Tuesday, December 23, 2008
BOSTON, MASS. - DOJ filed a criminal information today in federal court charging a wholly owned subsidiary of ExxonMobil Corporation with violating the criminal provisions of the Clean Water
Act in connection with a spill of approximately 15,000 gallons of diesel oil and kerosene into the Mystic River from ExxonMobil's oil terminal in Everett, Mass. The information was filed in connection with a $6.1 million settlement.
According to the information, ExxonMobil Corporation and its corporate predecessors have owned a marine distribution terminal in Everett, Mass. (the "Everett Terminal") since 1929. Oil tankers deliver petroleum products that are distributed from the terminal throughout the region. ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, is a wholly owned subsidiary of, and operates the facility on behalf of, ExxonMobil Corporation. The Everett Terminal included an inland "tank farm," which was comprised of a tank loading rack and 29 large-scale oil storage tanks in which oil products were stored. Various above-ground pipes and valves connected those tanks to the Terminal's marine transfer area located at the confluence of the Mystic and Island End Rivers. ExxonMobil's failure to replace a leaking seal valve and a corroded coupling at the transfer station, known to be faulty, was the cause of the spill. ExxonMobil also negligently failed to conduct required inspections by which it would have detected the spill while it was still ongoing.
As part of its plea agreement, ExxonMobil has agreed to pay the maximum possible fine of $359,018 (twice the cost of the clean up), the clean up costs of $179,634, and a community service payment of $5,640,982 to the North American Wetlands Conservation Act fund to be
used to restore wetlands in Massachusetts. ExxonMobil further agreed that for the next three years, the Everett facility will be monitored by an court-appointed official and will be subject to a rigorous environmental compliance program.
The Island End River flows into the Mystic River, which flows into Boston Harbor. Both rivers are navigable waterways of the United States.
As depicted in the attached diagram, the Terminal's marine
transfer area was comprised of three berths (Berths 1, 3 and 4).
Barges and ships offload petroleum products that were piped to and
stored in the tanks within the tank farm. Those products were then
piped to the Terminal truck loading rack, where they were loaded onto
trucks for distribution. Berth 1 is an approximately 500-foot long
extended southwesterly from the Everett shoreline and ran parallel to the Island End River. Berths 3 and 4 were situated side-by-side on an approximately 1000 foot dock that ran from the outermost end of Berth 1 northwesterly to the Everett shoreline, parallel with the Mystic River, with Berth 3 being closer to Berth 1.
The product receipt lines at Berth 1 ran parallel to the Berth 1 dock to approximately the point where the Berth1 dock met the Berth 3 dock, and from that point those lines ran parallel to the Berth 3 dock, where they ultimately were connected to the Berth 3 product receipt lines. The Berth 1 product receipt lines were isolated from the Berth 3 product receipt lines by seal valves, which were designed to prevent product being offloaded at Berth 3 from flowing into the Berth 1 product receipt lines.
The Everett Terminal was operated and maintained by a staff of approximately 14 employees situated in an office building adjacent to the tank farm and just north of the marine transfer facility. The regular Terminal staff consisted of a terminal superintendent, terminal supervisor, nine terminal operators who covered the Terminal's 24-hour operations, electrician, mechanic and accountant. At any given time, at least two terminal operators were on duty. Additional Terminal support was provided by a field operations specialist, an area administrator and an area engineer.
ExxonMobil was responsible for the proper operation and
maintenance of the facility. These responsibilities entailed, among
other duties, monitoring the Terminal, and when necessary, cleaning,
repairing, and replacing, as appropriate, worn or damaged equipment, including pipes, valves, docks, and tanks. Likewise, ExxonMobil was responsible for monitoring the transfer of petroleum products at each point in the process: from delivery at the marine transfer area, through the receipt and storage of those products in the tank farm, and to the loading of the products onto trucks at the truck loading rack. It was therefore necessary that facility employees remain alert to pressure drops or spikes during transfer operations and to monitor the site visually for spills, hazards or other irregularities.
At approximately 4:30 A.M. on Jan. 9, 2006, the oil tanker M/V
Nara docked at Berth 3 to unload petroleum products, including
approximately 3.1 million gallons of low sulfur diesel (LSD) fuel, which
is blue-green in color and is used as fuel in various types of engines. Later that morning, hoses running from the Nara's tanks were attached to a product intake manifold on Berth 3. By mid-afternoon, pumps aboard the Nara began to pump LSD fuel from the vessel through the manifold into a product receipt line that was connected to storage tanks on the tank farm. As it was being pumped from the Nara, the LSD flowed past a 10-inch seal valve located on Berth 3, which closed off a product receipt line from Berth 1. As a result of wear and tear, the valve did not close completely and leaked oil into the Berth 1 product receipt line.
ExxonMobil was aware of this defect. In September 2005, a
contractor pressure-tested the value and informed ExxonMobil that it
leaked. Nevertheless, ExxonMobil had failed to replace the valve by the
time the Nara arrived in January 2006. As a result, LSD pumped from the Nara leaked by the defective valve into the Berth 1 product receipt line. The line was approximately 610 feet long and 10 inches in
diameter, and was filled with approximately 2,500 gallons of low sulfur kerosene. At the other end of the line was a pressure relief valve capped by a 3/4-inch coupling. The coupling had not been replaced in more than 30 years, was unpainted and was badly corroded.
As the Nara's delivery continued, the leakage by the seal valve
on Berth 3 built pressure in the Berth 1 product receipt line until the
coupling on Berth 1 burst. The rupture sent the kerosene in the pipe,
along with LSD from the Nara, pouring through the destroyed coupling into a rectangular containment pan on Berth 1, as depicted in the attached photograph. The fuel filled the containment pan and began to spill over its side and into the Mystic River below. The spill continued until approximately 5:00 A.M. on January 10, when pumping from the Nara ended.
A total of approximately 2,500 gallons of kerosene and 12,700
gallons of LSD poured into the Mystic River, causing a visible
blue-green sheen on the Mystic River that eventually spread up the
Island End River and down to Boston Harbor, and prompting several
reports to the Coast Guard. ExxonMobil personnel did not discover the
ruptured coupling and the full containment pan on Berth 1 until
approximately 11:00 A.M. on January 11, when the Coast Guard arrived at the facility to ask questions about the origin of the sheen.
ExxonMobil's negligent failure to provide adequate resources and oversight to the maintenance and operation of the Everett terminal was a direct cause of the spill. In particular, ExxonMobil negligently failed to replace the leaking seal valve on Berth 3, and to replace the unpainted and corroded coupling at Berth 1, which ruptured as a result of the leakage and pressure build-up in the product receipt line.
ExxonMobil also negligently allowed the spill to continue after it should have been discovered by failing adequately to monitor the transfer operations from the Nara. Although ExxonMobil's employees were required to perform regular walk-through inspections of the berths, they failed to do so while the containment pan was spilling LSD into the Mystic River. Because the segment of the walkway over the containment pan was partially submerged when the pan filled, a routine walk-through of the berth, had one been performed, inevitably would have resulted in the detection of the spill while it was still occurring.