Saturday, April 29, 2017
The California State Bar Court Review Department proposes disbarment under a three-strike provision for an attorney who sought continuances in two matters for supposed heart attacks
...given Moriarty’s disciplinary history, we also look to standard 1.8(b), which states that disbarment is appropriate where an attorney has two or more prior records of discipline if: (1) an actual suspension was ordered in any prior disciplinary matter; (2) the prior and current disciplinary matters demonstrate a pattern of misconduct; or (3) the prior and current disciplinary matters demonstrate the attorney’s unwillingness or inability to conform to ethical responsibilities. Moriarty’s case meets two of these criteria: he previously received 30- and 45- day actual suspensions; and, like the hearing judge, we find that his prior and current misconduct establish his unwillingness or inability to conform to ethical norms. Moreover, the two specified exceptions to standard 1.8(b) do not apply here. Moriarty’s present misconduct did not occur at the same time as his prior misconduct, and his limited mitigation for cooperation is neither compelling nor does it predominate over the significant aggravation for two prior discipline records, multiple acts of wrongdoing, significant harm, and his indifference.
We next consider whether any reason exists to depart from the discipline called for by standard 1.8(b). We acknowledge that disbarment is not mandatory as a third discipline. (Conroy v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 495, 506-507 [disbarment is not mandatory in every case of two or more prior disciplines, even where no compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate (analysis under former std. 1.7(b))]; In the Matter of Miller (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 131, 136 [to fulfill “purposes of lawyer discipline, we must examine the nature and chronology of respondent’s record of discipline”].) However, if we deviate from recommending disbarment, we must articulate clear reasons for doing so. (Std. 1.1; Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5 [requiring clear reasons for departure from standards].) Moriarty has not identified an adequate reason for us to depart from applying recommending disbarment, we must articulate clear reasons for doing so. (Std. 1.1; Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5 [requiring clear reasons for departure from standards].)
Moriarty has not identified an adequate reason for us to depart from applying standard 1.8(b), and we cannot articulate any. Further, we reject the hearing judge’s reasons for deviating from recommending disbarment—i.e., because “the timing of [Moriarty’s] misconduct” and “the nature and extent of [his] prior disciplines do not justify disbarment.” The record shows multiple instances of similar wrongdoing dating back to 1996, repeated abandonment of clients, blatant violation of applicable orders, and a troubling similarity between Moriarty’s present misconduct and the misconduct underlying Moriarty I. We also note that his misconduct in Moriarty II occurred shortly after his Moriarty I probation ended, and his present misconduct occurred shortly after his Moriarty II probation ended. Moreover, we find that the metes and bounds of the misconduct here are greater than the judge found. The record depicts an attorney who, for much of the past two decades, was either committing repeated, serious misconduct or being monitored on probation.
Friday, April 28, 2017
A District of Columbia Hearing Committee proposes a three-year suspension with fitness - not disbarment - for a truly horrific course of unethical conduct in failing to prosecute a medical malpractice/wrongful death case.
The case was in South Carolina. The D.C. attorney has never been admitted there.
He got into the case after it had been filed and substantial discovery had been completed. His standard boilerplate retainer agreement failed to consider or acknowledge the lien of former counsel.
He thereafter failed to diligently handle the matter leading to dismissal of the case. He failed to advise the clients, who learned two things when they complained to the South Carolina Bar.
First, he was not a South Carolina attorney. Second, the case had been dismissed.
When the D.C. Bar came calling, he lied and tried to place the blame on local counsel (who had conveniently died)
Many of the findings and conclusions in this case depend, in part, on whether one believes Respondent or his clients. Respondent testified that he told his clients certain information. The clients testified that he did not. Respondent’s version of the facts is too frequently contradicted by his own documents (letters and pleadings) or discredited by his own unexplained failure to memorialize significant conversations. See, e.g., FF 60, 64, 66, 74 (Respondent’s letters to Probate Court and MetLife Insurance contradicting his testimony); FF 31 (failing to document purported disclosure to clients of non-licensure in South Carolina). Respondent’s attempt to lay blame for each of the charges on the deceased Mr. Hinton is unconvincing. Mr. Hinton is obviously not able to defend his conduct, but the record speaks for itself. Mr. Hinton’s law office did not have any record of a fee-sharing agreement with Respondent or any documents to suggest a significant role in Respondent’s legal representation of Mr. Reid and his parents. FF 69. Respondent’s letter to the Probate Court unequivocally stated that “The Bynum Firm” continued its representation of the medical malpractice action as late as March of 2014. FF 64. When initially questioned by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel in April 2016, Respondent claimed that he was the lead attorney representing Mr. Reid and his parents. FF 88. As he became aware of the seriousness of the charges and had to defend himself in the disciplinary process, however, Respondent then shifted blame to Mr. Hinton. The Committee has no difficulty concluding that numerous statements and representations by Respondent during his hearing testimony were, in fact, intentionally false.
The committee finds a host of violations that started with the retainer
Respondent’s copies of two retainer agreements (one for Mr. Reid and a second for Mr. Reid’s parents) had internally conflicting provisions about the fees Respondent would charge (hourly and contingent). The retainer agreement also incorrectly stated he would “file” a medical malpractice action as to the scope of representation, when Respondent knew that actions already were filed and had been litigated for more than two years before his involvement. FF 34, 36. The retainer agreements essentially contain boilerplate text that Respondent used verbatim without considering the actual circumstances of his clients’ situations. FF 34. Disciplinary Counsel also faults Respondent for not mentioning the representation on the insurance matter in the retainer agreement for Mr. Reid. FF 73. Although the agreements themselves were in writing and forwarded to the clients “within a reasonable time after commencing the representation,” the problem is that Respondent’s draft of the “scope of representation” (1) relates to legal representation that was already completed by Mr. Smith, (2) fails to refer to the representation of the Estate in Probate Court, and (3) does not mention the insurance matter. Accordingly, the scope of the representation was not communicated to either Mr. Reid or his parents, and Respondent did not fulfill the requirements of S.C. Rule 1.5(b).
And lack of diligence, communication, conflicts, dishonesty
We...have no trouble finding that Respondent violated S.C. Rule 8.4(d) based on the following: (1) Respondent’s admission to Disciplinary Counsel’s investigator that he was the lead attorney, and then his subsequent position at the hearing that he was not the lead attorney; (2) the recorded false content of his letters to the Probate Court; and (3) his too convenient, unverifiable claim that the now deceased Mr. Hinton understood that he was in charge of the case. All these factors point to one conclusion—Respondent intentionally misrepresented key facts throughout. When Defendants’ counsel moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute, Mr. Hinton alerted Respondent and sent him the motion. FF 61. We believe this conduct is consistent with Mr. Hinton viewing Respondent as the lead attorney. When Mr. Reid and his parents wanted to know the status of the medical malpractice actions, they attempted to reach Respondent, not Mr. Hinton. FF 56-58. Both Mr. Reid’s and Frances Reid’s conduct was consistent with an honestly-held belief that Respondent was a licensed South Carolina attorney experienced in medical malpractice actions who was their only attorney.
But, according to the committee, the dishonesty was insufficiently "flagrant" to warrant disbarment.
