Thursday, October 23, 2014
An attorney convicted of second degree endangerment of children has been suspended for an indeterminate period by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
He may seek reinstatement in five years from the date of his January 2011 interim suspension on a showing of fitness to practice.
From the court's summary
The facts of this case are undisputed. In July 2008, printouts of pornographic images, some of which depicted young female victims, were found in a receptionist’s desk drawer at the district office of New Jersey’s Twentieth Legislative District. At the time, respondent was an assemblyman representing the Twentieth District. The discovery led to an investigation by the New Jersey State Police, which revealed that this was not the first time pornography was encountered at the office; staff had previously discovered sexually explicit images in the office during morning work hours or following a weekend. As a result, the Office of Legislative Services required passwords on the computers.
When confronted, respondent admitted to the State Police that he had visited pornographic sites and printed the sexually explicit pictures. He acknowledged that the sites he viewed and the printed images contained both adult and child pornography. He explained that he had accessed the receptionist’s state-issued computer with a password that he instructed another member of his staff to obtain. Interviews also revealed that staff members observed respondent viewing pornography on the receptionist’s computer on prior occasions. In total, the police recovered thirty-four images of child pornography that respondent accessed on computers at the district office and at respondent’s law office. The images retrieved from respondent’s law office depicted nineteen girls under sixteen years old.
Respondent resigned from his position in the Legislature on July 20, 2008.
The court called the sanction a "step short" of disbarment. (Mike Frisch)
From the web page of the Ohio Supreme Court comes this story of a prosecutor's third brush with the attorney discipline system.
He had previously been suspended for a year in two separate matters.
One matter involved allegations that he had insinuated to other counsel that he was in a sexual relationship with a judge; the other confidentiality violations relating to an Ohio State football investigation.
The Ohio Supreme Court has placed Christopher T. Cicero of Columbus on an indefinite suspension from the practice of law for altering the charge in his own speeding case.
After receiving a speeding ticket in Columbus, Cicero obtained a blank but signed document from a Franklin County judge that Cicero then had his assistant fill out, changing his speeding charge to a headlight violation.
Cicero had previously amassed about 50 speeding tickets and had his driver’s license suspended twice. The lesser offense of an equipment violation carried no points against his license and eliminated the possibility of another driver’s license suspension.
The alteration came to light when Judge Scott VanDerKarr’s bailiff noticed that the judgment entry document that was filed did not include a required notation for a finding of guilt. When the court contacted Cicero, he refused to provide the name of the prosecutor who agreed to allow the change to a lesser charge, and the judge issued an arrest warrant for Cicero for contempt of court.
Cicero subsequently identified a prosecutor, who was working his second to last day in the office on the day of Cicero’s arraignment in March 2012. The prosecutor denied having any conversation with Cicero about amending the speeding ticket.
Cicero would not explain to the judge how the deal to amend his charge came about, and he was sent to jail for five days. Afterward, Cicero withdrew his plea to the headlight violation and pled no contest to the original speeding charge. The judge cited him for contempt and sentenced him to time served.
Cicero has been before the Supreme Court in two prior disciplinary cases – one in which he claimed he was having sex with a judge presiding over one of his cases and another in which he shared confidential information from a potential client with the head football coach at the Ohio State University.
The panel that reviewed this case for the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline noted Cicero’s pattern of misconduct and refusal to accept responsibility for his actions, among other aggravating factors, and recommended that he be indefinitely suspended.
The full board, however, recommended to the court that Cicero be prohibited permanently from practicing law for his misconduct. While Cicero did not challenge the misconduct and rule violations that the board found, he objected to the proposed sanction of disbarment.
After reviewing a number of prior disciplinary cases, the court determined that Cicero’s history of misconduct involved three different matters and did not reflect a “longstanding pattern of deceit.” In a 5-2 decision, written by Justice Judith L. French, the court concluded that an indefinite suspension was appropriate for Cicero’s misconduct, but noted that his repeated violations were “troubling.”
“By no means do we condone Cicero’s dishonest, unprofessional, and censurable conduct, which was prejudicial to the administration of justice and which adversely reflects on Cicero’s fitness to practice law,” Justice French wrote. “Nevertheless, in light of this court’s precedent and considering all of the circumstances, including the aggravating factors and lack of significant mitigating factors, we do not find that Cicero’s conduct, egregious though it may be, rises to the level for which we reserve the sanction of permanent disbarment.”
Cicero can apply to return to the practice of law in two years.
Joining the majority were Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Terrence O’Donnell, Sharon L. Kennedy, and William M. O’Neill.
In a written dissent, unusual in disciplinary cases, Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor would have disbarred Cicero. Her opinion was joined by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger.
In Chief Justice O’Connor’s view, the majority “does not adequately recognize the insidiousness of Cicero’s behavior.” Calling his conduct a “charade” and his long list of excuses “outlandish,” Chief Justice O’Connor also emphasized Cicero’s refusal to take responsibility for his actions and admit his wrongdoings. “Cicero’s quiver of untruths is notable for its depth, if nothing else,” she added.
