comment was heard by Ms. Britton, as well as other individuals in the courtroom who were seated behind the prosecutor's counsel table. Neither Judge Malone nor his court reporter heard the Respondent's comment.
Ms. Britton was surprised and offended by the Respondent's comment and asked to approach the bench to raise the issue with Judge Malone. Ms. Britton told Judge Malone that the Respondent had called her a 'bitch,' to which the Respondent indicated that he in fact had called her a 'dirty bitch.' The Respondent then apologized to Ms. Britton, although Ms. Britton did not initially believe the Respondent had apologized to her. However, Judge Malone confirmed that the Respondent had apologized.
The attorney also submitted a falsely notarized document in the disciplinary case.
There was mitigation
The Respondent testified that on the day [R.C.'s] trial began, July 8, 2013, he was experiencing severe, almost debilitating pain in his right big toe. As a result of a delay in seeking medical attention for a blister on the toe, the Respondent had developed a very serious medical condition that ultimately resulted in rather significant treatment after July 8, 2013. The Respondent had received information from his doctor prior to the incident on July 8, 2013, that treatment for the toe condition might include amputation.
And the behavior was not isolated, From the panel findings
It is interesting to note, that during cross-examination, the Disciplinary Administrator questioned two of the Respondent's witnesses, Douglas County District Court Judge Paula B. Martin and Sherri E. Loveland, attorney, Lawrence, Kansas, about similar conduct by the Respondent towards them. Judge Martin testified that in approximately 1981, the Respondent called her a 'bitch' when she was in a trial as opposing counsel. Ms. Loveland testified that approximately 30 years prior, the Respondent had called her a 'fucking bitch' during a court proceeding. While both of the incidents testified to by Judge Martin and Ms. Loveland are very remote in time to the incident which occurred in July 2013, it does reveal that the Respondent has a history of this type of conduct.
Disciplinary counsel sought a one-year suspension which the court rejected
...instead of adopting the discipline suggested by respondent or the Disciplinary Administrator, a majority of the court elects to impose a 3-year suspension. However, we elect to stay imposition of that discipline and place respondent on probation for a 3-year period from the date a probation order is entered by this court. A minority of the court would impose a harsher discipline in light of the violation of KRPC 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving misrepresentation) and respondent's prior disciplinary history.
The Iowa Supreme Court has suspended an attorney without possibility of reinstatement for at least six months.
Verla Jean Bartley was admitted to the Iowa bar in 1961. She rose to prominence in the profession over the years and was active in the state bar association. She has no prior disciplinary record. In 2002, she began practicing as "of counsel" with an Iowa City law firm and retired from the active practice of law in 2014.
The misconduct involved neglect and misrepresentations in two estate matters.
The court discounted her self-report
However, this mitigation is lessened somewhat when the self-reporting is at least in part motivated by knowledge that the law firm would otherwise be reporting the violation.
After considering mitigating and aggravating factors, the court concluded
We also observe that the misrepresentation was not only the most serious unethical conduct engaged in by Bartley, but measured against a career that spanned more than half a century, it appeared to be the most uncharacteristic. Bartley consciously engaged in the misrepresentation to cover up her neglect and, in the process, only elevated the seriousness of her conduct and the degree of sanctions we are responsible to impose. We have observed this result in other lawyer discipline cases, and it is one that all lawyers who face the prospect of discipline would be better off avoiding.
Thursday, February 26, 2015
A conviction for a violent crime merits an 18-month suspension, according to a recent order of the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
Disciplinary Counsel has requested that we suspend the respondent’s license to practice law based upon these two criminal convictions. The respondent appeared before the Court, with counsel, and requested that we impose a less severe sanction. The respondent presented mitigation evidence that his criminal conduct occurred while he was seriously intoxicated, that he has sought and continued treatment for his substance-abuse issues, including in-patient rehabilitative care, and that he has refrained from consuming alcohol and other intoxicating substances since his arrest on the felony charge. Having heard the representations of Disciplinary Counsel, the respondent, and his counsel, we determine that a suspension of the respondent’s ability to practice law in this state is necessary...
By committing a crime of violence the respondent has tarnished the profession, and his conduct warrants a serious sanction.
