Law Librarian Blog

Statistical Analysis of Federal Court Judicial Nominations Since the Reagan Administration

It's not like partisan politics in the presidential nomination and Senate confirmation of federal judical candidates is a late 20th century development. It's been around since the days our founding fathers split into Federalists and Democratic-Republicans camps based on fundamental ideological differences over the role of the federal government. That, however, doesn't mean an analysis of the last 30 or so years of federal judicial appointments isn't warranted. In a recent CRS report, one of the takeaways is the following:

President Obama is the only one of the five most recent Presidents for whom, during his first term, both the average and median waiting time from nomination to confirmation for circuit and district court nominees was greater than half a calendar year (i.e., more than 182 days).

Of course, the Democratic Party is just as guilty of playing Beltway politics as the Republician Party. Here's an excerpt from the summary of the May 3, 2013 CRS Report, President Obama’s First-Term U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations: An Analysis and Comparison with Presidents Since Reagan:

The process by which lower federal court judges are nominated by the President and considered by the Senate is of continuing interest to Congress. Recent Senate debates in Congress over judicial nominations have focused on issues such as the relative degree of success of President Barack Obama’s nominees in gaining Senate confirmation (compared with other recent Presidents) as well as the number and percentage of vacant judgeships in the federal judiciary and the effect of delayed judicial appointments on judicial vacancy levels. This report addresses these issues, and others, by providing a statistical analysis of nominations to U.S. circuit and district court judgeships during the first terms of President Obama and his four most recent predecessors.

[JH]

Texas Supreme Court Issues Warning About Errors in West's Texas Rules of Court

The warning was published on the Texas Supreme Court website. That's a first, I think. Jason Wilson has the story at In publishing, the little things do matter. [JH]

Should Retired Federal Judges' Working Papers Be Archived as Official Government Records Open for Research Purposes?

Never gave the matter a thought. You? Well, Kathryn A. Watts, Univ. of Washington School of Law, has. Judges and Their Papers [SSRN], 2013 New York University Law Review article, may be the first serious attempt to answer the question, "who should own a federal judge's papers?" Here's the abstract:

Who should own a federal judge’s papers? This question has rarely been asked. Instead, it has generally been accepted that the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal judges own their own working papers, which include papers created by judges relating to their official duties, such as internal draft opinions, confidential vote sheets, and case-related correspondence. This longstanding tradition of private ownership has led to tremendous inconsistency. For example, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s papers were released just two years after he left the bench, revealing behind-the-scenes details about major cases involving issues like abortion and flag burning. In contrast, Justice David Souter’s papers will remain closed until the 50th anniversary of his retirement, and substantial portions of Justice Byron White’s papers, including files relating to the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, were shredded. In addition, many collections of lower federal court judges’ papers have been scattered in the hands of judges’ families. Notably, this private ownership model has persisted despite the fact that our country’s treatment of presidential records shifted from private to public ownership through the Presidential Records Act of 1978. Furthermore, private ownership of judicial papers has endured even though it has proven ill-equipped to balance the many competing interests at stake, ranging from calls for governmental accountability and transparency on the one hand to the judiciary’s independence, confidentiality and collegiality on the other.

This Article is the first to give significant attention to the question of who should own federal judges’ working papers and what should happen to the papers once a judge leaves the bench. Upon the 35th anniversary of the enactment of the Presidential Records Act, this Article argues that judges’ working papers should be treated as governmental property — just as presidential papers are. Although there are important differences between the roles of President and judge, none of the differences suggest that judicial papers should be treated as a species of private property. Rather, the unique position of federal judges, including the judiciary’s independence, should be taken into account when crafting rules that speak to reasonable access to and disposition of judicial papers — not when answering the threshold question of ownership. Ultimately, this Article — giving renewed attention to a long forgotten 1977 governmental study commissioned by Congress — argues that Congress should declare judicial papers public property and should empower the judiciary to promulgate rules implementing the shift to public ownership. These would include, for example, rules governing the timing of public release of judicial papers. By involving the judiciary in implementing the shift to public ownership, Congress would enhance the likelihood of judicial cooperation, mitigate separation of powers concerns, and enable the judiciary to safeguard judicial independence, collegiality and confidentiality.

