Thursday, March 26, 2015

Young v. UPS Musings and an Open Thread

Packages

As we all know by now, the Supreme Court issued its decision yesterday in Young v. UPS, which resulted in a 6-3 victory for the plaintiff.  Congratulations to friend-of-blog Sam Bagenstos, who was closely involved in the case and provided some thoughtful comments below.  As Marcia notes in her summary of the case, the Court took a middle-of-the-ground approach here which surprised many of us.  After a quick read of the decision, I am convinced that we will be talking about this case for awhile to come, and I thus wanted to highlight a few quick thoughts and (more importantly) attempt to spark a discussion in the comments section below. 

First, the case reminds me tremendously of the Faragher/Ellerth decisions, where the Court again created a new standard in the employment discrimination context (perhaps to secure votes?).  Those cases, though, seemed much more firmly grounded in the common law than the approach here, which the dissent accuses of being magically created.  Second, though it seems like an almost throw-away part of the opinion, I was struck by the fact that the Court appears to definitively describe two ways of establishing intentional discrimination --  through circumstantial and direct evidence.  Much was written following Reeves and Costa questioning the ongoing existence of this distinction, which now appears to be alive and well.  Finally, for those of you that have not read Scalia's dissent yet -- it is a must read (for example, he accuses the majority of waving its "Supreme Wand" to "Poof!" achieve its "desired result" in this case).  Scalia raises a number of fair concerns -- in particular, will the analysis of the case truly be limited to the PDA and has the Court conflated disparate impact and disparate treatment in reaching its result.  This decision, combined with Ricci, truly does raise some questions about the future of disparate impact doctrine. 

There is certainly enough in this case to fill a few symposium issues, and I am primarily interested in starting a discussion of this case here while it is still fresh in our minds.  I am thus starting a thread below, and encourage a dialogue about the decision in the comments section.  Feel free to share any thoughts, questions, disagreements, etc. in the forum below.

-- Joe Seiner

March 26, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, March 25, 2015

Young v. UPS: SCOTUS Interprets the PDA

ScotusThe Supreme Court issued an opinion today in Young v. UPS, a case concerning whether a pregnant woman denied a light duty accommodation under a policy that accommodated injuries caused on the job, but did not accommodate injuries caused off the job, violated Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.

The decision, written by Justice Breyer, and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, is fairly complicated, and it will take some time to make sense of. Justice Alito concurred, and Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy also wrote a separate dissent. 

Because I am still working through it, I'll reproduce part of the syllabus here. Note that the Court did not adopt the position urged by any of the parties, but instead adopted a middle ground, modifying the McDonnell Douglas proof structure to make something entirely new. Justice Scalia's dissent argues that this move will merge disparate treatment with disparate impact. I think that may be right, but I disagree that it's a bad thing.

Held: 1. An individual pregnant worker who seeks to show disparate treatment through indirect evidence may do so through application of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Pp. 10–23. (a) The parties’ interpretations of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s second clause are unpersuasive. Pp. 12–20. (i) Young claims that as long as “an employer accommodates only a subset of workers with disabling conditions,” “pregnant workers who are similar in the ability to work [must] receive the same treatment even if still other nonpregnant workers do not receive accommodations.” Brief for Petitioner 28. Her reading proves too much. The Court doubts that Congress intended to grant pregnant workers an unconditional “most-favored-nation” status, such that employers who provide one or two workers with an accommodation must provide similar accommodations to all pregnant workers, irrespective of any other criteria. After all, the second clause of the Act, when referring to nonpregnant persons with similar disabilities, uses the open-ended term “other persons.” It does not say that the employer must treat pregnant employees the “same” as “any other persons” who are similar in their ability or inability to work, nor does it specify the particular “other persons” Congress had in mind as appropriate comparators for pregnant workers. Moreover, disparate treatment law normally allows an employer to implement policies that are not intended to harm members of a protected class, even if their implementation sometimes harms those members, as long as the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reason for doing so. See, e.g., Burdine, supra, at 252–258. There is no reason to think Congress intended its language in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to deviate from that approach. Pp. 12–14.