On these sad facts - and lying in the bar proceedings - fair minds on the Board on Professional Responsibility and Court of Appeals might disagree as to that sanction conclusion.
The case is In re Raleigh Bynum. The link to the decision (you must either enter the name or page through the recent decisions) is here. (Mike Frisch)
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed a conviction for threats made to a district court commissioner during a bond hearing
On August 13, 2015, [Commissioner] Caron met with Smith following his arrest (the “Initial Appearance”). Caron testified that after she set money bail, Smith became furious. Caron testified that Smith “exploded and started cursing, yelling profanities. He said, ‘Fuck you bitch.’” Caron testified that Smith also shouted, “I’m going to find you,” and “You better find another job.” Caron further testified that Smith put his finger up, made eye contact with her, and said, “I’m going to find you” while thrusting his finger into the glass.
The guards then came to take him away. Deputy John Hinman of the Washington County Detention Center testified that, as Smith started to leave the room, “he turned back around and spit towards the Commissioner.”
It was not error to admit the spit
The purpose of the rule is to keep a jury from assuming the commission of one crime based on the commission of another crime or act. Here, Smith’s conduct is undisputed. Rather, it was the significance of the conduct that mattered. Therefore, the spitting did not unfairly suggest that Smith committed the act, but rather, appropriately provided context for the act.
Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.
The Iowa Supreme Court imposed a six-month suspension for misconduct in a domestic matter
In this disciplinary case, attorney Theodore Sporer appeals the findings and recommendations of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission recommending his law license be suspended for a period of six months. The alleged ethical violations occurred in the aftermath of a divorce decree. In a contempt proceeding arising from the divorce decree, the district court found Sporer falsely testified that he rejected the terms of a settlement letter sent by the opposing lawyer by immediately writing handwritten notes on the letter and sending it back to the opposing lawyer on the same day. The district court also found Sporer falsely and frivolously asserted that the secretary’s signature on the bottom of a settlement letter bound the client to the terms of a settlement agreement.
...we affirm the findings of the grievance commission. We also affirm most of the grievance commission’s conclusions. We suspend Sporer’s license to practice law for six months.
The attorney had one prior reprimand in 31 years of practice.
At issue was a document in divorce litigation that opposing counsel's secretary (Young) had signed in his office
But the district court concluded that the September 24 settlement letter with Sporer’s handwritten note was “a fraud.” The court cited the tone, substance, and circumstances of the note. The court emphasized that it would be absurd for Linda to give up her retirement benefit of more than $100,000, plus an unknown value of a share of a defined benefit pension, in exchange for $3000. Further, the court noted that it would be extremely unlikely that Linda would surrender the retirement award in settlement of the contempt action against Gary.
Further, the district court reasoned that there was no plausible motivation for Linda to accept “such a ridiculous agreement.” According to the court, there was no prospect of the district court’s award of retirement benefits to be eliminated on appeal. The only argument presented by Gary was a fault-based argument unlikely to result in any adjustment of the amount of the retirement account award.
We begin by observing that Sporer’s assertion that it was “unfathomable” to him that Young was anything other than a full agent is objectively absurd. Every lawyer knows that clerical staff provide essential support to a legal practice and make significant contributions to the lawyers and clients for whom they perform administrative services. Yet no lawyer, let alone a highly experienced lawyer, reasonably believes that clerical staff performing routine tasks such as retrieval of documents have authority, actual or apparent, to bind clients of the firm. We are not surprised that neither Sporer nor we have found legal authority supporting the proposition that legal secretaries generally have authority to bind clients of the attorneys for whom they work...
On this subjective issue, we give respectful consideration to the findings of Judge Staskal in the contempt hearing and the commission in this proceeding. The commission and Judge Staskal did not believe Sporer actually believed his extraordinary assertion that secretaries have authority to bind clients to settlement agreements. We too simply find it hard to accept the notion that an experienced lawyer would believe a secretary dispatched on a routine mission of picking up legal documents had the authority to bind a client to the terms of a settlement agreement, particularly one in which a party was required to surrender a substantial legal claim. We thus conclude that the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that Sporer knowingly made a false statement of fact or law to the tribunal in violation of rule 32:3.3(a)(1)...
There are a number of features in the record that make Sporer’s assertions with respect to the annotation of the September 24 settlement letter difficult to believe. As Sporer himself concedes, lawyers do not ordinarily respond to settlement letters by scribbling handwritten annotations and returning them to the sending party by multiple means in nonemergency situations. Sporer responds by claiming he was “in a hurry” and angry at Duffy upon receipt of the September 24 settlement letter and was trying to make a point by responding in handwriting with exclamation marks...
Sporer defends his conduct in part by suggesting that it would make no sense for him to testify falsely about an inconsequential document. But the marked-up version of the September 24 settlement letter and its claimed delivery to Duffy were not inconsequential. If Sporer had sent the marked-up September 24 settlement letter to Duffy on September 27—well before Linda cashed the settlement check on October 10—the case for accord and satisfaction or ratification would have been enhanced. The last communication on the settlement would not have been from Duffy but from Sporer. Sporer would thus have a better shot at establishing accord and satisfaction or ratification because he could argue that Duffy and Linda knew that Gary still insisted that the payment of the $27,000 would be made only with a full release of all claims, including the award of retirement assets and benefits in the divorce decree.
In light of all the above, we thus find that the Board has proved by a clear and convincing preponderance of the evidence that the September 24 settlement letter with the Sporer notations was not generated on September 27 and was not provided to Duffy on that date. False statements to a tribunal, of course, may be orally made to the court.
From the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee
May a judge submit a letter to a municipality supporting the dedication of a little league baseball field in the name of the judge’s deceased former bailiff?
The judge’s former bailiff recently passed away. During his life, he was very active in little league baseball. The former bailiff’s family is petitioning the city to dedicate one of its little league baseball fields in his name. The City Council has suggested the family provide letters of support from the community, and the inquiring judge has been asked to write a letter supporting dedication of the ball field. The inquiring judge has certified that there is no solicitation of monetary contributions or other donations associated with the request to the city and that the judge’s letter will not be used for any of those purposes.
The type of letter involved in this inquiry is more akin to those letters that are allowed by the Code and by the JEAC opinions referred to above. This letter will contain the judge’s recommendation, based solely upon the judge’s personal knowledge of the deceased bailiff. This letter will not be sent in a matter where there is an adjudicatory or investigative proceeding. At most, the letter may be considered to be tangentially related or appealing to a government body which will decide to bestow an honorary title (a privilege) in memory of a deceased person. However, this is not the type of “privilege” contemplated by either the Code or the JEAC opinions. The prohibited type of privileges are those which will benefit a living individual or ongoing business interest who may be seeking to be granted a benefit or license the likes of which, if awarded, would bestow on petitioner a legal right. See, e.g., JEAC Op. 13-08. The decision in the subject matter for which the letter is to be used, rests solely upon the discretion of the city council and would not bestow any rights or privileges of that sort.
In conclusion, this Committee finds that the inquiring judge may write a letter to the city council based upon the judge’s personal knowledge.
Thursday, April 27, 2017
This is the latest in the ongoing legal saga of Hachi-Ko and Bella, two Akita dogs owned by JK, a lawyer in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.
