Friday, March 13, 2009
A report prepared by University of South Florida researchers describes Florida's use of a federal waiver on expenditure of Title IV-E funds. Since October 2006, Florida has redirected monies from out-of-home care (i.e., foster care and group home placements) by expanding prevention, family preservation, and in-home and other diversionary services and supports for families involved in, or at risk of involvement in, the child welfare system. According to the data-laden report, Florida's community-based approach has resulted in improved outcomes for children with respect to safety and permanency, potentially signaling important innovations in child welfare policy and practice.
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
Monday, March 9, 2009
In his forthcoming article, "Child Welfare and Future Persons", Carter Dillard, Westerfield Fellow, at Loyola University, New Orleans takes on the questions raised by State v. Oakley, 629 NW2d 200 (Wis. 2001) that we find in most of our family law textbooks -- that is, when, if ever, are orders prohibiting procreation constitutional and enforceable? Here is the abstract of the article:
While ethicists have delved deep into the rights and wrongs of procreating, lawyers have had little to say about the matter, stymied by practical concerns, the tendency of the law to ignore prospective children and their interests, and the misperception that a fundamental rights boundary absolutely forbids state intervention. But recently a small door has opened in this wall between law and ethics: as courts faced with having to repeatedly remove abused and neglected children from parents adjudged unfit have issued temporary no-procreation orders. As precedent builds and the possibility of ex ante regulation of procreation and parenthood grows, a moral and legal debate is developing over what duties prospective parents owe their future children and the society with which those children will interact. But increasingly the debate is a muddle of inapposite and conflicting state probation and constitutional law in search of statutory guidance. This Article attempts to cut through it, and to state the intermediate-level principle at its core:
A prospective parent has a moral and legal duty to be fit when he or she has a child, one arising from or creating correlative claim-rights shared by the state and prospective children, and a prospective parent has no liberty to have a child until he or she is fit.
The Article then argues for codification of this principle, to be applied in cases of recurring child abuse and neglect.
Read the article on SSRN. (last visited March 9, 2009 bgf)