Tuesday, May 27, 2014
Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs) utilize a variety of payment arrangements to attract potential residents. One option popular prior to the 2008 recession was a "100% refundable entrance fee" model, where the new resident was promised return of his or her upfront entrance fee upon "termination," subject to certain conditions, usually including re-occupancy of the unit in question by a new resident. During good financial times, this refund option benefited both parties. The company could rely on a quick "resale" of the unit, either for the same or a higher entrance fee. Thus the company often took the position it was able to "use" the original resident's entrance fee immediately, subject to any state regulations for mandatory reserves or other repayment guarantees or restrictions.
But who bears the risk of a downturn in the senior living market, especially the dramatic downturn that accompanied the 2008-2010 recession?
In Stewart v. Henry Ford Village, Inc., the issue was whether a departing resident must accept the company's offer of a lower refund, tied to what any new resident would pay as an entrance fee to reside in that unit. The difference was hefty, as the resident had paid $137k in 1998 when she moved in, but when she left the community in 2010, comparable units were reportedly going for $89k.
In a rare court decision analyzing a refundable fee, the Court of Appeals for Michigan ruled that the parties' contract language controlled, and in this contract the contract did not provide for a lower refund amount. Further, the company's obligation to comply with the contract terms was subject to an implied obligation of good faith (a Contract Law concept my students would, I hope, recognize!) to promptly market and "resell" the unit, thus suggesting a CCRC would not be in good faith for delaying a unit's resale as a negotiation tool. Here is the heart of the court's analysis:
"Given the totality of the circumstances, the status of the parties, and the rights and obligations as set forth in the Agreement, the Disclosure Statement, and the [state's Living Care Disclosure Act] we find no support for the conclusion that plaintiff should or is obliged to bear the risks of a declining real estate market. To the contrary, those risks would seem properly to fall to defendant. By way of example, when a lessee properly complies with his or her lease in vacating a rental property, the lessee bears no responsibility for the fact that the landlord may need to lower the rent to attract a subsequent tenant. Rather, it is the landlord alone who must bear the consequences of the existing market risks. Additionally, plaintiff notes that if the unit was subsequently reoccupied with a higher entrance deposit, defendant would not furnish additional monies to plaintiff. Defendant has not suggested otherwise.... It strikes us as incongruous, as unsupported contractually, and as of questionable good faith (without adequate disclosure), that plaintiff be held to bear the risks of a declining real estate market without the ability to reap the rewards of a booming one."
In the "unpublished" (and therefore nonprecedential) opinion, the Michigan appellate court remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The ruling demonstrates the importance of the contract language, state regulations, and, I suspect, the likelihood that future refundable fee CCRC contracts will provide clearly that refunds will be tied in whole or in part to "resale" amounts, at least for any so-called 100% refundable fee agreements.
It should also be noted that refundability of admission fees is potentially a separate issue from actuarially sound practices for CCRCs in the handling of such fees. Along that line, I note that one of the residents who pioneered concerns about financial soundness in CCRCs, Charles Prine of Pittsburgh, passed away recently. Mr. Prine's articulate advocacy included testimony before the Senate Special Committee on Aging. Chuck will be missed.
Friday, May 23, 2014
John Marshall Law School and Roosevelt University, both in Chicago, and East China University of Political Science and Law in Shanghai, are jointly sponsoring an International Elder Law and Policy Conference in Chicago on July 10-11.
Keynote speakers include Professor Israel Doron of the University of Haifa in Israel and Dr. Ellinoir Flynn and Professor Gerard Quinn, both from National Unviersity of Ireland, Galway School of Law.
Scheduled panel topics include:
- Dignity and Rights of the Elderly
- Elimination of Age Discrimination
- Caregivers and Surrogate Decision Makers
- Social Security, Pensions and Other Retirement Financing Approaches
- Prevention of Elder Abuse
- Access to Justice
Here's the link to the Registration website.
Friday, May 16, 2014
As readers may have noticed, I've been a long-time "student" of Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs), drawn to the industry because of its vibrancy and dynamic approach to senior living. Along the way, I've come to know the many strengths -- and occasional weaknesses -- of individual operations, and the importance of resident engagement to long-range success. One of my resident contacts shared with me a new PBS NewsHour spotlight on university-connected CCRCs, with a prime focus on Oak Hammock, a community developed under the auspices of the University of Florida. Universities can offer a unique draw for alums and other college grads, including retired faculty, who value continued educational opportunities.
