Monday, November 23, 2015
Mass. Appellate Court Reinstates Legal Malpractice Verdict Following Flawed Medicaid-Planning Advice
In October 2015, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether there were damages flowing from a lawyer's Medicaid advice to an older couple. The lawyer had counseled that, for Medicaid planning reasons, the couple should not retain a life estate in a house purchased with their money but held in the name of their adult children. The court found the surviving mother suffered real damages, even if eviction from the house by her children was unlikely. Key allegations included:
Thirteen years later, in July of 2007, the Brissettes [the parents] and two of their four children, Paul Brissette and Cynthia Parenteau, met at [Attorney] Ryan's office to discuss the Brissettes' desires to sell the South Hadley home and to buy property located in Springfield. They discussed the prospect of putting the Springfield property in the names of Paul and Cynthia. Ryan told the Brissettes that if they reserved life estates in the Springfield property, they could be ineligible for Medicaid if they applied any time within five years of getting the life estates. He also told them that if they took life estates in the Springfield property, there could be a Medicaid lien against that property when they died. There was evidence that the Brissettes asked about “protection,” but Ryan told them that he did not feel that the Brissettes needed protection because they could trust their children to do what they wanted them to do. In reliance on Ryan's advice, the Brissettes decided that the Springfield property would be bought with their money but put in Paul's and Cynthia's names, and that the Brissettes would not have life estates in the Springfield house.
After her husband's death. Mrs. Brissette concluded she wished to own "her" home in her own name, but the children declined to re-convey the property to her.
During the malpractice trial, Lawyer Ryan conceded his advice about the effect of a life estate on Medicaid and/or a Medicaid lien was wrong, and expert witnesses also testified that the incorrect Medicaid advice was "below the standard of care applicable to the average qualified attorney advising clients for Medicaid planning."
Friday, November 20, 2015
Filial Friday: Court Finds Less Than "Ideal" Childhood Not Enough to Release Duty to Support Indigent Parent
It is, perhaps, a mark of the growing acceptance of filial support obligations in Pennsylvania courts -- although not necessarily equating with understanding by the general public in Pennsylvania -- that a recent appeal from a filial support ruling resulted merely in a "nonprecedential" opinion by the appellate court, one that adopts the findings of the lower court.
In Eori v. Eori, 2015 WL 6736193, (Aug. 7, 2015) the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court's award of $400 per month in support with a short opinion. This ruling obligates one son, the defendant, to contribute financially towards the care of his 90-year old mother, being provided in the home of another brother. The incorporated findings of fact, from the lower court, track a sad family story. One point in dispute was whether the mother's alleged actions during the son's childhood constituted the defense of "abandonment":
Defendant’s next error complained of on appeal pertains to the second defense Outlined in 23 Pa. C.S.A. Section 4603(2)(ii), which negates the obligation of filial support when it is established that the parent seeking support abandoned the child during a ten year period of the child’s minority. In this case, the Defendant argued that he was abandoned and raised as error number six that the trial court failed to consider said testimony. The term “abandoned” is not defined in the act itself, However, the Custody Act at 23 Pa.C.S.A. Section 5402 defines “abandoned” as “left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision.” Defendant testified that he did not have the greatest family growing up and he wanted to get away. . . . He testified that his grandmother cared for him more than his Mother; however, they were never far apart because he testified that his grandmother either lived with Mother or beside Mother. . . . Although he testified that Mother was abusive, left and caused them to move many times, and was either gone or fighting, he never established that she left for a ten year period. He did not provide details or time periods on any of the testimony presented.
The lower court concluded: "Therefore, it was not clear from [son's] testimony that Mother ever left for a ten year period without provision for his reasonable and necessary care or supervision. Although it may not have been an ideal childhood, there was no evidence of abandonment to release Defendant from his obligation to support Mother."
Procedural note: In Pennsylvania, trial judges have the option of waiting to write "opinions" explaining their "orders" until after a notice of appeal is filed by a party. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 1925. Further, the trial judge can also require the appealing party to file a "statement of errors," in advance of the trial judge's obligation to write an opinion. I don't know how many states use this process, but certainly by comparison to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is a rather unique opportunity for judges to write an opinion, as did the trial judge in the Eori case, that, in essence, expresses views on the merits of the "appeal."
