Wednesday, June 27, 2018
The Supreme Court has just released its decision in Janus v. AFSCME. I’m not typically the best predictor of what the Court will do, but even I had this one called from the moment Justice Gorsuch was confirmed. The Court, in a 5-4 decision by Justice Alito, overruled its own Abood decision to hold that public-sector union fees are unconstitutional. I won’t repeat how we got to this point (although you can start at my earlier post on the Janus oral argument, which has links on the aborted Friedrichs case, as well as our coverage of 2014’s Harris v. Quinn, in which Alito made clear where he wanted to go on this issue), but the upshot is that public-sector unions nationwide must now operate on an opt-in basis for all union contributions—even contributions that go to core collective-representation services. In other words, the free rider issue that exists for the private sector in right-to-work states now exists for all public-sector workplaces.
The basis for the decision is that dissenting employees’ have a 1stAmendment right not to pay any funds to the union representing them—even for collective bargaining and other work that goes to the benefit of all unit employees. This follows the dicta in Harris, but is a clear departure from the Court’s public-sector employment jurisprudence, which does not look favorably on individual employees' 1st Amendment claims. In particular, if this case didn’t involve unions, you would expect the Court to hold that concerns about dues paid to a third party are not matters of public concern. This result, to my mind, is the culmination of several related factors: in addition to the strong pro-business bent of this Court, we’ve seen public-sector unions becoming more powerful than their private-sector counterparts, while also becoming strongly aligned with one political party. This has occurred during a period of time in which political antagonism is on the rise and we’ve more jurists appear willing to join that battle. As a result, unions as a whole, but public-sector ones in particular, have been targeted both politically and legally. And they just took a massive loss at the Court today.
Janus, of course, is not the end (although some unions may feel like it right now). Here are some questions I have after the decision—please add more (or responses) in the comments:
- Will courts try to apply Janus to the private sector? There has been some loose language by the Court in the past that raises the possibility that court enforcement of union fee agreements is enough for state action, particularly in more highly regulated areas. The Court since then has been moving towards a more narrow interpretation of state action, but as Janus shows, that doesn't mean they won't make an exception when unions are involved. Indeed, in Janus, the Court stated that the line between chargeable and uncharitable expenses is "unworkable" (it's certainly difficult at times, but this seems a stretch). On the other hand, in its defense of overruling Abood, the Court in Janus stressed the difference between public- and private-sector collective bargaining and footnote 24 the Court described this state action argument as "more questionable" now then when Abood was decided. This could be considered a minor win for unions. See Joe Slater’s helpful article on this topic in which he argues persuasively that this holding should not apply to the private sector.
- Is this the beginning of the end for exclusivity? Up to now, American labor law has been built on the notion that unions act as the exclusive representative of all employees in a unit. I predict (see warning above) that Janus will usher in more challenges to exclusivity. This may include unions being more willing to explore members-only representation, as well as the NLRB at some point addressing whether the NLRA requires employers to bargain with minority unions. For instance, a bill has already been introduced in NY that would allow unions to decline to represent non-member employees for grievances and other matters, while also allowing them to provide insurance and other benefits only to members; other states (California and NJ) have recently enacted and/or are working on other pro-union measures. One limit to this, however, is that in Janus, the Court seemed to double-down on the notion that unions and public-sector employers cannot agreed to contracts that treat nonmember employees worse. That doesn't preclude members-only unionism, but it does serve as a reminder that there would be limitations to such representation.
- Related to the exclusivity issue--is this also the end of fair representation? Even before the Janus decision was announced, unions filed suit in state courts challenging the idea that they have a duty to fairly represent all unit employees. Now that Court has held that the Constitution precludes dissenting employees from paying for union representation, unions will argue in turn that it is unconstitutional to force them to expend time and resources representing employees who pay nothing. Janus gives some mixed signals. In one direction, the Court stated that unions' "duty of fair representation is a necessary concomitant of the authority that a union seeks when it chooses to be the exclusive representative." Thus, unions may have to seek to be members-only to push this argument. In the other direction, the Court seems to approve of arrangements in which union charge nonmembers for using grievance or arbitration procedures.