Here's the link to "Why More Seniors Are Going Back to College -- to Retire."
Although short (about 8 minutes), I find the piece to be balanced, especially in that it hints at the financing terms often needed to make such communities attractive and therefore viable. Some of the people interviewed explain the need for sophisticated mangement to counsel university-based programs, as development of CCRCs can be quite different than simply building a senior's version of "dorms." My own university stumbled a bit at the starting gate in its early efforts to get a community fully occupied, with the 2008 recession added to the challenges.
Thanks, Karen, for sending us the link!
Thursday, May 15, 2014
Maryland Elder Law and Disability Law specialist Ron Landsman provides a thoughtful analysis of use of trusts, especially "special needs trusts," to assist families in effective managment of assets. His most recent article, "When Worlds Collides: State Trust Law and Federal Welfare Programs," appears in the Spring 2014 issue of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA) Journal. Minus the footnotes, his article begins:
"'Special needs trusts,' which enable people with assets to qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid, are the intersection of two different worlds: poverty programs and the tools of wealth management. Introducing trusts into the world of public benefits has resulted in deep confusion for public benefit administrators. . . . The confusion arising from the merger of trust law with public benefits is sharply drawn in the agencies' [Social Security Administration (SSA) and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)] attempts to define what it means for a trust to be for the sole benefit of the public benefits recipient. Public benefits administrators have focused on the distributions a trustee makes rather than the fiduciary standards that guide the trustee. The agencies have imposed detailed distribution rules that range from the picayune to the counterproductive and without regard, and sometimes contrary, to the best interests of the disabled beneficiary."
Drawing upon his experience in drafting trusts for disabled persons, Ron takes on the challenge of explaining how and where he sees the agencies' focus on "distribution" as misguided. He contends, for example:
"The [better] task for CMS and SSA [would be] to use their authority to develop standards and guidelines that utilize, rather than thwart, competent, responsible, properly trained trustees as their partners in making special needs trusts an effective tool in serving the needs of people with disabilities. If this were done properly, capable trustees would be the allies of the federal and state agencies in the efficient use of limited private resources. Beneficiaries would live better, more rewarding lives to the extent that resources can make a difference, at a lower cost to Medicaid, with a greater possibility of more funds recovered through payback."
Ron is detailed in his critique of agency guidelines and manuals, and he provides clear examples of his "better" sole benefit analysis.
May 15, 2014 in Estates and Trusts, Federal Cases, Health Care/Long Term Care, Housing, Medicaid, Property Management, Social Security, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Wednesday, May 14, 2014
It occurs to me that what I'm about to write here is a mini-review of a mini-book. Slightly complicating this little task is the fact that I count both authors as friends and mentors.
The latest edition of Elder Law in a Nutshell by Professors Lawrence Frolik (University of Pittsburgh) and Richard Kaplan (University of Illinois) arrived on my desk earlier this month. (As Becky might remind us, both are definitely Elder Law's "rock stars.") And as with fine wine, this book, now its 6th edition, becomes more valuable with age. This is true even though achieving the right balance of simplicity and detail cannot be an easy task for authors in the intentionally brief "Nutshell" series. Presented in the book are introductions to the following core topics:
- Ethical Considerations in Dealing with Older Clients
- Health Care Decision Making
- Medicare and Medigap
- Long-Term Care Insurance
- Nursing Homes, Board and Care Homes, and Assisted Living Facilities
- Housing Alternatives & Options (including Reverse Mortgages)
- Alternatives to Guardianship (including Powers of Attorneys, Joint Accounts and Revocable Trusts)
- Social Security Benefits
- Supplemental Security Income
- Veterans' Benefits
- Pension Plans
- Age Discrimination in Employment
- Elder Abuse and Neglect
The authors describe their anticipated audience, including "lawyers and law students needing an overview of some particular subject, social workers, certain medical personnel, gerontologists, retirement planners and the like." Curiously, they don't mention potential clients, including family members of older persons. I suspect the book can and does assist prospective clients in thinking about when and why an "elder law specialist" would be an appropriate choice for consultation. This book is a very good starting place.