For those gathering together as family for Thanksgiving next week, perhaps this case history provides lessons.
Wednesday, November 11, 2015
In the October 2015 issue of the Pennsylvania Bar Quarterly, attorney Owen Kelly reports on "The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Elder Law Task Force Report and Recommendations" as a "Blueprint for Justice." His overview provides:
Our Commonwealth is in the midst of a period of unprecedented growth in its elder population and this growth is projected to continue for the foreseeable future. The growing elder population will present profound challenges to the Commonwealth's courts, particularly with respect to guardianships, abuse and neglect, and access to justice. In April 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established the Elder Law Task Force to address the impact this growing segment of the population will have on the judicial system. In November 2014, the Task Force issued its report which contained a multitude of recommendations on a variety of issues related to elders' interactions with the court system. Since their creation on January 1, 2015, the two entities charged with overseeing implementation of the Task Force's recommendations -- the Office of Elder Justice in the Courts and the Advisory Council on Elder Justice in the Courts -- have been actively implementing many of the recommendations. Task Force recommendations implemented or in progress include: proposed new and revised guardianship forms; education and training initiatives; proposed changes to the Rules of Criminal Procedure; revising bar admission rules to allow retired or voluntarily inactive attorneys to provide pro bono services for elders; a study of a pilot Elder Court; and changes to the statewide electronic case management system to allow for better monitoring of guardianships.
As someone who was a member of the Task Force, I am glad see that concrete steps are underway to implement changes, especially with respect to better accountability for guardianships on a state-wide basis. Much work is ahead.
Thursday, November 5, 2015
Are There Limitations on Estate "Re-Planning" Following Adult Adoptions, Especially for Same-Sex Couples?
In my course on Wills, Trusts and Estates, students always seem to be intrigued by "adult adoptions." There can be a variety of reasons for an adult adoption, often tied to estate planning goals, including attempts to create statutory heirs that can nullify challenges by other family members to bequests in traditional estate documents, such as wills or trusts on the grounds of "undue influence." Sometimes the cases are connected to sad facts, such as the troubled life of tobacco heiress Doris Duke, who at age of 75 adopted a much younger woman, but came to regret that fact, leading to a mostly unsuccessful attempt at disinheritance. Robert Sitkoff's casebook on Wills Trusts & Estates has a fascinating profile of the Duke case, even though the original reasons for the adoption were not entirely clear.
In the news this week is a less unhappy, but still complicated case -- and I imagine there could be similar cases around the country -- where in 2012, after forty years as a same-sex couple, a retired teacher adopted his partner, a retired writer:
Now, they're trying to undo the adoption to get married and a state trial court judge has rejected their request, saying his ability to annul adoptions is generally limited to instances of fraud.
"We never thought we'd see the day" that same-sex marriage would be legal in Pennsylvania, Esposito, 78, told CNN in a telephone interview. The adoption "gave us the most legitimate thing available to us" at the time, said Bosee, 68.
Thursday, October 22, 2015
In one of those feature articles that The New York Times does so well, N.R. Kleinfeld reports The Lonely Death of George Bell. It is a sad story, as Mr. Bell died in his apartment at the age of 72 and no one "missed him," so his body was not discovered for days. You may have stopped reading precisely because it is such a sad story. But, at the same time, George's story is a surprising tale of the potential consequences of dying alone. The article lays out the layers of necessary decision-making, from the simplest of questions -- where will George be buried -- to the complex, where public authorities must hunt for an executor and for beneficiaries named in George's 30-year old will. Then, in turn they must hunt for their heirs, when it turns out that this modest man's death left behind almost a half million dollar estate and few living connections.
My thanks to Penn State law student Kevin Horne who shared with me the link to this interesting story. As he points out, this story gives another side to our course on Wills Trusts & Estates.
Wednesday, October 21, 2015
The ABA Section on Family Law has devoted the entire Fall 2015 issue of its Family Advocate magazine to "Crossing Paths with a Trust." The paper copy of the issue just appeared on my desk. The opening editorial advises family law attorneys advising clients considering divorce not to fear trusts:
Lawyers who simply take a deep breath and read the trust will often be surprised to learn that they have in their hands a road map for how assets will be managed, who gets what, when they get it, and under what terms.