- While exclusivity and fair representation are weakened, will Janus usher in a strengthening of public-sector employees’ 1st Amendment rights? The language in Janus suggests so, as it now states that public-sector working conditions are matters of public interest that warrant more 1st Amendment protections. Despite that, however, the answer I think is “no.” Although it’s not defensible, I believe the Court will limit its broad 1st Amendment interpretation to cases brought against unions. Individual employees, I predict, will continue to face steep challenges raises these claims. Indeed, in Janus, the Court made a point of stressing that union speech is a public concern and it distinguished Pickering by stressing the difference between a union pushing for a wage increase and an individual employee--all of which seems to be a to distinguish individual employees' free speech claims. In addition, I doubt the Court will be as concerned with the 1stAmendment when unions challenge Section 8(b) limitations on their right to protest, picket, and boycott. See Charlotte Garden’s article on this.
- How badly will this hurt unions? We saw fairly steep declines in union membership following major changes in states like Wisconsin. Will Janus and its new opt-in requirement extend that affect nationwide? I suspect that, on average, public-sector unions will see a big hit, but that the effect will not be consistent everywhere. This is especially true given that some states have already made moves to add protections for public-sector collective bargaining in anticipation of Janus.
- On a minor note, while discussing the difficulty in challenging what's chargeable and what's not under Abood, the Court in Janus stressed the "substantial" costs in bringing an arbitration case to make such a challenge. It wasn't central to either case, but that's one of the exact arguments in Epic Systems (and the earlier Italian Colors) that the Court didn't seem concerned about.
- On a non-labor related note, the number of precedents overruled by the Court in the last couple of weeks is remarkable--and that's just the ones overruled explicitly. For whatever reasons, the Court this term has seemed more willing to break from its past to achieve the result it wants, and it will be interesting to see if that trend continues next term.
Friday, June 1, 2018
Some recent labor and employment law issues in the news:
- Well, it wasn't the big unit, but some employees at Boeing's South Carolina plant have voted to unionize. On Thursday, 178 technicians and inspectors voted (104-65) to be represented by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers union.
- The largest federal employees union, American Federation of Government Employees, is suing to stop new rules put in place by recent executive orders. The central target of the dispute is a new 25% cap on "official time" that union officials can spend on union business; the other orders encourage more terminations of federal employees and restrict agencies' ability to negotiate collective-bargaining agreements. The official time challenge is based on the Civil Service Reform Act provision that permits official time and the First Amendment. This latter claim may be difficult given the Davenport decision, although the union is making more of a discrimination argument based on the executive orders application only to work done on other employees' behalf rather than work that a union official does on his or her won behalf.
- Casino strike averted? Just hours ago, the Culinary Workers union reached a deal with Caesar's to avoid what was looking to be a massive strike in Las Vegas. Caesar's only employs about a quarter of the 50,000 workers who could potential strike, so nothings certain yet. But it does look like the strike threat is paying off for the union.
Wednesday, May 23, 2018
The NFL has just adopted a new policy on national anthem protests, which raises some potential labor law issues. As I understand the new policy, it implements three new features. First, it allows each team to establish its own policy on national anthem protests. The second feature, however, limits the first as it gives the NFL the power to fine any team if one of its players protests during the national anthem. The third feature also limits teams' ability to establish their own policy by eliminating the previous league-wide requirement that players must stay on the field during the anthem.
So what does this all mean? It appears that players who do not want to stand for the national anthem have at least two choices: stay in the locker room or take a knee during the anthem (or other types of protest). What happens to a player who takes the latter option depends on his team. At a minimum, the NFL will fine the team. But whether the individual player is disciplined depends on whether the team has established a policy barring such protests.