The events of what transpired in an attack involving one of the aforementioned dogs has been the subject of:
(a) A dangerous dog hearing;
(b) An appeal from that dangerous dog hearing;
(c) A small claims trial; and
(d) An appeal from that small claims trial.
On March 18, 2012, the Member and another person were walking the two aforementioned Akita dogs. While passing near the Mendal Art Gallery in Saskatoon, the dogs walked past two other dogs (shelties) being walked by SJ. Hachi-Ko is alleged to have attacked one of SJ’s dogs, that later died of its injuries;
The Member was injured attempting to separate the dogs;
Hachi-Ko was prosecuted as being a dangerous dog, partially as a result of this attack;
Shortly after the incident, the Member provided a written statement which set out her recollection of what occurred to JK and JK provided the same to bylaw enforcement officials on or about April 4, 2012;
In the written statement, the Member identified the attacking dog as being Hachi-Ko.
The Member later equivocated on the identity of the attacking dog
Hachi-Ko and Bella are almost identical Akita dogs. Hachi-Ko is a male dog and Bella is female. They are extremely difficult to distinguish. Hachi-Ko is slightly bigger then Bella. They can be distinguished by different colour of collars that they wear, as well as other minor differences that one might be able to ascertain if one knew the dogs relatively well;
Although the Member had identified Hachi-Ko as being the attacking dog in her written statement as well as in her telephone call with KB on February 5, 2013, at trial the Member equivocated and indicated that she could not positively identify which of the two dogs had been the attacking dog;
Ultimately, Hachi-Ko was declared to be a dangerous dog. Further, the dog’s owner, JK, was successfully pursued in small claims court in relation to the attack.
As to the false testimony allegation
Throughout the investigation process and at the hearing of this matter, the Member’s position has remained consistent. She indicates that she initially thought the attacking dog was Hachi-Ko. She assumes that her certainty in this regard was due to the fact that SJ at the time of the attack exclaimed “get him off of her” or words to that effect. As SJ identified the dog as being male, the Member assumes that, in the heat of the moment, she believed that the description was accurate. After considering matters for a significant period of time and realizing that some of her recollections regarding the incident were not accurate (including the precise location where the attack occurred), she started to have doubts as to her certainty as to which dog was the attacker.
The panel believes it is entirely plausible that the Member became confused as to the identity of the attacking dog given:
(a) The passage of time;
(b) The events of the day in question being chaotic; and
(c) The Member being confused as to other issues related to the incident and reconsidering her previously stated recollections regarding the identity of the attacking dog.
The panel further notes that the Member’s testimony at this discipline hearing was consistent with her testimony at the dangerous dog hearing of June 7, 2013.
The Justice of the Peace was certainly at liberty to make the determinations that he did and prefer the evidence of others or the Member’s prior statements, as opposed to her testimony on June 7, 2013. However, this does not lead to the panel concluding that the Member was attempting to obfuscate or otherwise mislead the Court in the dangerous dog hearing.
The Member has a rather appropriate last name for a person accused of false testimony - de Whytell. (Mike Frisch)
A reciprocal one-year suspension has been imposed by the New Jersey supreme Court based on an identical Pennsylvania suspension.
From the report of the Disciplinary Review Board
The Joint Petition set forth the factual basis for respondent’s multiple Pennsylvania RPC violations. Specifically respondent agreed that, by letter dated November 10, 2011, he "reach[ed] out" to Dwayne Stevens, an employee with the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility, Bail Unit, in an effort to expand his criminal defense practice. The letter requested an opportunity for respondent to speak to Stevens "about the prospect of a mutually beneficial busines~ relationship." Respondent suggested they meet for lunch and, to that end, gave Stevens his phone number.
On December 26, 2011, respondent sent similar letters to eight clerical assistants assigned to the bail unit in pretrial services at the Criminal Justice Center. In addition to proposing the same "mutually beneficial business relationship," respondent explained that he was "trying to find out who posts bail in Philadelphia so that [he] can follow up on [his] end." Further, he acknowledged that, although the requested information might be public, he was hoping they would expend the minimal effort and assist him.
During the week of January 2, 2012, respondent approached Brittany Baggio, a court employee, at the information counter at the Criminal Justice Center in Philadelphia. He asked her to take a stack of his business cards and keep them at the information counter so she could distribute them to anyone looking for a lawyer. He also offered to pay Baggio if she gave a card to a prospective client who eventually retained his services. He suggested she give her name to the client or put her initials on the back of the card so he would know the source of the referral. He said the arrangement was "just between" them. Baggio refused to accept the stack of cards. Nevertheless, he placed the stack of business cards on the information counter and left. Prior to January i0, 2012, he returned to the information counter and left a stack of his business cards with a different court employee.
Judge John W. Herron, Administrative Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, Trial Division, conduct and, by letter dated respondent explain the improper became aware of respondent’s January 4, 2012, requested solicitation of referrals contained in the letters he sent to court personnel. Further, Judge Herron requested the names of all individuals to who respondent had made offers of compensation in exchange for business. Respondent was suspended from the court-appointed attorney list for the First Judicial District.
For this conduct, the Joint Petition established that respondent violated Pennsylvania RPC 5.4(a), RPC 7.3(a)I, RPC 8.4(a), RPC 8.4(c) and RPC 8.4(d).
The Joint Petition found, as an aggravating factor, that respondent "had been employed by the First Judicial District as a Juvenile Probation Officer since 2003, [and] was terminated from his employment for failing to return to work." As to the mitigation, the parties agreed that respondent admitted his misconduct and had been practicing law for only three years.
For these violations, the parties agreed that a one-year suspension was the appropriate discipline, followed by a oneyear period of probation (with conditions). According to the OAE’s brief, respondent "properly self-reported his Pennsylvania discipline" to the New Jersey disciplinary authorities.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant forfeited his right to appointed counsel
We review whether Jack Suriano's actions, which caused three attorneys appointed by the State Public Defender to withdraw in rapid succession, constituted forfeiture of his right to counsel, and whether the right-to-counsel warnings and procedure this court recommended in State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996), should be made mandatory. We conclude that Suriano forfeited his constitutional right to counsel by repeatedly refusing to cooperate with his attorneys, constantly complaining about their performance, verbally abusing them, and triggering one lawyer's fear of a physical threat. Suriano's dilatory and manipulative game-playing frustrated the progression of this case and interfered with the proper administration of justice. We uphold the circuit court's determination that Suriano forfeited his right to counsel, and we affirm the court of appeals decision. We see no reason to change the forfeiture standard this court set forth in Cummings and decline Suriano's request to modify it. Instead, we reaffirm our holding that right-to-counsel warnings in forfeiture cases and the procedures suggested by the Cummings dissent are strongly recommended, but not required. We affirm.
The alleged crime
In October 2013, Suriano obstructed the Door County Sheriff's Department and sanitation officials who came to his home with a warrant to take a soil sample from the property. Police arrested Suriano, and he was charged with obstructing an officer...
Attorney One was a public defender who moved to withdraw after about a month
Erickson testified that, while his goal was to resolve the case, Suriano's goals included:
To take depositions of all the parties and explore all contractual relationships;
To prove his innocence;
"[T]o explore every legal or even nonlegal aspect of this case" to make things difficult and frustrate "the legal system";
"To be an ass"; and
"[T]o make it difficult or frustrating for the court system to proceed" because Suriano believed he was improperly charged.