Highly recommended. [JH]

California State Judiciary, Just Another Fee-for-Service Branch of Government?

A budget proposal for the California state court system is causing quite a stir. It includes "charging $10 for so much as a peek at any file in any courthouse" as a new fee and doubling the per page copy charge from $1 to $2 according to the Santa Rose Press Democrat's editorial Price-gouging plan to fund state courts. Maria Dinzeo provides a detailed report of reaction to the budget proposal at Tide of Criticism Meets Court Admin Office Idea for New Fee (Courthouse News). [JH]

Connecticut Courts Offer Games With Other Court Materials

There are lots of things one expects from judicial web sites:  opinions, dockets, rules, and maybe jury instructions.  Connecticut's Judicial Branch includes a page of kid's games.  "Try one of our games," the page says.  The offerings include tic-tac-toe, various puzzles and word games.  Anyone interested in trying their luck can access the page here.  [MG]

Opening PACER

Hat tip to Legal Research Plus for calling attention to OpenPACER.org's draft bill, The Open PACER Act of 2013.

The Open PACER Act provides for free and open access to electronic federal court records. The courts currently offer an expensive and difficult-to-use web site. They charge more than their cost of offering the service—more than Congress has authorized—violating the E-Government Act of 2002. This Act seeks to, once and for all, compel the courts to fulfill Congress' longstanding vision of making this information "freely available to the greatest extent possible".

[JH]

Recorded for Posterity

Last week, the now famous remark by Justice Thomas made Elie Mystal's Non-Sequiturs post on ATL:

Now you can hear for yourself the three words that Clarence Thomas spoke. It’s at the 41-minute mark.

Recorded for posterity, Elie Mystal provided the link to the audio from the SCOTUS website.

Do note that Justice Thomas has spoken from the bench in the course of reading opinion summaries but this was a first (and a last?) for speaking during oral arguments. [JH]

Supreme Court Action: Admiralty Jurisdiction and Justice Thomas "Speaks"

The Supreme Court issued one opinion yesterday.  It concerned an interpretation of a section of the Rules of Construction Act (1 U.S.C §3) that defines a vessel.  The case is Lozman v. Riviera Beach (11-626).  Lozman owned a floating home that was docked at a marina in Riviera Beach, FL.  It had been towed between locations on several occasions with one tow running a distance of two hundred miles.  The Court observed that the home had no ability to self-propel or generate electricity. 

Lozman and the City did not get along very well.  Riviera Beach tried evicting Lozman from the marina and ultimately filed an in rem action against Lozman under the Federal Maritime Lien Act, invoking admiralty jurisdiction in federal court.  The District Court determined Lozman’s floating home was a vessel under the Rules of Construction Act and found for the city.  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  The Supreme Court took up the question of jurisdiction and focused on the statutory language defining a vessel, “every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”

The Court looked to past precedents and took the position that the floating home was not designed to any practical degree to transport persons or things over water.  The fact that it was towable did not change any of this:

Though our criterion is general, the facts of this case illustrate more specifically what we have in mind.  But for the fact that it floats, nothing about Lozman’s home suggests that it was designed to any practical degree to transport persons or things over water.  It had no rudder or other steering mechanism. 649 F. 3d, at 1269.  Its hull was unraked,  ibid., and it had a rectangular bottom 10 inches below the water.  Brief for Petitioner 27; App. 37.  It had no special capacity to generate or store electricity but could obtain that utility only through ongoing connections with the land.  Id., at 40. Its small rooms looked like ordinary nonmaritime living quarters. And those inside those rooms looked out upon the world, not through watertight portholes, but through French doors or ordinary windows.  Id., at 44–66.

The Court ultimately held that nothing about the home could lead a reasonable observer to consider it designed to a practical degree for transportation on water.  As a side note Riviera Beach had taken possession of Lozman’s home via the prior litigation and had it destroyed.  The City had posted a $25,000 bond in case Lozman prevailed.  Whoops.  Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Kagan.  Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent joined by Justice Kennedy.  She stated that the test of a reasonable observer changes the application of past precedent and would have remanded the case for more fact finding on the qualities of the floating home.  A picture of the home is included on page 16 of the slip opinion.

