Wednesday, July 10, 2013
Immigration Article of the Day: Teague New Rules Must Apply in Initial-Review Collateral Proceedings: The Teachings of Padilla, Chaidez and Martinez by Rebecca A. Sharpless and Andrew Stanton
Teague New Rules Must Apply in Initial-Review Collateral Proceedings: The Teachings of Padilla, Chaidez and Martinez by Rebecca A. Sharpless University of Miami - School of Law and Andrew Stanton Office of the Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida June 13, 2013 University of Miami Law Review, Forthcoming
Abstract: In Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to counsel their noncitizen clients about the immigration consequences of a plea. Padilla left undecided the critical question of whether its holding applies to other noncitizen defendants whose pleas were final before March 31, 2010, when the Court issued its opinion. The Court took up this question in Chaidez v. United States, a case raising this issue in the context of a writ of coram nobis under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) involving a federal conviction. Assuming, but not deciding, that the retroactivity framework set out in Teague v. Lane applied to a federal conviction, the Court held that Padilla established a “new rule” and, therefore, was not available in postconviction proceedings involving pleas that became final before Padilla. In so ruling, the Court held for the first time that an application of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard in Strickland v. Washington resulted in a new rule. In deciding that Padilla established a new rule, the Court expressly declined to consider Chaidez's additional arguments that (1) Teague's retroactivity framework does not apply when a federal, as opposed to a state, conviction is at issue; and (2) new rules about ineffective assistance of counsel should apply to postconviction proceedings in which ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised for the first time.
This article focuses on Chaidez's last argument regarding the application of certain types of new rules in postconviction proceedings, notwithstanding Teague. It argues for a “postconviction pipeline” in which new rules would apply. The pipeline includes any properly filed postconviction motion in state or federal court which involves an initial challenge to a criminal conviction.