Tuesday, May 23, 2017
EEOC Seeks Rehearing En Banc in 9th Cir Decision Finding Unequal Pay Based on Salary History Alone is not Gender Discrimination
The EEOC has petitioned for rehearing en banc in the 9th Circuit's decision in Rizo v. Yovino (Apr. 27, 2017) holding that pay a woman less than men doing the same job because of their different salary histories was not gender discrimination.
Some of the highlights of the petition:
- The Commission, along with two circuit courts, takes the position that prior pay cannot be the sole factor causing the disparity because the practice perpetuates the gender pay gap that continues to exist nationally, in the field of education and elsewhere.
- A practice like the County’s undermines the purposes of the EPA because it institutionalizes the gender pay gap that studies confirm continues to exist and relies on the largely discredited market forces theory, which endorses paying women less than men because they will agree to work for less.
- The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have held categorically that while there is no prohibition against relying on multiple factors including prior pay, prior pay alone cannot be considered a “factor other than sex” within the meaning of the EPA. See, e.g., Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1199 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing Angove, 70 F. App’x at 508); Irby, 44 F.3d at 955 (stating that “prior salary alone cannot justify pay disparity”). They reason that “if prior salary alone were a justification, the exception would swallow up the rule and inequality in pay among genders would be perpetuated.” Irby, 44 F.3d at 955.
- Courts similarly reject the related “market forces theory,” discredited by Corning Glass (417 U.S. at 205) — that an employer must offer more money to male applicants because they will not accept less but, conversely, may offer less money to female applicants because they will accept less. The Eleventh Circuit explained, “[T]he argument that supply and demand dictates that women qua women may be paid less is exactly the kind of evil that the [Equal Pay] Act was designed to eliminate, and has been rejected.”
- We recognize that even if this Court adopts the rule from the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, it will not entirely eliminate the circuit conflict. The Seventh Circuit takes the position that “prior wages are a ‘factor other than sex.’” Wernsing v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
For a prior blog post about the Rizo decision, see Court Holds Salary Histories are Non-discriminatory Basis to Pay Women Less
For some of my additional thoughts on the case, see Erin Mulvaney, EEOC Fights Ninth Circuit Ruling That Institutionalizes Gender Pay Gap, Natl. L. J. (May 23, 2017)
Two important points to keep in mind are:
- How salary histories can be gendered: Historically women have been paid less than men because they could be. "Market forces" allowed employers to pay women less because women were willing to take jobs for less than men, usually because women had less options and less bargaining power. Women were also paid less because they were assumed to be working for "pin money," extra spending money rather than being a primary breadwinner or supporter of a family. It was also assumed that women were primarily dedicated to their families and children, and thus work was secondary, and family needs might interfere with dedication to work, thus justifying the lower pay. And, most obviously, if a woman was discriminated in a past job, that discrimination is perpetuated forwarded if it is continued to be used as a marker for future salaries. These are all workings of structural or systemic gender discrimination beyond any individual animus.
- There are easy non-gendered workarounds: As the EEOC points out, just base salary on the relevant factors, sometimes reflected in salary history and sometimes not in cases of discrimination. Consider the factors directly of work experience, number of years of experience, and education and degrees.