Thursday, May 3, 2012
Legal regulation of the family focuses on two canonical relationships: marriage and parenthood. Courts, legislatures, and scholars routinely take family law’s concentration on just two family ties to be so commonsensical as to require no explicit discussion or explanation. Yet marriage and parenthood are not the only family relationships that can be central to family life. Family law’s reflexive orientation around marriage and parenthood diverts attention and scrutiny from considering how the law should regulate and protect other family ties. For instance, the sibling relationship is a crucial, yet noncanonical family tie. Family law views children almost exclusively through the lens of children’s relationships with their parents, rather than the lens of children’s relationships with their siblings. The law offers siblings only modest and sporadic protection, too often permitting adoption and parental divorce or death to separate siblings and sometimes leave them with no right to contact each other or even learn of each other’s existence. But siblings can be vital sources of support, love, nurturing, and stability for children, and family law could and should do much more to safeguard sibling ties when they are threatened. This essay uses the example of sibling relationships, which have received remarkably little legal attention, to explore the law’s treatment of noncanonical family relationships and to consider some of the reform possibilities that emerge when we free ourselves from the assumption that family law should focus narrowly on marriage and parenthood.
Saturday, April 7, 2012
We are inviting academic editorial contributors to Cultural Sociology of Divorce: An Encyclopedia, a 3-volume library reference to be published in 2013 by SAGE Publications. We hope you’ll consider contributing to this exciting project.
While the formal definition of divorce may be fairly concise and straightforward (the legal termination of a marital union, dissolving the bonds of matrimony between parties), the effects are anything but, particularly when children and other family members are involved. The Americans for Divorce Reform estimates that “probably, 40 or possibly even 50 percent of marriages will end in divorce if current trends continue." And outside the United States, there are markedly increased divorce rates across developed countries—divorce and its effects are a significant social factor in our culture and others. In fact, it might be said that a whole “divorce industry” has been constructed, with divorce lawyers and mediators, family counselors, support groups, etc. As King Henry VIII’s divorces showed, divorce has not always been easy or accepted. In some countries, divorce is not permitted and even in Europe, countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, and the Republic of Ireland only legalized divorce in the latter quarter of the twentieth century. This multi-disciplinary encyclopedia covers curricular subjects around the world ranging from marriage and the family to anthropology, social and legal history, developmental and clinical psychology, and religion. Three volumes, including over 500 articles, illuminate what has become a culture of divorce and its impact on society.
This comprehensive project will be marketed to academic and public libraries as a print and digital product available to students via the library’s electronic services. Each article, ranging from 900 to 4000 words, is signed by the contributor. The General Editor of the encyclopedia is Robert E. Emery, Ph.D., University of Virginia, who will review all the articles for editorial content and academic consistency. Payment for the articles are honoraria that range from a $50 book credit from Sage Publications for article submissions up to 1,000 words up to a free copy of the encyclopedia for contributions totaling greater than 10,000 words. More than this, your involvement can help assure that credible and detailed data, descriptions, and analysis are available to students of divorce issues.
At this time the project is almost completely assigned with the exception of the following family law related topics (including proposed word counts):
Custody of Children, Sole 2,200
Divorce Law-Comparative Perspective 3,000
Divorce Law-Hispanic Traditions 2,000
Gender Issues in Divorce Law 1,800
Government Enforcement of Child Support 2,000
Judges, Family Law 2,000
No Fault Divorce vs. Divorce Rates 1,800
Property Distribution 3,000
The final deadline for submissions is May 21, 2012. If you would like to contribute to building a truly outstanding reference with Cultural Sociology of Divorce: An Encyclopedia, please contact me by the e-mail information below. I will provide you with the complete article list, submission guidelines, and sample article for your review.
Thanks very much,
Golson Media for SAGE Publications
Sunday, March 25, 2012
What once protected only virginal girls under the age of ten now also protects sexually aggressive males under the age of eighteen. While thirteenth-century statutory rape law had little reason to address the unthinkable possibility of chaste nine-year-old girls raping adult men, twenty-first-century statutory rape law has failed to address the modern reality of distinctly unchaste seventeen-year-old males raping adult women. Despite dramatically expanding statutory rape's protected class, the minimalist thirteenth-century conception of the offense remains largely unchanged -- intercourse with a juvenile. Overlooked is the new effect of this centuries-old offense -- a sexually aggressive seventeen-year-old raping an adult now exposes the adult rape victim to statutory rape liability. By being raped, the adult rape victim satisfies the minimal elements of the offense, lacks any defenses, and thereby commits statutory rape of her juvenile rapist. Therefore, the offense of statutory rape criminalizes being raped; that is, it criminalizes being the victim of rape. Paradoxically, while the offense of rape prohibits committing rape, the offense of statutory rape prohibits being raped. What the law of rape seeks to protect us from -- being raped -- the law of statutory rape punishes us for.
