September 24, 2012
Doorey on The [Canadian] Charter and the Law of Work: A Beginner's Guide
David Doorey (York Univ. (Canada)) has just posted on SSRN an updated version of his paper entitled: The Charter and the Law of Work: A Beginner's Guide.
Here's the abstract:
This essay explains how the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted and applied the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the law of work. It is intended as an introduction to this complex legal field for an audience unfamiliar with the Charter. Beginning with an overview of the Charter review process, the paper then examines the Court’s application to work law of Section 2(d) freedom of association, Section 2(b) freedom of expression, and Section 15 equality rights. The paper is an updated version describing the law as of summer 2012.
The paper provides a great introductory overview of the development and current state of Canadian Charter law relating to work and employment, including freedom of association, freedom of expression, and right to equality. David wrote it for an audience of new law students or non-law students being introduced to the Charter in the law of work, but it might also be a useful tool for scholars from the U.S. and abroad who are interested in a quick snapshot look at recent developments under the Canadian Charter.
As an honorary Canuck (based on my many visits and trips to Canada), I wholly endorse the idea of American labor and employment lawyers becoming more familiar with the ideas that animate Canadian workplace law!
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Interesting read. The thing that leapt out to me was the way secondary boycotting is treated in Canada. Initially, it seems that they (like the U.S.) banned it without much thought. Then at some point "up there," a light went on in some judge's head that such a ban is, you know, obviously incompatible with the concept of free expression.
Seems no one down here has cottoned to that yet, though I'm amazed that Section 8(b)(4) (and especially 8(b)(4)(i), which is a viewpoint-discriminatory prohibition on pure speech of public concern) has not come under harsher constitutional attack in the post-Snyder v. Phelps world. You can picket a military funeral out of pure personal hatred, but you can't picket a retailer to get it to stop selling struck goods? How can that outcome be rationally justified?
Posted by: Anon | Sep 25, 2012 8:40:50 PM