Gender and the Law Prof Blog

Editor: Tracy A. Thomas
University of Akron School of Law

Monday, November 13, 2017

SCOTUS Grants Cert in Case Challenging Disclosures Required by CAL Reproductive FACT Act

Today the US Supreme Court granted cert in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and limited to the following question: “Whether the disclosures required by the California Reproductive FACT Act violate the protections set forth in the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."

For a prior post on the case see Petition for Cert on Required CAL Disclosures for Pregnancy Crisis Centers as Violating Free Speech

See also USA Today, Abortion, Contraception Return to Supreme Court in Free Speech Case

The Ninth Circuit's decision below upholding the law and disclosures is here.

November 13, 2017 in Abortion, Constitutional, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, October 3, 2017

An Originalist Defense of the Privileges or Immunities Clause for Gender Nondiscrimination in Bradwell v. Illinois

M. Frances Rooney, Note, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and an Originalist Defense of Gender Nondiscrimination, Geo. J. Law & Public Policy (forthcoming).

The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a constitutional right not to be discriminated against on the basis of gender. Original public meaning originalism provides the structure to find that the clause includes a right to practice a lawful profession that extends to all citizens, irrespective of gender. The clause is a guarantee of rights to every “citizen of the United States,” not every male citizen; because of that, the clause is a positive grant of rights to all citizens in the United States. 

The central thesis of this Note is that women who are citizens of the United States have rights guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, specifically the right to practice a profession. This right cannot be denied on the basis of gender, because adult women have the same capacity as men to practice law. Had this been recognized in 1873, the time The Slaughter-House Cases and Bradwell v. Illinois were decided, and had the erroneous interpretation of the clause in Slaughter-House not prevailed, Bradwell would have recognized this right. Given the contemporary knowledge of the capacities of women and an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation and construction, the decision in Bradwell should be overruled. Taking this step would lead to the development of an originalist gender equality jurisprudence.

Feminist pioneer Elizabeth Cady Stanton made a similar argument against Bradwell (and Minor v. Happersettat the time using the P&I Clause.  Although her arguments were more textualist than originalist per se.  I discuss these early equality interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in my recent book Elizabeth Cady Stanton & the Feminist Foundations of Family Law.  A blog post summarizing the relevant part, chapter 2, is here, at  What do You Women Want?: The 19th Century Demand for Reform of Marital Property.

October 3, 2017 in Constitutional, Legal History, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 26, 2017

Are Women's Narrative Stories Admissible Evidence in the Supreme Court?

Linda Edwards, Telling Stories in the Supreme Court: Voices Briefs and the Role of Democracy in Constitutional Deliberation, 29 Yale J. L & Feminism 29 (2017)

On January 4, 2016, over 112 women lawyers, law professors, and former judges told the world that they had had an abortion. In a daring amicus brief that captured national media attention, the women “came out” to their clients; to the lawyers with or against whom they practice; to the judges before whom they appear; and to the Justices of the Supreme Court.

The past three years have seen an explosion of such “voices briefs,” 16 in Obergefell and 17 in Whole Woman’s Health. The briefs can be powerful, but their use is controversial. They tell the stories of non-parties—strangers to the appellate case—with no vetting by cross examination or the rules of evidence. Yet, despite their controversial nature, they have thus far received little academic attention. 

The time has come to ask some tough questions: Are these briefs legally permissible? Theoretically legitimate? How do they compare with other sources consulted regularly by the Court? Are they really so different from the policy arguments we have accepted without blinking for over a hundred years?

These foundational questions quickly take us into even murkier waters—legal and constitutional theory; narrative theory; framing; and cognitive science. Voices briefs prompt us to look at constitutional decision-making in a new way. Soon we find that voices briefs are interrogating long-accepted assumptions rather than the other way around. The analysis produces some surprising reasons why voices briefs can play an important role in constitutional interpretation and some realistic ideas about handling the undeniable concerns that still haunt their use.

September 26, 2017 in Abortion, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 13, 2017

The Rise of Women's Voices on the Supreme Court

 

Taunya Lovell Banks, President Obama and the Supremes: Obama's Legacy -- The Rise of Women's Voices on the Court,  (forthcoming), Drake Law Rev. (forthcoming)

For approximately two hundred years, all of the United States Supreme Court justices were male. Now there are three women on the Court, two appointed during the administration of President Barack Obama. With the appointment of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan to the Court, women’s voices literally are more prominent, especially during oral argument. This article speculates on whether the presence of these three women on the Court will influence the substance of decisions. It asks whether we are witnessing the emergence of a definable “women’s” voice, in the collective sense, or whether there is simply a greater representation of women on the Court; women justices, who like their male counterparts, sometimes agree and sometimes do not. In addition, this article asks whether the reaction of some commentators, and male justices, to the increased participation of women justices during oral argument suggests implicit gender bias, another possible by-product of President Obama’s legacy.

September 13, 2017 in Courts, SCOTUS, Women lawyers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 12, 2017

New Movie on Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "On the Basis of Sex"

Armie Hammer Joins Felicity Jones in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Biopic  

Armie Hammer will start opposite Felicity Jones in On the Basis of Sex, the biopic of renowned Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Participant Media is behind the drama, which will be directed by Mimi Leder from a script by Daniel Stiepleman, who is also Ginsburg’s nephew.Sex focuses on Ginsburg, played by Jones, as she teams up with her husband, Marty Ginsburg (Hammer) to bring the first landmark gender discrimination case before the Supreme Court.

The movie is eyeing a fall shoot in Montreal.