In other startling Court news, Justice Thomas actually said something at a Supreme Court oral argument on Monday.  He was moved to make an unintelligible joke that is reputed to be a dig at Yale (his alma mater) or Harvard.  His last comment from the bench otherwise was February 22, 2006.  Here is the section of the argument transcript from the case of Boyer v. Louisiana:

MS. SIGLER: Well, there was a provision -­ there is a provision in Louisiana law that allows someone to move for the admission and the certification of somebody as capital counsel, which was the procedure employed in this case. That is perfectly permissible.  But Miss Lehman at that time was a very experienced attorney, and we lay out her qualifications in the brief.   So while she may not have been perfectly qualified under Rule 31 to serve as lead counsel, she was certainly more than qualified -­

JUSTICE SCALIA: She was a graduate of Yale law school, wasn't she?

 MS. SIGLER: She's a very impressive attorney.

 JUSTICE SCALIA: And another of his counsel,

Mr. Singer -- of the three that he had -- he was a graduate of Harvard law school, wasn't he?

 MS. SIGLER: Yes, Your Honor.

 JUSTICE SCALIA: Son of a gun.

 JUSTICE THOMAS: Well -- he did not -­

(Laughter.)

 MS. SIGLER: I would refute that, Justice Thomas.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, do you want to define constitutionally adequate counsel? Is it anybody who's graduated from Harvard and Yale?

 (Laughter.)

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Or even just passed the Bar?

 MS. SIGLER: Or LSU law.

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I would think -- no, no, no. This is a very serious question, which is, I don't know that we have ever defined what the minimum qualification is for qualified counsel. But it is -­ some of it has to be that counsel themselves feel adequate to represent a capital defendant.

The question presented in the case is:

1. Whether a state's failure to fund counsel for an indigent defendant for five years, particularly where failure was the direct result of the prosecution's choice to seek the death penalty, should be weighed against the state for speedy trial purposes?

I’m going to wager a guess and bet that Justice Thomas will answer the question with a “no.”  I’ll revisit this when the opinion is announced.  [MG]

Working Class Heroes: Did Congress violate the Constitution’s Compensation Clause by not paying COLA increases to Federal Judges?

ABAJ News' Martha Neil has reported that a group of federal judges plans to seek class action status because they did not receive COLA raises in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2007 and 2010, even though other federal workers did.

Is it time for ... yes it is. [JH]

Arizona To Let Third Year Law Students Sit For The Bar

The Arizona Supreme Court has amended its rules to allow third year students to take the bar exam in that state.  There are certain conditions attached to the allowance.  Students must have taken 90% of their courses or have no more than eight hours left to complete to qualify for the exam.  Students must not be enrolled for more than two semester hours in the month of the exam or the previous month.  The most important condition is that law students (via law school certification) must show they have graduated within 120 days of the first day of the bar exam.  The rules allow an additional 60 days to make the showing.  No graduation or certification within these time frames means the results are voided. 

The Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law lauds the move in a press release: 

Judy Stinson, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the College of Law, echoed Sylvester’s comments about the advantages that the rule change will provide students. 

“It is a win-win for everyone involved,” Stinson said. “This rule change will make our students more employable earlier and give them the ability to offset the cost of their legal education sooner as well. It will also allow students to take the bar exam in Arizona in the spring and take another state’s bar exam in the summer, should they choose to do so.” 

Third-year students who are allowed to sit for the February bar will already have completed more than 90 percent of their coursework prior to taking the exam, which will give the College of Law flexibility in crafting the final weeks of their law school education. 

Brian Leiter suggests that there will be a push for an in-house bar review course.  I know that many schools, particularly those with less than stellar bar passage rates provide some form of bar review.  These typically do not substitute for the commercial versions popular with law students.  Arizona law schools might find a better solution by contracting with one of these commercial bar services to provide that service as part of the preparation for early takers. 

I just want to mention one more point.  The Arizona official Court Rules site is “powered by Westlaw” and includes this note (as of today): 

This site from West provides free access to an unannotated version of the Arizona state and local court rules as published in West's Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated. The contents of these rules are current through amendments received as of May 15, 2010. 

