Rahm Opinion a Bit Uncivil?

Rahm Emmanuel's court victory in his quest to become Mayor of Chicago yesterday made national news because of who he is.  The Illinois Supreme Court's opinion is more interesting for how it reads rather than the result it reaches.  The tone of the opinion carries a certain seething irritation for the appellate court not just getting it wrong, but getting it really wrong.  At least in the Supreme Court's view.  Here are a few excerpts:

The court acknowledged that in Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie, 44 Ill. 16 (1867), this court used an intent based approach in determining a candidate residency question, but found this unpersuasive because a different standard of proof was applicable in that case. (Note 1)

(Note 1) The appellate court left it to the reader to discern how the standard of proof was in any way relevant to what standard the court used to determine the merits of the residency issue.

* * * *
Before proceeding to the merits, we wish to emphasize that, until just a few days ago, the governing law on this question had been settled in this State for going on 150 years. 

* * * * 
Of course, the appellate court did not see the statutory question this way. But its reasons for departing from over 100 years of settled residency law are hardly compelling and deserve only brief attention.

* * * *
The appellate court  then spends five pages examining section 3.1–10–5(d) of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1–10–5(d) (West 2008)), which is somewhat mysterious given that this section in no way speaks to the definition of “residency.”

Hey!  What's wrong with you guys?  There's more, but unlike the Illinois Supreme Court, I don't see a reason to pile it on.  The decision was 7-0, though two justices wrote a separate opinion that called out the other five for being so mean-spirited about the decision:

It is for this reason that the tone taken by the majority today is unfortunate. Because our own case law was, until today, unclear, it is unfair of the majority to  state that the appellate court majority “toss[ed] out 150 years of settled residency law” (slip op. at 10), adopted a “previously unheard-of test for residency” (slip op. 17), or was engaged in a “mysterious” analysis (slip op. at 16). In order to properly address the parties’ arguments, the appellate court had to reconcile this court’s conflicting pronouncements on the question of residency. That court did the best it could without the benefit of a supreme court opinion which clarified the standards.

I think that even the bad memos in legal writing don't get that kind of reaction.  Just amazing.  [MG]