Labor law aficionados will see the potential NLRA issues here. The NFL owners established this new policy without discussing it with the NFLPA (players union). This raises some potential labor law problems. First, the new policy could violate the existing collective-bargaining agreement; indeed, the union said it was reviewing whether such a conflict exists. Second, by establishing a new policy without discussing it with the union, the NFL may have violated Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, which prohibits an employer from unilaterally implementing changes in work conditions without first bargaining with the union. The NFL is likely to argue that this duty to bargain isn't implicated because players have the option to avoid any penalties (i.e., adverse work actions) by staying in the locker room. That's a plausible argument, but it's not obviously a winning one because the union could respond that there has been a change in the terms of work, namely that players were previously required to stand on the sidelines during the anthem and could take a knee without penalty, while under the new policy that's no longer an option.
Stay tuned . . . .
Monday, May 21, 2018
The Supreme Court today issued its decision in Epic Systems, ruling for employers who, as part of mandatory arbitration clauses, require their employees to waive their right to class actions. This should come as a surprise to no one, as the case pitted the Court's hatred of class actions against the NLRA.
The 5-member majority decision followed a typical pattern in many respects, including a continuation of its ever-broadening reading of the Federal Arbitration Act's protection of arbitration agreements and a rejection of an argument to grant the NLRB Chevron deference. What's more surprising though was the majority's reading of the NLRA's Section 7. Although it was not required to do so, the Court essentially overruled long-standing NLRB precedent holding that Section 7 protected employees who join together in collective legal actions to advance their workplace conditions. The Court defended this conclusion by, among other things, saying that "Section 7 focuses on the right to organize unions and bargain collectively" and holding that Section 7's protection for "other concerted activities," "like the terms that precede it, serve to protect things employees 'just do' for themselves in the course of exercising their right to free association in the workplace, rather than 'the highly regulated, courtroom-bound ‘activities’ of class and joint litigation.'” I've taught labor law for many years and have never seen Section 7 described in this narrow of a fashion. Indeed, the Court oddly cites the famous Washington Aluminum case for the proposition that "§7 cases have generally involved efforts related to organizing and collective bargaining in the workplace, not the treatment of class or collective action procedures in court or arbitration." One may debate whether Section 7 was originally thought to encompass class actions, but describing Washington Aluminum as an "organizing and collective bargaining" case is nuts--that's the classic decision involving non-union collective action. It involved a walkout by non-union workers who were sick of severely cold conditions in their plant; there was no union on the scene, no attempt to organize a union, and no collective bargaining.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent does a thorough job of showing why Section 7 is much broader than the majority makes it out to be. Using history, the NLRA's text, and NLRB precedent she also emphasized that access to the legal enforcement was a key aspect of the new rights embodied in the NLRA. She finishes with this:
If these untoward consequences stemmed from legislative choices, I would be obliged to accede to them. But the edict that employees with wage and hours claims may seek relief only one-by-one does not come from Congress. It is the result of take-it-or-leave-it labor contracts harking back to the type called “yellow dog,” and of the readiness of this Court to enforce those unbargained-for agreements. The FAA demands no such suppression of the right of workers to take concerted action for their “mutual aid or protection.”
Given that this case will likely be followed shortly by a loss for public-sector unions in the Janus case, this term looks to go down as one that brought a major constriction of labor rights.
Sunday, April 1, 2018
Thanks to Mitch Rubinstein for sending word of Davids v. State, ____A.D. 3d____(NY App. Div. 2d Dep't. March 28, 2018), where a New York appellate court refused to dismiss a constitutional challenge to teacher tenure statutes. Basically, the claim is that it is too difficult to fire teachers and the tenure statutes violate the Education Article in the NYS Constitution. For Mitch's take on the case, see this post at his blog Teacher and New York Public Employee Lawyer.
Thursday, March 1, 2018
How does the NLRB typically do statutory interpretation? For her paper An Empirical Examination of Statutory Interpretation, forthcoming in the Minnesota Law Review, Amy Semet looked closely at the less than 2 percent of NLRB opinions issued from 1993 to 2016 in which the Board majority didn't just refer to prior case decisions, but itself explicitly engaged in some kind of statutory interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act.