The feature is slated for release in 2018, in line with Ginsburg's 25th anniversary as a Supreme Court Justice. Focus Features is distributing domestically.

 

Felicity Jones Replacing Natalie Portman in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Biopic 

Felicity Jones is set to star as Ruth Bader Ginsburg in a biopic about the Supreme Court justice's life.

On the Basis of Sex will be directed by Mimi Leder (The LeftoversShameless) and follows Ginsburg as she fights for equal rights throughout her entire law career, which began at Harvard University and Columbia Law School and led to Washington.

At one time, Natalie Portman was considered to play Ginsburg in the feature, which was written by Daniel Stiepleman and was placed on the 2014 Black List. 

 

September 12, 2017 in Media, Pop Culture, SCOTUS, Women lawyers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 22, 2017

Justice Ginsburg and the Price of Equality

Linda Greenhouse, Justice Ginsburg and the Price of Equality, NYT, discussing Ginsburg's opinion in the recent case Sessions v. Morales-Santana finding a citizenship rule that treated unwed fathers differently than mothers to violate equal protection, but denying the remedy of extending the beneficial mother's rule to fathers.

And what about Justice Ginsburg? Can we assume she’s happy with the outcome of the case, or do we suppose she wrote the remedial section with gritted teeth? Twenty-four years ago, in July 1993, she was President Bill Clinton’s first Supreme Court nominee, and I covered her Senate confirmation hearing. I had met Judge Ginsburg several times, but didn’t know her well. I found her Judiciary Committee testimony enlightening, and I wrote an analysis that appeared under the headline “A Sense of Judicial Limits.” I described her as “something of a rare creature in the modern judicial lexicon: a judicial restraint liberal.” By that I meant that while her own commitments were to liberal outcomes, she displayed an equally strong commitment to letting Congress take the lead. “In her view, equality — or any other goal — is best achieved if all branches of government have a stake in achieving it.”

 

So I’m ready to assume that if the remedial portion of her opinion last week was a compromise, it was one she offered willingly. Her “over to you, Congress” handoff may seem naïve in the present political climate, but it conforms with her deepest beliefs about the appropriate judicial role.

 

And it’s worth remembering that from her earliest years as a nervous young lawyer standing before the nine men of the Supreme Court, Ruth Ginsburg has always played a long game, with the ultimate goal, equality of the sexes, constantly in view. As this case turned out, the price for equality was high. But I don’t doubt that for Justice Ginsburg, it was a price worth paying for being able to strike a blow against still another law based on a generalization about the way “men and women are.”

 

I have previously blogged about my thoughts on Ginsburg's decision leveling down the remedy for equal protection.  See SCOTUS Denial of Equal Protection Remedy Jeopardizes Equality Law: What was Justice Ginsburg Thinking?

 

June 22, 2017 in Constitutional, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 15, 2017

Rational Basis Review as the Future of Sex Discrimination Challenges

Katie Eyer, Protected Class Rational Basis Review, 95 N.C. Law Rev. (2017)

It is commonplace today to associate rational basis review exclusively with groups that are not formally afforded heightened scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s equal protection precedents: groups like gays and lesbians, people with disabilities, and undocumented immigrants. Thus, discussions of the benefits of nurturing a jurisprudence of meaningful rational basis review typically focus exclusively on such “unprotected” groups. In contrast, rational basis review is rarely thought of as providing important protections for groups such as racial minorities and women, who have secured “protected class” status and therefore are subject to regular heightened review of group-burdening classifications.

Drawing on extensive original archival research, this Article challenges this common conception. Race and sex discrimination litigators have often historically relied on rational basis arguments as a complement to heightened scrutiny. And during eras when robust rational basis review was prevalent—such as the 1970s—these claims have often succeeded. Today, as a result of, inter alia, the LGBT rights cases (which have expanded judicial conceptions of the scope of rational basis review), we stand at a moment of increased possibility for meaningful rational basis review. Rational basis arguments thus ought to form a part of how we conceptualize the contemporary possibilities for race and gender justice claims.

Such an approach has the potential to revitalize what has long been a stalled constitutional jurisprudence around sex and race discrimination. As many scholars have acknowledged, it is extraordinarily rare for courts today to find that a government actor engaged in intentional discrimination against women or racial minorities—the contemporary standard for triggering heightened scrutiny. But as the history unearthed herein demonstrates, courts (especially lower courts) have, at times, been willing to find that racially and gender-impactful laws violate rational basis review. Moreover, such review has often had the capacity to undermine widely shared assumptions regarding the rationality of entrenched structures of race and gender oppression. As such, protected class rational basis review may present one of the few realistic alternatives for reviving a meaningful project of race- and gender-based constitutional change today.

 

 

June 15, 2017 in Constitutional, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

And More on the SCOTUS Decision on Leveling Down Remedies for Sex Discrimination

A summary from SCOTUSblog:

At Dorf on Law, Michael Dorf focuses on “the Court’s remedy” in Morales-Santana – “leveling down” so that no one gets the previously unequally distributed benefit rather than “leveling up” so everyone does – “and how Justices Thomas and Alito approached the case”; he maintains that “[b]y mischaracterizing the Court’s holding they evade responsibility for judging the case on the merits.” At the Gender and the Law Prof Blog, Tracy Thomas also looks at the remedy, criticizing the decision as a “literal roadmap for future courts to deny the ‘extension’ remedy and instead order the ‘withdrawal’ of benefit in cases of sex discrimination” and calling it “one giant step backwards.” In a two-part post on the Human Rights at Home blog, here and here, Deborah Brake explains that “[a]lthough the remedial issue in Morales-Santana is admittedly a thorny one, the Court’s analysis, limited to a determination of what the legislature would have wanted, fails to do justice to the full scope of equality rights and what is required to remedy violations of such rights”; she argues that the court “short-circuited the analysis, leaving leveling down remedies unchecked and with the potential to undermine equality rights.”