Friday, March 23, 2012
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry v. Brown, authored by Judge Reinhardt, has been widely lauded by marriage equality proponents for its creative minimalism. In keeping with commentators’ expectations, the court found a way to determine that California’s Proposition 8 violated the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, namely that the provision took away an entitlement that had previously been enjoyed by same-sex couples — the right to the appellation of one’s partnership as a “marriage” — for no rational reason. The people of California’s categorization and differential treatment of same-sex couples as compared with opposite-sex couples, the court held, failed the test of minimal rationality required for upholding state action. The two types of couples were simply too indistinguishable to carry the weight of the difference between them that the people of California had tried to codify. Thus, the court struck down the state constitutional amendment.
The court did so, however, by relying heavily on facts peculiar to California’s political history, thereby limiting the case’s disruption of democratic processes in both California and elsewhere, and, not incidentally, minimizing the size of the target the case presents should the presumptively hostile Supreme Court review the decision. First, Proposition 8 removed an entitlement that had been granted by the California Supreme Court just a few years earlier. The case thus arose in a posture not shared by other cases involving same-sex marriage: what was at stake was the constitutionality of a referendum that took away — rather than failed to grant — same-sex marriage. Second, California, by statute, guarantees to same-sex couples a “domestic partnership” which statutorily grants all of the legal incidents of marriage, including rights of parentage and adoption. Because of the first fact — that what the Court was faced with was the withdrawal of a preexisting right — the Court did not have to reach the question of whether same-sex couples possess a “right to marry” where it has never before been recognized. Because of the second fact — that all that was at stake in California was the appellation “marriage” since the domestic partnership laws guaranteed to same-sex couples all other incidents of marital status — there was no need for the Court to decide whether there would be a “rational basis” for a state to refuse to grant the right to marry to same-sex couples on the basis of the purported superiority of child-raising in families headed by opposite-sex partners: the case simply does not raise these questions, since California’s statutory scheme grants equal family status to both sorts of couples, and Proposition 8 did not upset that. The court did not, therefore, have to decide that there exists a “fundamental right to marry,” or that any restriction on the rights of gay people to marry would violate fundamental constitutional values. Rather, it narrowly held that Proposition 8, which stripped gay citizens only of the appellation “married” and left all other incidents of marriage intact, worked a dignitary and psychic harm on gay and lesbian partners, and did so for no defensible reason. This decision is thus of no relevance to cases challenging a state’s refusal to extend marriage to include gays and lesbians, and it is of no relevance to cases challenging a state’s withdrawal of such a right if that right is also accompanied by a denial of concrete benefits and accompanied by some explanation — such as the superiority of hetero-sexual parenting — for the decision to do so. Perry v. Brown is nothing more than a sui generis decision for a unique set of facts. Thus, creative minimalism.
Wednesday, March 21, 2012
Wednesday, March 14, 2012
Over the past century, the Supreme Court has articulated numerous doctrines that protect family privacy. These doctrines are not, however, well-suited to the brave new world of families formed through donor eggs, sperm, and embryos. As the number of donor-conceived children born to same-sex and heterosexual couples and to single parents increases, and as these families develop connections to one another, the law has not yet adjusted. This Article provides an extensive mapping of these “donor-conceived family communities,” and it reaches two major conclusions that support the development of these new families. First, relational interests, the traditional focus infamily law, should govern the regulation of the donor world. Second, legal recognition should be given to the emotional and psychological ties between donor families in order to provide guidance to the development of donor-conceived family communities. These two principles point the way to integrating changing social realities into a new legal framework for donor families, allowing children from the same donor to connect to one another. While further regulation of relationships has its dangers, this paradigm shift in the donor world could prompt broader beneficial changes, creating options beyond framing all families within the dyadic nuclear-family model.