Seriously?  The rules are available on commercial Westlaw with amendments through October 12, 2012.  The site has this note as well: 

This site has been upgraded to assure you a positive Westlaw experience. 

Over two years without an update, I don’t think so.  [MG]

Justice Scalia Compares Sodomy To Murder

Justice Scalia made another newsworthy statement on Monday when he appeared at Princeton University.  He responded to a question from a gay student who was offended by his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas where the Justice equated homosexual sodomy with bestiality and murder.  Justice Scalia responded by saying:

If we cannot have moral feelings against homosexuality, can we have it against murder?  Can we have it against other things? I don’t apologize for the things I raise.  It’s a form of argument that I thought you would have known which is called the reduction to the absurd. I’m surprised you aren’t persuaded. 

Or words to that effect.  In deference to the Justice and accuracy, all of the above is accurately what he said, though various news reports broke the response into segments within their text.  My own response to this is I didn’t know we decided Supreme Court case outcomes based on the most absurd possible analogies.  But who am I to question the methodology of the Court.  I can’t predict how Justice Scalia will vote on the legal issues in the DOMA and Proposition 8 cases the Court added to its docket on Friday.  I do know without a doubt where his sentiments lie.

Justice Scalia returned to a familiar refrain when he said about the Constitution.  “It isn’t a living document.  It’s dead, dead, dead, dead.”  There.  It’s settled.

Other reports on the appearance are available in Slate and Salon if one seeks commentary that heartily disagrees with Justice Scalia’s response to the question.  The report in the Los Angeles Times is a bit more neutral.  [MG]

The Supreme Court Finally, Maybe, Takes Up Gay Marriage

Well, well, well.  The Supreme Court announced today that it will take up two major cases affecting the rights of homosexuals to marry.  One case concerns the invalidation of California’s Prop. 8 which amended the California constitution to prohibit marriage between two men or two women.  The other concerns the Defense of Marriage Act which more than one lower courts has declared unconstitutional.  The Court is expected to hear arguments and decide the case in the current term.  There is, however, a procedural wrinkle in both cases that gives the Court an out on the substantive issues if it so desires.  The Court wants the parties to brief jurisdictional issues as well.  Here is the statement in today’s orders list:

12-144 HOLLINGSWORTH, DENNIS, ET AL. V. PERRY, KRISTIN M., ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted.  In addition to the question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following question:  Whether petitioners have standing under Article III, §2 of the Constitution in this case.

12-307 UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR, EDITH S., ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted.  In addition to the question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions: Whether the Executive Branch’s agreement with the court below that DOMA is unconstitutional deprives this Court of jurisdiction to decide this case; and whether the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives has Article III standing in this case.

[MG]

Is PACER Making a Profit?

The Bay Citizen's Shane Shifflett and Jennifer Gollan report that PACER brings in five times what it costs. For details, see PACER federal court record fees exceed system costs. Hat tip to beSpacific. [JH]

CJ Roberts: Emerging Technologies Present the Biggest Legal Challenge in Federal Courts, including SCOTUS

"Reconciling ever-changing science and technology with established Constitutional principles - set down by statutes and rulings long before the modern world was even imagined - will be an ongoing challenge for federal courts, especially his own, U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts said Wednesday {October 17, 2012] during a Rice University discussion reported the Houston Chronicle's Mike Tolson in Chief Justice Roberts: Technology among top issues for court.

"Is being able to see through walls a violation of search and seizure protections? I think it will be a good opportunity to see how prescient the framers were if the Constitution will be able to deal with these questions," Roberts told an audience of several thousand. "What is the fundamental protection offered by the Constitution when applied to new technology and situations? It's a question that comes along all the time."

Houston, that's the homebase of the very techno-knowledgeable 3 Geeksters. Perhaps SCOTUS should retain them as court-appointed advisors. Yup, this is just a quick comment as a follow-up to Mark Giangrande's much more timely Chief Justice Roberts Speaks post. Mark's post includes a video link to CJ Robert's presentation. Recommended. {JH}

Posner's Pragmatism: "I don’t need four minutes to explain my theory of statutory and constitutional interpretation because I have no theory."