Here's more from Debbie Brake, Remedial Grief

The remedy that the Court ordered – nullification rather extension of the more favored treatment – is a classic example of leveling down in response to a violation of equality rights.  The problem of leveling down – that everyone can be made worse off from the successful invocation of equality rights – is endemic to equality law, whether its source is constitutional or statutory.  One of the most famous examples of leveling down occurred when Jackson, Mississippi, after losing a case challenging the city’s operation of racially segregated swimming pools, decided to close the pools rather than integrate them.  The disappointed African American residents of Jackson sued, challenging the pool closure as a violation of the equal protection clause.  The Court disagreed, finding the city’s response, closing the pools for everyone, was racially neutral and ended differential treatment.

 

This tried and true tactic is not merely a remnant of segregation.  Leveling down surfaces periodically as a response to equality claims.  In Title IX litigation challenging unequal opportunities for girls and women in sports, schools often threaten that such claims will only result in their taking opportunities from male athletes, ending the discrimination with no benefit to female athletes, and leaving them holding the blame for making male athletes worse off.  In an example from another case, a pregnant girl who was kicked out of the school’s National Honor’s Society for becoming pregnant successfully sued her school for sex discrimination.  Instead of responding by letting the girl participate, the school ended its participation in the National Honor Society altogether – it leveled down.  Left unchecked, leveling down can be an effective strategy for de-railing equality claims altogether Worse yet, in some cases (though not all), the leveling down can exacerbate the stereotypes and injuries from the original discrimination. ***

 

Leveling down is a thorny and under-analyzed response to discrimination, and one that courts often fail to give sufficient attention.  The Morales-Santana decision is no exception.  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court discerns two principles for deciding between nullification and extension.  One the one hand, the Court identifies a general preference for extension.  On the other hand, the Court confidently asserts that the choice between nullification and extension turns on legislative intent, and how the legislature, had it known that the offending provision would be found unconstitutional, would cure the violation.  The Court’s invocation of these two principles is somewhat mystifying.  The Court does not identify any source from which a preference for extension derives, other than to cite its own cases blithely asserting that such a preference exists (again, without identifying its source).  Nor does the Court attempt to square the preference for extension with the decisive role it gives to legislative intent.  If legislatures are more likely to favor extension over nullification in their intent, there is no attempt to prove this as an empirical matter.  In the end, the preference for extension seems to drop out of the picture in the face of the Court’s discernment of a legislative intent to nullify rather than extend the favored treatment.

 

By retreating to congressional intent and abandoning the general preference for extension, the Court does a disservice to the development of equality law, leaving no discernible check on leveling down where the entity that discriminated (in this case, the Congress) desires to remedy the violation by removing the benefit from all rather than extending it to the disfavored group.  Because the Court viewed Congressional intent as dispositive, the Court treated the remedy as a closed issue, having discerned a congressional preference for nullification.

And Brake, Remedial Grief, Part 2:

The analysis advocated here often eludes easy answers and this case is no exception. My disagreement with the Court is not necessarily that it reached the wrong result, but that it short-circuited the analysis, leaving leveling down remedies unchecked and with the potential to undermine equality rights. The touchstone should not be the remedial preference of the discriminator, but an analysis of whether nullification fully remedies the injury of the discrimination and whether it functions to punish the assertion of equality rights. The Court should have considered whether reverting to the stricter residency requirements for all parents fully eradicates the underlying gender stereotypes about the strength of maternal bonds and the low expectations for paternal influence on children’s values. Given that Congress was willing to ease up on the residency requirements for citizen mothers, does its abandonment of the more lenient rule if it had to include fathers reflect a deep-seated resistance to viewing unwed fathers as legitimate parents, regarding them as insufficiently bonded to their children to deserve citizenship-conferral rights? Or would it reflect a judgment, free from gender stereotypes, that the longer residency is appropriate for all parents in order to ensure the transmission of American values? The relationship between the constitutional injury and the remedy may be difficult to parse, but it is not determined merely by asking the question of what the legislature would have wanted.

June 15, 2017 in Constitutional, Gender, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 14, 2017

More on Equal Protection and Leveling Down as a Remedy

I blogged yesterday about the Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana and its remedying of sex discrimination by leveling down, or withdrawing a benefit from one sex, rather than leveling up and extending the benefit to both.

Here is more on the leveling down remedy.

Michael Dorf, Equal Protection and Leveling Down as Schadenfreude

My Verdict column this week explores Monday's Supreme Court ruling in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, in which the Court invalidated a federal statutory provision that confers citizenship on children born outside the U.S. to unwed U.S.-citizen mothers in some circumstances in which such citizenship is denied to children born outside the U.S. to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers.

As I note in my column, an equal protection violation can be remedied either by leveling up (everyone gets the benefit) or leveling down (no one does). The leading case is Heckler v. Mathews. Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in Morales-Santana parses what I call Congress's "fallback" intent to conclude that the right remedy (absent further congressional intervention) is leveling down. On Take Care, Ian Samuel argues that this "mean remedy" could harm people who thought they were U.S. citizens. Yet the Court says that its holding applies only "prospectively." Not good enough, Samuel complains, because, he says, the Court does not explain what "prospectively" means. I agree that Justice Ginsburg's opinion could have been clearer but she approvingly cites the Solicitor General's merits brief and reply brief on this point. The SG's argument at the relevant pages really only makes sense on the assumption that "prospective" application means application to children born abroad to U.S.-citizen mothers after the date of the Court's opinion--unless and until Congress changes the law.