The articles in the issue include a "plain English guide to trusts as a means of orchestrating assets in divorce cases," how trusts can interact with disclosure requirements for premarital agreements, how to address equitable division of interests assigned to trusts, the use of child support or alimony trusts, and the unique potential advantages for using trusts for "special needs" planning for disabled children. The issue ends with a bonus -- a primer on "will basics."
The articles underscore what I sometimes find myself saying to law students, that courses on "wills, trusts and estates" are about advanced family law issues, and that if families fail to address disputes among family members while they are still living, the issues may not be any less complicated when the asset-holding family member passes away.
The entire issue seems like a good resource for a wide audience, including law students. Unfortunately, the on-line version of Family Advocate issues is restricted to ABA Family Law Section members, at least during the first few weeks of publication. Apparently you can purchase paper copies (see for example the rates for the previous issue, for Summer 2015) , including bulk orders, although I find there is often a lag time for specific issues to become available to purchase. I guess you have to keep checking!
October 21, 2015 in Estates and Trusts, Ethical Issues, Health Care/Long Term Care, Housing, Legal Practice/Practice Management, Property Management, Retirement, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, October 20, 2015
ABA's Bifocal, an electronic journal from the ABA Commission on Law and Aging has released one of its October issue articles. Written by Charlie Sabatino in his usual bold style, we confront ten "Myths and Facts About Health Care Advance Directives," sometimes better (if confusingly) known as "living wills." To tease the article, Myth #3 is "Advance Directives are legally binding, so doctors have to follow them." You will want to read the rest of the story....
Thursday, October 15, 2015
When One Spouse Uses Community Funds to Care for His Infirm Parent, Is That A Breach Of Fiduciary Duty to His Spouse?
Last week I spoke on filial support duties, and one question from the audience was whether Pennsylvania's filial support law could obligate someone to provide for a stepparent. My answer under Pennsylvania law was "probably not." My analysis was based on Pennsylvania cases, such as Commonwealth v. Goldman, that had used a strict definition of parent-child relationship for purposes of calculating the limits on indigent support obligations, although doing so in the context of in-laws rather than stepparents.
But something in the back of my mind was itching, and of course, over the weekend I started scratching. I remembered a case, which did seem to recognize a potential for indirect obligations to "parents-in-law."
The case is from California, where divorcing spouses were arguing over division of community property. One focus of the disputes was proceeds of the sale of a former house. While rejecting an argument that the sale of the property transmuted the funds into 50/50 separate property, a California appellate court was willing to consider the expenditure by the husband of some of these funds to care for his "infirm mother" to be a "community debt." Further, the court observed that unlike the obligation to "reimburse the community" for payment out of community funds to support a child not of that marriage, there was no statutory obligation to "reimburse the community" if the funds were used to care for one spouse's parent.
Pointing to California's "not commonly known" filial responsibility law, the court held that if the funds were actually spent for care of his indigent mother, such use did not constitute an "unauthorized gift."
The court went further, however, noting that "a spouse's debt payments may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty and run afoul" of California law dealing with contracts with third parties, when entered into by only one married party. A bit of a Catch-22 problem, right? However, this interesting fiduciary duty issue "was not raised" in the parties' briefs and therefore was not resolved on this appeal.
On remand, husband was "entitled to establish the funds were expended to support his mother, who was in need and unable to maintain herself." For the full analysis, including citations to the relevant California statutes, see In re the Marriage of Leni (2006).
Tuesday, October 13, 2015
In the last few months, I've been getting calls about folks involved in disputes with what I would call two levels of concern. First, there is the concern about how to represent a client with a disability, especially a disability such as dementia, that can make it problematic to ascertain whether the client fully understands his or her own safety or personal care needs. But, the second level is perhaps even more important, the question of whether the lawyer or lawyers involved in the dispute have fully analyzed the questions of "who is my client?" and "do I have a conflict of interest?"
A case that demonstrates well the potential tensions between client capacity, client best interests, and the needs for attorneys to be self-aware, is Dayton Bar Association v. Parisi, 565 N.E. 2d 268 (Ohio 2012). The disciplinary proceeding arose out of two separate client matters, both involving "older" clients. In the first matter, what I call the classic elder law issue of "who is my client" is at the heart of the problem. The decision emphasizes that just wanting to keep the "client safe" is not a defense to a conflict.
In this matter, the attorney in question "began to provide legal services for ... a 93-year-old woman who claimed that she was being held against her will in a nursing home."