On Oct. 17, 2012, Judge Posner presented "How I Interpret Statutes and the Constitution" at Columbia Law via video conference. Hosted by the Federalist Society, you can view his presentation here. ATL's David Lat reviews Posner's remarks at Judge Posner on Statutory Interpretation: This Is How We Do It (Or, for the less high-minded: MOAR BENCHSLAPS.) [JH]

Chief Justice Roberts Speaks

Chief Justice Roberts spoke at Rice University earlier this week as part of Rice’s centennial celebration.  Rather than giving a formal lecture, the talk was billed as a conversation with the Chief Justice.  His comments included a concern about the Constitution as applied to new technologies:

"What is the fundamental protection offered by the Constitution when applied to new technology and situations? It's a question that comes along all the time."

Justice Alito addressed this concern in one of the most recent cases, United States v. Jones where the Court confronted this issue.  That case concerned placing a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle:

The Court argues—and I agree—that “we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’”  Ante, at 5 (quoting  Kyllo  v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 34 (2001)).  But it is almost impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to what took place in this case. (Is it possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted himself somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the movements of the coach’s owner?³)

³The Court suggests that something like this might have occurred in 1791, but this would have required either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both—not to mention a constable with incredible fortitude and patience.

It appears that GPS trackers were much larger at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. 

Chief Justice Roberts further addressed collegiality on the Court.  He pointed out that talk of divisiveness is untrue. There are never voices raised in anger at conferences and there is great intellectual depth on the Court.  While the press is fond of labeling Justices as liberal or conservative, many of the Court’s decisions are unanimous.  I’m not so sure about that last part myself.

The story on the talk is in the Houston Chronicle.  There is a video of the talk at the Rice University web site, courtesy of Rice’s Educational Technology Team.  [MG]

Justice Scalia On Church And State

Justice Scalia spoke recently at Washington’s Catholic Information Center.  The details are in the National Catholic Register.  One of the topics that came up was the religious makeup of the Court, which now stands at six Catholics and three Jews.  He chalks it up to a decline in religiosity:

“The fact that the Supreme Court consists of — what now? — six Catholics and three Jews: I would like to believe that it’s because of more religious toleration, but I think it’s actually because of indifference.”

Justice Scalia is consistent with the latest Pew Report on religion and public life:

The Landscape Survey confirms that the United States is on the verge of becoming a minority Protestant country; the number of Americans who report that they are members of Protestant denominations now stands at barely 51%. Moreover, the Protestant population is characterized by significant internal diversity and fragmentation, encompassing hundreds of different denominations loosely grouped around three fairly distinct religious traditions - evangelical Protestant churches (26.3% of the overall adult population), mainline Protestant churches (18.1%) and historically black Protestant churches (6.9%).

While those Americans who are unaffiliated with any particular religion have seen the greatest growth in numbers as a result of changes in affiliation, Catholicism has experienced the greatest net losses as a result of affiliation changes. While nearly one-in-three Americans (31%) were raised in the Catholic faith, today fewer than one-in-four (24%) describe themselves as Catholic. These losses would have been even more pronounced were it not for the offsetting impact of immigration.

Justice Scalia’s expressed views on the separation of church and state seem downright moderate:

Scalia went further, drawing on the evidence of the Gospels to support the notion that the church and state hold authority in separate realms. Christ’s words and actions, he said, make it clear “that the state is not the source of man’s power, nor of his religion. … Its focus should not be with the hereafter, but with the here: ensuring a safe, just and prosperous society.”

And further:

“My message is: Don’t place your hope in politics,” Scalia said. “That is not your salvation. … Certainly, good government should abide by the natural law. And, as the Catholic Church teaches, natural law prohibits certain things, such as abortion, that Catholics in public life can oppose.”

The rest of the article is worth reading.  [MG]

Justice Scalia, Again

CBS News is reporting on a recent address Justice Scalia gave to the American Enterprise Institute.  Here's a highlight:

"The death penalty? Give me a break. It's easy. Abortion? Absolutely easy. Nobody ever thought the Constitution prevented restrictions on abortion. Homosexual sodomy? Come on. For 200 years, it was criminal in every state."