Because Samuel reads the opinion as harsher than I believe it is, he ends up preferring the approach--at least in practical effect--of Justices Thomas and Alito. Yet, as I shall explain, I do not think that their approach is possible without overruling Heckler v. Mathews.

To see why, we need a brief recap of Heckler v. Mathews. The Social Security Act contained a provision that conferred certain benefits on women but not men. In what Congress no doubt thought was a fiendishly clever poison pill, the statute also provided that in the event that the courts struck down the sex-based preference, no one would get the benefit, i.e., the fallback was leveling down. Then, when a man challenged the law as sex discrimination, the government argued that he lacked standing, invoking the poison pill: Even if the male challenger prevailed on his equal protection claim, the government said, he wouldn't get any benefit; thus his injury was not redressable by a favorable ruling.

The SCOTUS disagreed. Although validating Congress's right to level down via a fallback provision, the Court said that the plaintiff's injury was nonetheless redressable by a favorable ruling. Sure, he wouldn't receive the financial benefit but he would get something else of value, namely, equal treatment. ***

Leveling down as a remedy for an equal protection violation has an element of schadenfreude about it. But it nonetheless comports with our notions of what equality is about.

Perhaps that is what formal equality is about.  But feminists talk about equity as a concept broader than pure parallelism and providing equal opportunity for all.  Thus, I would argue, formalism and leveling down is not an adequately meaningful remedy for a constitutional violation.

June 14, 2017 in Constitutional, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 13, 2017

SCOTUS Denial of Equal Protection Remedy Jeopardizes Equality Law: What was Justice Ginsburg Thinking?

I've spent much of the last 20 years writing about remedies. Specifically, I have written a lot about the right to a meaningful remedy required by due process.  (For more, see here, here, here, here.) The Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana violates this general command of the law and more concerningly, jeopardizes equal protection law. For a right without a remedy has little value.

In Morales-Santana, a six-justice majority of the Supreme Court led by Justice Ginsburg and including Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, found that the US law of citizenship for a child born abroad to one American parent discriminated on the basis of the gender.  The law required an unwed father to have five years physical presence in the US before going abroad, while an unwed mother needed only one year. Ginsburg in the majority opinion waxes eloquently about the dangers of formal sex classifications and the reliance on “stunningly anachronistic” stereotypes of gender and parenting roles.

The Court, however, refused to grant the remedy requested of applying the one year rule to men.  Instead, it applied the five year rule to everyone. Ginsburg acknowledges that the usual equal protection remedy is to extend protection and benefit to the class denied, rather than withdrawing the benefit for both classes.  She says, however, and unconvincingly, that the statutory language here requires the withdrawal and application of the stricter standard until Congress weighs in. 

I have to agree with Ian Samuel that this remedial decision is a “contender for the worst thing Justice Ginsburg has ever written for the Court.” It seriously jeopardizes equal protection law, and the availability of practical, meaningful relief for discrimination. The equality principle becomes normative rather than operative.  It emasculates the equality law by denying the meaningful relief sought of equal application of the benefit.  Practically, if discriminatory treatment results in merely a formal reprimand, and actually takes away benefit, there will be little incentive for plaintiffs to sue.  Discriminatory treatment will go unchallenged, or will require only “mean” plaintiffs seeking to deny others benefit if they can’t have the benefit too.

I’ve been trying to figure out then, why Ginsburg would write this, and why some of the other Justices would go along.   

    1.  Failure to Consider the Precedent: If there had been a will to award the remedy requested, there was a way to do so. For the remedial holding is in stark contrast to Ginsburg’s demand for a remedy if extension and inclusion in US v. Virginia.  There, after the Court held that the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) discrimination against women by not admitting them to the full military education, Ginsburg strongly rejected remedies of anything other than full inclusion and admission to the program.  She rejected the creation of a separate military school for women, and reiterated that the remedy required was inclusion and opportunity in the program provided to men. Certainly the VMI case gave her the solid precedent to demand a remedy of inclusion in Morales-Santana.

Interestingly, the Court does not cite one of its closest prior cases where it found an equal protection violation but denied a remedy.  In Dep't of Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), the Court held that requiring women employees to pay more for retirement benefits than men (because of their average longer longevity) was discrimination.  The practice was stopped going forward due to a change in state law, but the Court denied the reimbursement remedy sought by the plaintiffs. The Court created a framework to consider the equities of the impact on the defendant (how would the government get all that money) and potentially on third parties of other retirees. (I’ve written about Manhart here and here).

This equitable standard and framework of Manhart could have been useful to Justice Ginsburg in weighing the equities of the impact of a change in the citizenship rule.  It provided a mechanism to evaluate the potential harms to third parties like the children effected, and would have given support for a remedy extending the one-year rule to men.

    2. Vote Getting: Perhaps Ginsburg agreed on the remedy to gain votes for the substantive decision on equality. That is certainly a common judicial approach to compromise to get the votes. And remedies are often easy ways for judges to gain these votes without appearing to compromise on the merits.  Who were the questionable Justices?  Roberts?  Kennedy?  She only need one of these.  Kennedy’s decision in Obergefell and Troxel both evidence strong concern with the impact of unconstitutional state action on children.  Children here will be denied citizenship based on the actions of their parents, something Kennedy is usually concerned about.  And Obergefell also shows his strong acceptance of the evolving nature of social constructions.    

