Saturday, July 31, 2010
Friday, July 30, 2010
The 62-year study found that couples who know someone or are related to someone who gets divorced are 75 percent more likely to split up themselves.
Local marriage counselor Dr. Matt Borer said it works like an illness. He said it can spread through families, friends and even the office.
Read more here.
Thursday, July 29, 2010
America is embroiled in a culture war over homosexuality. The homosexual movement demands the end of “heteronormativity” -- the social and legal preference for heterosexuality. It insists that “Gay Is Good” -- just as good as heterosexuality. This article presents a defense of heteronormativity; it argues that straight is better. In particular, it argues that naturally conceiving, bearing and raising children is intrinsically good for parents; that it is both intrinsically and instrumentally good for children to be raised by their biological parents who are married to each other; and that traditional marriage is both intrinsically and instrumentally good for women and men. Because of the unique benefits of traditional marriage, it is also beneficial to society. Because of these benefits, society may legitimately favor heterosexuality (e.g., in public education), although it may not punish other forms of sexual behavior that are not harmful.
Nearly 20 percent of
"In recent decades, social pressure to play traditional roles has lessened in a broad variety of ways and there is more leeway for individual choice. This could play a part in lowering pressure for people to get married and bear children," said D'Vera Cohn, a co-author of the report.
"Women have more options than in the past to build strong careers and to exercise the choice not to have children," she added in an email.
Read more here.
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Emory University School of Law has issued a call for papers for a January 2011 Workshop titled "Aging as a Feminist Concern."
Read more details and submission procedures here: Download Call for Papers - Aging and Feminism
Potential contributors are encouraged to think creatively about the relationship between aging and gender, and how feminist legal theory can be brought to bear on understanding old-age policies. To this end, possible paper topics include:
What characterizes a feminist approach to aging and how does this differ from other approaches?
How do current discourses and practices of domestic violence, family law, employment/labor law, sexuality, masculinity, and political theory engage or fail to engage with the elder population?
How does the law reinforce or enhance the vulnerability and marginalization of the elderly?
What arguments can be made for and against the proposition that the government must support caretaking and caretakers of the elderly? How do these arguments differ from those made on behalf of the caretakers of children or the disabled?
How should government "protect" older adults, what are the implications of such protection, and how might feminist legal theory inform and guide our understanding of protective policies?
How should family responsibility be structured in old-age policy?
What are the implications of health care reform for older adults aging?
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence is re-evaluating its existing guidelines to determine whether infertility treatments for women over 39 should receive state-funding. Women aged 23 to 39 meeting set medical criteria currently are entitled up to three cycles of IVF on the NHS. Read about it here.
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
For prospective parents seeking to adopt U.S.-born babies, white infants are the most in demand and, relatively speaking, in the shortest supply. Some domestic adoption agencies have responded to this mismatch by assessing higher fees for the adoption of white infants than for infants of other races. After briefly considering the historically prominent role played by race in the different forms of domestic adoption, this Article explores the ethical and child-welfare concerns raised by race-based pricing in private adoption agencies.
The blogosphere is buzzing with commentary on the rape conviction received by an Arab in Israel for lying to a Jewish woman regarding his religion in order to have sex with her. The story is available here, read commentary here and here.
Monday, July 26, 2010
From the Houston Chronicle:
A judge Friday agreed to temporarily bar the allegedly transgendered widow of a Wharton firefighter from spending or collecting his death benefits.
State District Judge Randy Clapp ruled after hearing from Nikki Araguz that she received a check for $60,000 on Thursday, about a 10th of the total cash expected because of Thomas Araguz's July 4 death in an egg farm inferno.
The firefighter's parents have filed a lawsuit alleging that the marriage is void because Nikki Araguz was born a man.
Their attorney, Chad Ellis, said family members got what they wanted in Friday's hearing and expect to go forward.
"Nikki Araguz is someone who has conned people her entire life," said Ellis, an attorney for Simone Araguz, the firefighter's mother. "We are getting daily reports that Tommy Araguz was not the first person who this has happened to. She has deceived other men into thinking that she was born a woman."
If the marriage is voided in Texas, he said, all of the proceeds will go to Tommy Araguz's two sons from a prior marriage.
He said Thomas Araguz testified in a deposition two months ago that he did not know his wife was born a man, which was flatly disputed by Nikki Araguz.
"I had been completely honest with him about my entire history: legally, financially, physically, mentally, and medically," Nikki Araguz said after the hearing. "And I have evidence to prove such facts."
She said she looks forward to the outcome of the case.
"My husband and I loved each other very much," she said "When all of the evidence is presented, the whole world will know that I am Mrs. Capt. Thomas Araguz III, and I'm now a widow."
Nikki Araguz's attorneys have declined to comment on their defense but said they expect to file an answer to the lawsuit detailing their strategy in the coming weeks.
Friday's hearing was the first step in litigation to determine whether the two were legally married.
In court, Nikki Araguz's birth certificate, indicating that she was born a man, and an affidavit in which she changed her name were admitted into evidence.
The law that generally determines gender in Texas is a 1991 court case, Littleton v. Prange, which held that three factors - a person's gonads, genitalia and chromosomes - determine gender at birth.
Nikki Araguz's attorney, Phyllis Randolph Frye, who is transgendered, said she hopes this case will end that law.
Read the full story here.
Carter Dillard (Loyola University New Orleans) has posted Procreation, Harm, and the Constitution, 105 Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy 5 (2010) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This Essay provides relatively novel answers to two related questions: First, are there moral reasons to limit the sorts of existences it is permissible to bring people into, such that one would be morally prohibited from procreating in certain circumstances? Second, can the state justify a legal prohibition on procreation in those circumstances using that moral reasoning, so that the law would likely be constitutional?
These questions are not new, but my answers to them are and add to the existing literature in several ways. First, I offer a possible resolution to a recent debate among legal scholars regarding what has been called the nonidentity problem and its relation to the right to procreate. Second, using that resolution, I provide a novel constitutional argument that at least begins to justify limiting the right to procreate.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the nonidentity problem, explains why it creates seemingly irresolvable dilemmas for constitutional law, and sketches out two opposing positions in the legal debate. Part II uses a common exception to the nonidentity problem to buttress Lukas Meyer’s solution: the notion of threshold harm. If my argument holds true, one cannot admit there is such a thing as a life not “worth living” without endorsing the notion that future persons deserve lives above some minimum threshold of well-being. Finally, Part III analogizes threshold harm to the state’s compelling interest in protecting the welfare of living children. It demonstrates that if the state can limit the fundamental right to parent children when the parenting would cause the children’s lives to be below a defined threshold of well-being, then the state can limit the fundamental right to procreate.