She pointed out that the prosecutor Cicero claimed had agreed to let him plea to a lesser charge did not work on traffic or criminal matters and was not assigned to any arraignment courtroom.
“Cicero’s spectacular talent for deflecting blame and minimizing misbehavior reflects his inability to conduct himself in an ethical manner,” the chief justice wrote. “That inability portends great risk to his clients and endangers the public and the legal profession.”
She disagreed with the majority perspective that Cicero be given a lesser sanction because his misconduct over the years has involved distinct matters.
“It does not matter that Cicero’s three disciplinary cases did not spring from a common source,” she wrote. “Cicero’s pattern of dishonesty, blaming others, disrespect for the legal process and for the courts, self-serving behavior, and feigned remorse is unrelenting. In fact, it is his willingness to defraud and impugn the court system in a great variety of unrelated circumstances that is the most troubling of all.”
Cicero’s actions have reinforced the worst stereotypes about the legal profession, and his misconduct warrants disbarment, she concluded.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has disbarred an attorney for misconduct in the course of representing a client in a child custody disputes and during the resulting bar investigation.
We conclude that the appropriate sanction for Barnett’s misconduct is disbarment. Barnett forged [client] Wooden’s signature on an Affidavit of Indigency without consulting her or obtaining her consent, and then submitted the false document to the circuit court. Barnett failed to notify Wooden of the Exceptions hearing dates, or otherwise communicate with her for at least ten months during the course of his representation. After Wooden filed with the Commission a complaint concerning Barnett’s lack of communication, Barnett intentionally misled Bar Counsel concerning his discussions with Wooden regarding the Exceptions hearing dates and overall attorney-client communications. Barnett’s misconduct culminated in his unauthorized withdrawal of the Exceptions (i.e., the Exceptions were not pursued even though Wooden retained Barnett for the sole purpose of filing and pursuing Exceptions), and negatively impacted the public’s perception of the legal profession. There are no mitigating factors and Barnett’s misconduct is aggravated by multiple violations of the MLRPC and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct.
The court had entered a sua sponte order of disbarment on October 3, the date of the scheduled oral argument. THe attorney had failed to appear. (Mike Frisch)
How long must a disbarred attorney wait for reinstatement?
Sixteen years was the period of banishment for an attorney reinstated yesterday by the New York Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department.
The attorney had been disbarred in 1998 as a result of a criminal fraud scheme described by the New York Times
Since 1990, Mitchell Rachlin has collected more than $626,000 in payments from an insurance policy, claiming that neck and back injuries from a car accident prevented him from working at his law practice.
Undercover investigators, however, say that Mr. Rachlin has been hard at work at his Hempstead law firm on Long Island -- with no sign of impairment. Videotapes from a hidden camera show him moving nimbly about the office, even cradling the phone with his supposedly injured neck.
Not only was he working at his office, investigators say, Mr. Rachlin was also helping clients concoct their own fraudulent insurance claims.
Today, Mr. Rachlin was among 20 people indicted in Nassau County on felony charges stemming from a two-year sting, called Operation Backbone, to uncover fraud in insurance cases involving automobile no-fault, disability and workers' compensation. The others were 3 lawyers, 12 chiropractors, an orthopedist, a medical supplier, a legal assistant and a chiropractor's receptionist.
From the disbarment order
The respondent admitted that on or about October 23, 1995, he knowingly submitted false lost wages documents to Cigna Insurance Company (hereinafter Cigna) in support of a no-fault lost wage claim and thereby obtained in excess of $3,000 from Cigna. The respondent further admitted that between approximately March 1995 and August 1995, he engaged in a scheme constituting a systematic ongoing course of conduct whereby he intended to defraud Cigna Insurance Company and Zurich Insurance Company by referring “false, fraudulent statement[s]” to those companies regarding the disability claims of more than one person. Those persons received in excess of $1,000.
The reinstatement order does not set forth the evidence adduced to demonstrate present fitness to practice but notes the favorable recommendation of the Committee on Character and Fitness.
The court had denied two previous petitions. (Mike Frisch)
The New York Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department has disbarred an attorney who, after having neglected the matters of several clients, lied and created false documents to conceal the neglect.
As noted in an earlier post, the case underscores the value of granting disciplinary counsel the power to depose as
The respondent does not contest the charges, notwithstanding earlier denials. He stated at the hearing: "My testimony [at my deposition] speaks for itself." At his deposition, the respondent not only admitted that he was "mistruthful," but he also admitted that he had fabricated orders, fabricated judges' signatures, and fabricated court stamps and index numbers on various orders, all in an effort to conceal his neglect.
In mitigation, the respondent testified at his deposition that a close friend of his died of an aneurysm at his home, and that the respondent allegedly tried to save his friend's life, but was unsuccessful. According to the respondent, the trauma of that incident caused him to go into a deep depression. Unfortunately, he turned to alcohol, claiming at the same time that he was a recently recovered alcoholic. Although the Grievance Committee requested that the respondent produce medical reports substantiating his health problems, the respondent failed to provide any documentation in support thereof. The respondent recounted the same chain of events at the hearing, but offered no evidence whatsoever to support his claims. The Special Referee requested that the respondent provide some documentation, e.g., a medical report from his treating physician, which the respondent indicated could still be obtained. No such documentation was provided subsequent to the hearing.