The court further provided
At the conclusion of his eighteen-month period of suspension, the respondent may apply for reinstatement to the practice of law. Should he do so, the respondent will bear the burden of convincing this Court that he has maintained his sobriety, that he has continued with his treatment for substance abuse, and that he is morally fit to resume the practice of law.
The Washington State Supreme Court has imposed a six-month suspension of an attorney for pervasive neglect of a personal injury matter.
Rather than challenge the factual basis of the Washington State Bar Association's (WSBA) three-count complaint, Pfefer's brief to this court raises arguments about due process and unconstitutional vagueness. He does not cite to any testimony, evidence, or argument that the events of his representation did not occur exactly as the hearing officer found. Our own review of the record shows the same-a knowing disregard of fundamental professional duties owed to his client and an indifference to making restitution. The WSBA Disciplinary Board (Board) unanimously recommended that Pfefer be suspended from the practice of law for six months and pay restitution to his former client in the amount of unaccepted settlement offer. We affirm, to practice on the payment of restitution of $5,834.15 to his former client and the payment of costs and expenses to the WSBA.
The attorney contended that he was denied due process.
One claim was that Rule 3.7 was improperly applied because his partner was both his attorney and a fact witness. He claimed that the lawyer-witness rule did not apply to bar disciplinary matters.
The court rejected the claim
More fundamentally, Pfefer fails to show on this record that the hearing officer disqualified Caruso at all. Rather, he gave Pfefer a choice: either Caruso could act as advocate and cross-examine two of the WSBA's witnesses (including [client] Ortiz) or he could testify as a fact witness. Pfefer chose the latter. The hearing officer ruled that Pfefer had the opportunity to testify in the narrative, subject to objection, and Caruso was permitted to sit at counsel's table and advise Pfefer throughout the hearing. Because the record shows that the hearing officer did not disqualify Caruso from assisting Pfefer at the disciplinary hearing, we find no error.
The attorney's challenges to costs also fell on deaf ears
His supplemental objections challenged virtually every expense, objecting to, for example, mileage reports for disciplinary counsel, lunch expenses, parking, the use of in person questioning of witnesses at the disciplinary hearing instead of performing the hearing telephonically, document fees, and interpreter's services. The Chair did not consider Pfefer's supplemental objections, concluding they were too late.
An attorney who improperly sought a default in an employment discrimination case on behalf of a former Special Assistant Attorney General was suspended for one month by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
We find it inconceivable that the respondent could have held a belief, much less a reasonable one, that at all times during the long history of Huntley’s quest for resolution of her claims Lynch, Coyne and Goulart did not plead or otherwise defend against those claims. Accordingly, the respondent could not have had a good-faith basis to support the affidavits he filed with the clerk in support of his applications for default. Therefore, he made a false statement of fact to the clerk of the court when he submitted his own affidavits asserting that Lynch, Coyne and Goulart had "failed to plead or otherwise defend the within action," in violation of Rule 3.3(a). Additionally, his conduct in filing these applications with the clerk, without notice to the defendants or their counsel, for purposes of obtaining an unwarranted entry of default, were dishonest and deceitful, in violation of Rule 8.4(c). Finally, his conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice, causing the court, defendants, and their counsel to squander limited resources addressing respondent’s filings, in violation of Rule 8.4(d).
we note that the respondent is a fairly young attorney, with no history of public discipline. He seems to firmly believe in his client’s cause, and he is zealous in his pursuit of her claim. However, we agree with the board that his actions in pursuit of those claims were misleading, disingenuous, and harassing. We are not convinced that the respondent fully grasps that his conduct in this matter was wrongful. We find his lack of appreciation of that fact to be a substantial aggravating factor.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court accepted the consent disbarment of a convicted attorney.
An East Greenwich attorney has been disbarred by order of the Rhode Island Supreme Court after she pleaded no contest to charges of embezzling from an elderly client.
Janet A. Mastronardi, 54, was sentenced last July to two and a half years home confinement and four and a half years suspended with probation.
Mastronardi was accused of overbilling her client by more than $129,000 for services rendered in overseeing the woman’s finances. The woman needed assistance due to declining health.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court had suspended Mastronardi back in March 2013. On Jan. 30, 2015, Mastronardi filed an affidavit with the state disciplinary board acknowledging that she was aware she was the subject of a disciplinary investigation; the disbarment followed, and is retroactive to March 11, 2013.