Among other things, for the 121 cases in which NLRB majority opinions interpreted the NLRA “as a matter of first impression,” Semet reports the kinds of statutory-interpretation arguments that appeared (p. 31, tbl. 1):
|Case Type||Text-Partial||Text-Primary||Language Canons||Leg. History|
And here, from the paper abstract, on what Semet ultimately found:
Overall, I find no ideological coherence to statutory methodology. Board members switch between textualist or purposive methods depending upon the partisan outcome sought. Indeed, Board members often use statutory methodologies to dueling purposes, with majority and dissenting Board members using the same statutory methodology to support contrasting outcomes. The Board has also changed how it interprets statutes over time, relying in recent years more on vague pronouncements of policy and less on precedent or legislative history.
In short, Semet concludes that “despite scholars arguing that agencies should interpret statutes differently than courts, in practice, this study indicates that the NLRB interprets its governing statute in similar fashion to how courts do.”
Monday, February 26, 2018
Well, that didn't last long. Two months following its several of the Browning-Ferris joint-employer standard in Hy-Brand, the NLRB has vacated that recent decision. No, it wasn't a change of heart. Rather, the NLRB vacated Hy-Brand because its Inspector General recommended that action due what it viewed as the improper participation of Member Emanuel, who participated in the case despite the fact that his former firm represented one of the parties involved with the Browning-Ferris litigation, which was still involved in litigation that would be influenced by the NLRB's joint-employer standard.
Needless to say, as soon as JohnRing is confirmed--and he now has a hearing date of March 1--we will likely see Hy-Brand again under a different name.
Tuesday, February 20, 2018
Thanks to Aaron Halegua for passing along this feature story from last week's Bloomberg BusinessWeek about a Chinese casino in Saipan. It gives a very compelling account of the labor and safety issues concerning the Chinese construction workers there. And, these issues became the subject of many questions during a Senate hearing earlier this month about a bill concerning the future of a CNMI-specific guest worker program. For those who want further information about the labor situation in Saipan and the response by the federal authorities, see Aaron's short piece in ChinaFile.
Friday, February 16, 2018
Yesterday, the NLRB announced that it is seeking input on whether an employer's misclassification of employees as independent contractors should be a unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1). In the case at issue, Velox Express, an ALJ found such a violation. This comes on the heels of some recent NLRB decisions finding a ULP in misclassification cases, as well as the General Counsel's release of a Division of Advice memorandum along the same lines (indicating more of a focus on that issue). Unsurprisingly, the new Board looks to be reigning in this type of ULP, if not eliminating it altogether. The question presented in the Velox call for briefs:
Under what circumstances, if any, should the Board deem an employer’s act of misclassifying statutory employees as independent contractors a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act?
Stay tuned . . . .
Inside Higher Ed is reporting on three different graduate student election certification efforts being abandoned in recent days. Following the NLRB's 2016 Columbia University decision, there was a surge of organizing activity for private-school grad students. However, with the new Trump Board, the fear among unions and organizers is that Columbia will soon be overturned. As a result, unions are abandoning the formal NLRB representation process, hoping to gain voluntary recognition from the universities. Thus, last week, unions working with grad students at Boston College, University of Chicago, and Yale University withdrew election petitions they had filed with the NLRB. Just to underscore the significance of these moves, note that the unions had already won elections at all three schools. But given that the schools were challenging those elections, the unions clearly felt that the better strategy was to stand down and attempt to gain voluntary recognition. The chances of voluntary recognition at these three schools appear to be low--it's unclear why the schools would reverse their strong opposition to their grad students' organization efforts--but it's something that has worked at other schools. As the article noted:
William Herbert, executive director of the National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions at Hunter College of the City University of New York, said it appeared graduate students will rely on the already demonstrated showing of majority union support. “Keep in mind that graduate student unions were voluntarily recognized at NYU and the University of Connecticut,” he said, the latter case involving a public institution subject to state labor laws.
[Update] Bill also has a recent article exploring the early history of organizing in higher education, including examples of voluntary recognition. The paper is "The History Books Tell It? Collective Bargaining in Higher Education in the 1940s," which appears in the Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy. Check it out.