The SPD gave Suriano a second attorney, Linda Schaefer, who very quickly moved to withdraw, averring that "a significant conflict ha[d] developed" so she could "no longer effectively represent Mr. Suriano." At the February 2014 pretrial hearing, the circuit court addressed Schaefer's motion and asked Suriano if he wanted to comment on it. Suriano said "No," and the circuit court granted the motion.
The judge warned the defendant that three strikes might be an out but the third appointed attorney nonetheless encountered problems
The circuit court then asked [attorney] Singh about the SPD's "three-strike" rule——that is, whether the SPD would appoint another attorney when a defendant has already had three SPD appointed attorneys who withdrew. Singh responded he could not speak for the SPD, but he had "grave doubts" about whether the SPD would appoint a fourth attorney if Suriano fired Singh. Singh said everyone should "assume that if I end up off the case he's going to have to either represent himself [or] get a lawyer on the economy." The court then specifically asked Suriano if he wanted Singh to continue as his lawyer. Suriano did not directly answer the court's question; instead, he rattled off a series of complaints about Singh, claimed he had not "received any value" from the SPD, and contended that, although his case should be "very easy to win on dismissal," none of his lawyers would pursue it.
Singh pressed on bravely but finally moved to withdraw
Finding the relationship irretrievably broken, the circuit court granted Singh's motion to withdraw. The circuit court then gave Suriano an opportunity to be heard on the State's request that the court find forfeiture. Suriano argued he wanted an attorney to represent him and a forfeiture finding would "be a real prejudice." He talked about how each of his SPD-appointed lawyers had failed him and how he wanted his motion to suppress reinstated. The circuit court engaged Suriano in a colloquy about his education and learned Suriano had two college degrees——geology and chemistry——and was one credit short of a graduate degree.
The trial court refused to appoint another attorney
Suriano represented himself at the one-day trial, and the jury found him guilty of obstruction. The circuit court sentenced him to a $100 fine, plus costs, and 10 days in jail, which would be "permanently stay[ed]" if Suriano paid the fine within 60 days. Suriano appealed with the help of a newly appointed SPD-appellate lawyer, and his sentence has been stayed pending appeal. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment, and we granted Suriano's petition for review.
The court here found he forfeited his right to appointed counsel
we conclude Suriano forfeited his right to counsel. Suriano's case falls into the forfeiture category because there is no dispute he did not expressly waive his right to counsel. A defendant forfeits his or her right to counsel "when the 'court becomes convinced that the orderly and efficient progression of the case [is] being frustrated,'" Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 753 n.15 (quoted source and ellipsis omitted), by the defendant's voluntary and deliberate choices, id. at 752.
The record supports the circuit court's finding that Suriano made it clear he would not cooperate with any attorney. His actions caused three SPD lawyers to withdraw in rapid succession. One of those lawyers specifically testified that Suriano was trying to frustrate the progress of the case and cause delay because Suriano believed the case should be dismissed. Another one of his lawyers felt so threatened by Suriano that he would not meet with him unless he could be sure Suriano did not have a weapon. Suriano verbally abused at least one of his lawyers, admitted in open court that he did so, and declared he would do it again because the disparaging verbal assaults were all "true." The circuit court found Suriano was playing games and manipulating the case to delay the trial. Suriano did not say he wanted to represent himself, but his repeated dilatory tactics and abusive behavior expressed loudly and clearly that he would make it impossible for any attorney to represent him. This is sufficient to satisfy the forfeiture standard and supports the circuit court's finding of forfeiture in this case. Suriano's voluntary and deliberate choices frustrated the orderly and efficient progression of this case...
Applying the Cummings standard to this case, we hold that Suriano forfeited his constitutional right to counsel by engaging in voluntary and deliberate conduct, which frustrated the progression of his case and interfered with the proper administration of justice. The record supports the circuit court's findings that Suriano repeatedly refused to cooperate with his attorneys, engaged in recurrent dilatory tactics to manipulate and cause delay, and verbally abused counsel, even causing one of his lawyers to view Suriano as a physical threat. The circuit court's finding of forfeiture meets the Cummings standard and we agree with the court of appeals' decision affirming it.
Justice Abrahamson dissented
To protect an accused's right to counsel, to avoid after-the-fact legal disputes regarding whether an accused relinquished (that is, forfeited or waived) the right to counsel, and to promote certainty and judicial efficiency, I would mandate an in-court, on-the-record colloquy by the circuit court with the accused in all cases pertaining to relinquishment of the fundamental right to counsel. The colloquy is set forth in Justice Geske's dissent in State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996).
The majority opinion "strongly recommends" this procedure. See majority op., ¶¶1, 34. I would require it.
I would require the circuit court record to reflect that the circuit court made the accused aware of the seriousness of the charges he or she faces, the potential penalties that may be imposed upon a finding of guilt, and the difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation.
Wednesday, April 26, 2017
The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld as mandatory the six-year disciplinary statute of limitations for most violations
The issue that we must decide in this case is whether the six year limitation period set forth in Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) constitutes a mandatory bar to grievance complaints brought after that six year limitation period has expired or whether the provision, instead, is discretionary. On April 4, 2014, Wesley S. Spears filed a grievance complaint against the defendant, Attorney Joseph Elder, alleging that the defendant had engaged in professional misconduct in 2004. A reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee conducted a hearing on the grievance complaint and found by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had violated certain of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The reviewing committee also directed the plaintiff, the Disciplinary Counsel, to bring this presentment action against the defendant. After the plaintiff brought this action in 2015, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the action was barred by § 2-32 (a) (2) (E). The trial court concluded that the time limitation set forth in § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) is not mandatory and denied the motion to dismiss. After a trial to the court, the trial court concluded that the defendant had violated certain of the Rules of Professional Conduct and ordered that the defendant be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. The defendant then filed this appeal. We conclude that § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) bars grievance complaints that are not brought within the six year limitation period unless one of the exceptions set forth in § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) (i) or (ii) applies. Because none of these exceptions applies in the present case, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court with direction to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
The story is a complicated one that led to this finding
The presentment action was tried to the court, which concluded that the defendant had violated rules 4.1 and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by misrepresenting himself to a third person in the course of his representation of a client. As a sanction, the trial court ordered that the defendant be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
We conclude that the most reasonable interpretation of this rule is that the judges of the Superior Court intended that the six year period of limitation set forth in Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) would bar any untimely complaints unless one of the exceptions set forth in subparagraph (i) or (ii) applies. We can think of no reason why our judges would expressly impose a specific period of limitation and then effectively eviscerate that limitation period by conferring unfettered discretion on the screening panel to ignore it...