The respondent's submissions in support of his purported mitigation consist of self-serving statements for which no evidence, documentary or otherwise, has been produced. Other than the respondent's bare claims, and despite separate requests by the Grievance Committee and the Special Referee for supporting documentation, no evidence was presented to support his contentions that: (1) a close friend had died in his arms, (2) he suffered from depression and post-traumatic distress disorder, (3) he sought treatment, and (4) he abused alcohol, entered Alcoholics Anonymous, and is now sober. Given the utter lack of evidence to support any of the respondent's claims, we find these claims to be not credible.
Wednesday, October 22, 2014
A Tennessee attorney has been censured for using improper means to obtain evidence in her own divorce.
The story is told in this opinion from a Magistrate Judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
This case...is not a garden variety case of one spouse putting spyware on the other spouse's computer to electronically eavesdrop. Plaintiff alleges defendant engaged in an elaborate, deceptive scheme which involved wiretapping his computer to intercept emails, altering those emails to make it appear he was having an affair, and altering legal documents in order to provide that if plaintiff did have an affair, defendant would receive more money in a divorce. Because of the elaborate nature of the allegations and because the plaintiff seeks punitive damages, the Court has been required to focus a wide lens on the parties' conduct and consider behavior beyond simply wiretapping. The result is the regrettable and unavoidable airing of dirty laundry...
Were the Court required to rely primarily on the testimony of either party, it would be very difficult to reach a conclusion about the plaintiff's conduct. Defendant's testimony, in particular, is so contradictory to the forensic and documentary evidence and so inconsistent with her previous statements as to render her testimony at trial completely incredible. However, there is clear and convincing evidence from sources other than the two parties' own testimony that defendant engaged in egregious conduct: evidence from William Dean's forensic computer examination of the KLC computers and defendant's laptop computer; from the documentary evidence, much of which was produced by defendant pursuant to a subpoena; from the two recorded phone conversations (again produced by the defendant); and from other witnesses. The Court has detailed this evidence in the fact portion of this opinion. All this evidence considered as a whole leads to only one logical conclusion: defendant engaged in a concerted scheme to gain advantage over the plaintiff in a divorce by 1) tricking plaintiff into signing an altered prenuptial agreement with a provision that rendered the prenuptial agreement null and void in the event that plaintiff committed adultery, 2) by secretly substituting a page in the September 27, 2007 Agreed Order with different pages that contained a provision making plaintiff's premarital assets part of the marital assets and forfeiting three fourths of those assets to defendant if plaintiff committed adultery, 3) by secretly installing eBlaster on the computers regularly used by plaintiff, 4) by secretly intercepting at least three emails sent by R.G. to plaintiff and altering them to look like R.G. and plaintiff were having an affair, and 5) by intending to use the altered emails, the altered prenuptial agreement and the altered September 27, 2007 agreed order to obtain a significant amount of plaintiff's property to which she was not entitled in a divorce from plaintiff. The Court concludes the only reason this plan was not successful was that defendant was unable to keep eBlaster a secret. Once eBlaster was discovered, plaintiff launched into an investigation which uncovered defendant's conduct. This conduct on the part of the defendant was extreme and outrageous and merits punitive damages.
The Court may also consider the conduct of plaintiff in determining punitive damages. Plaintiff frequently abused alcohol during the marriage which caused him to be verbally and physically abusive. Further, during the course of their divorce proceedings and after their divorce proceedings, plaintiff engaged in behavior which can only be described as harassment of the defendant. He sent defendant incendiary text messages and popped up in places around town where defendant could be found. His conduct included "shooting the bird" at defendant and making prejorative comments about her in public settings. Plaintiff's conduct bordered on stalking. "[T]wo wrongs do not make a right. Two wrongs simply make two wrongs." Finally, the amount of punitive damages should bear a reasonable relation to actual damages awarded. Considering the totality of the circumstances discussed herein, the Court awards plaintiff $10,000 in punitive damages. (citations omitted)
The Court concludes plaintiff has proven at trial by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant violated the federal and Tennessee wiretap acts by intercepting plaintiff's emails. The Court therefore shall award the plaintiff $10,000 in statutory damages. Further, the Court concludes that plaintiff has proven by clear and convincing evidence that defendant engaged in outrageous and egregious conduct and the Court awards plaintiff $10,000 in punitive damages. Finally, the Court determines that plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs to maintain this action. An appropriate judgment shall be entered.
The attorney submitted a conditional guilty plea to the ethics charges.
WBIR had this report on the attorney's trial testimony against her next husband, who serves in the state House of Representatives.
WNCT reported that the trial led to a reckless enganderment conviction. (Mike Frisch)
My favorite issue of the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics -our yearly compilation of student notes on current developments in ethics law - has just hit the street.
This issue holds up well with the past editions and gives the reader excellent exposure to the hottest legal ethics issues that face 21st century members of the legal profession.