Thus it is possible that she need one vote to get the merits decision.  Except, that frankly, there doesn’t seem to be much new in this decision on the substantive of gender and equal protection.  The opinion provides a nice summary of the law, citing all of the prior precedents.  But it doesn’t add any new ground. Ginsburg does repeat her “exceedingly persuasive justification” language from VMI, which has been read to suggest strict scrutiny is required for gender classifications.  Except that she immediately goes on to cite the accepted standard of intermediate scrutiny for gender.  So if anything, she has undermined her opinion in VMI that was trying to create precedent for a higher standard of scrutiny.

The majority opinion also arguably adds a new angle from Obergefell about the need to interpret gender discrimination claims against an evolving nature of societal expectations.  However, that understanding of antiquated sex stereotypes already exists in the precedent in Hoyt, Frontiero, and Hibbs.  The new decision makes it a little stronger, and perhaps that will prove useful in future cases.  Except that if you win on this nice academic language, you still lose any meaningful remedy or change.

    3. Retroactivity. One judicial strategy for making a decision on the merits palatable is to deny an immediate remedy. The idea is to have legal change dictated, but not applied until the future.  This might explain the compromise on the remedy that brought in Roberts.  Except, retroactivity usually allows for meaningful relief in the future, which this decision does not.     

    4.  The Mean Remedy: This opinion now provides current, modern precedent for the dangers of equal protection challenges—the denial of benefit to all.  What Samuel calls the "the mean remedy" denies benefit to both men and women, rather than extending the benefit one group had previously enjoined. This is the fear all litigators have in brining equal protection challenges, that you will win the battle but lose the war.  This was a big concern we had decades ago when litigating a civil rights case on behalf of women prisoners,  that the equality claims to equal education and employment (critical to good time credit, income, and rehabilitation) would not be extended equally, but would be denied to all.  (That didn’t happen). It is also what VMI tried to do privately after the case – close down the school to deny public military education to both men and women, with the alumni then opening a private school for men only (assumed to be immune from the state action requirement).

Now we have confirmation of that fear – and precedent for denial. We have a new decision, with six votes of liberal and conservative Justices, providing the literal roadmap for future courts to deny the “extension” remedy and instead order the “withdrawal” of benefit in cases of sex discrimination. That to me is one giant step backwards.

June 13, 2017 in Constitutional, Gender, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 12, 2017

SCOTUS Holds Citizenship Law for Unwed Fathers Violates Equal Protection But Denies Remedy Extending Equal Treatment

Justice Ginsburg (6-2) writing for the Court in Sessions v. Morales-Santana holds unconstitutional a federal citizenship law requiring unwed fathers of children born abroad to have previously lived in the US for 10 years, while an exception for unwed mothers required only 1 year of physical presence.  In classic Ginsburg voice, the Justice attacks facial classifications based on gender as based on outdated, and illegal, stereotypes.  Her opinion provides a good treatise summary of the law of equal protection, citing her opinion in US v. Virginia, Reed, Frontiero, Hibbs, and newly-integrating Obergefell.

However, the Court, refused to extend the one-year exception to unwed fathers, instead, requiring that both men and women be held to the 10-year standard.  Which is the danger of an equal protection analysis -- that the treatment sought will be denied or retracted rather than extended equality.

Here are the highlights of the equal protection analysis:

III
Sections 1401 and 1409, we note, date from an era when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife with overbroad generalizations about the way men and women are. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida (1961) (women are the“center of home and family life,” therefore they can be “relieved from the civic duty of jury service”); Goesaert v. Cleary, (1948) (States may draw “a sharp line between the sexes”). Today, laws of this kind are subject to review under the heightened scrutiny that now attends “all gender-based classifications.” J. E. B. v. Alabama (1994); see, e.g. United States v. Virginia (1996) (state-maintained military academy may not deny admission to qualified women). Laws granting or denying benefits “on the basis of the sex of the qualifying parent,” our post-1970 decisions affirm, differentiate on the basis of gender, and therefore attract heightened review under the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee. Califano v. Westcott, (1979) (holding unconstitutional provision of unemployed-parent benefits exclusively to fathers). Accord Califano v. Goldfarb, (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional a Social Security classification that denied widowers survivors’ benefits available to widows); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld (1975) (holding unconstitutional a Social Security classification that excluded fathers from receipt of child-in-care benefits available to mothers); Frontiero v. Richardson, (1973) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional exclusion of married female officers in the military from benefits automatically accorded married male officers); cf. Reed v. Reed (1971) (holding unconstitutional a probate-code preference for a father over a mother as administrator of a deceased child’s estate).

Prescribing one rule for mothers, another for fathers, §1409 is of the same genre as the classifications we declared unconstitutional in Reed, Frontiero, Wiesenfeld, Goldfarb, and Westcott. As in those cases, heightened scrutiny is in order. Successful defense of legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender, we have reiterated, requires an “exceedingly persuasive justification.” Virginia; Kirchberg v. Feenstra (1981).

A
The defender of legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender must show “at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724 (1982); alteration in original); see Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53, 60, 70 (2001). Moreover, the classification must substantially serve an important governmental interest today, for “in interpreting the [e]qual [p]rotection [guarantee], [we have] recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality . . . that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 20). Here, the Government has supplied no “exceedingly persuasive justification,” Virginia, 518 U. S., at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted), for §1409(a) and (c)’s “gender-based” and “gender biased” disparity, Westcott. 