Our determination that the time limitation set forth in Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) is mandatory finds support in the underlying purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is ‘‘to preserve public confidence in the system and to protect the public and the court from unfit practitioners.’’ Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 554, 663 A.2d 317 (1995). The purpose is not to punish the attorney. E.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. Shluger, 230 Conn. 668, 675, 646 A.2d 781 (1994). When an attorney has not engaged in any professional misconduct for six years prior to the date that a grievance complaint has been filed, and none of the exceptions set forth in § 2- 32 (a) (2) (E) (i) or (ii) applies, it reasonably may be presumed that the attorney does not pose a continuing danger to the public or the court. Our interpretation is also bolstered by the policies underlying limitation periods generally, ‘‘namely, to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims and the impairment of proof wrought by lost witnesses and/or evidence.’’ Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC, 312 Conn. 286, 309 n.23, 94 A.3d 553 (2014).
In the present case, the sole reason that the trial court gave for denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss was that the six year limitation period set forth in Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) is not mandatory. Because we have concluded that the limitation period is mandatory unless one of the exceptions set forth in § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) (i) or (ii) applies, we conclude that the trial court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
The violations not subject to limitations
‘‘Notwithstanding the period of limitation set forth in this subparagraph, an allegation of misconduct that would constitute a violation of Rule 1.15, 8.1 or 8.4 (2) through (6) of the Rules of Professional Conduct may still be considered as long as a written complaint is filed within one year of the discovery of such alleged misconduct.’’ Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) (ii) provides: ‘‘Each period of limitation in this subparagraph is tolled during any period in which: (1) the alleged misconduct remains undiscovered due to active concealment; (2) the alleged misconduct would constitute a violation of Rule 1.8 (c) and the conditions precedent of the instrument have not been satisfied;(3)the alleged misconduct is part of a continuing course of misconduct; or (4) the aggrieved party is under the age of majority, insane, or otherwise unable to file a complaint due to mental or physical incapacitation.’’
The District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility has recommended an informal admonition as reciprocal discipline for a sanction imposed in California.
There is a problem - the California sanction was disbarment
The Court referred this matter to the Board to recommend whether reciprocal discipline should be imposed on Respondent following his disbarment in California. Disciplinary Counsel argues that reciprocal discipline should be imposed and that Respondent should be disbarred. Respondent argues against the imposition of reciprocal discipline and argues that no discipline is warranted. The Board has reviewed Respondent’s Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed and Disciplinary Counsel’s Statement Regarding Reciprocal Discipline (“ODC’s Statement”). None of Respondent’s arguments are well-taken, and reciprocal discipline should be imposed.
However, the Board finds on the face of the record that the misconduct established in California warrants substantially different discipline in the District of Columbia. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(e). As discussed below, Respondent was disbarred in California pursuant to a procedural rule that requires disbarment when a respondent is in default, and the facts deemed admitted pursuant to California’s default procedures show that he engaged in some misconduct, but not misconduct that would be sufficient to warrant disbarment in the District of Columbia. Thus, the Board recommends that the Court not impose identical reciprocal discipline, but instead should order Disciplinary Counsel to issue an informal admonition to Respondent.
The misconduct found in California
The Hearing Department found that, based on the facts it deemed admitted, Respondent charged an unconscionable fee of $735,481.25 in the underlying client matter (in violation of California Rule of Professional Conduct 4-200(A)) and willfully violated Business and Professions Code § 6068, subdivision j, by failing to notify the State Bar of a change in his address. See April 21, 2015 Order at 4-5. The Hearing Department found that the State Bar had not proven a violation of Rule 3- 700(D)(2) (failure to return unearned fees) because the record was insufficient to determine what portion of the fees had been earned.
We recognize that the underlying facts here were not decided in California in a contested evidentiary hearing, where the proof offered could have been challenged. Rather, the facts were deemed admitted because Respondent did not participate, was in default, and never moved to have the default set aside. The difference is immaterial to the question of whether reciprocal discipline should be imposed.
The above-quoted statement pays lip service respect to the default but rejects any meaningful sanction
we recommend a sanction based on the fact that Respondent charged an unconscionable fee. As discussed above, [the] Martin [precedent] noted that an informal admonition is the typical sanction for charging an unreasonable fee unaccompanied by other Rule violations. We do not think that the failure to maintain a current address with the California Bar (the other California violation) is sufficient to aggravate the sanction above an informal admonition. We do not lightly find an exception to the rebuttable presumption that an identical reciprocal sanction should be imposed, but are constrained by the current parameters of the consequences for defaulting in a disciplinary proceeding in the District of Columbia. Disbarment imposed in California because of Respondent’s procedural default is substantially different than an informal admonition.
The Martin decision states in pertinent part
Under our case law, Martin‟s unreasonable fee in violation of Rule 1.5 (a), comingling funds in violation of Rules 1.15 (a) and (c), and failure to promptly return client funds in violation of Rule 1.16 (d), standing alone, do not warrant a severe penalty such as a lengthy suspension or disbarment. For example, sanctions for charging an unreasonable fee range “from informal admonition to suspension,” and suspension is usually imposed only in combination with violation of other rules. In re Shaw, 775 A.2d 1123, 1125 n.5 (D.C. 2001) (per curiam). See also In re Roxborough, 675 A.2d 950, 952 (D.C. 1996) (per curiam) (noting attorney received informal admonition for charging an excessive fee).
When it comes to unconscionable fees, size matters.
A case involving $800 is a weak precedent for one involving a near three quarter of a million dollars.
So let's see.
The attorney charges an unconscionable fee of nearly 3/4 of a million dollars. He gets disbarred in California under a procedural rule that mandates disbarment for the default. In D.C. , the BPR really does not like defaults so they give him a total free pass.
This result - a disbarment that magically transforms into a slap on the wrist - is what is really unconscionable.
I'm shocked that no one dissented - a unanimous opinion. I'll be more shocked if the Court of Appeals affirms this result.
The case is In re Timothy Naegele.
The BPR cites a case of mine that is more comparable than they might think. In In re Shieh, the then-BPR asked that a disbarment in California for maintaining frivolous litigation be reduced to a two-year suspension.
The Board agreed with Bar Counsel that respondent's “disregard for the administration of justice surpasses our disciplinary experience”; its refusal to recommend disbarment stemmed chiefly from what it considered to be a lack of “unequivocal direction from th[is c]ourt” as to the proper sanction for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice unaccompanied by other misconduct such as dishonesty or neglect of client affairs. If our decision that follows does not supply that direction for most, or even many, future disciplinary matters of this kind, it is only because respondent's abuse of the legal system in California may well be in a class by itself. Not to disbar him would defile that system and bring deserved discredit upon the authority by which he has been allowed to practice law.
Expect that lesson to be taught again. (Mike Frisch)
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has sanctioned an attorney for serious misconduct
Attorney Christopher E. Meisel has appealed Referee Hannah Dugan's recommendation that his license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for two years for 15 counts of misconduct, which included converting approximately $175,000 from two estates and two guardianship proceedings. Attorney Meisel stipulated to all counts of misconduct but asserts that, rather than a two-year suspension, a five-month suspension of his law license is an adequate sanction.
Upon careful review of this matter, we uphold the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. We conclude, however, that rather than a two-year suspension, Attorney Meisel's license to practice law should be suspended for 18 months. We further agree with the referee that Attorney Meisel should be required to pay the full costs of this proceeding, which are $10,831.67 as of February 7, 2017. Although the referee recommended that various conditions be imposed upon Attorney Meisel, we find that the imposition of conditions would be better addressed in a future reinstatement proceeding.