Tuesday, January 30, 2018
As will be a surprise to exactly no one, we're seeing a challenge to the NLRB's Columbia decision concluding that grad students can be classified as employees under the NLRA. This time it's a challenge in the actual Columbia case. Following the union's 1602-623 win, the university is pursing a challenge via a technical 8(a)(5). That's the process for appealing most representation decisions of the NLRB. The employer refuses to bargain with the union--typically a violation of Section 8(a)(5)--and uses the proceedings of that unfair labor practice case to challenge the underlying representation action. In this case, the grad students' status as employees eligible to union under the NLRA.
More to come on this one, so stay tuned.
Friday, December 15, 2017
Another twofer from the NLRB today. The first is another expected change--the Specialty Healthcare decision that has been much derided by employers. In Specialty Healthcare (2011), the Board concluded that if, after there is a determination pursuant to the traditional unit determination test, an employer argued that employees should be added to a union's proposed unit, the Board would find the proposed unit appropriate unless the employer could show that the excluded employees shared an overwhelming community of interest with the proposed group of employees. In PCC Structurals, the NLRB reversed Specialty Healthcare and its "overwhelming community of interest" standard, instead using only the multi factored test for a unit determination in most cases. Also, although it wasn't presented in PCC Structurals, the NLRB also reinstated the Park Manor standard for nonacute health care facilities (like nursing homes), that prompted the Specialty Healthcare decision. Legally, the issue over the traditional v. Specialty Healthcare tests hinges on what is meant by the NLRA's mandate that a unit merely be "an appropriate" unit rather than the "most appropriate" unit and how much the interests of excluded employees should play a role. But in reality, the disagreement is mainly based on the fact that, in general, the smaller the unit, the easier to organize.
In the second case, Raytheon Network Centric Systems, the NLRB reversed a 2016 case, DuPont, in which the Board had concluded that an employer must bargain with a union before instituting a change that is consistent with a previous practice that was created under an expired management rights clause or made pursuant to employer discretion. In Raytheon, the NLRB stated that an employer need not bargain before implementing any change that is similar in kind and degree with an established past practice that is similar to the unilateral change--even if the past practices were created under a collective-bargaining agreement, even if there was no agreement when the disputed change was implemented, and even if the past practices involve some degree of employer discretion. The dissent argues strenuously that this new rule violates the Supreme Court's decision in Katz.
We now have four NLRB reversals over two days, all of which were issued without any notice or invitation for comment. Moreover, they all mirror Chairman Miscimarra dissents. The Chairman's term is expiring tomorrow, so I wouldn't be surprised to see several more decisions even running into next week (dated Dec. 16).
Thursday, December 14, 2017
Well, that didn't take long. A mere day after our post about possible changes from the new NLRB, the Board has announced two major rule reversals.
The second case announced, as will surprise exactly no one, reverses the NLRB's Browning-Ferris decision on joint employer status. In Hy-Brand Industrial, the NLRB returned to the pre-Browning standard, under which joint employment is found only if actual control is exercised in a "direct and immediate" manner that is not limited or routine. You can see our previous coverage of the standards here. This has been a major issue for many employers, such as franchise businesses, and the subject of a lot of activity in Congress, so this move was expected.
The first case announced reversed a 2004 decision, Lutheran Heritage, which concluded that an employer's facially neutral workplace rule will be unlawful if employees would reasonably construe it as prohibiting the exercise of NLRA, Section 7 rights. Under the new case, The Boeing Co., the NLRB will only find facially neutral rules to be unlawful by weighing the nature and extent of the potential impact of the rule on NLRA rights, and the employer's legitimate justifications for implementing the rule. The Board also emphasized that an otherwise lawful rule could still be applied in an unlawful fashion. To provide more clarity, the Board is establishing three categories; according to the NLRB announcement:
Tuesday, December 12, 2017
With the new Republican majority at the NLRB, changes from the prior Board were to be expected and now we're beginning to see that pay out. For instance, yesterday, by a 3-2 vote, the NLRB flipped its policy on settlements yet again. Last year, in USPS, the Board concluded that ALJs should accept a proposed settlement over the General Counsel's and charging party's objections only if the offer provided a full remedy for all alleged complaints. In Presbyterian Shadyside, the new Board reversed USPS and will now allow ALJs to accept settlement proposals over the other parties' objections if the settlement is viewed as reasonable, using the Independent Stave factors.