As co-faculty advisor (along with my colleague Professor Mitt Regan) to the journal, I am biased in its favor.
With that disclaimer, I highly recommend that all practitioners with an interest in ethics take a look.
Kudos to the journal staff for their hard work and dedication to this notable contribution to the profession. (Mike Frisch)
A recent disciplinary decision from the Maryland Court of Appeals
This attorney discipline matter concerns an attorney who accepted $2,500 from a client as a retainer for a divorce case, had no further communication with her client, performed no work on the matter, and apparently abandoned her Maryland law practice. The attorney, who did not maintain a separate trust account, deposited the client’s payment into a general account and never returned the unearned fee to the client. The attorney did not cooperate with Bar Counsel’s disciplinary investigation, failed to respond to the disciplinary charges later filed against her, and did not participate in the proceedings before the hearing judge or our Court. As a result, we have no information that would mitigate the sanction for her misconduct. We hold that she violated multiple provisions of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) as well as related rules and statutes and, based on those violations, disbar her.
I only hope that this attorney is not admitted in D.C. as I would hate to read a decision that imposed censure as reciprocal discipline for this misconduct. (Mike Frisch)
A sexual relationship with the client's wife has resulted in the suspension of an Ohio attorney.
The relationship took place during and after the criminal trial in which the client was accused of murdering his own parents.
As reported by Kathleen Maloney
The Supreme Court today suspended Columbus attorney James D. Owen for having a sexual relationship with the wife of a client. The court noted in its decision that the professional conduct rules do not address this issue nor had there been any case law about this type of situation.
In a 6-1 vote, the court imposed a two-year suspension, with the second year stayed on conditions, for Owen’s misconduct.
In 1997, Owen began representing Robert Caulley, who had been accused of murdering his parents three years earlier. Owen was originally hired to research a false confession defense in the capital case. Given his work on part of the case, a trial judge removed Caulley’s court-appointed lawyers and put Owen in their place.
The accused’s wife relocated from Texas to Ohio in summer 1997 and helped Owen with case-related tasks. Several days before Caulley’s trial began that September, Owen and Caulley’s wife started a sexual relationship, which continued until August or September of 1998. The jury found Caulley guilty of two lesser offenses, not punishable by death, and he was sent to prison.
Caulley found out about the affair years later, and the Ohio Public Defender contacted Owen in 2011 to tell him it was asking the court for a new trial because of his relationship with Caulley’s wife. Owen admitted his actions and cooperated in the efforts to gain a new trial, which was granted. He also reported his misconduct to the Disciplinary Counsel about a month later and entered into a five-year contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (OLAP) in early 2012. He sought treatment for anxiety, depression, and severe attention deficit disorder.
In a per curiam opinion, the court found that a sexual relationship with the spouse of a current client creates a conflict of interest that compromises the trust and confidence between the client and attorney.
The court has disapproved of lawyers engaging in sexual conduct with clients, and it today upheld the same principle for sexual relationships with a client’s spouse because “the vulnerability of the client and the betrayal of trust are the same.”
Owen’s suspension with one year stayed is contingent on him complying with his OLAP contract and committing no further misconduct.
In the court’s majority were Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Terrence O’Donnell, Judith Ann Lanzinger, Sharon L. Kennedy, Judith L. French, and William M. O’Neill.
Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor dissented. She would have imposed an indefinite suspension.
We understand the effects that mental illness, alcoholism, psychological impairments, and dysfunctional upbringings can have on a practicing attorney, not to mention the stresses attorneys endure in their day-today lives, both professional and personal. As debilitating as these can be to practitioners, however, there are consequences when they lead to misconduct, and attorneys will be held accountable. Owen has accepted full responsibility for his misconduct. He acknowledges that he had ample time and opportunity to disclose the affair to Caulley and later to Caulley’s appellate attorneys, yet he failed to do so. He is deeply remorseful for his betrayal of his family, his client, and his profession.
The pathetic state of lawyer regulation in New Jersey is on display in a reprimand for negligent misappropropriation just issued by the Disciplinary Review Board and accepted by the Supreme Court.
The disciplinary matter came to light during a random audit.
The attorney conceded that he was deficient in his recordkeeping and that he had commingled his trust and business accounts.
The attorney was charged with two counts of knowing misappropriation, for which the sanction is disbarment.
The special master found the violations; both findings were overturned by the DRB.
The count that appears to clearly involve knowing misappropriation involved the handling of a $35,000 settlement check in a slip-and-fall case.
The attorney prepared the deposit ticket and deposited the funds in his business account. The account had a balance of slightly over $1,100.
He then used escrow funds (i.e. other people's money) to pay the client her share. He used the funds deposited in the business account to pay business and personal expenses. He wrote eighteen checks for such purposes and invaded entrusted funds to the tune of over $9,000.
A workers' compensation lien owed to a state agency for over $11,000 went unpaid for a year and was satisfied by a loan from the attorney's father.