Justice Abrahamson dissented
Attorney Meisel has had more than his share of medical problems and has obviously suffered immensely. I could go along with the referee's recommendation of a two-year suspension. The referee already considered mitigating factors. In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 562 N.W.2d 137 (1997), this court said that absent a causal connection between an attorney's medical condition and the attorney's professional misconduct, the medical condition may not be considered a factor mitigating either the seriousness of the misconduct or the severity of the discipline to be imposed for it. The per curiam opinion undermines Sosnay. I am unwilling to do that. What is left of Sosnay? Lawyers, the OLR, and referees ought to know what factors are mitigating factors.
Tuesday, April 25, 2017
The order of a Michigan Tri-County Hearing Panel disbarring former state assistant attorney general Andrew Shirvell has been posted
Based on the evidence presented by the parties at the hearings held in this matter, the hearing panel found that respondent committed the professional misconduct alleged in Counts One and Two of the formal complaint. The panel found that respondent failed to treat all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect and did so because of a protected personal characteristic, in violation of MRPC 6.5; brought a claim in the United States District Court for alleged tortious interference with a business relationship and thereafter continued to assert the issue without a basis for doing that was not frivolous, in violation of MRPC 3.1; filed an appeal of the United States District Court's imposition of Rule 11 Sanctions and thereafter continued to assert the issue without a basis for doing so that was not frivolous, in violation of MRPC 3.1; engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or violation of the criminal law, where such conduct reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer, in violation of MRPC 8.4(b); engaged in conduct that exposed the legal profession or the courts to obloquy, contempt, censure, or reproach, in violation of MCR 9.104(2); and engaged in conduct that was contrary to justice, ethics, honesty, or good morals, in violation of MCR 9.104(3). Respondent was also found to have violated MCR 9.104(1) and (4); and MRPC 8.4(a) and (c).
Our prior coverage quoted the misconduct findings
In 2010, Christopher Armstrong was elected president of the student council at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. The student council does not make University policy, but it works with, reports to, and advises the University on a range of issues.
Respondent Andrew Shirvell, a 2002 graduate of the University, worked as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Michigan. In early 2010, respondent learned via an online newspaper report of Armstrong's election and also learned that Armstrong was openly gay. Respondent began posting on his Facebook page about Armstrong, whom he had never met. Among other comments, respondent called Armstrong "dangerous" and a "radical homosexual activist" and a "major-league fanatic who is obsessed with imposing the radical homosexual agenda on the student body." Respondent also set up a Facebook "fan page," entitled "Michigan Alumni and Others Against Chris Armstrong's Radical MSA Agenda," which purported to "expos[e] the real Chris Armstrong." Respondent urged others, via Facebook and email, to join the "pro-family" group in order to "fight against Satan's representative." Respondent took to his personal Facebook page to express outrage when Facebook deleted his "fan page" about Armstrong. Respondent wrote: "I will not be SilENCED by the likes of Armstrong. You're going down fruity-pebbles." Respondent's self-proclaimed "outrage" continued from there: "I better not see Chris Armstrong at MY [church] parish in Charlotte -that's all I got to say." Respondent claimed that Armstrong was scared of him and-in commenting on another story involving gay students-"remember[edJ the good old days when 'guys' like this would get their asses kicked at school"
Not content with Facebook posting, respondent then established a blog entitled "Chris Armstrong Watch," which discussed Armstrong's "character and his agenda and other items." The blog purported to be a "watch site," providing "testimony" and "an expose of the REAL Chris Armstrong." The blog was accessible to the public from April 201 0 until September 30, 2010, when respondent removed it from public view. The blog featured a picture of Armstrong's face next to a swastika. The blog called Armstrong "a radical homosexual activist, racist, elitist, & liar" and attributed to Armstrong a "Nazi-like hatred of the First Amendment," explaining, "Much like Nazi Germany's leaders, many of whom were also homosexuals, Armstrong believes that any and all opposition must be suppressed by whatever means necessary." The blog further stated that Armstrong "mocks Christians," and called Armstrong an "anti-Christian bigot." One entry claimed that Armstrong attended an event "whose intent was to encourage underage drinking," and that Armstrong "spent most of this time [after the semester ended] engaging in underage binge-drinking." The blog made repeated references to Armstrong's participation in -and facilitation of -underage drinking. It alleged that Armstrong showed contempt toward law enforcement. Respondent -re-posting online conversations between Armstrong and another student at the University -claimed that these conversations revealed Armstrong's "tendency toward sexual promiscuity," and thus labeled Armstrong "a perverted homosexual exhibitionist." Respondent interpreted another online conversation as demonstrating that Armstrong had previously hosted an "orgy" in his college dormitory, at which "homosexual shenanigans" were rampant. Days after this entry, respondent authored another blog post proclaiming: "Armstrong engages in sexual escapades at 'churches & children's playgrounds.'" Respondent linked Armstrong to "possible involvement" in violent attacks against places of worship in the wake of California's passage of Proposition 8. Respondent alleged that Armstrong used his welcome to freshmen as "a thinly veiled attempt to cause sexually confused, and perhaps some impressionable, 17 -and-18-year-olds to experiment sexually with members of their own gender."
Respondent also reported on an alleged romantic relationship between Armstrong and another student. Respondent claimed that the other student was "not out of the closet," but that Armstrong "basically seduced" the student and quickly became obsessed with him. Explaining that the other student, "[t]hanks in large part to Armstrong's influence ... has indeed morphed into a proponent of the radical homosexual agenda," respondent called Armstrong "a very, very twisted sick individual who is manipulative and cunning in a most devilish way."
Respondent also appeared on television to rant about Armstrong. In September 2010, in an interview on local station WXYZ, respondent said that Armstrong held the presidential position in order "to promote special rights for homosexuals at the cost of ... heterosexual stUdents." Respondent later appeared in front of a national audience with CNN's Anderson Cooper. Standing by his blog and Facebook posts, respondent told Cooper that he had "gotten stuff from third-party sources," and argued that Armstrong was not giving interviews because "he can't defend what's on the blog." When Cooper suggested that respondent was a bigot, respondent retorted, "The real bigot here is Chris Armstrong." Two days later, back before a national audience on Comedy Central's The Daily Show, respondent said that Chris was "acting like a gay Nazi," and that this explained his decision to include a picture of Armstrong next to a swastika on the blog.
The order indicates that he now resides in Florida. (Mike Frisch)
Monday, April 24, 2017
An Illinois attorney has filed a motion for consent disbarment on these facts
Movant’s admissions, copies of weed cutting liens and releases and other materials from court files relating to property tax sales, and the testimony of various attorneys who represented the Cook County villages or municipalities involved, would establish the following facts:
A weed cutting lien is a mechanism allowed by statute whereby a municipality may provide for the expense of cutting of weeds where the "owners of real estate refuse to do so or neglect to cut them." 65 ILCS 5/11-20-7. The cost or expense to the municipality is placed "upon the real estate, provided a lien is recorded within 60 days of the cost being incurred." 65 ILCS 5/11-20-7. Under the Illinois property tax code, 35 ILCS 200/22-35, the weed cutting lien is an advancement of municipal funds which allows others to obtain relief from the purchase of property at a tax sale by moving to vacate the tax sale, obtaining the entry of an order that a tax sale was in error, and thereafter, obtain a refund of the monies paid for the property at the tax sale.