The lawyer became concerned about the client's "financial welfare, ... confusion and disorientation," and therefore "applied for a guardianship on the ground the individual was incapacitated as a result of Alzheimer's-related memory loss."
As the Disciplinary proceedings analyzed, the decision of the lawyer to file a guardianship petition may have been consistent with Ohio Rule of Professional Conduct (similar to ABA Rule) 1.14(b) which the Court viewed as permitting "a lawyer to file a petition for guardianship of a client when no less-restrictive alternatives are available."
However, the attorney then had the client "sign a durable power of attorney" and the POA appointed the lawyer as her agent. Next the attorney withdrew her own application for the guardianship, and filed a separate application for guardianship on behalf of the niece.
Compounding this series of conflicts of interest, the disciplinary proceeding addresses the fact that the attorney eventually used the POA as authority to pay "her own fees of more than $18,000 without first obtaining the court's order."
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Disciplinary Board's finding that representing both the woman and her niece in a guardianship violated Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a)(2) on conflict of interest. Further, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the Board that the attorney's use of the POA to pay her own legal fees while the guardianship application was pending was improper.
The full opinion is well worth reviewing, especially as the second matter leading to the lawyer's suspension from the practice of law involved the attorney billing for legal services plus "non-legal" services she performed as an agent under a POA for an older man whose "extended family was either unwilling or unable to assist in his care."
The Disciplinary Board found, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, that doing a "good job" and helping the man avoid a nursing home did not suffice to justify the $200K plus fees in question. The Court singled out a prime example of the attorney's overbilling, charging "approximately $13,000 in fees and expenses for overseeing the partial restoration of [the man's] beloved Jaguar."
October 13, 2015 in Cognitive Impairment, Dementia/Alzheimer’s, Elder Abuse/Guardianship/Conservatorship, Estates and Trusts, Ethical Issues, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, October 9, 2015
In a convergence of my teaching, research and public outreach work, this week I've found myself in several overlapping conversations about whether adult children have obligations -- moral or legal -- to care for or financially support their parents.
This week, following my Elder Law Prof Blog post recommending Hendrik Hartog's fascinating book, Someday All This Will Be Yours, which I also recommended to my Trust & Estate students, I had a nice series of virtual conversations with Dirk about his book. What a thoughtful historian he is. We were talking about his research-based observation in the book about adult children and needy parents:
Adult children were not legally bound to remain and to work for their parents. Nor were they obligated to care for the old. Adult children were, paradigmatically and legally, free individuals, "emancipated," to use the technical term. . . . Furthermore, there was little -- perhaps nothing-- to keep an uncaring or careless adult child from allowing a parent to go over the hill to the poorhouse.
I asked, "what about filial support laws?" Turns out that was a timely question because Professor Hartog had just been interviewed for a Freakonomics Radio episode, "Should Kids Pay Back Their Parent for Raising Them?" The program became publically available, via podcast or written transcript, on October 8, 2015. In the interview Professor Hartog was asked to comment on filial support laws. He said in part:
Filial responsibility statutes are very weak efforts to ensure that the young will support the old if they are needy.... They rarely are enforced. Very, very, very, very rarely. So, you know, in a sense, every time they are enforced they become a New York Times article or they become an article in the local newspapers.
Professor Hartog was speaking in large measure from the perspective of his important historical research, including review of a body of case reports from New Jersey spanning some 100 years from the mid 1880s to the mid 1900s. And based on my own historical research, I would also say that in the U.S., filial support laws have been rarely enforced, although I would characterize the enforcement as often "episodic" in nature, especially after the growth of Social Security and Medicaid benefits. But...
I think the modern story is quite different in at least one state -- Pennsylvania. Part of this difference is tied to the fact that Pennsylvania's filial support law permits enforcement by commercial third-parties, including nursing homes, as I discussed in my 2013 article on Filial Support Laws in the Modern Era. Other U.S. jurisdictions with "modern" enforcement cases are South Dakota and Puerto Rico.
Indeed, I'm speaking on October 9, 2015 at the invitation of a Bench and Bar Conference in Gettysburg, PA about "The Festering Hot Topic" of Filial Support Laws in Pennsylvania. In the presentation, I report on controversies arising from recent, aggressive collection efforts by law firms representing nursing homes, as well the latest examples of successful enforcement suits by nursing homes and family members. I also analyze a disturbing additional claim, where Germany is seeking to enforce its filial support law to compel a U.S. resident to pay toward the costs of care for an ailing father in Germany.