Today, the Board also raises the prospect of reversing the new representation rules that were so contentious the earlier half of this decade. The Board released a request for information regarding these rules. In addition to what sounds like a fair amount of sniping among the Board members, the request asks the following three questions: "the Board has an interest in reviewing the Election Rule to evaluate whether the Rule should be
(1) retained without change,
(2) retained with modifications, or
(3) rescinded, possibly while making changes to the prior Election Regulations that were in place before the Rule’s adoption.
Regarding these questions, the Board believes it will be helpful to solicit and consider public responses to this request for information."
For a description of the new rules and how they changed the process, check out my article on the topic, NLRB Elections: Ambush or Anticlimax?, 64 Emory L.J. 1647 (2015). As I described, the new rules were actually a fairly modest change to procures. NLRB statistics following their implementation support that conclusion as well. The election timeline was shortened some, but the new rules seem to have no appreciable effect on election outcomes. Given all of this, it will be interesting to see if the Board feels like this is an issue worth the time to tackle.
Tuesday, October 24, 2017
What do unions do for regulation? That's the subject of Alison Morantz's recent and timely review of the research literature: "What Unions Do for Regulation," Annual Review of Law and Social Science 13 (2017): 515-534. Here's the abstract:
The question of how organized labor affects the content, enforcement, and outcomes of regulation is especially timely in an era in which protective laws and regulations are being scaled back or minimally enforced and union membership is in decline. This article surveys literature from a wide array of regulatory domains—antidiscrimination, environmental protection, product quality, corporate governance, law enforcement, tax compliance, minimum wage and overtime protection, and occupational safety and health—in an effort to identify common findings on what unions do for regulation. Literature on the topic has taken up five questions: how labor unions affect the passage of protective laws and regulations; how they affect the outcomes that regulators target; how they affect the intensity of regulatory enforcement; the specific activities and channels of influence they use to influence regulated outcomes; and the role they play in self-regulation. Drawing on empirical literature from the domains listed, I review and analyze literature on each of these questions and offer several conclusions and suggestions for future research.
Morantz's main conclusion: There's a lot of support in the research literature for thinking that, "in most contexts, unions' tendency to strengthen workers' collective voice and mitigate market imperfections predominates their tendency to exert monopoly power and engage in economic rent-seeking." The best evidence of this comes from studies of how unionization strongly correlates with lower rates of serious and fatal workplace injuries. Some prior research also shows that unions tend to lower overall wage dispersion, which may indirectly reduce pay discrimination against women and racial minorities.
Saturday, October 14, 2017
Over at Indisputably, Sarah Cole has a great post about the Fifth Circuit's rejection of a preliminary injunction by the NFL Players' association that would have prevented the suspension of Cowboy running back Zeke Elliott. As Sarah points out, the arbitration clause that the NFL and the Players' Association agreed to is bizarre, but the Players' Association must follow the procedure it agreed to before challenging the outcome in court.
In other news, an unfair labor practice charge has been filed against the Cowboys (and owner Jerry Jones) for threatening to bench players who kneel during the national anthem to protest race discrimination and violence. As Ben Sachs points out over at onlabor, this is a possible ULP for interfering with the players' protected concerted activity under the NLRA. In a separate onlabor post, Noah Zatz makes a convincing case that any benching would violate the opposition clause of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.
Saturday, October 7, 2017
Some recent labor & employment news to catch up on:
- The NLRB is back at full strength, at least for a while, now that William Emmanuel has been sworn in. Terms that are set to expire soon are Chairman Miscimarra (Republican) on Dec. 16, 2017 and Mark Pearce (Democratic) on Aug. 27, 2018. They're close enough that we may see a package deal for a Republican and a Democratic nominee, but we'll see.
- Kate O'Scannlain, a partner at Kirkland & Ellis has been nominated to be Solicitor of Labor. And yes, she is the daughter of Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain on the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit put the Uber driver classification cases (O'Connor et al.) on hold. The court decided that it should pause the numerous class action suits pending the Supreme Court's decision on whether the NLRA bars class-action arbitration waivers.