What's missing from the overview? Not a lot, although I find it interesting that despite solid coverage of the basics of Medicaid, and even though it is unrealistic to expect exhaustive coverage in a mini-book, the authors do not hint at the bread and butter of many elder law specialists, i.e., Medicaid Planning. Thus, there's little mention of some of the more cutting edge (and therefore potentially controversial) planning techniques used to create Medicaid eligibility for an individual's long-term care while also preserving assets that otherwise would have to be spent down.
Modern approaches, depending on the state, may range from the simple, such as permitted use of assets to purchase a better replacement auto, to more complex planning, as in states that permit purchase of spousal annuities or use of promissory notes, allow modest half-a-loaf gifting, or recognize spousal refusal. Even though the federal Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 succeeded in restricting assets transfers to non-spouse family members, families, especially if there is a community spouse, may still have viable options. Without appropriate planning the community spouse, particularly a younger spouse, may be in a tough spot if forced to spend down to the "maximum" permitted to be retained, currently less than $120,000 (in, for example, Pennsylvania). See, for example, a thoughtful discussion of planning options, written by Elder Law practitioners Julian Gray and Frank Petrich.
Perhaps the Nutshell omission is a reflection of the unease some who teach Elder Law may feel about the public impact of private Medicaid planning?
May 14, 2014 in Advance Directives/End-of-Life, Books, Cognitive Impairment, Dementia/Alzheimer’s, Discrimination, Elder Abuse/Guardianship/Conservatorship, Ethical Issues, Federal Statutes/Regulations, Health Care/Long Term Care, Housing, Medicaid, Medicare, Property Management, Social Security | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Friday, May 2, 2014
"The Facade of Stability in Assisted Living," an article by social scientists at University of Maryland Baltimore County, published in the May issue of the Journal of Gerontology (Series B: Social Sciences), takes a hard look at assisted living settings, using research from 17 different facilities. Key findings include:
"Our ethnographic research in 17 diverse AL settings (2004-to the present) has found evidence that what may appear to be quite stable is, in fact, a facade. First, our research indicates that stability -- in many senses -- is not the norm for ALs. . . . Changes occur at multiple levels of person (residents, family members, staff, or managers) collectives (groups or types of residents, staff or managers), organizations (owners or corporations) and external environments (economies or competitors). . . . Second, among these multiple levels and dimensions of change/instability, only a few have been examined substantially in research to date. . . . The changes in AL communities contradict their outward appearance or facade of stability and may profoundly affect the quality of life for residents."
The research, which the authors recognize has limitations because, for example, it was based on evaluation of AL facilities in a single state (Maryland), nonetheless is a reminder that families seeking reliable information about placements for aging loved ones should use caution about "old" data about any specific facility or provider "branding." The authors caution, "changes driven by new owners or managers and altered competitive pressures challenge contemporary ALs to provide services beyond the original intention of this sector under the social model of care that dominated its origins."
Tuesday, April 22, 2014
In some instances where a resident of a nursing home fails to qualify for Medicaid, the question may involve a transfer of a nonexempt asset by the resident or by someone (usually a family member) acting in place of the resident. If the nursing home is not then paid privately, a debt is incurred. Depending on the specific reasons for a ruling of ineligibility, the nursing home, as an unpaid creditor, may be motivated to challenge the transfer as "fraudulent." This in turn may trigger application of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), as adopted in the specific state.
Along that line, there is a new article, "Reconsidering the Uniformity of Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act," by Steven Boyajian, Esq., published this month in the American Bankruptcy Institute Journal. The article outlines proposed amendments to the UFTA currently under consideration:
"The UFTA has been adopted in 43 states, Washington D.C., and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and has not been specifically amended in the 30 years since it was drafted. Despite the UFTA's admonition that it 'shall be applied and construed to ... make uniform the law with respect to subject of [the UFTA] among states enacting it,' portions of the UFTA have been subject to conflicting interpretations by courts nationwide....
Amendments being considered by the Drafting Committee proposed to resolve the conflicting judicial interpretations of the following issues: (1) the effect of § 2's presumption of insolvency if a debtor was generally not paying its debts as they become due; (2) the standard of pleading and proof applicable to a claim that a transfer was made or obligation incurred 'with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor'; and (3) the allocation of burdens with respect to the elements of a claim to avoid a constructively fraudulent transfer or obligation."
