Monday, March 31, 2014

An Institutional Perspective on Cartel Enforcement

Vivek Ghosal and Daniel Sokol have posted to SSRN The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, which takes a closer, more institutional look at cartel enforcement policy following seminal but less detailed treatments in Antitrust Law: An Economic Analysis, by Posner (1976), and The Antitrust Paradox, by Bork (1978). Ghosal and Sokol illustrate how the evolution of cartel enforcement can be traced to the evolution of the institutions involved, including the Justice Department. Though not inconsistent with Posner and Bork, this view lends more richness to the understanding of how cartel enforcement has arrived at its present juncture.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/law_econ/2014/03/an-institutional-perspective-on-cartel-enforcement.html

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