- Speaking of the Court's class action arbitration case (Epic et al.), oral argument on the case was held on Oct. 2. SCOTUSBlog has a good summary of the argument--bottom line, it doesn't look good for the argument that the NLRA prevents these class-action waivers. Justice Gorsuch didn't ask any questions and his like of textualism suggests at least a chance that the NLRA argument could win. But I have a hard time believing that he's going to buck the trend in the Court of interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act in a way that upholds arbitration agreements.
Thursday, September 28, 2017
Today, the Supreme Court agreed to hear two workplace-related cases--both involving issues that are repeat customers. In Janus v. ASFCME, the Court will take another stab at declaring that the First Amendment bars requiring public-sector employees from paying dues for union representation. (You can see here and here for our past coverage of the Friedrichs case). I'll go out on a very steady limb here and say that the Court will hold 5-4 in favor of the dissenting union-represented employees.
Also, in Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, the Court will again look at whether car dealership service advisors/representatives should be exempt from the FLSA's overtime provisions. The Court considered this case before, reversing the Ninth Circuit's reliance on a recently changed Department of Labor rule. Now that the appellate court has refused to exempt those employees based on its own reading of the statute's exclusion of car salesperson, the Court has decided to address the issue again.
You can read more at SCOTUSBlog.
Friday, August 11, 2017
Bill Hebert (Hunter College) and Joshua Freeman (Queens College and CUNY Graduate Center) appeared on New York Public Radio's Brian Lehrer Program on Wednesday to discuss New York's public sector collective bargaining law, which is celebrating its 50th anniversary on September 1, 1967. The segment is tied with a program that will be taking place at Hunter College's Roosevelt House Public Police Institute in Manhattan on September 26. The program is being co-sponsored by Roosevelt House, the National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions, and the Joseph S. Murphy Institute for Worker Education and Labor Labor Studies. Other participants in the Taylor Law program will be Marty Malin, Joe McCartin, Kim Philips-Fein and Marilyn Sneiderman.
Wednesday, August 9, 2017
Yesterday, Jeff posted on Google Engineer Files NLRB Complaint Regarding Post-Memo Termination. Today's Wall Street Journal quotes Susan Bisom-Rapp (TJSL) and Matt Bodie (SLU) extensively on the viability of the engineer's claims. Here's an excerpt:
Thomas Jefferson School of Law Prof. Susan Bisom-Rapp, who researches employment discrimination law, said while she disagreed with Mr. Damore’s views, she could envision potential legal arguments he could make to invoke the NLRA.
That Mr. Damore’s letter doesn’t appear to be drafted in concert with other Google employees doesn’t in itself mean the law cannot be invoked. Protections can be triggered by a single employee trying to rally colleagues around a wider workplace issue.
Mr. Damore could try to argue that he’s “protected in expressing himself in an effort to engage in dialogue with co-workers about Google’s diversity efforts,” said Prof. Bisom-Rapp.
However, “an employee gripe or complaint standing alone, without that call to fellow employees to gather together, is not enough,” said Julie Totten, an employment defense lawyer with Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP in Sacramento.
Labor law also forbids employers from firing a worker for alleging an unfair labor practice, making the timing of Mr. Damore’s formal complaint potentially relevant in a legal dispute, said Prof. Bisom-Rapp.
Legal experts said federal antidiscrimination law could offer Mr. Damore another possible, albeit narrow, legal avenue. His memo suggested Google is engaging in reverse discrimination, citing “special treatment for ’diversity’ candidates.” Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act bans employers from retaliating against workers for complaining about unlawful workplace discrimination.
“You would have to show what Google is doing is illegal. That would be difficult,” said Prof. Matt Bodie, an employment law scholar at Saint Louis University Law School and a former NLRB field attorney.
The NLRB generally doesn’t impose remedies beyond reinstatement of employment and back pay, Mr. Bodie said.
The full WSJ article is available at Jacob Gershman & Sara Randazzo, Fired Engineer Likely to Face Obstacles in Challenging Google, WSJ 8/9/17.