(ii) The Solicitor General argues that the Court should give special, if not controlling, weight to a 2014 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guideline concerning the application of Title VII and the ADA to pregnant employees. But that guideline lacks the timing, “consistency,” and “thoroughness” of “consideration” necessary to “give it power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140. The guideline was promulgated after certiorari was granted here; it takes a position on which previous EEOC guidelines were silent; it is inconsistent with positions long advocated by the Government; and the EEOC does not explain the basis for its latest guidance. Pp. 14–17.

(iii) UPS claims that the Act’s second clause simply defines sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination. But that cannot be right, as the first clause of the Act accomplishes that objective. Reading the Act’s second clause as UPS proposes would thus render the first clause superfluous. It would also fail to carry out a key congressional objective in passing the Act. The Act was intended to overturn the holding and the reasoning of General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, which upheld against a Title VII challenge a company plan that provided nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits to all employees but did not provide disability-benefit payments for any absence due to pregnancy. Pp. 17–20.

(b) An individual pregnant worker who seeks to show disparate treatment may make out a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework by showing that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.” The employer may then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons for denying accommodation.

That reason normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those whom the employer accommodates. If the employer offers a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason, the plaintiff may show that it is in fact pretextual. The plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.

The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers. This approach is consistent with the longstanding rule that a plaintiff can use circumstantial proof to rebut an employer’s apparently legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, see Burdine, supra, at 255, n. 10, and with Congress’ intent to overrule Gilbert. Pp. 20–23.

2. Under this interpretation of the Act, the Fourth Circuit’s judgment must be vacated. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). The record here shows that Young created a genuine dispute as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from hers. It is left to the Fourth Circuit to determine on remand whether Young also created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UPS’ reasons for having treated Young less favorably than these other nonpregnant employees were pretextual. Pp. 23–24.

MM

March 25, 2015 in Disability, Employment Discrimination | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Saturday, March 21, 2015

Bernt on Crowd Work and Volunteerism

Lisa Bernt (Visiting scholar, Northeastern) has just posted on SSRN her very interesting piece, "Suppressing the Mischief: New Work, Old Problems".  This article was part of a symposium issue, "Employed or Just Working?: Rethinking Employment Relationships in the Global Economy," of the Northeastern University Law Journal.  From the abstract:

Increasing numbers of individuals are working in what have been described as nonstandard, contingent, or precarious relationships.  These new arrangements force some difficult questions for labor law:  Do these nonstandard types of work fit into the current regulatory scheme?  If so, how?  More fundamentally, what is work? What kind of work raises the concerns that labor law is meant to address?  This paper discusses crowd work and recent developments in volunteerism as illustrations of arrangements that call for a fresh look at the way we identify workers who benefit from labor law protection. It then outlines a boundaried purposive approach to labor law coverage, one that first looks at broader purposes of labor law to decide whether a worker belongs in that protective realm, and then moves to examine the specific regulatory purpose at issue.  This method widens potential application of some workplace laws, yet still limits those admitted into the labor law domain to those in economically dependent relationships that give rise to the mischief at which workplace regulation is aimed.

Professor Bernt provides a refreshing look at this important topic, and the article is definitely worth taking a look if you have the opportunity.

-Joe Seiner

March 21, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, March 19, 2015

Cunningham-Parmeter on Gender Equality

Profile

Friend-of-blog Keith Cunningham-Parmeter (Willamette) has just posted on SSRN his superb piece, (Un)Equal Protection: Why Gender Equality Depends on Discrimination, which appears in the Northwestern University Law Review.  From the abstract:

Most accounts of the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence describe the Court’s firm opposition to sex discrimination. But while the Court famously invalidated several sex-based laws at the end of the twentieth century, it also issued many other, less-celebrated decisions that sanctioned sex-specific classifications in some circumstances. Examining these long-ignored cases that approved of sex discrimination, this Article explains how the Court’s rulings in this area have often rejected the principle of formal equality in favor of broader anti-subordination concerns. Outlining a new model of equal protection that authorizes certain forms of sex discrimination, (Un)Equal Protection advocates for one particular discriminatory policy that could dramatically promote gender equality in the decades to come. Fatherhood bonuses — laws that give families additional parental leave when fathers stay at home with their newborns — have the potential to drastically reorder gendered divisions of labor and expand women’s workplace opportunities. Countries that have experimented with fatherhood bonuses have seen women with children spend more time in paid work, advance in their careers, and earn higher wages. Applying these international models to the American context, this Article explains why fatherhood bonuses would fit comfortably within our constitutional framework, which authorizes discriminatory policies when such policies support women’s public participation. (Un)Equal Protection concludes by proposing a model for fatherhood bonuses in the United States that would encourage more men to perform care work, thereby advancing the goal of gender equality for both sexes.

This piece provides a novel look at gender equality issues from an international perspective, and is a great read.  I highly recommend taking a look at this article.

- Joe Seiner

March 19, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, March 17, 2015

March Madness and Employment Law

Bball

As we all put the finishing touches on our bracket picks for the NCAA tournament, there are a few labor and employment law issues that are continuing to make some noise and are worth highlighting here. In particular, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is hearing arguments today in O'Bannon v. NCAA on whether a federal judge's determination that the use of players' names, images and likenesses without compensation improperly restrain trade.  There are interesting articles on the case at both NPR and CBS.  From the NPR piece:

"Duke coach Mike Krzyzewski made $9.7 million last year, according to USA Today. The people running around in the middle of the court - the players - are, of course, not getting paid. That's because a long time ago, a bunch of colleges got together and said scholarships are fine, but paying athletes is against the rules. [The O'Bannon case] will turn on a simple question - are those rules a violation of federal law?"

We are all also awaiting the decision in the Northwestern case which is currently before the NLRB and looks at the ability of college players to unionize.  The outcome of that case will have far reaching effects on college athletics as well.  These two cases just scratch the surface of the existing controversy over the treatment of players in college sports.

-Joe Seiner

March 17, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, March 16, 2015

Challenge to Brown University on the Horizon

NLRBAs we noted earlier, the UAW's attempt to organize graduate students at Columbia raised the potential for the NLRB reversing Brown University.  As of Friday, that potential significantly increased.  In two short decisions (I haven't been able to find them yet), the NLRB ordered a regional hearing on the UAW's petition to represent grad students at both Columbia and the New School.  This procedural decision establishes a path for the NLRB to ultimately review whether the students are employees under the NLRA.  Thus, these cases--in addition to the Northwestern University footballs players--means that we'll likely see a lot of collegiate student action at the Board for a while.

-JH

March 16, 2015 in Labor and Employment News, Labor Law | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Saturday, March 14, 2015

EEOC issues "Digest of EEO Law" and Anti-Harassment Article

EEOC

image from eeoc.gov

The EEOC just published the most recent version of its "Digest of EEO Law."  This is a wonderful (and free resource) which carefully examines recent agency and federal court cases on employment discrimination.  Though the digest focuses primarily on federal sector  cases,  many of the principles addressed  are directly applicable to the private sector.  The digest is available here.  Perhaps more interestingly,  this digest also features an article which outlines some of the procedures employers can  look to when developing anti-harassment policies.  The paper, "The Law of Harassment: Assisting Agencies in Developing Effective Anti-Harassment Policies"  is another excellent resource for employers.  Again, while this resource is targeted primarily at the public-sector, private sector employers will likely find it useful as well.  The EEOC generates many helpful and plainly written documents that can help the general public to navigate the complex area of employment discrimination law.  This is one of those resources.

–Joe Seiner

March 14, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015

Gelbach on Twombly, Iqbal, and Case Quality

    How well does the "plausibility" pleading standard of Twombly and Iqbal filter cases on the merits? This has been a matter of some controversy, particularly as applied to employment discrimination cases.  In a new paper, "Material Facts in the Debate Over Twombly and Iqbal" (forthcoming in the Stanford Law Review), Jonah Gelbach offers an empirical analysis with ambiguous results.  Here's the abstract: 