Monday, March 12, 2012
Robin Fretwell Wilson (Washington & Lee) has posted "The Perils of Privatized Marriage" (MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTI-CULTURAL CONTEXT: RECONSIDERING THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION, p. 253, Joel A. Nichols, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2011) has posted on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Governments around the world continue to struggle with how to accommodate religious minorities in an increasingly pluralistic society, and how to accommodate religion in matters of family law. Efforts to respect religious understandings in family disputes seem at first blush innocuous: they would allow religious groups to define their own norms and celebrate the rich diversity of society. However, the experience of women and children of multiple faiths across the world demonstrates that religious deference extracts an unconscionable price. As the Volume in which this Chapter appears illustrates, such proposals would confer considerable latitude in family matters not only on adherents of Islam, but on Christians, Jews, and members of other faiths.
This Chapter argues that such efforts are well-intentioned but naïve. Religious communities are not immune from family violence, and religious norms place women at significant financial and custodial disadvantages. In many instances, there are striking breaks between civil law norms and the outcomes demanded by religious understandings in places where religious arbitration is occurring. The experiences of women and children demonstrate that removing state protections from the family is fraught with peril. In some systems of religious deference, the cost of exiting a marriage, even an abusive one, for women is unconscionable - leading to a substantial risk of poverty and sometimes the loss of child custody after divorce. Some religious leaders tolerate family violence, further frustrating a woman’s ability to exit an abusive marriage. The foreseeable inequities to women and children in systems of religious deference cannot be justified on grounds that a woman voluntarily chooses to participate. Unlike prenuptial agreements, which must be in writing and are policed for duress and unconscionability, existing systems of religious deference offer no such safeguards. This Chapter concludes that policymakers should give serious consideration to the costs of giving deference to religious understandings of family relationships before ceding authority for family disputes to religious bodies.
Tuesday, February 21, 2012
Anat Rosenberg (Radzyner School of Law) has posted "Liberalism Unsettled: Freedom and Status in the Promise of Marriage" on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This paper examines the tension between freedom and subjection under liberalism; but, rather than emphasize either side of the binary, my aim is to articulate the terms of duality, and provide an account of the social life of liberal thought. To do so, I revisit the nineteenth-century promise of marriage.
The promise of marriage represented a conceptual fusion of the liberal ideals of contract and sentiment, central to rise of the free market and the conjugal family, and of the counterforces of status - particularly gender and class. While the former marshaled the hope of free will as a new basis for the social order, subjection lurked in the latter. The fusion threw the hopes and tensions of the liberal hypothetical into sharp relief, and turned the promise of marriage into a central cultural locus for Victorians.
I rely on an interdisciplinary reading of the promise’s fortunes in contract law and canonic novels to examine the terms on which liberalism engaged with status. The examination reveals two historical strategies. One was containment: considerations of status were contained within the conceptual liberal frameworks of sentiment and contract, and, in consequence, reduced in magnitude. A second was withdrawal: the application of the liberal framework was bordered and limited, but the delimitation was construed as inconsequential, because liberalism retained relevance in areas conceptualized as the core of social relations.
Contra familiar accounts, which treat the opposition between liberal ideals and status in terms of mutual exclusion, and take the persistence of status to mean that liberalism has been a (partially) failed hope or a form of apologetics for power, containment and withdrawal tell a more complex story. The liberal rejection of status did not entail an attempted elimination but rather a new interpretation of status’s legitimate workings within social relations. Containment and withdrawal teach us of the distinctive ways in which liberalism, as a social phenomenon – rather than an ideal philosophical construct, processed, adapted to, and also transformed, forces of status.
Monday, February 20, 2012
Yildiz Maria Berenos (Utrecht Univ. School of Law) has posted "Time to Move On? The International State of Affairs with Respect to Child Relocation Law" (8 Utrecht L. Rev. 1 (2012)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract
By surveying binding law in civil and common law jurisdictions and non-binding law produced by national, regional and international organizations, this article tries to map the international state of affairs with respect to child relocation. Various legal topics that have concerned legislatures are discussed. It appears that - worldwide and more specifically within Europe - great variety exists with respect to child relocation law, which leads to legal uncertainty. As a consequence, parents often do not know how to act in case of child relocation. This might have a negative effect on other issues, such as child abduction. Harmonization of law on child relocation seems necessary to diminish the existing legal uncertainty. It is concluded that the development of a European or international non-binding law instrument that addresses both national and international relocation cases could be a first step in the harmonization process.