The DRB described the special master's findings
In the Howard matter (count one), the special master concluded that respondent’s deposit into the business account was "knowing and purposeful." The special master noted that the deposit slip bore the business account number placed by respondent, after the account name, that respondent checked off boxes to both "business" and "checking," and that he wrote "(bus)" on the deposit slip. The special master remarked that, without this deposit, the business account would have contained insufficient funds to cover the eighteen checks written by respondent between August 9 and 27, 2010.
In concluding that respondent knowingly misappropriated trust funds, the special master found, consistent with [chief auditor] Waldman’s testimony, that respondent paid Howard with trust account funds belonging to other clients. Compounding respondent learned that he was out of that offense, once trust, he took no immediate action, waiting until he received a notice of the OAE’s random audit, before borrowing funds from his father. Thereafter, he waited five months, before satisfying the workers' compensation lien.
Notwithstanding these rather damning facts and the special master's conclusion, the DRB finds a way to absolve this behavior
Respondent went on to say that, from roughly March 2011, when he discovered his "crazy mistake," until late August 2011, he thought that he could replenish the account by using legal fees, as they came in. However, he said, the OAE’s audit notice had "forced his hand," in late August 2011. He then immediately borrowed funds from his father and replaced the amount of the check issued to Howard ($11,494.80) in the trust account. Even with that loan, however, respondent failed to satisfy the workers’ compensation lien for another six months, accomplishing that task in late February 2012. He did not do so sooner, he claimed, because he did not have sufficient funds at the time.
This case presented us with a difficult scenario. On the one hand, respondent seemed forthright, but careless and forgetful. He claimed to have had little reason to use the settlement funds as he did. One may also wonder why, if respondent was so desperate for funds that he was willing to risk his law license, he would not have asked his father for a loan, much sooner than he did. Could it be because he was unaware of his mistake? It should be noted, too, that respondent presented character witnesses and has a stainless disciplinary record of thirty years.
On the other hand, respondent acted in a way that both Waldman and the special master found to be consistent with the actions of other attorneys who have knowingly misappropriated trust funds. In particular, respondent’s actions regarding the handwritten notations on the deposit slip present serious problems...
...the record does not identify the owner of the funds that were allegedly invaded or the extent of the invasion. It does not show how much respondent should have been holding in trust at the time, to whom those funds in the trust account belonged, how much remained after the alleged invasion, and the amount of the alleged invasion.
We, therefore, dismiss the charge that respondent knowingly misappropriated client funds, when he issued the check for Howard’s portion of the settlement proceeds. We also dismiss the charge funds was intentional in nature. The record does not allow a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent’s use of the $11,000 lien was anything more than inadvertent, a "crazy mistake, as respondent put it.
Ah, yes. The old "why would he do it?" defense.
Possible answer: it was an easy solution to a financial problem that did not involve charity from his father.
If the record was not sufficient to get to the bottom of this then the public interest demands a remand for further findings. These facts do not lead to absolution.
No disciplinary regime that wishes to instruct its bar and assure the public about the sanctity of entrusted funds would tolerate this result or reprimand on these facts. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, October 21, 2014
The New Mexico Court of Appeals has reversed a favorable ruling to the defendant in a legal malpractice case
Roland Lucero and his company, R & L Straightline Tile, (collectively, Plaintiff) appeal from a judgment entered in favor of Defendant Richard Sutten following a bench trial on the issue of legal malpractice. The district court found that Defendant negligently failed to apprise Plaintiff of the dangers of providing an unsecured $300,000 loan to a Las Vegas development company. However, the district court applied the doctrine of independent intervening cause, a defense that had not been previously raised in Defendant’s proposed findings prior to trial, and concluded that the real estate market collapse of the mid-to-late 2000s severed the connection between Defendant’s professional negligence and Plaintiff’s damages claimed therefrom. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in applying the doctrine of independent intervening cause to these facts. We agree. We reverse and remand for consideration of damages in light of this Opinion.
The district court should not have dismissed this case but, instead, it should have determined whether Defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s loss and, if applicable, employed a standard comparative fault analysis.
A former Eli Lilly attorney was suspended for 90 days by the Indiana Supreme Court for taking confidential materials with him when he left.
Respondent has been an attorney since 1993 and was admitted as a patent attorney by the United States Patent and Trademark Office in 2000. Respondent was employed by Eli Lilly and Company ("Lilly") from 1999 through 2009. Respondent had a duty to protect Lilly's intellectual property and preserve Lilly's confidences. In 2009, as Respondent prepared to leave his employment with Lilly, he copied documents and forms onto a disk. A Lilly administrative assistant made a copy of the disc and gave both discs to Respondent. The information on the discs ("CD Data") was property of Lilly and was considered by Lilly to be confidential. Respondent took the CD Data from Lilly's premises and retained it, knowing that he was not authorized to possess or control the CD Data after he left Lilly.