In outlining the proposals, the author emphasizes the continuing nature of the discussions about UFTA proposals. One of the cases cited as part of the discussion is a nursing home collection case, Prairie Lakes Health Care System v. Wookey, 583 N.W. 2d 405 (S.D. 1998).
Pennsylvania also has a case involving intepretation of a UFTA claim in the context of a nursing home collection matter. In Presbyterian Medical Center v. Budd, 832 A.3d 1066 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), a nursing home plaintiff turned to Pennsylvania's filial support law as an alternative to a claim under UFTA, thereby permitting potential recovery against an adult child, without proof of fraud required.
Tuesday, April 8, 2014
Last September we noted the kick-off of the Stanford Center on Longevity's world-wide Design Challenge that encouraged teams to tackle the need for "solutions that help keep people with cognitive impairments independent as long as possible." In March, PBS News Hour had a nice piece on the partnership that launched the competition.
The latest news is that 7 teams are finalists from among 52 entries from 15 countries. The final phase of the competition will take place on April 10. As explained by Stanford's news release:
"They are coming to Stanford to make their final pitches for a $10,000 first prize and connections to industry leaders and investors. There will be talks by a number of distinguished speakers, a panel of Silicon Valley investors, and the announcement of next years’ challenge. Join us for what should be a great day of learning and networking."
Monday, April 7, 2014
Causation Proof Needed for Breach of Contract Claims Against "Responsible Parties" in Nursing Home Cases
We have another interesting appellate decision from Connecticut on the question of personal liability of an individual who signed an agreement as a "responsible party" when admitting his parent to a nursing home. The opinion is in Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, issued by the Connecticut Court of Appeals with a decision date of April 8, 2014.
The majority of the three judge panel concludes that the son who signed the agreement cannot be held liable, based on the evidence -- or rather lack of evidence -- in the record. Although the evidence establishes the son failed to provide all information requested by the state Medicaid department following his mother's application for Medicaid, and therefore breached duties he assumed as a "responsible party" under Section IV of the nursing home agreement, the majority concludes he cannot be held liable because there "is no evidence in the record...indicating that, had the defendant [son] complied with his obligations under the agreement, [the nursing home] would have received any Medicaid payments."
In other words, the nursing home proved breach, but not causation of damages, even though "the parties stipulated...that if the department granted Medicaid benefits to the defendant's mother, the department would have paid the facility $47,561.18." The ruling focuses on that "if," noting:
"The testimonial evidence submitted to the court demonstrated, on the one hand, that submitting the proper information to the department merely triggered a review of the resident's eligibility and, on the other hand, the submission of such information was not a guarantee of approval to receive such benefits.... [A]n eligibility services supervisor at the department...testified that the department could not determine whether an applicant qualified for Medicaid absent a review of the applicant's financial information, which was not furnished to the department in the present case. As the defendant notes in his appellate brief, the plaintiff did not ask Leveque 'if, based upon the defendant's testimony regarding the assets maintained by [his mother], he had an opinion regarding whether ... [she] would have qualified for [such] benefits.' In addition, the record before us does not indicate that the plaintiff was prevented from presenting the proper financial documentation, expert testimony, or other evidence that would have otherwise established the resident's likelihood of approval, nor has the plaintiff in this appeal directed our attention to any such evidence."
There is a complicated history to third-party liability issues in nursing home contracts, especially in Connecticut. As readers of our Blog may recall, last year the Connecticut Supreme Court declined to hold a signing family member liable for costs of the parent's care, where that individual did not have a Power of Attorney or other authority to apply for Medicaid. See "Nursing Home Contracts Revisited: The Nutmeg State Adds Spice," commenting on Aaron Manor, Inc. v. Irving, 57 A.3d 342 (Conn. 2013). Further, as we note in that post, Connecticut made significant changes to its Medicaid laws effective in October 2013, as a result of a series of nursing home cases involving third-parties. In certain circumstances, Connecticut now seeks to impose statutory liability on individuals who are either transferors or transferees, connected to the resident's ineligibility for Medicaid because of disqualifying transfers.
The Meadowbrook decision is also well worth reading for anyone interested in the related but separate concepts of contract law and promissory estoppel.