1
History reveals what lurks behind §1409 [enacted in 1940] . . . During this era, two once habitual, but now untenable, assumptions pervaded our Nation’s citizenship laws and underpinned judicial and administrative rulings: In marriage, husband is dominant, wife subordinate; unwed mother is the natural and sole guardian of a nonmarital child. Under the once entrenched principle of male dominance in marriage, the husband controlled both wife and child. “[D]ominance [of] the husband,” this Court observed in 1915, “is an ancient principle of our jurisprudence.” Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 311 (1915). See generally Brief for Professors of History et al. as Amici Curiae 4–15. Through the early 20th century, a male citizen automatically conferred U. S. citizenship on his alien wife. C. Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own:Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship 15–16, 20–21 (1998). A female citizen, however, was incapable of conferring citizenship on her husband; indeed, she was subject to expatriation if she married an alien. . . . And from 1790 until 1934, the foreign-born child of a married couple gained U. S. citizenship only through the father....

For close to a half century, as earlier observed, this Court has viewed with suspicion laws that rely on “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.” Virginia; Wiesenfeld. In particular, we have recognized that if a “statutory objective is to exclude or ‘protect’ members of one gender” in reliance on “fixed notions concerning [that gender’s] roles and abilities,” the “objective itself is illegitimate.” Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U. S., at 725. In accord with this eventual understanding, the Court has held that no “important [governmental] interest” is served by laws grounded, as §1409(a) and (c) are, in the obsolescing view that “unwed fathers [are] invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers” to take responsibility for nonmarital children. Caban v. Mohammed. Overbroad generalizations of that order, the Court has come to comprehend, have a constraining impact, descriptive though they may be of the way many people still order their lives. Laws according or denying benefits in reliance on “[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles,” the Court has observed, may “creat[e] a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that force[s] women to continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver.” Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 736 (2003). Correspondingly, such laws may disserve men who exercise responsibility for raising their children. In light of the equal protection jurisprudence this Court has developed since 1971, §1409(a) and (c)’s discrete duration-of-residence requirements for unwed mothers and fathers who have accepted parental responsibility is stunningly anachronistic.

FN 13 Even if stereotypes frozen into legislation have “statistical support,” our decisions reject measures that classify unnecessarily and overbroadly by gender when more accurate and impartial lines can be drawn. J. E. B. v. Alabama; see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, (1976); Weinberger.

 

June 12, 2017 in Constitutional, Family, International, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, March 24, 2017

Judicial Interactions at SCOTUS Oral Arguments are Highly Gendered

Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice, Interrupted: The Effect of Gender, Ideology and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 Virginia L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017).

This Article studies how the justices compete to have influence at oral argument, by examining the extent to which the Justices interrupt each other; it also scrutinizes how advocates interrupt the Justices, contrary to the rules of the Court. We find that judicial interactions at oral argument are highly gendered, with women being interrupted at disproportionate rates by their male colleagues, as well as by male advocates. Oral argument interruptions are also highly ideological, not only because ideological foes interrupt each other far more than ideological allies do, but we show that conservatives interrupt liberals more frequently than vice versa. Seniority also has some influence on oral arguments, but primarily through the female justices learning over time how to behave more like male justices, avoiding traditionally female linguistic framing in order to reduce the extent to which they are dominated by the men.

For another report reaching a similar conclusion, see Study Shows Male Justices Interrupt Female Justices More During Oral Argument

March 24, 2017 in Courts, Gender, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Would Gorsuch Follow Supreme Court Precedent on Pregnancy Discrimination

Gillian Thomas, Would Gorsuch Follow Supreme Court Precedent Rejecting Discrimination?

A former law student’s allegations that U.S. Supreme Court nominee Judge Neil Gorsuch last year told a University of Colorado Law School class that women often “use” their employers for maternity coverage, only to quit after giving birth—and accordingly, that female applicants should be questioned about their pregnancy plans—are jaw-dropping, if true. As Emily Martin of the National Women’s Law Center wrote this week in U.S. News & World Report, such opinions contravene a body of sex-discrimination law going back nearly 50 years.

 

Judge Gorsuch was questioned briefly at a confirmation hearing Tuesday about the alleged statements, and not surprisingly, he denied making them. The statements have been corroborated by a second student in the class and contemporaneous documents produced by the original complaining student, but they also have been disputed by other students.

 

Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee should be alarmed by Gorsuch’s refusal to go beyond merely defending his classroom statements and give a full-throated repudiation of pregnancy discrimination, which remains one of the most pervasive barriers to working women nearly 40 years after enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.

 

There is an even more fundamental legal principle at stake, though, about which Gorsuch remained silent. Gorsuch allegedly told his students that employers not only can rely on stereotypes in making employment decisions—that is, by assuming that a woman will quit once she becomes a mother—but that they should (so that they can “protect themselves”). But the Supreme Court has found, time and again, that it is illegal to rely on a stereotype about a group in making a decision about an individual employee. Does Gorsuch agree? We still don’t know.

 

In the 1978 case City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, the Supreme Court found illegal an employer’s pension plan that required female workers to contribute more to the plan than their male colleagues because actuarial calculations showed that women generally lived longer than men. The plan violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—the federal law outlawing employment discrimination because of race, national origin, color, religion, and sex—because, the Court explained, the law “precludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class. If height is required for a job, a tall woman may not be refused employment merely because, on the average, women are too short.” Admonished the Court: “Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply.”