Sunday, February 19, 2012
Nicholas Lafferriere (Universidad Catolica Argentina) has posted "Artificial Reproductive Techniques and Parenting: Trends and Paradoxes" on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The increasing use of artificial reproductive techniques generates very complex problems concerning parent-child juridical relations. Posthumous insemination, heterologous fertilization procedures, and surrogate motherhood raise questions as to the traditional ways in which we establish parenthood. This paper analyzes trends in comparativefamily law and proposes responses to the challenges presented by artificial reproductive techniques. First, it considers the juridical issues that arise from the use of donor gametes, with special attention to the question of donor anonymity. Then the paper considers basic principles that should guide law and policy in this area, and proposes conclusions as to the right to identity, the commodification of the human body, the traceability of gametes, the exploitation of women, and other matters. The paper considers same-sex marriage (with special attention to a recent Argentinian law recognizing them); and it considers the possibility of “two-mother” or “two-father” families. The complexities of the different combinations of biological parents, donors, and surrogate mothers are considered. The paper concludes by identifying the problems intrinisic to these reproductive techniques and by emphasizing the need for strong legal measures to assure the human dignity of the unborn child and the transmission of life, with special consideration to family law.
Sunday, February 12, 2012
Harvey S. Rozen (Princeton Univ. Dept. of Econ.) has posted "The Marriage Tax is Down But Not Out" on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The public debate surrounding the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has paid little attention to the tax consequences of being married. Specifically, there has been virtually no discussion of the possible existence of an implicit "marriage tax"--the increase in the joint income tax liability of a man and woman when they marry. This lack of concern appears to be due to the perception that the new law has lowered marginal tax rates to such an extent that the magnitudes of marriage taxes (and subsidies) are inconsequential. In this paper, I show that to the contrary, the new law created large taxes on being married for some couples, and large subsidies for others. On the basis of a tax simulation model, I estimate that in 1988, 40 percent of all couples will pay an annual average marriage tax of about $1100, and 53 percent will receive an average subsidy of about $600. One striking result that emerges from the analysis is the relatively large marriage tax that will be borne by some low income couples with children. For such couples, the marriage tax can amount to 10 percent of joint gross income. Hence, the new tax law appears to quite "anti-family" for some low income workers.
Friday, February 10, 2012
Davidson: "Mother's Baby, Father's Maybe!--Intestate Succession: When Should a Child Born Out of Wedlock Have a Right to Inherit from or Through His or Her Biological Father?"
Camille Davidson (Charlotte School of Law) has posted "Mother's Baby, Father's Maybe!--Intestate Succession: When Should a Child Born Out of Wedlock Have a Right to Inherit from or Through His or Her Biological Father?" (22 Columbia J. Gender & Law 531 (2011)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
When the renowned chess genius Bobby Fischer died, his body was exhumed in order to determine whether his genetic samples matched samples from a child whose mother claimed he fathered outside of a marital union. Bobby Fischer was domiciled in Iceland and under Icelandic law, if there had been a genetic connection, the child would have been the sole legal heir of his intestate estate. The law is not so clear in the United States. Each state has enacted laws of intestate succession. While the laws in all fifty states provide that a child born out of wedlock is automatically his or her mother's legal child, state statutes vary substantially as to when that same child is entitled to an intestate inheritance from or through his or her genetic father.
If Fischer, the Chicago native, had been domiciled in North Carolina at his death, even if DNA had established a genetic relationship between Fisher and the child, the child would still have been precluded from inheriting her father's estate. In North Carolina, a biological or genetic connection is not enough to constitute a paternal legal heir without strict compliance with statutory formalities. In contrast, if Fischer had been domiciled in Georgia, and through clear and convincing evidence a genetic relationship was established, the child would inherit from her father's estate as his legal child. As one can see, in the United States, paternal inheritance depends on the state of the father's *532 domicile. As such, when we discuss the out of wedlock child and his or her right to inherit family wealth through intestate succession, the old adage “Mother's baby, father's maybe” comes to mind.