Further, in a separate concurring opinion, a third judge concludes that the nursing home agreement should not be construed as imposing liability unless the "responsible party" has been shown to have misappropriated the resident's resources, because without that personal fault, the responsible party agreement becomes a "guaranty," prohibited by federal Medicaid law. The majority, however, "strongly" rejects that analysis. We'll keep our eyes open to see if the Meadowbrook case goes to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
When I first began analyzing "responsible party" liability in nursing home contracts, I became convinced the contracts drafted by many facilities created a minefield of problems. In some instances, the providers seem to intentionally blur the lines of responsibility for third-parties. On the one hand, facilities "need" agents to sign for new residents who are often lacking capacity to contract. So the admissions office points to the "no personal liability" language in the agreement signed by the third-party. On the other hand, if something does go wrong with the Medicaid application, that same facility will often be quick to point out that it is the third-party signer's obligation to fix the problem, or face potential personal liability.
The nursing homes, of course, whether for profit 0r nonprofit, are not in the business of providing free care.
The last ten years of litigation have only increased the importance for individuals to understand the significance of nursing home agreements. Individuals may want legal advice from specialists in state Medicaid law before signing the agreement; further they may need to seek legal help again if there is any hiccup in the Medicaid application process. After the Meadowbrook case, I think it is safe to say care facilities will be better prepared to prove causation of damages.
Thursday, April 3, 2014
Here's an excerpt from a recent Blog posting at the Special Needs Alliance:
This is the first in a series of articles addressing scarce housing for people with disabilities.
The shortage in housing for individuals with disabilities has reached crisis proportions, with some special needs attorneys citing it as their clients’ number one issue.
“Pricing Out in 2012,” a joint study by CCD (Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities) and the Technical Assistance Collaborative (TAC), found that “as many as two million non-elderly people with disabilities reside in homeless shelters, public institutions, nursing homes, unsafe and overcrowded board and care homes, at home with aging parents or segregated group quarters-often due to lack of affordable housing in the community.”
The situation results from a perfect storm of demographic trends, failed promises and budget tradeoffs. Prior to the 1970s, most people with significant disabilities lived in public institutions or at home with family caregivers. The history of institutionalization predates the nation’s founding, with the 1773 establishment of the first Public Hospital for Persons of Insane and Disordered Mind in Williamsburg, Virginia.
Saturday, March 29, 2014
The Department of Labor recently posted a Final Rule that changes how the Fair Labor Standards Act is interpreted for domestic service. Of special interest is how the Rule impacts shared living programs under Medicaid.
The Department of Labor has also created guidance to assist stakeholders in determining whether an entity paying a direct care worker through a shared living arrangement is required to comply with the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements. The guidance also describes how certain FLSA principles apply to shared living arrangements.
These changes become effective January 1, 2015.
Friday, March 28, 2014
This semester I'm teaching Contracts, which always provides interesting opportunites to introduce "Elder Law" concerns in a traditional course.
This week I offered a not-so-hypothetical fact pattern, where Grandmother deeds house to Grandchild, in exchange for Grandchild's "promise to care for Grandma for the rest of her life." Whenever I use this hypo, I pick one of a number of reasons the agreement does not work out as planned, such as the individuals don't get along with each other, grandchild gets pregnant or ill, etc. This week's reason was "Grandma needs more specialized care" but cannot afford it because she's given away her primary resource. Grandchild doesn't want to sell the house, now that it is "hers," and she doesn't want to take out a mortgage.
I ask the students to brainstorm Grandmother's options. Almost always, someone suggests Medicaid, and we talk about whether Medicaid will provide adequate assistance and whether there are potential barriers to eligibility for public benefits, such as the five-year look back period.
Students sometimes suggest Grandmother is subject to "undue influence," which if proven would be grounds for potential rescission. Good job! Except that I am usually careful in my hypo not to make Grandchild overtly manipulative. And in truth, many of these arrangements begin more because of the desires of the aging individual, than because of any greed on the part of the younger person. We also explore "incapacity" and "duress" as possible grounds for rescission.