 

A decade later, the Court ruled that a Big Eight accounting firm’s rejection of a female candidate for partner because she was “macho” and needed “a course at charm school” had violated Title VII: “[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group.” Soon after, the Court invalidated a battery manufacturer’s policy that prohibited women of childbearing age from holding any job involving contact with lead, which could be toxic to fetuses. (Those risky jobs also, not surprisingly, paid more than others at the company.) That policy, the Court ruled, assumed that any fertile woman was a potential mother, regardless of whether she was sexually active, used birth control, or wanted children. Again, ascribing group characteristics to the detriment of an individual employee—even for allegedly benevolent reasons—was found to violate anti-discrimination principles.

 

In the five decades since Title VII was enacted, myriad other stereotypes have been recognized by courts as motivating illegal discrimination.

For elaboration on the point about Manhart and generalized stereotypes that are true, see my chapter on the case in US Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the Supreme Court (Kathy Stanchi, Linda Berger, & Bridget Crawford, eds) (Cambridge Univ. Press 2016). 

March 24, 2017 in Constitutional, Judges, Pregnancy, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 21, 2017

Following the Changes in the Supreme Court's Abortion Law

Mary Ziegler,  The New Negative Rights: Abortion Funding and Constitutional Law after Whole Woman's Health:

The Hyde Amendment, a ban on the Medicaid funding of abortion, is once again at the center of the abortion wars. For the most part, critics of the Hyde Amendment argue that it authorizes discrimination against poor women. Using original archival research, this Article show that the amendment has had a far greater impact.

In popular debate, proponents of the Hyde Amendment helped to forge an idea of complicity-based conscience that has recently transformed fights about everything from same-sex marriage to contraceptive access. Constitutionally, the fight for the Hyde Amendment also revolutionized the rights-privilege distinction in constitutional law. In abortion-funding cases, the Court held that there was no constitutional problem with laws that created practical obstacles to abortion access so long as the obstacles themselves were not controlled or created by the state. This approach has resonated outside the context of abortion law.

The Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt makes a challenge to the Hyde Amendment realistic and compelling. The cases upholding the Hyde Amendment regard as constitutional any burden on a woman’s right to choose that is neither created nor controlled by the government. Whole Woman’s Health explicitly rejected this approach, looking instead at how the formal terms of law interact with forces beyond the government’s control. For this reason, the Article shows that Whole Woman’s Health undermines the core premises of the Hyde Amendment and creates an opening for those seeking to revisit the distinction between negative and positive rights.

Mary Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance: The Undue Burden Test after Casey/Hellerstedt:

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt represents the Supreme Court’s most important intervention in the constitutional politics of abortion. However, as this Article shows, Hellerstedt does not represent the clean break some commentators identify. Instead, the decision comes at the end of a decades-long movement-countermovement conflict about the meaning of an unconstitutional undue burden on a woman’s right to choose abortion.

Positioning Hellerstedt in historical context matters because doing so underscores the Court’s ongoing responsiveness to popular views of what the Constitution says about abortion. The history studied in the Article also reveals what should happen in the next front of the abortion wars, when the Court considers fetal-protective, rather than woman-protective, antiabortion laws. To maintain the delicate balance created by Casey, the Court should require evidence that both fetal-protective and woman-protective abortion regulations are substantially related to their stated goal.

 

March 21, 2017 in Abortion, Constitutional, Legal History, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 20, 2017

EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Employer Questioning about Pregnancy

In light of the article Amid Charges By Former Law Student On Gender Equality, Former Clerks Defend Gorsuch, here's a summary by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on what the existing state of the law is (and which a future SCOTUS could change) regarding employer treatment based on existing or intended pregnancy.

Questions and Answers about the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues

These Questions and Answers address the EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (Guidance) originally released on July 14, 2014, and recently updated in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., --- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). The updated Guidance is available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm.***

1. What workplace actions are prohibited under the PDA?

Under the PDA, an employer cannot fire, refuse to hire, demote, or take any other adverse action against a woman if pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action. The PDA prohibits discrimination with respect to all aspects of employment, including pay, job assignments, promotions, layoffs, training, and fringe benefits (such as leave and health insurance).***

3. May an employer ask an employee or applicant whether she is pregnant or if she intends to become pregnant soon?

Although Title VII does not prohibit employers from asking applicants or employees about gender-related characteristics such as pregnancy, such questions are generally discouraged. The EEOC will consider the fact that an employer has asked such a question when evaluating a charge alleging pregnancy discrimination. Adverse decisions relating to hiring, assignments, or promotion, that are based on an employer's assumptions or stereotypes about pregnant workers' attendance, schedules, physical ability to work, or commitment to their jobs, are unlawful.

March 20, 2017 in Constitutional, Pregnancy, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Petition for Cert on Required CAL Disclosures for Pregnancy Crisis Centers as Violating Free Speech

Petition for Certiorari, National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra

QUESTION PRESENTED

The State of California enacted a law called the “Reproductive FACT Act.” The State admits its purpose is targeting “crisis pregnancy centers” based on their viewpoint that “discourag[es]” abortion. The Act forces pro-life religious licensed centers to post notices that encourage women to contact the State to receive information on free or low cost abortions. The Act also burdens pro-life religious unlicensed centers’ speech by requiring them to place extensive disclaimers in large fonts and in as many as 13 languages in their ads, which significantly burdens their ability to advertise. But the Act exempts most other licensed medical and unlicensed non-medical facilities, such as abortion providers, hospitals, and other healthcare facilities, as well as federal health care providers. The Ninth Circuit candidly admits that it upheld the Act amidst a “circuit split” with decisions by the Second and Fourth Circuits over how to scrutinize regulations of speech by medical professionals on controversial health issues. The ruling also conflicts with a recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit.

