Wednesday, March 1, 2006
The Supreme Court in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., ruled Tuesday that the federal Hobbs Act Statute could not be used to prevent demonstrations by anti-abortion protestors at abortion clinics. The unanimous 8-0 ruling ends a case that was initiated in 1991 by health care clinics that perform abortions and a pro-choice national nonprofit organization that supports the legal availability of abortions, the National Organization For Women. The case was kept alive by the 7th U.S. Court of Appeals, which held in 2003 that that the laws could be used despite the Supreme Court decision that had lifted an injunction on pro-life defendants in the suit. In the present case, Justice Breyer, writing for the court, ruled that the Hobbs Act only covered threats of violence related to extortion and robbery.
The Hobbs Act says that an individual commits a federal crime if he or she “obstructs, delays, or affects commerce” by (1) “robbery,” (2) “extortion,” or (3) “commit[ting] or threaten[ing] physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section. The dispute here concerned the meaning of the words, “in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section.” If the phrase is construed as referring to violence committed pursuant to plans or purposes that affect interstate commerce through robbery or extortion, the statute governs only a limited subset of violent behavior, namely, behavior connected with robbery and extortion. However, if the language is construed to refer to any violence committed pursuant to those plans or purposes that affect interstate commerce, it governs a broad range of human activity, namely, all violent actions against persons or property that affect interstate commerce.
The Court held that that physical violence unrelated to robbery or extortion falls outside the scope of the Hobbs Act. This language, as construed by the Court, means that behavior that obstructs, delays, or affects commerce is a “violation” of the statute only if that behavior also involves robbery or extortion (or related attempts or conspiracies).
In rejecting the theory that the protests were a kind of “extortion,” the Court noted that in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U. S. 393 (2003) (NOW II), it stated that the Hobbs Act defines “extortion” as necessarily including the improper “obtaining of property from another.” It said that the claimed “property” consisted of “a woman’s right to seek medical services from a clinic, the right of the doctors, nurses or other clinic staff to perform their jobs, and the right of the clinics to provide medical services free from wrongful threats, violence, coercion and fear.” It declared that “[w]hatever the outer boundaries may be, the effort to characterize [the protestors] actions . . . as an “obtaining of property from” respondents is well beyond them.” It held in NOW II that “because [the protestors] did not “obtain” property from respondents, [the protestors] “did not commit extortion” as defined by the Hobbs Act. It also found that the state extortion law violations, and other extortion-related violations, were flawed for the same reason and must also be set aside. (reo). You may download here the Supreme Court_abortion_opinion.pdf