Friday, June 1, 2018
A New Deal for Europe? The Commerce Clause as the Solution to Tax Discrimination and Double Taxation in the European Union
The decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Kerckhaert-Morres,allowing double taxation of the same income, led to stagnation in the European internal market. Over the past thirteen years, reservation of competences to member states has created tension between the European Community’s goal of a common internal market and the goal to eliminate double taxation.
By exploring and comparing the constitutional basis for taxation in the United States and the treaty basis for taxation in the European Union, one discovers how American New Deal legislation in the 1930s, as a departure from LochnerEra,could provide the basis for an analogous departure from Kerckharet-Morresin a European New Deal.
The common understanding of the evolution between the LochnerEra and the New Deal denotes the reversal of decades of judicial intervention that prevented states from enacting economic regulation,with reference to substantive due process rights under the Commerce Clause, and a judicial policy to approve all economic regulations based on a different reading of the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause.As the New Deal in the 1930s brought the United States out of the LochnerEra, a similar New Deal should be conducted in the European Union to bring it out of the Kerckhaert-Morresera.
The European Union should adopt a true federal system akin to that of the United States, avoid pretending to maintain a Hamiltoniansystem, or avoid fiscal coherence issues all together for a non-common market. The Lochner-styleKercharet-Morres era damages the unity of the “federal” system of the European Union.
The European Union exhibits some markers of a federal system of finance,such as a national bank in the European Union Bank. However, a common codified system of taxation enacted through a directive or new multi-lateral treaty negotiation amongst states, such as the 1916 Constitutional Amendment or the United States Commerce Clause, could lead to the creation of a proper federal system in the European Union.
Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert & Morres v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. I-10967.
But see Hegel’s theory of dialectical processes in the resolution of conflict over power. Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln IV, Hegelian Dialectical Analysis of U.S. Voting Laws, 42 U. Dayton L. Rev. 87, 91 (2017).
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
The Texas Supreme Court recently summarized Lochnerby stating:
Basically, then, during the “Lochner[E]ra,” substantive due process was a touchstone by which courts analyzed both the purpose and the effect of governmental economic regulation by scrutinizing them with a somewhat equivocal deference to the legislative body’s pronounced purpose for a law and its choice of the method embodied in the law to achieve that purpose.
Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 85–86 (Tex. 2015). Cf.Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty(2004).
The United States Supreme Court pronounced that:
[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis . . . .
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). “Ensuing federal decisions tracked Carolene Products’ guidance that economic regulatory laws were presumed to be constitutional absent evidence or judicially known facts demonstrating that no rational basis existed for the regulation.” Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 86.
CompareJoyce O. Appleby, Foreword to The Revolutionary Writings Of Alexander Hamiltonvii, viii–x (Richard B. Vernier ed., 2008) (discussing the skill and impact of Hamilton’s writings), with Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, Cabinet Battle #1, (Atlantic Recording Corp. 2015)(in order to be “aggressive and competitive,” such as the musical), and Richard F. Duncan, Justice Scalia and the Rule of Law: Originalism vs. the Living Constitution, 29 Regent U. L. Rev.9, 33, n.169 (2017).
See Kevin Foley, The Civil War and the National Banking System, CoinWeek(Nov. 13, 2015), https://coinweek.com/education/the-civil-war-and-the-national-banking-system-the-birth-of-national-bank-notes/.
Saturday, September 23, 2017
My comment - really good read based on BIS statistics! See excerpt below that I think captures the article.
Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? Macro Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality
Annette Alstadsæter, Niels Johannesen, and Gabriel Zucman
NBER Working Paper No. 23805
JEL No. E21,H26,H87
Drawing on newly published macroeconomic statistics, this paper estimates the amount of household wealth owned by each country in offshore tax havens. The equivalent of 10% of world GDP is held in tax havens globally, but this average masks a great deal of heterogeneity—from a few percent of GDP in Scandinavia, to about 15% in Continental Europe, and 60% in Gulf countries and some Latin American economies. We use these estimates to construct revised series of top wealth shares in ten countries, which account for close to half of world GDP. Because offshore wealth is very concentrated at the top, accounting for it increases the top 0.01% wealth share substantially in Europe, even in countries that do not use tax havens extensively. It has
considerable effects in Russia, where the vast majority of wealth at the top is held offshore. These results highlight the importance of looking beyond tax and survey data to study wealth accumulation among the very rich in a globalized world.
Excerpt: We find that while about 10% of world GDP is held in tax havens globally, this average masks a great deal of heterogeneity. Scandinavian countries own the equivalent of only a few percent of GDP in offshore wealth, but this figure rises to about 15% in Continental Europe, and to as much as 60% in Russia, Gulf countries, and a number of Latin American countries. The size of offshore wealth is not easily explained by tax or institutional factors. Among countries with a large stock of offshore assets, one finds autocracies (Saudi Arabia, Russia), countries with a recent history of autocratic rule (Argentina, Greece), alongside old democracies (United Kingdom, France). Among those with the lowest stock of offshore assets, one finds relatively low-tax countries (Korea, Japan) alongside the world’s highest tax countries (Denmark, Norway). Instead, geography and specific national trajectories seem to matter a great deal. Proximity to Switzerland—the first country that developed a cross-border wealth management industry, in the 1920s—is associated with higher offshore wealth, as is the presence of natural resources, and political and economic instability
post-World War II.
Wednesday, December 9, 2015
Abstract: ... The promised donation has been questioned by both the conservative and liberal press. Both seemingly demonizing their decision to give 99 percent of their wealth to an entity engaged in charitable giving. Much of the vitriol directed toward them focuses on the preconceived notion of what charitable giving should look like. What does charitable giving look like, and more importantly, what should it aspire to be? ...
read Prof. David Herzig's full opinion here.