 

The question presented is: Whether the Free Speech Clause or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits California from compelling licensed pro-life centers to post information on how to obtain a state-funded abortion and from compelling unlicensed pro-life centers to disseminate a disclaimer to clients on site and in any print and digital advertising.

The Ninth Circuit's decision below is here.

March 20, 2017 in Abortion, Constitutional, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, March 17, 2017

Thinking through the Impact and Application of the Supreme Court's Decision in Whole Woman's Health

Mary Ziegler, The New Negative Rights: Abortion Funding and Constitutional Law after Whole Woman's Health:

Abstract

The Hyde Amendment, a ban on the Medicaid funding of abortion, is once again at the center of the abortion wars. For the most part, critics of the Hyde Amendment argue that it authorizes discrimination against poor women. Using original archival research, this Article show that the amendment has had a far greater impact.

In popular debate, proponents of the Hyde Amendment helped to forge an idea of complicity-based conscience that has recently transformed fights about everything from same-sex marriage to contraceptive access. Constitutionally, the fight for the Hyde Amendment also revolutionized the rights-privilege distinction in constitutional law. In abortion-funding cases, the Court held that there was no constitutional problem with laws that created practical obstacles to abortion access so long as the obstacles themselves were not controlled or created by the state. This approach has resonated outside the context of abortion law.

The Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt makes a challenge to the Hyde Amendment realistic and compelling. The cases upholding the Hyde Amendment regard as constitutional any burden on a woman’s right to choose that is neither created nor controlled by the government. Whole Woman’s Health explicitly rejected this approach, looking instead at how the formal terms of law interact with forces beyond the government’s control. For this reason, the Article shows that Whole Woman’s Health undermines the core premises of the Hyde Amendment and creates an opening for those seeking to revisit the distinction between negative and positive rights.

Mary Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance: The Undue Burden Test after Casey/Hellerstedt:

Abstract
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt represents the Supreme Court’s most important intervention in the constitutional politics of abortion. However, as this Article shows, Hellerstedt does not represent the clean break some commentators identify. Instead, the decision comes at the end of a decades-long movement-countermovement conflict about the meaning of an unconstitutional undue burden on a woman’s right to choose abortion.

Positioning Hellerstedt in historical context matters because doing so underscores the Court’s ongoing responsiveness to popular views of what the Constitution says about abortion. The history studied in the Article also reveals what should happen in the next front of the abortion wars, when the Court considers fetal-protective, rather than woman-protective, antiabortion laws. To maintain the delicate balance created by Casey, the Court should require evidence that both fetal-protective and woman-protective abortion regulations are substantially related to their stated goal.

March 17, 2017 in Abortion, Constitutional, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 13, 2017

Presentation: Lessons From Women Shortlisted for the US Supreme Court

Renee Knake presents, What Does it Mean to Be the First? Lessons from Women Shortlisted for the U.S. Supreme Court, with commentary by:

    Judge Vanessa Gilmore, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
    Diane Ralston, Chief Legal Officer, TechnipFMC plc
    Doris Rodriguez, Partner, Andrews Kurth Kenyon

March 13, 2017 in Conferences, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, February 17, 2017

Examing Why Women Lawyers are Less than 20 Percent of Advocates in the US Supreme Court

Jennifer Mika, The Noteworthy Absence of Women Advocates at the US Supreme Court, 25 American J. Gender, Social Policy & Law 1 (2016)

Abstract:     

Arguing before the U.S. Supreme Court is considered one of the most prestigious accomplishments in a litigator’s career. However, during the last five terms, women consistently make up less than one fifth of this elite club. This article takes a closer look at the advocates that argued before the Supreme Court during the 2015-2016 term as well as those who appeared more than once in a given term over the past six years. It explores the possible causes of the deficit in women advocates including gender disparity in Supreme Court clerkship experience. It strives to start a dialogue about how the gender gap in Supreme Court advocacy can be closed.

 

February 17, 2017 in SCOTUS, Women lawyers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 13, 2017

Study Shows Male Justices Interrupt Female Justices More during Oral Agument

Adam Feldman & Rebecca Gill, Echoes from a Gendered Court: Examining the Justices' Interactions during Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Abstract:      

Supreme Court oral arguments are the only publicly scheduled opportunities for the Justices and advocates to directly engage in discussions about a case. There are few rules to regulate these conversations. Within this unique setting and due to the lack of argument structure combined with the limited time allotted to each argument, the Justices vie for chances to speak, sometimes at the expense of utterances from other Justices. In this Article we examine how the Justices’ genders dictate much of the Justices’ interactions and ultimately the power structure of oral argument.

This Article shows how gender is an embedded characteristic of the oral arguments and how the Justices’ appropriations and perceptions of gender roles create disparities in the balance of authority on the Court. The Article’s analysis shows a major gap between male Justices’ interruptions of female Justices and female Justices interruptions’ of male Justices during oral arguments. After discussing why this is problematic, the Article offers suggestions for how the Court can reduce these interruptions through institutional reforms. The Article’s analyses corroborate conversational and power dynamics previously elucidated by sociolinguists, but also extend those findings to the insular environment of the United States Supreme Court.

 

February 13, 2017 in Courts, Judges, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)