This week, students also suggested "failure of consideration" as grounds for rescission. There is an interesting line of cases, perhaps a hybrid of Property and Contract law, that treats "support deeds" as a specific analysis, potentially justifying relief. Examples include:
- Gilbert v. Rainey, 71 SW. 3d 66 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002), permitting mother to rescind deed for failure of consideration, and admitting mother's parol evidence to show daughter promised life care in exchange for the conveyance of the home, to show that conveyance was not a completed gift;
- Frasher v. Frasher, 249 S.E. 2d 513 (W.Va. 1978), granting cancellation of deed from grandparents to grandchildren, on the grounds that where discord arises between the parties to a "support deed" between an aged grantor and a younger family member, the property should be restored "if it can be done without injustice" to the younger family member.
After class was over, some of my students stopped by to chat, offering variations on the hypothetical, sometimes from examples within their own extended families. In both of the sample cases above, the court attaches special meaning to the concept of "support deeds" going from older to younger generation, but most of the cases along this line are fairly old. The fact that my students were offering modern variations on the fact pattern suggests there may be good reason to revisit this area of the law.
Perhaps any resurgence in this topic is another sign of our "aging" times. So, that leads to my question, does your state recognize failure of consideration, tied to "support deeds," as grounds for rescission of a conveyance?
Wednesday, March 26, 2014
Tough Question: Evidence Demonstrates Potential for Unsatisfactory Care in Nursing Homes, So Why Expect Better Care at Home?
Howard Gleckman at Forbes writes about the elephant in the room of home and community-based care. Will it really be better than the care in a nursing home?
Hat tip to ElderLawGuy Jeff Marshall for pointing the way to this thoughtful piece.
Perhaps more than most who teach Elder Law, I spend a fair amount of time on provider perspectives on long-term care, examining industry concerns. I've often been struck by a disconnect in communication between lawyers who represent providers and those who represent families and individuals. My impression is there are often important lessons to be learned from "the other side."
Along that line, here is a one minute video from Merit Senior Living, a company that offers administrative services such as management of human resources and payroll for staffing of various forms of senior living. Perhaps some of the lessons that can be learned here are unintentional?
Friday, March 21, 2014
Paula Span, writing for the New York Times' column, The New Old Age, offers several perspectives on the Vi of Palo Alto lawsuit filed by residents at this high-end, California continuing care retirement community (CCRC). In her first piece, "CCRC Residents Ask, 'Where's the Money?'" she sets forth competing viewpoints of the parties:
Though their suit covers several matters, concern over eventual refunds is at heart of the battle. In their complaint, the plaintiffs call the transfer of money from the local provider to its Chicago parent company “upstreaming.”
Management calls it standard business practice. Entrance fee repayments come not from a reserve, but from the eventual resale of an apartment after a resident moves out or dies, said Paul Gordon, a lawyer for Vi. “Once I pay someone, I can’t tell them what to do with it afterwards,” he said. “It’s their money.”
“The payments are going to be made,” Mr. Gordon said. “The rest is eligible for distribution as a return on investment” — i.e., as profit.
That’s a different arrangement from what residents believe they signed up for. Because the Chicago company has not assumed the debt owed for eventual refunds, residents “lost all the security and peace of mind they had paid for,” Mr. McCarthy [the attorney for Vi plaintiffs] said.
In her second article released the next day, Ms. Span takes a broader view than the single lawsuit involving Vi of Palo Alto, noting that "In Many States, Few Legal Rights for CCRC Residents," citing some of my work with states where resident-inspired changes are under consideration, and noting the important work of the National Continuing Care Residents Association, also known as NaCCRA.
Sunday, March 16, 2014
Remember the first time you went to camp and your mother put labels on all of your clothes? At the other end of the timeline is the need to keep track of personal items, clothing and eye glasses in senior care facilities. One of the most common complaints in residential care is "missing" things ... like your dad's favorite red sweater.
Now there is new tool to help staff get items back in their proper place -- and the tool is useful whether the location is camp, college or a nursing home.
Check out identaMe labels -- waterproof, self-sticking, laundry-friendly and colorful. You can order pre-printed labels on-line, complete with your loved one's name and a "catchy" logo.
Saturday, March 15, 2014
To help prevent thousands of people with disabilities from experiencing homelessness or unnecessary institutionalization, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development announced about $120 million in funding for state housing agencies to provide long-term rental assistance. Developed in partnership with HHS, applications for the Section 811 PRA are due May 5, 2014.