I guess we know how he intends to rule in the Proposition 8 case or the Defense of Marriage Act cases when they reach the Court.  It's high contrast to a Court nominee deflecting a senator's question by saying that the issue may come before the Court.  [MG]

It's The First Monday In October, With One Opinion Out On Redistricting

It’s the first Monday in October, which means the Supreme Court’s 2012 term opens.  Two cases are on the docket for argument today, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (10-1491), and Lozman v. Rivera Beach, FL (11-626).  The former deals with application of the Alien Tort Statute to corporate activity and the latter as to whether a floating structure that is indefinitely moored and receives power and other utilities from shore is considered a vessel under federal statutes.  The oral argument transcripts should be available from the Court’s web site later on today.

The Court did issue one per curiam opinion last week.  The case is Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission (11-1184).  The case concerns redistricting of congressional districts in West Virginia.  A three judge panel invalidated the redistricting plan implemented by West Virginia for violating the “one person one vote” principle embodied in Article I, §2 of the Constitution.  The Court requires that populations in congressional districts be more or less the same number, but does allow differences when the districts are drawn in a way that meets legitimate state objectives.

The plaintiffs argued that there was a population difference of 0.79% between districts.  Competing state plans could have brought this number lower if one had been adopted.  Some of the legitimate state objectives include not splitting counties between districts, limiting population shifts, avoiding contests between incumbents, splitting political subdivisions, and others.  The Court said that under its standards from Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725 (1983), West Virginia demonstrated legitimate state interests through the plan that was adopted.  The others didn’t come as close in that regard, though they may have further minimized the population differences compared to the plan before the Court.  The three-judge panel’s decision was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

I should note one more Court related development.  The Los Angeles Review of Books has published an interview by Don Franzen with Justice Scalia concerning his book with Bryan Garner, Reading The Law.  There are no snipes with Judge Posner.  A sample:

FRANZEN: Some would be surprised to see that you actually argue against strict construction. In fact, you include strict construction in your list of thirteen fallacies. Most people think textualism, originalism, and strict construction are sort of a trinity.

SCALIA: I think strict construction gives a bad name to textualism. My approach is to give the text a reasonable meaning that it bore when it was adopted. For instance, if you interpret strictly the First Amendment, it would be the case that Congress could censor handwritten letters, because, strictly, it covers only freedom of speech and of the press. A handwritten letter is neither speech nor press. Come on, that’s absurd, that’s not the meaning of the First Amendment. The First Amendment reasonably understood is a guarantee of freedom of expression, whether handwritten or oral, or semaphore or burning a flag.

FRANZEN. Then what about the Reno case, extending it to the internet?

SCALIA: Of course. There’s no reason why speech on the internet is not speech.

The rest of the interview is well worth reading.  [MG]

Jenkins' The Partisan: The Life of William Rehnquist

John A. Jenkins, the president and publisher of CQ Press, is a four-time recipient of the ABA’s Gavel Award Certificate of Merit, the highest award in legal journalism. Based on early buzz, he might become a five-time recipient for his The Partisan: The Life of William Rehnquist. See, e.g., Peter Landers' LB Bookshelf: Rehnquist Bio Doesn’t Pull Punches (WSJ Law Blog).

Quoting from the summary published here:

William Rehnquist's life story is profoundly significant yet largely unknown, which is how he wanted it. Rehnquist's place on the Court was at once an accident of history and an inevitable result of it—something that Rehnquist had secretly coveted since law school, and yet could never have connived to obtain. His nomination in 1971 was one of the modern political era's most unlikely appointments.
As a justice and later as leader of the Court, he presided over the some of the century's most dramatic decisions, including the impeachment of President Clinton and the resolution of Gore v Bush. In thirty-three years on the Supreme Court (nineteen as chief justice)—from 1972 until his death at age 81 in 2005—Rehnquist was on a mission, waging a quiet, constant battle to imbue the Court with a deep conservatism favoring government power over individual rights. His story is important because it teaches us why the Court matters, and how and why our least transparent, least understood branch of government has been politicized.

[JH]