This paper presents empirical evidence concerning the adjudication of defendant-filed summary judgment motions from nearly 2,000 randomly selected employment discrimination and contracts cases to try to assess Twombly and Iqbal’s performance in filtering cases according to merit. I first explain how such data might be helpful in such an assessment, taking into account the possibility that parties’ behavior might have changed following Twombly and Iqbal. I then report results indicating that even using this large collection of data -- the most comprehensive data assembled to date to address this question -- we cannot tell whether “TwIqbal” supporters or critics are more correct about the efficacy of the new plausibility pleading regime in the pre-discovery filtering of cases according to merit. This null result points to the very real possibility that plausibility pleading’s case-quality effects -- a quintessential empirical question -- simply can't be answered using data. This paper’s basic message, then, is that empirical evidence is unlikely to settle the debate over the case-quality effects of the new pleading regime ushered in by Twombly and Iqbal.

Gelbach's sample of employment-discrimination cases consisted of  700 pre-Twombly cases (each with no pro se plaintiff and an adjudicated defense summary judgment motion) and 368 such cases post-Iqbal.  His conclusion: Even assuming "no selection into summary judgment, the data on employment discrimination cases simply can’t settle the dispute over TwIqbal’s quality-filtering effect."

 

--Sachin Pandya

March 10, 2015 in Employment Discrimination | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, March 9, 2015

Higher Turnover, Higher Pay

Directly related to our earlier story about Wal-Mart's decision to increase its minimum pay to $9 per hour is a piece at Bloomberg.com which examines how turnover costs for lower pay workers is resulting in a push for higher wages.  The article discusses the training and start-up costs for new employees, and explains why it makes economic sense to try to hang on to lower pay workers.  From the article:

"A modest bidding war has broken out among the retailers who hire from the bottom of the labor pool, buoyed in part by improving sales. [Wal-Mart's pay raises were] quickly matched by TJX, the parent company of TJ Maxx and Marshalls. Gap, Starbucks, and IKEA had already joined the growing list of service sectors now committed to higher starting wages."

This development signals an improving economy, and an increase in the leverage of the workforce.  The article is definitely worth a read.

-- Joe Seiner

March 9, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, March 8, 2015

New York Court of Appeals Imports Ricci into NY Human Rights Law

    A few weeks ago, the New York Court of Appeals became the first State supreme court to expressly import Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009)—which interpreted Title VII—into that State’s own employment-discrimination law.  How precisely it did so, however, is a bit unclear.

         Margerum v. City of Buffalo, No. 7 (N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) concerns a lawsuit brought in New York state court by white firefighters against the City of Buffalo.  At the time, the City also faced a Title VII lawsuit alleging that firefighter promotion exams had a disparate-impact on African-American firefighters.   The white firefighters in Margerum argued that the City had violated State law—including New York Human Rights Law, the State’s own employment-discrimination statute---by letting expire certain promotion eligibility lists because the Margerum plaintiffs—who would otherwise have been promoted—are white.  The trial court granted plaintiffs summary judgment, ruling that the City had failed to meet the “strong basis in evidence” standard set forth in Ricci.  The Appellate Division affirmed: “[T]he City defendants did not have a strong basis in evidence to believe that they would be subject to disparate-impact liability if they failed to take race-conscious actions, i.e., allowing eligibility lists to expire, inasmuch as the examinations in question were job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 

         On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had erred by granting the plaintiffs summary judgment on the Ricci standard.  In so doing, however, that Court read the Ricci standard into New York’s Human Rights Law.  Here’s the majority opinion’s reasoning in its entirety: “As both parties agree, the Ricci standard governs. We have consistently held that the standards for recovery under the New York Human Rights Law are in nearly all instances identical to Title VII and other federal law.”

         This ruling drew dissent from Justice Jenny Rivera.  She argued that importing the Ricci standard"undermines the legislative purpose and stated equal opportunity goals of our Human Rights Law.” Among other things, Justice Rivera wrote: “The federal approach [in Ricci] essentially subordinates the interests of plaintiffs alleging disparate impact to those of plaintiffs claiming disparate treatment. . . .  Under the Human Rights Law, no individual has a stake in a workforce selected and maintained through the use of criteria that result in proscribed disparities. A workforce so constituted is antithetical to the statute's concept of equal opportunity, and the right to employment purged of discrimination.” Ricci should not apply, she concluded, because “an employer does not commit statutorily proscribed intentional discrimination when the employer seeks to reduce and eliminate the causes of inequality at the workplace.”