The program reinforces the guiding principles of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the landmark 1999 Supreme Court ruling in Olmstead v. L.C., which require state and local governments to provide services in the most integrated settings appropriate to meet the needs of individuals with disabilities. Read the News Release or Notice of Funding Availability for details.
Thursday, March 13, 2014
Via Disability Scoop:
Under a new bill proposed in the U.S. Senate, the amount of money that Supplemental Security Income recipients could save without losing access to their benefits would rise for the first time in over two decades. Currently, individuals who receive SSI can have no more than $2,000 in cash or liquid assets at any given time without forfeiting their eligibility for benefits. The legislation, introduced late last week, calls for that asset limit to increase to $10,000. The bill would also eliminate restrictions that currently disallow friends and family from providing financial, food and housing support to those receiving SSI and the measure would boost the amount of income beneficiaries could earn without losing out on benefits.
“SSI is a critical program that helps millions of our poorest and most vulnerable citizens keep their heads above water,” said U.S. Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., who proposed the bill along with Sen. Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio. Warren said the legislation would “help strengthen SSI for families who rely on these essential benefits.” More than 8 million Americans — including many with disabilities — draw on SSI. Currently, the maximum federal benefit for an individual receiving SSI is $721 per month, though many states tack on additional funding for their residents meaning that actual payments can be somewhat higher. The last time the asset cap for SSI recipients was increased was in 1989, the senators said.
Read the legislation: Supplemental Security Income Restoration Act of 2014
Monday, March 10, 2014
National Study of Long-Term Care Providers Report
This report presents descriptive results from the first wave of the National Study of Long-Term Care Providers, (NSLTCP) which was conducted by CDC’s National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). Data presented in this report are drawn from five sources: NCHS surveys of adult day services centers and residential care communities, and administrative records obtained from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services on home health agencies, hospices, and nursing homes.
The report provides information on the supply, organizational characteristics, staffing, and services offered by providers of long-term care services; and the demographic, health, and functional composition of users of these services. Service users include residents of nursing homes and residential care communities, patients of home health agencies and hospices, and participants of adult day services centers. NSLTCP will be conducted every other year starting in 2012. Key
- In 2012, about 58,500 paid, regulated long-term care services providers served about 8 million people in the United States.
- Provider sectors differed in ownership, and average size and supply varied by region. Rates of use of long-term care services varied by sector and state.
- Users of long-term care services varied by sector in their demographic and health characteristics and functional status.
Friday, March 7, 2014
In MetLife Home Loans v. Vareen, decided in Kings County, New York on February 11, the mortgage company attempted to foreclose on a reverse mortgage, apparently because of unpaid water bills for the property. The case was "conferenced extensively with the defendant homeowner's family in the court's Foreclosure Settlement Conference Part," with no resolution of the dispute, but the homeowner did not file a formal answer in the lawsuit. Eventually the mortgage company sought an "ex parte" default ruling.
In denying the requested relief, the judge noted that the homeowner had a contractual obligation to stay current on all items which could become charges against the property. However, the mortgage company also had the contractual option to "make the payment for the mortgagor and charge the mortgagor's account. If a pattern of missed payments occurs, the [mortgage company] may establish procedures to pay the property charges from the mortgagor's funds as if the mortgagor elected to have the mortgagee pay the property charges under this section." It appears the homeowner was receiving monthly "reverse mortgage payments," rather than a single lump sum.
This history of the case is a reminder that reverse mortgages may not be the best solution for some older homeowners, especially if the cost to maintain the house is substantial, or if the elderly homeowner (or a volunteer in the family) is unable to handle payment of bills as they come due.
Here the court stepped in to prevent loss of the home, citing the lender's contract options. The court quoted the rosy language of a HUD-approved consumer guide, appearing to assure borrowers they can "continue to live at home as long as you want," and concluded:
"As such, plaintiff cannot foreclose on defendant's reverse mortgage because of her default in paying the NYC water bill. Furthermore, serving a senior citizen holding a reverse mortgage with a complaint that fails to specify what the default is can only be described as unconscionable."
Other court challenges to attempts to foreclose on reverse mortgages where there is a "surviving" spouse, but that individual is not an owner of record, are detailed here, with the potential class of plaintiffs represented by an AARP Foundation Litigation team. Thanks to ElderLawGuy Jeff Marshall for tweeting on AARP's efforts.