Between 2010 and 2015, at the request of a tax sale purchaser, Movant recorded at least 43 weed cutting liens against at least 43 different properties located in 16 different villages or municipalities in southern Cook County. Many of the properties in question had been sold at a tax sale.
Between 2010 - 2015, after the tax sales relating to the properties had taken place, Movant recorded at least 43 releases of weed cutting lien charges against various properties.
At no time did Movant have authority from any of the Cook County municipalities to file the weed cutting liens or releases on their behalf.
Movants conduct in recording the weed cutting liens and releases facilitated the filing of petitions for tax sale in error, the subsequent entry of the order of tax sale in error and the reimbursement of monies paid at the tax sale plus interest accrued and is in violation of the property tax code, 35 ILCS 200 et seq. Movant received fees totaling approximately $20,000 for his role in this fraudulent scheme.
Movant’s conduct was dishonest and he knew it was dishonest because he knew he did not have authority from any of the 16 different south suburban Cook County villages or municipalities to file the weed cutting liens or releases of liens on their behalf.
The attorney concedes that the conduct involved dishonesty.
The motion goes to the Illinois Supreme Court for final action.
While there are many attorneys who have had disciplinary issues related to weed, liens have rarely been involved. (Mike Frisch)
The Tribunal Hearing Division of the Law Society of Upper Canada has granted a paralegal license to an applicant convicted of domestic violence
The applicant was born in India in 1971 and has been living in Canada since 1988.
In 2002, he returned to India where he got married. His wife joined him in Canada in 2003. She had been a dentist in India and was taking steps to qualify to practise in Canada. In 2006 their son was born.
On November 3, 2008, the wife reported to the police that she had been assaulted. Ultimately, based on the wife’s statement, the applicant was charged with five counts of assault and one count of assault with a weapon.
On November 6, 2003, the applicant grabbed her hair and hit her with the other hand.
On January 31, 2004 while in a library, the applicant stomped on her foot when she asked him about a call he had answered.
On January 31, 2004, after the library incident, the applicant attempted to strangle her with a cord (the assault with a weapon charge).
On July 31, 2004, the applicant kicked her several times while they were seated in the car, resulting in a large bruise. He then pulled her out of the car leaving her in torrential rain, returning for her later.
On December 31, 2004, the applicant gave her a black eye that required she go to the hospital.
On November 3, 2008, (the incident that resulted in charges being laid) the applicant stopped the car they were in and hit her several times before driving off with their son.
The applicant was convicted on all six counts following a trial and on January 14, 2010 was sentenced to one year in jail, with two years of probation to follow.
The applicant’s integrity, empathy, and honesty were made clear through his witnesses, his letters of reference, and his own testimony. We accept this evidence and find that these words are an apt description.
Counsel for the Law Society raised the issue of candour. She noted the scant amount of detail in the answers to the questions related to his convictions on the application form and in his further explanatory letter to the investigator from the Law Society.
She also noted that some of his references did not have full details about his criminal offences. He did not talk about his offences while at paralegal college, nor did he inform his placement for his work requirement about the charges (at the time he was hired). He testified that he was not required to disclose that at the time.
Counsel raised a valid point. Lack of a frank, open approach to the investigation can make it appear like there is something to hide. However, the references had knowledge that the applicant had been convicted of criminal offences and were in a position to inquire further if they were uncomfortable providing letters. The two witnesses who appeared at the hearing had read the Agreed Statement of Facts before testifying.
We also took into account the applicant’s shy and reticent nature and understood his desire for privacy.
A District of Columbia Hearing Committee has issued a recommendation for discipline.
On June 5, 2013, Disciplinary Counsel filed a Specification of Charges against Respondent, Frederic W. Schwartz, Jr., Esquire. Respondent is charged with violating Rule 1.4(a) of the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct in his representation of Dr. Jun Chen, a Chinese national, who sought employment based permanent residency status in the United States. The Ad Hoc Hearing Committee finds clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a) and recommends that Respondent receive an informal admonition.
Nothing remarkable about te result except the timeline.
Note that this matter involved a single count of alleged misconduct.
The Bar Docket No. is 2009-D148. That means that the investigation opened in early to mid 2009.
So, the case took four years to investigate and nearly four more for the hearing committee to issue its report.
In other words, business as usual.
Actually, the title is misleading. This matter must still be reviewed by the Board on Professional Responsibility.
The case is In re Fredric Schwartz and can be found at this link. (Mike Frisch)
The Indiana Supreme Court has suspended an attorney for his failure to pay the costs of a disciplinary case.
Grantconnected.com reported on recent charges
A Marion attorney is facing a drug possession charge stemming from a summertime traffic stop.
Beau J. White, Marion, is facing charges of possession of cocaine and operating a motor vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance in person’s body after he was pulled over by the Indiana State Police officer for a traffic incident in July.
White was driving northbound on Interstate 69 just before 9 p.m. on July 29 near the Marion/Montpelier exit when ISP Officer Jeremy Perez witnessed White’s vehicle drift into the right shoulder, hitting the rumble strips, according to a probable cause affidavit filed by Perez. After White was pulled over, Perez said he said White was sweating heavily, had bloodshot eyes and blood and mucus around his nose and mouth area, though White denied using any narcotic drugs when asked, according to the affidavit.
A search of the vehicle found 0.03 grams of cocaine in a small cellophane wrapper in the vehicle, according to the affidavit. White was then taken to the Grant County Jail and a toxicology test was performed on him.
While at the jail, White was interviewed by Det. Sgt. Josh Zigler of the Grant County Sheriff’s Department. During the interview, White said he was using cocaine bought in Muncie while driving that day on July 29 and was “depressed and downtrodden” about family life and drug use and would sometimes drive to relieve stress, according to a statement filed by Zigler in Grant County Superior Court 3.
Though the incident occurred in July, a warrant for White’s arrest wasn’t issued until Nov. 9, nearly four months later. White was arrested on Nov. 10 and shortly released from jail after paying a $605 bond.
Grant County Prosecutor James Luttrell said the delay in arrest was due to his office waiting on results from the toxicology reports. As of Nov. 17, the results of the toxicology test still haven’t been released.
“It’s not unusual for the toxicology to take this long,” Luttrell said. “We decided we weren’t going to wait longer.”
On Monday Superior Court 3 Judge Warren Haas removed himself as the judge in the case, giving both the plaintiff and defendant seven days to agree on a special judge.
White has worked as a public defender in the past. The Indiana Supreme Court temporarily suspended White’s license for a month in 2012 after the court found him to be guilty of failing to help a client, failing to act promptly, failing to keep the client informed about the status of the case and failing to refund an unearned fee when terminated.
Sunday, April 23, 2017
The Indiana Supreme Court has suspended an attorney for failure to respond to a disciplinary investigation.
The attorney's felony conviction for intimidation was affirmed by the Indiana Court of Appeals last year
In May 2014, Smith and his wife, Linda, were separated and sharing custody of their son, C.S. On May 29, 2015, C.S. was at Smith’s house, and when Linda called to check on C.S., Smith assured her that C.S. was fine. Later that night, Smith called Linda, told her he was in the McDonald’s drive-through, and asked if she wanted anything to eat. Linda believed that Smith wanted to bring her food so that he could spend time with her that night.