             It is, however, unclear whether the Margerum precisely followed Ricci in how the “strong basis in evidence” standard is supposed to apply in suits under the New York Human Rights Law.  In Ricci itself, the Court wrote: “We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.”  In other words, the “strong basis in evidence” standard is a defense to Title VII liability for the employer’s “race-conscious discriminatory action.”  See also Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579 (“valid defense”); id. at 580 (“lawful justification”, “excuses”).

         In contrast, the Margerum majority observed that once Buffalo “chose not to promote white candidates from the eligibility list,” the Margerum plaintiffs undisputedly “made out a prima facie case of discrimination. . . . The burden then shifted to the City to prove that it had “a strong basis in evidence to justify its race conscious action.” (emphasis added, citing, among other cases,  St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507–508 (1993), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). By using the burden-shifting idiom of McDonnell Douglas and progeny, the Margerum Court seems to have adopted the “strong basis” standard as a way to decide whether the City satisfied its burden of producing a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.  Satisfying that burden, however, is usually part of the McDonnell Douglas approach to analyzing whether the plaintiff has proven liability in the first place.  It’s not about whether the defendant-employer has proven a defense to Title VII liability.  Thus, Margerum appears to depart from Ricci in this respect—or so a lawyer might argue about Margerum in the next case.

 

  --Sachin Pandya

March 8, 2015 in Employment Discrimination | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Saturday, March 7, 2015

Wal-Mart, Pay Raises, and the Power of Collective Action

Wages and peanuts

There is an extraordinarily interesting article over at Time.com that looks more closely at the pay raises being offered by Wal-Mart.  The company recently moved to raise its starting pay to $9 an hour, now safely above the federal minimum wage of $7.25.  While Wal-Mart is well known for its ability to avoid unionization, the move has been lauded as a major victory and a sign of the strength of collective action.  Pressure from employees and outside groups likely caused the change in policy, which is critical as many other retailers may follow suit.  From the article:

"the fact that Walmart workers, who aren’t unionized in the U.S., got anything at all shows the PR pressure that companies like it are coming under as economic inequality gains clout as a political issue. Twenty-nine states have raised the minimum wage, and presidential candidates from both parties are expected to wrestle with the challenge for the next 18 months."

The minimum wage will likely be an important political issue in the upcoming elections, and it will be interesting to see what other retailers do in the  face of some of these existing pressures.

- Joe Seiner

March 7, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, March 5, 2015

Avoiding Union Avoidance

There is a really interesting article over at the Washington Post which looks at some of the problems of dwindling unionization.  The article comes at a time when another Wisconsin bill is set to undermine even more labor rights.  What is particularly interesting about this piece, however, is its focus on different ways that unions can actually survive in this climate.  The article, which relies heavily on the superb scholarship of friend-of-blog Catherine Fisk, suggests that to survive labor organizations must

"Allow for members-only unions. . . [p]ass more laws that protect workers’ rights generally. . . [and] [j]ust work harder to prove unions are valuable."

The article provides a fresh look at a difficult issue, and is definitely worth a quick read.

-- Joe Seiner

March 5, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, March 3, 2015

Arkansas Joins Tennessee in Prohibiting Local Anti-Discrimination Ordinances

          Last week, the Arkansas legislature prohibited local governments in that State from exceeding State law anti-discrimination protections—including protections against employment discrimination.  The legislation—Act No. 137, or the “Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act”—amended title 14 of the Arkansas Code:

 (a) A county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state shall not adopt or enforce an ordinance, resolution, rule, or policy that creates a protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a basis not contained in state law.

(b) This section does not apply to a rule or policy that pertains only to the employees of a county, municipality, or other political subdivision.

Ark. Code § 14-1-403.  In so doing, Arkansas joined Tennessee, which in 2011 enacted very similar legislation—the “Equal Access to Intrastate Commerce Act”—soon after Nashville passed an ordinance to add “gender identity” and “sexual orientation” to the classes covered under equal employment opportunity provisions applicable to government contractors.  Bills similar to the Arkansas and Tennessee legislation have been introduced in the Texas and West Virginia legislatures.  (For more on local-preemption statutes in general, see here.)