Ultimately, I think that Professor Hartog and I agree more than we disagree about the lack of behavioral impact flowing from filial support laws. As demonstrated by Professor Hartog in his book, much care and support is provided by children, but flowing from complicated moral or personal inclinations, rather than statute-based lawsuits.
This seems a more realistic paradigm, although not without opportunities for misunderstanding and disappointment. But, as I often observe, the very last person I would want involved in my care would be someone who is doing it "only" because a statute -- much less a court -- is telling them they must care for me.
October 9, 2015 in Books, Current Affairs, Estates and Trusts, Ethical Issues, Health Care/Long Term Care, Housing, International, Medicaid, Social Security, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, October 6, 2015
We have mentioned Hendrik Hartog's book, Someday All This Will Be Yours: A History of Inheritance and Old Age, (Harvard Press 2012) on this Blog as we did on this post outlining a recent symposium law review with articles inspired by the book. I've been remiss, however, in not recommending the book directly.
So let me correct that oversight now. If you haven't read Princeton Professor Hartog's book, or if (as was true for me for too long) you have allowed the book to sit on your "to read" stack, it's time to get to it. The book is a treasure of analysis, commentary, legal history, critique and provocation arising from the simple proposition that in many relationships, someone often utters (or thinks they have heard) words to the effect, "when I'm gone, someday, all this will be yours." The underlying legal question is what happens when no document (such as a will, a trust, or a contract) puts that pledge into writing.
I find much to talk about when reading Hartog's words. One curious item he describes is a poem, "Over the Hill to the Poor House," published by Will Carleton in 1872. Hartog explains that the poem is the source for the now common saying "over the hill" to refer to persons of a certain age. But Hartog points out that the poem's poignancy comes from its all-too-true narrative by one woman about what it can be like to grow old, frail and widowed, even if you have a large family of loving children.
From the closing lines of the poem:
An’ then I went to Thomas, the oldest son I’ve got,
For Thomas’s buildings’d cover the half of an acre lot;
But all the child’rn was on me—I couldn’t stand their sauce—
And Thomas said I needn’t think I was comin’ there to boss.
An’ then I wrote to Rebecca, my girl who lives out West,
And to Isaac, not far from her—some twenty miles at best;
And one of’em said’twas too warm there for any one so old,
And t’other had an opinion the climate was too cold.
So they have shirked and slighted me,an' shifted me about-
So they have well-nigh soured me,an' wore my old heart out;
But still I've borne up pretty well, an' wasn't much put down,
Till Charley went to the poor-master, an' put me on the town.
Over the hill to the poor-house--my chil'rn dear, good-by!
Many a night I've watched you when only God was nigh;
And God 'll judge between us; but I will al'ays pray
That you shall never suffer the half I do to-day.
And for a colorful "sung" version of the poem, with a change in gender for point-of-view, go to Lester Flatt and Earl Scrugg's version of Over the Hills to the Poorhouse.
Over 140 years later, we still hear the phrase "over the hill" in less-than-kind contexts, but one hopes the prospects for care and assistance are not quite as grim as described in these verses.
Monday, October 5, 2015
Illinois adopted a new law, Public Act 098-1093, effective on January 1, 2015 that assigns a "presumptively void" status to bequests made to non-family caregivers, if the transfer would take effect upon the death of the cared-for person. The law applies only to post-effective date bequests that are greater than $20,000 in fair market value. The statutory presumption can be "overcome if the transferee proves to the court" either:
1. by a preponderance of the evidence that the transferee's share under the transfer instrument is not greater than the share the transferee was entitled to receive under ... a transfer instrument in effect prior to the transferee becoming a caregiver, or
2. by clear and convincing evidence the transfer was not the product of fraud, duress or undue influence.
The law only applies in civil actions where the transfer is challenged by other beneficiaries or heirs.
(Fun) Spoiler Alert: The new law plays a clever "starring role" in the Fall 2015 season premiere of The Good Wife. Let's see how many of our law students were watching!