As to sanction
The parties cite the following fact in aggravation: Respondent was aware that the duty of a patent lawyer is to protect the intellectual property of the client. The parties cite the following facts in mitigation: (1) Respondent has no disciplinary history; (2) Respondent was cooperative with both Lilly and the Commission in their investigations; (3) Respondent had no intent to harm the client; (4) he returned the CD Data to Lilly upon request and did not intend to share it with third parties; (5) Respondent believes that the information regarding Lilly's products on the discs was either already in the public domain or would become public in the near future; (6) Respondent has expressed that the breach of his employment agreement was not intentional, yet he takes full responsibility for and regrets his actions; and (7) Respondent's misconduct resulted in the revocation of a substantial severance payment from Lilly.
An attorney who had failed to fully disclose his reportable conduct on his bar application and was convicted of a DUI after admission was suspended for six months with all but 120 days stayed and probation for three years by the Indiana Supreme Court.
Respondent was admitted to practice in Indiana in May 2004. The bar application asked for full disclosure of both criminal convictions and accusations of violations of the law. In 2000, he had been convicted of operating a vehicle with a BAC equivalent between 0.08 and 0.25, a class C misdemeanor. He reported this conviction on his 2003 bar application. He had also been charged in 1996 with Minor in a Tavern, a class C misdemeanor, which was resolved through a pre-trial diversion agreement. Respondent did not report this charge in his initial 2003 application nor in a renewed application.
In 2010, Respondent pled guilty to operating a vehicle while intoxicated ("OWI") endangering a person, a class A misdemeanor, for which he received an agreed public reprimand. See Matter of Massillamany, 946 N.E.2d 581 (Ind. 2011). Based on an incident on or about July 11, 2013, Respondent was charged with OWI with a prior conviction within five years, a class D felony. He self-reported this incident to the Commission on July 17, 2013. He pled guilty on April 9, 2014, and promptly notified the Commission of this conviction.
The probation requires him to abstain from alcohol and "mind altering" drugs. (Mike Frisch)
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of defamation claims against Syracuse basketball coach Jim Boeheim.
Plaintiffs Robert Davis and his step-brother Michael Lang sued defendants Syracuse University and James Boeheim, the University's head basketball coach, for defamation based on statements by Boeheim made in response to Davis and Lang's allegations of sexual molestation by Bernie Fine, Boeheim's longtime friend and the team's associate coach. Plaintiffs claimed that Fine used his position and authority within the University's basketball program to gain access to and control over Davis and Lang for purposes of sexually molesting them.
The Appellate Division had dismissed the case but the court found the comment at issue actioable
could view his statements as supported by undisclosed facts despite these denials.
Here, Boeheim stated that Davis and Lang lied and did so for monetary gain, and that Davis had done so in the past. Boeheim's assertions that Davis previously made the same claims, for the same purpose, communicated that Boeheim was relying on undisclosed facts that would justify Boeheim's statements that Davis and Lang were neither credible nor victims of sexual abuse. That, as defendants argue, Boeheim denied knowledge of facts, or prefaced some statements by saying "I believe", is insufficient to transform his statements into nonactionable pure opinion, because in context, a reasonable reader.
The context further suggests to the reader that Boeheim spoke with authority, and that his statements were based on facts. Boeheim was a well respected, exalted member of the University and the Syracuse community-at-large, and as head coach of the team appeared well placed to have information about the charges.
Game on. (Mike Frisch)
Monday, October 20, 2014
A three year suspension was imposed by the Louisiana Supreme Court on a lawyer on these findings
The record in this consolidated matter supports the hearing committees’ factual findings, as modified by the disciplinary board. Respondent neglected a legal matter, failed to communicate with a client, charged an unreasonable fee, failed to refund unearned fees, converted client funds, made false statements to the ODC, shared legal fees with a nonlawyer, facilitated the unauthorized practice of law by a nonlawyer, shared fees with a corporation not licensed to practice law, and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. This conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as found by the disciplinary board.
There was mitigation
The board also found that respondent suffered from various illnesses during the time of her misconduct, that she worked primarily as a solo practitioner since 2001 without the benefit of professional mentoring relationships, and that she devoted a substantial portion of her practice to representations in the public interest in under-served areas of the community.
The court this found that a lesser than than disbarment was appropriate. (Mike Frisch)
Saturday, October 18, 2014
The Louisiana Supreme Court decided a number of bar admission matters last week.
The court granted admission to an applicant who had a prior history as a civilian and in the military.
The Committee on Bar Admissions ("Committee") opposed petitioner’s application to sit for the Louisiana Bar Examination based on character and fitness concerns relating to his prior criminal history and his military disciplinary history. In addition, the Committee cited a finding by the Texas Board of Bar Examiners that petitioner had failed to fully and accurately disclose his criminal and military disciplinary history on his law school application and on his bar application in Texas. We subsequently granted petitioner permission to sit for the bar exam, with the condition that upon his successful completion of the exam, he apply to the court for the appointment of a commissioner to take character and fitness evidence.
There was a dissent from Justice Clark
I voted to deny petitioner’s request to sit for the bar exam, I voted to deny petitioner’s application for the appointment of a commissioner, and, for the same reasons, I would deny admission.
Petitioner has a record of both civilian criminal conduct and military criminal conduct. Further, and perhaps more seriously, petitioner shown a pattern of dishonesty by failing to report his complete criminal history and/or his employment history on his law school admission, his application for admission to the Texas Bar, and his application for admission to the Louisiana Bar.