The Arkansas legislation is the latest move in a story that began in August 2014.  That’s when, after ten hours of public debate, the City Council of the City of Fayetteville passed Chapter 119, an anti-discrimination ordinance that prohibited employers, landlords, and others from discriminating against anyone based on, among other characteristics, their sexual orientation or gender identity—protections not currently available under Arkansas state law. Once it passed, ordinance opponents began collecting signatures to seek repeal, with backing from the local Chamber of Commerce and others.  That effort succeeded: In a December 2014 special election, a majority of Fayetteville residents voted in favor of repeal.  Soon after, the Fayetteville City Council and its City Attorney began working on a new version of Chapter 119. 

But on February 2, 2015, State Senator Bart Hester (R) introduced the bill that eventually became Act 137.  On its face, Act 137 purports to “improve intrastate commerce” by making anti-discrimination law “uniform” for employers, businesses, and organizations in the State. Yet, in advocating for Act 137, Sen. Hester had suggested that Fayetteville’s ordinance jeopardized “basic rights of religious freedom.”  In a December television debate about Chapter 119 before its repeal, Hester argued that Fayetteville’s ordinance would force pastors to perform same-sex marriages and would give “an adult man – 30, 40, 50 years old – the right to share a bathroom with a six-year-old little girl, the right to share the changing room with women at the local gym. It’s not right. We need to protect our children.”

Meanwhile, a few months ago in Tennessee, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an Equal Protection Clause challenge to Tennessee’s statute on the ground that no plaintiff had shown a distinct, palpable injury in-fact sufficient to confer standing. Howe v. Haslam, No. M2013–01790–COA–R3–CV (Tenn. Ct. App., Nov. 4, 2014).  In so doing, the court distinguished Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  The reasoning: Whereas the law challenged in Romer rendered all LGBT advocacy in Colorado futile at every level and within every branch of state government” and “barred a class of persons from equal participation in the political process,” the Tennessee statute “erects no such barrier.”

 

  --Sachin Pandya

March 3, 2015 in Employment Discrimination | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, March 1, 2015

Zelinsky Offers a Solution to Hobby Lobby

ZelinskyEdward Zelinsky (Cardozo) has just posted on SSRN his article (42 Rutgers Law Record 109-25) The Aftermath of Hobby Lobby: HSAs and HRAs as the Least Restrictive Means. Here's an excerpt from the abstract:

In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), closely-held corporations’ employer-sponsored medical plans need not provide forms of contraception to which the shareholders of such corporations object on religious grounds. The question now arises how the President, the Congress and the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Treasury and Labor ought to respond to the Hobby Lobby decision.

The best alternative is to require any employer which objects to providing contraception to fund for their respective employees independently-administered health savings accounts (HSAs) or health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs). An HSA or HRA permits the covered employee to spend employer-provided, pre-tax health care dollars on any medical service the employee chooses without implicating the employer in the employee’s spending decision. The HSA/HRA alternative respects the religious rights of sponsoring employers since, unlike conventional insurance or self-insured health plans, the sponsoring employer’s plan does not provide a menu of choices which frames the employees’ decisions. Simultaneously, the HSA/HRA approach respects the autonomy of employees to spend health care dollars on whatever medical services such employees select including services to which the employer objects.

* * *

rb

March 1, 2015 in Pension and Benefits, Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Compa & Brooks on NAFTA & Labor

NAFTA and the NAALCLance Compa and Tequila Brooks have just published NAFTA and the NAALC Twenty Years of North American Trade-Labour Linkage (2015). Here's a description from the authors:

The 20th anniversary edition of the NAFTA and NAALC monograph in the International Encyclopaedia of Laws, Labour Law and Industrial Relations by Lance Compa and Tequila Brooks provides an up-to-date retrospective on all of the citizen petitions filed under the NAFTA labour side agreement since 1994. The monograph includes early petitions filed about trade union rights at the Honeywell and Echlin plants in Mexico, the McDonald's case in Canada and the Washington Apple and DeCoster Egg cases in the United States as well as more recent petitions filed about migrant worker rights under the H-2A and H-2B visa programs in the US. In addition to being the most complete compilation of NAALC cases in existence today, NAFTA and the NAALC Twenty Years of North American Trade-Labour Linkage outlines the internal mechanics leading to the filing of a 2000 NAALC petition with the Government of Mexico about unequal treatment of migrant workers in the US, and describes changes in the treatment of petitions by US, Mexican and Canadian authorities over the last 20 years. It also contains a chapter that compares the NAALC to the OECD Guidelines for Multi-National Enterprises and highlights recent North American cases filed under the OECD Guidelines including the relatively lesser known 2004 Yucatan Markey Tex-Coco Tex petition which was dual filed under both mechanisms. Finally, the 20th edition introduces a new chapter that compares labour provisions in US and Canadian free trade agreements negotiated since 2000 and discusses recent labour petitions filed under the US-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and US free trade agreements with Bahrain and Peru.

rb

March 1, 2015 in Book Club, Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Labor & Employment Roundup

OscarI'm well overdue for a labor & employment roundup, so this one is loaded.  And somewhat dated at times.  Enjoy:

 

Hat Tip: Jonathan Harkavy, Lynn Dancy Hirsch, Patrick Kavanagh

-JH

March 1, 2015 in Labor and Employment News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Herbert & McNally on Just Cause and Social Networking

HerbertBill Herbert (Hunter College) and Alicia McNally (New York State PERB) have just posted on SSRN their article, Just Cause Discipline for Social Networking in the New Gilded Age: Will the Law Look the Other Way?.  The abstract:

We live and work in an era with the moniker of the New Gilded Age to describe the growth in societal income inequality. The designation is not limited to evidence of the growing gap in wealth distribution, but also the sharp rise in employment without security, including contingent and part-time work. This article examines the state of workplace procedural protections against discipline as they relate to employee use of social media in the New Gilded Age. In our times, reactions to the rapid distribution of troublesome electronic communications through social networking tend to eclipse patience for enforceable workplace procedures. The advent of social media and the decline of job security have created a perfect storm that raises the question of whether labor law will look the other way when it comes to the principles of workplace fairness and justice.

The article begins with President William McKinley’s introduction of the doctrine of just cause discipline into American labor law in 1897, during the Gilded Age, at the same time that the common law at-will doctrine was continuing to gestate. McKinley’s unilateral executive action established principles that remain the cornerstone of just cause discipline: proper notice, a fair evidentiary investigation, an opportunity to be heard, and nondiscriminatory treatment. The article then turns to the development of just cause standards in the 20th Century, which added other elements such as notice of workplace policies and the use of progressive discipline. Lastly, the article examines how just cause principles should be applied to allegations of electronic misconduct in the New Gilded Age to ensure reasonable and prudent disciplinary results, employee acceptance of adverse employment decisions, and a decreased likelihood of litigated claims of unlawful discrimination.

I'll confess that I was totally unaware of McKinley's action.  Learn about that move and the intersection of just cause and technology in this interesting article.

-JH

March 1, 2015 in Labor and Employment News, Labor Law, Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy

HunterThe National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education's newest edition of the   Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy is out.  The peer-reviewed journal's latest includes the following articles:

  • The Impact of Unionization on University Performance by Mark Cassell and Odeh Halaseh;
  • Post-Recession CBAs: A Study of Wage Increases in the Agreements of Four State-wide Faculty Unions by Steve Hicks; and
  • Academic Collective Bargaining: Patterns and Trends by Curtis R. Sproul, Neil Bucklew, and Jeffery D. Houghton.

Check it out!

-JH

March 1, 2015 in Labor and Employment News, Labor Law | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, February 26, 2015

Important opinion from Hawaii Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of Hawaii has issued an important opinion that offers a new way to think about the McDonnell Douglas test. Adams v. CDM Media USA, Inc., 2015 WL 769745, No. SCWC-12-00000741 (Hawaii Feb. 24, 2015).