October 5, 2015 in Current Affairs, Elder Abuse/Guardianship/Conservatorship, Estates and Trusts, Ethical Issues, Film, Property Management, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations | Permalink | Comments (1)
Thursday, October 1, 2015
The Michigan Supreme Court recently invited amicus briefing by Elder Law attorneys and Disability Rights attorneys, in advance of oral argument in an interesting case involving a nursing home resident's claims of false imprisonment by the facility. The legal question of what is sometimes referred to as an "involuntary" admission for care initiated by family members or concerned others acting as "agents" for an unhappy or uncooperative principal, is important and challenging, especially if accompanied by conflicting assessments of mental capacity.
Following the Michigan Court of Appeals' 2014 ruling in Estate of Roush v. Laurels of Carson City LLC, in September 2015 the Michigan Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments on whether there are genuine issues of material fact on the resident's claim of falsely imprisonment for a period of approximately two weeks. Ms. Roush alleges the nursing home acted improperly in reliance on her "patient advocate," claiming that she was fully able to make health care decisions for herself, and therefore there were no legally valid grounds for her advocate to trump her wishes. Alternatively, Ms. Roush argued she validly terminated the patient advocate's authority.
In Michigan, individuals may appoint a statutorily-designated "patient advocate," with limited authority as an agent for certain health care decisions. Michigan law provides at M.C.L.A. Section 700.5506 that: "The [written] patient advocate designation must include a statement that the authority conferred under this section is exercisable only when the patient is unable to participate in medical or mental health treatment decisions...."
The Supreme Court's order identified specific issues for additional briefing by the parties. Further, the court expressly invited the "Elder Law and Disability Rights Section of the State Bar of Michigan. . . to file a brief amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae."
October 1, 2015 in Advance Directives/End-of-Life, Cognitive Impairment, Consumer Information, Dementia/Alzheimer’s, Elder Abuse/Guardianship/Conservatorship, Ethical Issues, Health Care/Long Term Care, Housing, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, September 15, 2015
The New Mexico Court of Appeals issued its opinion in August in the case of Morris, et al v.Brandenburg. The trial court had previously ruled that the statute in question, N.M. § 30-2-4 was unconstitutional. The appellate court determined that "[t]he question presented is whether this statute may constitutionally be applied to criminalize a willing physician's act of providing a lethal dose of a prescribed medication at the request of a mentally competent, terminally ill patient who wishes a peaceful end of life (aid in dying) as an alternative to one potentially marked by suffering, pain, and/or the loss of autonomy and dignity." id. at ¶ (1). The trial court had found a fundamental liberty interest to have physician aid-in-dying under the state constitution, but the appellate court disagreed. id.
Aid in dying, the medical concept of dying with autonomy and dignity, is a relatively recent human phenomena and deserves appropriate public evaluation and consideration. However, as a new legal consideration, it must also be carefully weighed against longstanding societal principles such as preventing a person from taking the life of another; preventing suicide; preventing assisted suicide; promoting the integrity, healing, and life preserving principles of the medical profession; protecting vulnerable groups from unwanted pressure to considering aid in dying as the best alternative to other medical options; and promoting human life where aid in dying is not the appropriate medical option despite a patient's request for its use... The recent advances in life-prolonging medical care and the public acceptance of aid in dying in some states has not diminished the other longstanding societal principles and concerns regarding intentional killing, the dying process, the preservation of life, and the basic life saving principles embedded in the medical profession.
Id. at ¶ 37 (citations omitted). The appellate court goes on to note that the dying process itself and the resulting death are not included in the state's constitutional enumerated rights and " can only qualify as inferences that might exist within the categories of liberty or happiness." id. at ¶ 41. The court also had concerns regarding the narrow application of the right as it would only apply to certain citizens who are terminally ill, death within a certain time, etc. id. at ¶¶ 45-47 After reviewing the remaining arguments of the plaintiffs, the majority ruled.
We reverse the district court's ruling that aid in dying is a fundamental liberty interest under the New Mexico Constitution. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order permanently enjoining the State from enforcing Section 30-2-4. We affirm the district court's determination that, for statutory construction purposes, Section 30-2-4 prohibits aid in dying. Separate from the Concurring Opinion, I would also remand this case to the district court to make any further findings it deems necessary, to conduct both an intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review of Section 30-2-4, as well as dispose of Plaintiffs' remaining claims.