In this paper, I suggest that each of the fifty states should, like Georgia and other similarly situated states, follow the trend of Icelandic law in the area of intestate succession. Specifically, where clear and convincing evidence (either before or after a father's death) determines that a father is the genetic parent of a child, and there has been no formal adoption of the child, such child should be entitled to an intestate share of his or her father's estate in the same manner as a child born to a married parents.
Thursday, February 9, 2012
This article takes up the axiomatic place of family law under federalism. Family is often depicted as belonging squarely in the state law domain, reflecting its nature as a matter of moral deliberation, rather than of, say, commerce or constitutional rights. This article demonstrates, however, that family law is a matter of federal law in an endless number of substantive areas, from immigration and taxation to privacy in the marital bedroom and the relative rights of putative and presumed fathers. It asks how the innumerable exceptions to the rule about family law’s place under federalism come to be rationalized. The answer, the article argues, has to do with the fact that the state-federal divide with respect to family maps onto the private-public divide that has long vexed feminists. The constant creation of exceptions to the general rule that family law is state law serve to preserve family’s allegedly moral character and obscure individualist dimensions of family.
Tuesday, February 7, 2012
Anna Stępień-Sporek, Paweł Stoppa, and Margaret Ryznar have posted "The Rules on the Administration of Community Property in Poland" (forthcoming, International Survey of Family Law) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The Polish rules on the administration of marital common property underwent significant changes in 2005. Previous regulations, having their roots in the pre-1989 communist regime of Poland, appeared insufficient for the current capitalist economy and today’s dynamically developing society. The previous management of common property, based on the unclear dichotomy between ordinary and extraordinary actions, created practical judicial problems and undermined the stability of legal relationships established without the consent of the other spouse. The new law, based on the general principle of self-management except for particularly important actions, seems preferable, although it is not completely free of shortcomings and still requires periodic review. This article describes the most notable differences between the old and new rules on the administration of common marital property, and introduces readers to the field of the administration of common property pursuant to the relevant new regulations.
Sunday, January 29, 2012
Cashmore: "The Link Between Child Maltreatment and Adolescent Offending: Systems Neglect of Adolescents"
Judith Cashmore (Univ. of Sydney Faculty of Law) has posted "The Link Between Child Maltreatment and Adolescent Offending: Systems Neglect of Adolescents" on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This paper is concerned with the nexus between abuse and neglect and adolescent offending in the lives of some children and young people, and the lack of a coordinated response to these by both the child protection and juvenile justice systems. The window for effective intervention, especially in relation to offending behaviors, is not closed after early childhood, though it is likely to be more expensive to intervene at later ages. Crucially, state parental responsibility for children and young people in care must not stop once they have offended and become troublesome as well as troubled.
Saturday, January 28, 2012
A new study suggests that marriage does not necessarily provide more or better benefits than other romantic relationships. From UPI:
"We found that differences between marriage and cohabitation tend to be small and dissipate after a honeymoon period. Also while married couples experienced health gains -- likely linked to the formal benefits of marriage such as shared healthcare plans -- cohabiting couples experienced greater gains in happiness and self-esteem," Musick and Bumpass said in a statement. "For some, cohabitation may come with fewer unwanted obligations than marriage and allow for more flexibility, autonomy and personal growth."
The study, scheduled to be published in the February issue of the Journal of Marriage and Family, said marriage is by no means unique in promoting well-being and that other forms of romantic relationships can provide many of the same benefits.
Friday, January 27, 2012
Call for Papers: Nov. 2012 Immigration/Family Law Symposium
In November of 2012 Hofstra will be hosting a symposium on the interplay between immigration issues and family courts’ obligations to serve families and children. We are currently soliciting papers for publication in Hofstra’s Family Court Review, which will be publishing a special issue on the same topic. We are especially interested in submissions from clinical professors. The call for papers is embedded below. Please feel free to contact either of us if you have any questions.
Lauris Wren (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Theo Liebmann (email@example.com)
Hofstra Law School
Hempstead, NY 11549
Family Court Review
Call for Papers
Special Issue: Immigration and the Family Court
The Family Court Review seeks submissions for an upcoming special symposium issue dedicated to the complex interplay between immigration issues and the family court’s obligations to serve families and children. Family courts throughout the United States have explicit statutory duties to aid families in crisis, to maintain families whenever appropriate, to protect children and safeguard their well-being, and to provide children with permanency in their lives. These are not narrow obligations, and the judges, practitioners and agencies involved in family courts must constantly adapt to serve the individual needs of all the families which come before them. The purpose of this Special Issue is to examine the unique challenges presented by working with families and children who are immigrants – both documented and undocumented – and the complex interplay between immigration issues and the family court’s obligations to serve the families and children.