In Adams, the plaintiff alleged she was subjected to age discrimination when a company refused to hire her for a telephone sales position. The Hawaii Supreme Court found that the plaintiff established a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. The question in the case was whether the defendant met its burden in step two of that test, to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, the employer proffered several reasons for not hiring the plaintiff. The employer asserted the plaintiff lacked sales experience in the last five years, her prior sales experience was in other fields and involved face to face communication, she had little or no sales experience with corporate executives at Fortune 1,000 companies, and the decisionmaker was told the plaintiff disliked tedious work.

The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the employer failed to meet its burden of production under the second step of the McDonnell Douglas test. The Court emphasized that the second step in the test requires the employer’s decision to be “legitimate.” The Court interpreted the word “legitimate” through the lens of Hawaii discrimination law to require that the refusal to hire an individual must relate to the ability of the individual to perform the work in question.

The Court held that summary judgment in the employer’s favor was inappropriate because the reasons provided by the employer either were properly contested by the plaintiff, were based or inadmissible hearsay or did not relate to her ability to do the job. Importantly, the Court held that the employer could not use the lack of sales experience in the last five years as a legitimate reason if the plaintiff could perform the sales job adequately without recent experience. In this case, the employer admitted that the decisionmaker did not rely on the published criteria for the job in his decision to not hire the plaintiff, and the Court expressed concern that this “recent job experience” criteria was only being applied to the plaintiff and that it was not a legitimate reason to disqualify a person for the job in question.

This case represents an important new way of looking at the second step of the McDonnell Douglas test and shows the further separation of state discrimination law from federal law. Also, the majority and dissenting opinions illustrate how confusing McDonnell Douglas still is, even though the test has been mulled over by courts for more than 40 years.

Sandra Sperino

February 26, 2015 in Employment Discrimination | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, February 25, 2015

EEOC General Counsel David Lopez on Supreme Court Oral Arguments

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I was recently asked by a reporter about metrics relating to case filings and monetary recovery for the past fiscal year. I responded that the metric that has garnered much of my attention this year is “two-and-a-half” – the number of cases involving the EEOC before the Supreme Court this term. This morning, the Supreme Court heard the case of EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch. This case involves a 17-year old Muslim teenager denied hire by an Abercrombie Kids store in Tulsa, Oklahoma. This is an appeal from an adverse 10th Circuit decision. 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013). According to the government’s brief: “The question presented is whether an employer can be liable under Title VII for refusing to hire an applicant or for discharging an employee based on a ‘religious observance and practice’ only if the employer has actual knowledge that a religious accommodation was required and the employer’s actual knowledge resulted from direct, explicit notice from the applicant or employee.”

This was the EEOC’s second visit to the Supreme Court this term as a party. In Mach Mining v. EEOC, argued on January 13, the EEOC appeared as Respondent in a case alleging systemic sex-hiring discrimination examining the Commission’s pre-suit requirements. The Seventh Circuit below had ruled in favor of the Commission. 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013). On December 3, 2014, the Supreme Court heard the Young v. UPS case addressing the scope of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The EEOC appeared as an amicus in this case. The Fourth Circuit had ruled below in favor of UPS. 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013). The EEOC, as a party, has had two cases before the Supreme Court in one term only once before. (Can you name the two cases? See below for the answer). The addition of UPS v. Young makes it an interesting term indeed. Moreover, the fact that these cases are the only cases involving federal anti-discrimination laws before the Court this term means that when the Supreme Court renders its decisions in these cases, these decisions will, no doubt, generate considerable commentary by practitioners and scholars alike. At that time, I certainly will welcome your thoughts and feedback. Of course, I won’t comment on the specifics of "Our Year in the Supreme Court" until the decisions are issued. The EEOC’s website (see www.eeoc.gov), however, includes general information about the Commission’s efforts to enforce the prohibitions against religious and pregnancy discrimination as well as our conciliation and other early resolution efforts.

David Lopez, EEOC General Counsel

Postscript: The two cases? In the October 1982 term, the Supreme Court heard Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 prohibits sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy not only for female employees, but also female dependents of male employees); and EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (extension of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to cover state and local governments is a valid exercise of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause).

February 25, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)