Id. at ¶ 54. The opinion includes concurring and dissenting opinions.
As we have tracked recently on this Blog, in a number of states, including Florida and Nevada, serious questions have been raised about the roles of guardians for disabled and elderly persons, and the extent to which there should be public oversight of guardians, especially "paid" guardians, including public guardians, "professional" guardians or "private" guardians.
In Florida, newly proposed legislation, Senate Bill 232 (filed in September 2015) would seek to clarify state oversight of all guardians, following on the heels of amendments to Florida state law enacted in mid-2015. Florida's legislature may take up the latest bill early in 2016, according to media reports. Key provisions in the bill include:
- renaming of the current office of "public guardianships," with expanded duties and responsibilities, to create the "Office of and Professional Guardians;"
- addition of findings about the potential need for a "public guardian" where there is "no willing and responsible family member or friend, other person, bank, or corporation available to serve;"
- a requirement that "professional" guardians "shall" register with the state;
- directions to establish a comprehensive system for receipt and state action on complaints made about professional guardians.
From reading SB 232, it seems to me there may be some attempt to appease the concerns about the potential for overregulation of so-called "professional" guardians, as new language in Section 744.2001 requires development and implementation of a new "monitoring tool to ensure compliance of professional guardians with standards" set by the Office, but this "monitoring tool may not include a financial audit " as specified in another section of the law (emphasis added).
Funding will be needed to make expanded oversight effective.
September 15, 2015 in Consumer Information, Elder Abuse/Guardianship/Conservatorship, Ethical Issues, Property Management, Social Security, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, September 11, 2015
In a recent decision in a complicated and long-running guardianship case, an appellate court in Illinois highlights a topic I'm seeing more and more often: How should courts "value" scores given by evaluators on mental status exams, especially when addressing guardianship issues?
The most recent opinion in Estate of Koenen, issued August 31, 2015, described testimony from multiple witnesses about the mental status of a man in a "plenary guardianship" proceeding. In two reports, from physicians chosen by the individual, the medical experts opined he was "capable of making his own personal and financial decisions." Another witness, a psychiatrist, was appointed by the court to evaluate the individual's "ability to make personal and financial decisions." Ultimately, the lower court concluded the individual was unable to manage his affairs.
On appeal, a central issue was the lower court's reliance on the court-appointed expert. Part of the psychiatrist's testimony was that the man "scored 26 out of 30, at the low end of the normal range" on the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA)" administered in January 2012, a test that was described by the court as a "twelve-minute test with standardized questions, as well as writing and 'copying' tests." The psychiatrist also testified that in January 2013 he tested the man again with a score on the MOCA that was "now 22 out of 30 which was 'fully consistent with dementia.'"
Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, noting the extensive use of interviews and other data collection by the court-appointed physician to support the findings of incapacity. The appellate court seemed interested however, in the actual number scores, taking note that the court-appointed expert discounted scores reported by the individual's preferred physicians on "Folstein or 'mini-mental' examination[s]" on the grounds that the MOCA test was more sensitive "for dementia."
Reading this challenging case is a reminder of the ABA-APA Handbooks, for attorneys, psychologists, and judges, on assessing capacity of older adults. The Handbook for Judges describes a host of cognitive and neuropsychological testing tools, although it appears neither the MOCA test or the Folstein test is described. Is "standardization" of testing for purposes of legal capacity decisions needed?
Thursday, September 10, 2015
A New York ethics opinion issued July 27, 2015 is a useful reminder of the possibility -- indeed probability -- that law firms well known for specializing in elder law or estate planning may be approached by successive generations of family members, thus creating potential issues of confidentiality (and more).
In the matter under consideration, involving a small law firm that practiced "primarily in the fields of estate planning and administration, trusts and elder law," two of the lawyers had a long relationship with a "father," including representation of the father in a contested adult guardianship case.
Later, a different lawyer in the firm met with a "son" of the father to discuss personal estate planning following a "public seminar" hosted by the firm. That lawyer did not conduct a "conflict check" before a first meeting, one on-one, with the son. (One can see how a law firm might be tempted to skip or delay a step in conflict-checking when organizing these kinds of business-generating efforts, a potential not directly addressed in the New York opinion. Would disclaimers or warnings about "client relationships" not forming immediately remedy potential problems -- or perhaps make them even more complicated?)