A license to practice law in Louisiana is a privilege, not a right, and petitioner has shown by his illegal and dishonest conduct that he is not entitled to that privilege. By admitting petitioner to the Louisiana Bar, the Court is lowering the standards demanded of members of the Bar.
Justice Clark also dissented from an order admitting another applicant who was not forthcoming with his law school and the bar concerning his criminal history
Petitioner has a record of criminal conduct, and perhaps more seriously, petitioner has shown a pattern of dishonesty by failing to report his complete criminal history on his law school admission and on his application for admission to the Louisiana Bar.
This applicant was denied admission.
These issues included petitioner’s involvement in a hit and run accident in which alcohol was allegedly a factor, a pattern of financial irresponsibility on the part of petitioner, and a lack of candor by petitioner in connection with his application for admission to the Louisiana Bar.
The applicant must wait two years to reapply. (Mike Frisch)
Friday, October 17, 2014
Any credible disciplinary system requires that a complained-about attorney provide substantive and meaningful cooperation with the bar investigation.
Failure to cooperate is treated as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
New York provides real teeth to the duty to cooperate, as demonstrated by a recent interim suspension ordered by the Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department.
Respondent's client filed a complaint with the Committee, alleging that respondent neglected her landlord-tenant case. The client further alleged that, after she paid respondent $1,000 to work on a bankruptcy case, respondent informed her that he could not handle the case because he was not a bankruptcy lawyer. She requested a refund of the $1,000, but respondent never returned the funds.
After the Committee initially contacted respondent, respondent submitted an answer generally denying his client's allegations. The Committee then requested respondent provide a chronology of the work he performed on behalf of the client along with any documents in support. When no response was received, the Committee made numerous attempts to contact respondent, including serving a subpoena requiring respondent's appearance for a deposition. Respondent failed to appear, and did not contact the Committee.
Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.4(e)(1)(i), this Court may temporarily suspend from the practice of law an attorney who is the subject of an investigation by the Committee, pending consideration of charges, upon a finding that the respondent is guilty of professional misconduct that immediately threatens the public interest. Such a finding may be made based upon the attorney's failure "to comply with any lawful demand of this court or the Departmental Disciplinary Committee made in connection with any investigation. . . ."
Although respondent submitted an answer to the complaint, he has not cooperated with the Committee in its ongoing investigation, and failed to appear for a deposition as ordered by a judicial subpoena. In addition, he has defaulted on this motion. Such conduct demonstrates a willful noncompliance with the Committee's investigation and warrants his immediate suspension.
I'd simply note that the District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility has opined that a general denial of allegations is a sufficient response. Further, D.C. Bar Counsel does not have the authority to depose an accused attorney.
Illinois gives discovery and deposition authority to its disciplinary counsel.
The Administrator, the Inquiry Board and the Hearing Board are empowered to take evidence of respondents, petitioners and any other attorneys or persons who may have knowledge of the pertinent facts concerning any matter which is the subject of an investigation or hearing.
The deposition is an invaluable tool to establish the facts both undisputed and at issue. Disagreements come into focus, charges can be brought with particularity and the entire process is streamlined as a result.
God forbid D.C. would ever grant such authority to its Bar Counsel.
Just a couple of things to add to the list of deficiencies in a system that no one seems remotely interested in correcting or improving. (Mike Frisch)
Thursday, October 16, 2014
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has accepted the consent disbarment of an attorney convicted in the so-called Computergate matter.
Matt Miller of pennlive reported on the conviction and appeal in September 2013
The state Superior Court refused on Wednesday to overturn the criminal convictions and 4- to 12-year prison sentence of former state Rep. Brett O. Feese in the so-called Computergate scandal.
In a 53-page ruling, a court majority rejected Feese's claims that prosecutors from the state Attorney General's Office committed misconduct and prejudiced his case by destroying raw notes of witness interviews and that they had failed to prove that he had broken the law.
The 59-year-old Feese, who was also the former director of the House Republican Campaign Committee and chief counsel for the House Republican Caucus, was one of only two of nine Computergate defendants to go to trial in Dauphin County Court. The others entered guilty pleas.
Feese was convicted of 40 charges, including theft, obstruction of the administration of law and conspiracy, after a 23-day trial in October 2011. Besides his prison term, he was ordered to pay $1 million in restitution and a $25,000 fine.
Feese, who once represented Lycoming County, and the other Computergate defendants were charged with using state-paid computer resources and employees to abet GOP political campaigns from 2000 to 2007.
Other Republicans who pleaded guilty to Computergate charges included former House Speaker John Perzel, who received a 2 1/2 to 5-year prison term and the same restitution order as Feese.
In denying Feese's appeal, the Superior Court found "too speculative" his accusations that prosecutors had acted in bad faith and skewed the outcome of the case by destroying the raw witness interview notes.
Prosecutors denied the allegations, saying the notes were destroyed under a long-standing policy of the attorney general's office and that the witness statements from those notes were transcribed in reports to which Feese's lawyer, Joshua Lock, had access.
