An email message on Iran's nuclear capability...

From: Iran-Alert@committeeonthepresentdanger.org

IRAN  UPDATE              December 6,  2007                             IRAN'S NUCLEAR  INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES              Let the  Head-Scratching Begin (or Continue)                             The new National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear activities has dramatically altered both domestic and international debates over those activities as well as the likely responses to them. At the same time, the agencies that participated in this earth-shattering review have raised a host of serious concerns about how they reached their conclusions and whether they took a broad enough look at all activities related to Iran’s nuclear work. Whether the global community should feel any differently about what Iran is doing and whether it should change course in light of this new estimate remain very open questions. Although useful commentary about this new estimate could range over the course of many pages, we want to focus your attention on three failures that are inherent in it.                             Failure of logic. Did Iran drop its nuclear weapons program? To believe so, you must set aside lots of other evidence that the Islamic Republic is hell-bent on developing or acquiring such weaponry, including its boasting about future superpower status and new capabilities; its messianic rhetoric; its stated designs on Israel, the United States, and the West in general; its simultaneous development of long-range missiles; its research into equipping such missiles with nuclear warheads; its two decades (and counting) of deception about nuclear research to begin with; and the desires of at least ten of Iran’s less complacent neighbors to start their own nuclear programs.                             Failure of intelligence. The United States currently lacks anything resembling a serious human intelligence capability vis-à-vis Iran, with such basic elements as “eyes on the ground.”  That raises the question of how, exactly, the NIE’s authors have any “confidence” at all in their estimates. Couple that with reports that the earthshaking new information that prompted the intelligence U-turn came from disclosures by Iranian military commanders and defectors, and there is ample reason to greet the new revelations with a healthy dose of skepticism. Separate and apart from the sources in this case, one might also keep in mind that our intelligence community has never (that is, never) accurately forecast when a nation would go nuclear – not the Soviet Union, nor China, nor India, nor Pakistan, nor North Korea.                             Failure of definition. The NIE qualifies its lead judgment, that Iran  “halted its nuclear weapons program,” with an astonishing footnote in which its explains:  For the purposes of this Estimate, by "nuclear weapons program" we mean Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran's declared civil work  related to uranium conversion and enrichment. That directly contradicts the long-standing position of the United States, of both political parties, and of our key allies in the Iranian crisis, which focuses on Iran’s declared civil nuclear work – including  the work related to uranium conversion and enrichment. Well, as noted above, why would Iran pursue its civil nuclear work so aggressively, and why would it remain so opposed to full disclosure, except as part of a weapons program? The United States has said for years that, absent an alternative rationale, we must presume that Iran’s declared civil program, including its uranium enrichment, is part and parcel of a weapons program and, as such, is a threat to peace. That’s the common position of our key allies, and that’s what led to our progress at the UN Security Council, with our European allies, and through our unilateral financial sanctions.                             A final point. Whatever you think about the quality of the NIE, you might want to keep in mind that it only covers nuclear development on Iranian soil. It includes not a word about the possibility of procurement of nuclear weapons components from abroad (and, as a result, not a word about Iranian cavorting with the North Koreans on nuclear-related matters). At the very least, the intelligence community might want to provide a second, related assessment about our level of “confidence” that we are adequately tracking Iranian foreign acquisition of WMD-related goods and services.

www.committeeonthepresentdanger.org. P.O. Box 33249, Washington DC 20003-3249             Contact: Larry Haas, larry@larryhaasonline.com. 202 257-9592