The law firm, upon discovering the potential for concerns, made the decision not to go forward with representation of the son, and then asked the New York State Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics for guidance on whether rules either "required" or "permitted" the law firm to disclose to the father the son's request for representation, or whether the firm was prohibited from further representation of the father.
For the New York ethics committee's interesting analysis, see New York Ethics Opinion 1067. For a contrasting "multi-generational" representation problem involving a husband's undisclosed "heir," see A. v. B., decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1999, a case that is a good springboard for discussion of professional responsibilities for attorneys in the course on Wills, Trust & Estates (as I discovered in the Dukeminer/Sitkoff textbook).
Friday, August 28, 2015
Sometimes "small" cases reveal larger problems. A recent appellate case in Pennsylvania is a reminder of how practical solutions, such as establishing a joint bank account to facilitate management of money or to permit sharing of resources during early stages of elder care, may have unforeseen legal implications later. In Toney v. Dept. of Human Services, decided August 25, 2015, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania ruled that "half" of funds held in a joint savings account under the names of the father and his son, were available resources for the 93-year-old father. Thus the father, who moved into a nursing home in May 2014, was not immediately eligible for Medicaid funding.
The son argued, however, that most of the money in the account was the son's money, proceeds of the sale of his own home when he moved out of state almost ten years earlier:
"The son alleged that his father used the bulk of that money to maintain himself, with the understanding that any money remaining from that CD after his father's death would revert to him. The ALJ, however, rejected the son's testimony as self-serving and not credible...."
Thursday, August 27, 2015
Justice in Aging offers a very interesting examination of training standards for the broad array of persons who assist or care for persons with dementia, including volunteers and professionals working in health care facilities or emergency services. The series of 5 papers is titled "Training to Serve People with Dementia: Is Our Health Care System Ready?" The Alzheimer's Association provided support for the study.
The papers include:
- Paper 1: Issue Overview
- Paper 2: A Review of Dementia Training Standards across Health Care Settings
- Paper 3: A Review of Dementia Training Standards across Professional Licensure
- Paper 4: Dementia Training Standards for First Responders, Protective Services, and Ombuds
- Paper 5: Promising Practices-Washington State-A Trailblazer in Dementia Training
To further whet your appetite for digging into the well written and organized papers, key findings indicate that "most dementia training requirements focus on facilities serving people with dementia," rather than recognizing care and services are frequently provided in the home. Further there is "vast" variation from state to state regarding the extent of training required or available, and in any licensing standards. The reports specifically address the need for training for first responders who work outside the traditional definition of "health care," including law enforcement, investigative and emergency personnel.
If you need an example of why dementia-specific training is needed for law enforcement, including supervisors and staff at jails, see the facts contained in Goodman v. Kimbrough, reported earlier on this Blog.
August 27, 2015 in Cognitive Impairment, Dementia/Alzheimer’s, Elder Abuse/Guardianship/Conservatorship, Ethical Issues, Health Care/Long Term Care, Housing, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, August 24, 2015
In a recent guardianship case reviewed by the North Dakota Supreme Court, the alleged incapacitated person (AIP), a woman suffering "mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease and dementia," did not challenge the need for an appointed representative, but proposed two friends, rather than any relatives, to serve as her co-guardians. The lower court rejected her proposal, finding that a niece, in combination with a bank, was better able to serve as her court-appointed guardian/conservator.
On appeal, the AIP challenged the outcome on the grounds that the court had made no findings that she was without sufficient capacity to choose her own guardians. In The Matter of Guardianship of B.K.J., decided on July 30, 2015, the ND Supreme Court affirmed the appointment of the niece, concluding that although state law requires consideration of the AIP's "preference," no special findings of incapacity were necessary to reject that preference.
Contrary to [the AIP's] argument [State law] does not require the district court to make a specific finding that a person is of insufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice regarding appointing a guardian. While it might have been helpful to have a specific finding, we will not reverse so long as the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a guardian.... Here, it is clear the district court was not of the opinion [that the AIP] acted with or has sufficient capacity to make an intelligent choice. Rather, the district court's findings noted [she] testified that she did not trust [her niece] anymore, but was unable to recall why . . . .
Decisions such as these can be inherently difficult to manage, at least in the early stages, especially if the AIP is unlikely to cooperate with the decision-making of the "better" appointed guardian.