Linda declined Smith’s offer, and Smith quickly became agitated and angry. He called Linda foul names and told her that she was a bad wife. He then threatened her, stating that he “was going to split [her] chest open with an ax.” Tr. pp. 38, 54. Linda knew that Smith had an ax and feared for her safety.
Linda disconnected the phone call and called 911. She drove to the Mishawaka police station, and while she was there, Smith began to text her. Smith claimed that C.S. was in bed at Linda’s house. He also stated that he was going to dispose of and destroy Linda’s property. Linda told the officers that she believed that Smith was inside her house.
South Bend Police Officers Alex Pishkur and Harvey Mills were dispatched to Linda’s home. When they arrived, Smith was walking from his vehicle into Linda’s house. Smith had parked his vehicle with an attached trailer in the middle of the street blocking the normal flow of traffic. Smith was uncooperative and hostile with the officers.
Linda returned to her home shortly thereafter. She and Smith spoke briefly while Officer Mills stood nearby. At one point, Smith moved closer to Linda and stated, “Now you’ve really done it.” Tr. p. 48. The officer then arrested Smith and placed him in handcuffs.
The officers decided to tow Smith’s vehicle but allowed Linda to look inside for the keys in order to move it from the roadway. Linda observed an ax underneath several items piled on the front passenger seat. Officer Mills also observed the ax...
The State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Smith committed intimidation, and Smith has not established any error in the charging information that would require us to reverse his conviction.
The Florida Supreme Court disbarred an attorney convicted on child pornography charges.
Bruce Charles Fehr, P.O. Box 1031, Coleman, disbarred effective immediately, following a Jan. 19 court order. (Admitted to practice: 1995) Fehr pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia to one count of child pornography. He was sentenced to three years in federal prison. (Case No. SC16-1173)
George Conger had this story from April 2016 from Anglican Ink
A Diocese of Georgia rector has been sentenced to three years imprisonment and ten years probation for possession of child pornography. On 30 March 2016 an Effingham County Court passed sentence on the Rev. Bruce Fehr, former rector of St Francis of the Islands Episcopal Church on Wilmington Island near Savannah. Acting upon a search warrant, on 23 April 2015 the Southeast Georgia Child Exploitation Task Force raided Behr’s home and seized his computer. Fehr and his wife, the Rev. Lori Fehr -- the assistant rector at St Francis -- are 2013 graduates of the School of Theology of the University of the South and were ordained to the priesthood in October 2013. Fehr and his wife are former attorneys, he practiced in the field of insurance litigation and she most recently served as an attorney for the Florida Department of Children and Families. Following sentencing the Bishop of Georgia, the Rt. Rev. Scott Benhase released a statement saying: “I am greatly saddened and angered by his crime. All children deserve the right to be free of such exploitation and we all should work to end such horrific practices. The Diocese will now begin our own process addressing the Reverend Fehr’s conduct.” Following the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the diocese will initiate a Title IV disciplinary investigation and is likely to depose Fehr from the ministry.
An attorney who failed to appear after he had been released on his own recognizance should be disbarred, according to a recent recommendation of the California State Bar Court Review Department
In early 2014, Respondent was arrested on a two-count criminal complaint charging Respondent with a felony violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a) (possession of a controlled substance) and a misdemeanor violation of Vehicle Code section 12500, subdivision (a) (unlicensed driver) with a special allegation based on two prior violations. The Napa County Superior Court released Respondent from custody upon his own recognizance.
On March 27, 2014, Respondent failed to appear in the Napa County Superior Court for arraignment and a settlement conference. Thereafter, on January 8, 2015, Respondent pleaded nolo contendere to and was convicted of a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 1320, subdivision (b) for failing to appear in the Napa County Superior Court on March 27, 2014.
Failing to appear after being released upon one’s own recognizance is a crime that may or may not involve moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline, depending upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the conviction. The court finds that the facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent’s conviction do not involve moral turpitude, but do constitute other misconduct warranting attorney discipline.
The attorney as one instance of prior discipline and, as one might expect, defaulted on the bar's allegation.
The Bar's web page summarizes the prior case
was suspended from the practice of law for 90 days and until he makes full restitution to clients. He was placed on probation for two years. He must pass the MPRE and the State Bar’s Ethics School test. The order took effect Aug. 28, 2016.
Hired to defend a couple from claims by a homeowners association, Olson failed to provide responses to a discovery request and failed to so inform his clients. He failed to inform opposing counsel that his clients were unavailable for a deposition on a certain day. The court imposed a $100 sanction on Olson for failing to file a case management statement. Olson also did not appear at a hearing on the association’s motion to compel deposition, leading to a $1,265 sanctions order.
Olson never informed his clients about the missed deposition or the sanctions. The trial court eventually issued terminating sanctions and entered judgment against Olson’s clients for $60,249.28 plus interest. Olson did not inform his clients.A new attorney requested but failed to obtain the client file from Olson. In aggravation, Olson’s multiple acts of misconduct were coupled with little insight or understanding of his actions. He contended, without substantiation, that opposing counsel forged documents. As an uncharged act in aggravation, Olson testified that he used for personal expenses $150 given him by his clients for jury fees. He caused significant client harm.
In mitigation, he presented good character testimony from two witnesses. His lack of prior discipline merits no consideration, because he was admitted to practice law less than two years before the present misconduct began. The State Bar Court wrote that Olson’s lack of insight “is of great concern. … The fact that he continues to shift the blame to the Superior Court, opposing counsel, and his clients, demonstrates no recognition of his own misconduct [and] gives this court little confidence that he will not commit similar misconduct in the future.”
Saturday, April 22, 2017
From the web page of the Idaho State Bar
The Professional Conduct Board of the Idaho State Bar has issued a Public Reprimand to Twin Falls lawyer Mark J. Guerry, based on professional misconduct.
The Professional Conduct Board’s Order followed a stipulated resolution of an Idaho State Bar disciplinary proceeding in which Mr. Guerry admitted that he violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 8.2(a) [Statements about Judicial and Legal Officials] and 8.4(c) [Conduct Involving Misconduct].
This disciplinary action related to a Facebook posting by Mr. Guerry during his campaign for prosecuting attorney. The Facebook post stated that a volunteer had informed Mr. Guerry that his opponent had gotten out of several DUIs because a district judge had intervened. Since his opponent had never been pulled over for a suspected DUI, and because a district judge never intervened in any alleged DUI on the opponent’s behalf, Mr. Guerry’s post was made with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity and the information in that post was false.
The public reprimand does not limit Mr. Guerry’s eligibility to practice law.
Guerry, who once worked for [opposing candidate] Loebs, also used his Facebook page to post personal attacks and thinly veiled threats against Loebs and outright accusations of misconduct against Loebs and District Judge Richard Bevan.
Guerry later admitted he had no proof the accusations were true and said the postings were made in the “fog of war” of the campaign. He said posting the accusations was “probably not a wise thing to do” and “probably not a fair thing to do.”