Contributions can be from scholars, practitioners, judges, public policy makers, and experts in all professional disciplines who work with children and families who are immigrants. We expect to publish a broad range of topics, including: whether immigration status should be a factor in basic family court legal standards; what responsibility family courts and related agencies have to tailor services for families with immigration-related issues; the duty of judges and attorneys to advise parties of immigration consequences of family court decisions; parental rights of detained non-citizen parents; the effect of undocumented immigration status on children’s mental health and overall well-being; and educating family court judges, attorneys and administrative personnel on relevant immigration issues. A symposium highlighting these topics will follow in November 2012.
To be eligible for publication, papers must be submitted by June 1, 2012. Submitted articles should be 15 – 20 double-spaced pages, including citations, notes, references, tables, and figures. Authors are requested to follow the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (5th edition) or the Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (19th Ed.). Publication decisions will be made shortly following the submission date and the publication of this special issue is expected to be completed in October 2012.
The Family Court Review is the quarterly research and academic journal of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC), edited at Hofstra University School of Law and published by Blackwell Publishing. AFCC is an interdisciplinary association of approximately three thousand judges, academics, researchers, counselors, evaluators, mediators, attorneys and others concerned with the constructive resolution of family conflict.
Please direct all inquiries to Professors Theo Liebmann and Lauris Wren, Special Issue Editors, by email at lawtsl and firstname.lastname@example.org.
Thursday, January 26, 2012
In a generation, American law has experienced dramatic reforms in response to domestic abuse. Feminist activism prompted and has driven these reforms and a deeper cultural understanding of domestic abuse, and recent legal innovation has yielded more effective options for victims of domestic violence. Virtually all of these reforms built upon existing legal structures to afford specific process and remedies to victims of domestic abuse, but why were innovations necessary if existing legal structures could have intervened on their own extant authority?
Customary, common law equity might have intervened effectively to interrupt violence in homes, to render injunctive relief for the protection of women and children, and to examine the dynamics of family violence. Despite this promise, equity failed for centuries as a means to protect victims of abuse in families. Now, equity has evolved, and society and culture are far better illuminated on matters of gender justice and the dynamics of intimate violence. Feminist reforms have taken root and flourished, and thelaw now empowers courts to intervene regularly in family matters. A persistent problem rises when lawmakers attempt to craft broad standards to address individualized, customized abuse. Equity can expand the tools available to courts to render justice for victims, especially victims who are not subject to physical violence. Equity can be an interstitial supplement when general law cannot accommodate unique, specific relationships that are abusive and violent.
This Article considers why traditional, common law equity failed historically to address domestic abuse and examines how equity now intersects with other legal remedies for victims. It concludes with a call to refine and improve equity in light of an illuminated, modern understanding of domestic abuse and gender justice, while claiming the old moral demands of a good judicial conscience, one that will suffer no wrong without rendering adequate, preventative and moral relief.
Monday, January 9, 2012
Over at Concurring Opinions, Naomi Cahn of George Washington University Law School recently reviewed Hendrik Hartog's "Someday All This Will be Yours: A History of Inheritance and Old Age" (Harvard University Press 2012). Cahn wrote:
The book touches upon family law, trusts and estates, property, contract, commodification, and (of course) the role of legal history, and it pulls these together with wonderful complexity and intertwined themes. It also should speak to many people on a personal level, whether they feel “’trapped’” into caring for elderly family members, well-compensated for providing this care, or simply honored to do so.
Read more here.
Sunday, January 8, 2012
Jennifer Levi (Western New England Univ. School of Law) has posted "Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples: Where We Are and Where We Are Going" on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The legal landscape for same-sex couples seeking to marry has shifted dramatically over the last five years. On October 10, 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court became the third state high court to rule that its state constitution could not sustain a statutory framework that excludes same-sex couples from marrying, following the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on November 18, 2003, and the California Supreme Court on May 15, 2008. Same-sex couples throughout the country have gotten married in Connecticut, Massachusetts, California, and in other countries throughout the world that provide full marriage equality, including in Canada. The Author discusses the developments in same-sex marriage in various jurisdictions.