Feese's argument about the note destruction did gain some traction with Superior Court Senior Judge James J. Fitzgerald III. In a dissenting opinion, Fitzgerald concluded that a hearing should have been held regarding the allegation that prosecutors had violated their own guidelines for destroying notes.
Lock is making the same arguments regarding the note destruction in a federal lawsuit he is pursuing on Feese's behalf against the Computergate prosecutors and Gov. Tom Corbett.
Meanwhile, Feese is serving his sentence in the state prison at Waymart.
Reuters has this report on a candidate for the Washington State Supreme Court
A disbarred lawyer and former driver of an ice-smoothing machine at Seattle hockey games is waging a long-shot bid for the Washington state Supreme Court, targeting the seat of a justice who stripped him of his license.
John "Zamboni" Scannell, whose nickname will appear on November's ballot, was disbarred in 2010 after the state Supreme Court ruled he obstructed a multi-year Washington State Bar Association investigation into alleged violations.
The violations included aiding a lawyer with a suspended license who performed legal work using Scannell's name, in preparation for a lawsuit in Virginia.
In upholding the disbarment, Justice Debra Stephens, who now faces Scannell in her re-election bid, wrote in the opinion that Scannell's obstruction "poses a serious threat to lawyer self-regulation."
"He continues to assert that his conduct is upright and characterizes the entire disciplinary process as 'fascist'," the opinion said.
Scannell would likely be unable to serve if elected because justices are required under the state's constitution to be admitted to practice law.
David Ammons, spokesman for the Secretary of State, said it does not check whether a person has been disbarred before letting a potential candidate enter the statewide Supreme Court race in Washington state.
"When people file, we don't investigate their background or do anything other than make sure they are a registered voter in Washington," Ammons said.
Should Scannell win the election, the state's Supreme Court would decide whether or not he is allowed to take the oath of office and be seated, Katie Blinn, director of legislative policy for the Secretary of State, said. If he is ineligible,Governor Jay Inslee would appoint a new justice.
Justice Stephens, a Spokane native appointed to the court effective Jan. 1, 2008, according to a profile on the court's website, did not immediately respond a request for comment, nor did Scannell.
The long-bearded, ponytail-wearing former lawyer was for years a Zamboni driver at Seattle-area hockey games, local media have said.
"If elected, I will serve," Scannell told The Stranger, a local weekly newspaper.
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department has imposed a reciprocal public censure of an attorney sanctioned in federal court.
the Southern District publicly censured respondent for permitting a nonattorney to use his username and/or password to electronically file involuntary bankruptcy petitions in violation of New York Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) rule 5.5(b) (aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law) and rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
In the original matter
In his response to the order to show cause, respondent explained that the filings at issue were made on behalf of the creditors, Goldsmith and Minko, by Benjamin Herbst, a nonattorney and Executive Director of the Council for Community Preservation, Inc. (CCPI), a community organization which had an affiliation with a paralegal training program. In providing legal services to the community, respondent had previously used Herbst and paralegal students in preparing legal documents. Respondent had permitted Herbst to use his ECF username and password when filing bankruptcy cases in which respondent was retained as counsel. However, in the case of the Lipschitz filings, for which respondent was not retained as the attorney, Herbst used respondent's ECF password without informing him that he was doing so, and without his permission.
Respondent subsequently discovered that Herbst and his paralegal students had used his ECF password on other occasions without his knowledge or consent. Respondent emphasized that: he terminated his relationship with Herbst and CCPI; he no longer accepts referrals from them; and he was extricating himself from representing clients referred to him through CCPI.
On April 3, 2012, the bankruptcy court held the sanction hearing at which respondent and Herbst appeared. Herbst, who corroborated respondent's version of events, explained that he had been under the misapprehension that it was permissible for CCPI to file pro se bankruptcy petitions through respondent's ECF account. It appears that Herbst may have filed the involuntary petitions to assist Lipschitz, the debtor. As a result of the bankruptcy filings, an eviction proceeding commenced against Lipschitz by his landlord was automatically stayed. Notably, the landlord testified before the bankruptcy court that Herbst had appeared before the housing court and claimed to be respondent.
During the hearing, respondent acknowledged that he failed to properly monitor the use of his ECF password, but emphasized that he did not directly participate in filing the petitions at issue. Respondent further acknowledged that he had previously represented the debtor, Lipschitz, in a landlord-tenant proceeding, and that the proceedings before the bankruptcy court presented a conflict of interest. Respondent emphasized, however, that he had become unknowingly involved in the conflict. As to his failure to appear at the prior hearings, respondent explained, inter alia, that he "may have" received the court's prior orders to show cause, but he was not sure because for a period of time, the court had been using an incorrect address to contact him. Nonetheless, respondent acknowledged that he may have had one or two conversations with the judge's law clerks in regards to the orders. In addition, respondent emphasized that he had acted under the incorrect belief that, as he was not the attorney for the petitioning creditor, he was not obligated to appear.
There were mitigating factors involving health issues of the attorney's spouse. (Mike Frisch)