Thursday, September 29, 2016
At Education Week's School Law Blog, Mark Walsh covers the U.S. Supreme Court's cert grant today in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1 (No. 15-827), in which the Court may resolve a circuit split on the issue of what level of educational benefit must a child receive under his or her individualized education program, or IEP, for a school district to have provided a free appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act? Walsh's article is below:
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, in Denver, ruled last year in the case of a Colorado child with autism that because the child's public school IEP had provided him with "some educational benefit," the Douglas County district had provided a "free, appropriate public education" under the IDEA. The 10th Circuit court thus rejected a private school reimbursement for the parents of the boy identified as Endrew F. after the parents had pulled him from public school amid the dispute over his 5th grade IEP.
In an August 2015 decision, the 10th Circuit court panel acknowledged that several other federal courts of appeals have adopted a higher standard that requires an IEP to result in a "meaningful educational benefit." But the 10th Circuit, agreeing with a lower court in Endrew F.'s case, said that a key 1982 Supreme Court precedent on special education, Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, merely requires an IEP to provide "some educational benefit."
"The courts of appeals are in disarray over the level of educational benefit that school districts must confer on children with disabilities to provide them with a free appropriate public education under the IDEA," says the appeal filed on behalf of Endrew F. and his parents by his Denver lawyers and the Supreme Court Litigation Clinic at Stanford Law School. "This court should use this case—which cleanly presents the legal issue on a well-developed set of facts—to resolve the conflict over this important question."
In May, the Supreme Court invited the U.S. solicitor general to file a brief expressing the views of the Obama administration. On Aug. 18, Acting Solicitor General Ian H. Gershengorn filed a brief that urged the justices to take up the appeal.
"This court should grant certiorari and overturn the 10th Circuit's erroneous holding that states must provide children with disabilities educational benefits that are 'merely ... more than de minimis' in order to comply with the IDEA," the brief states. "The 10th Circuit's approach is not consistent with the text, structure, or purpose of the IDEA; it conflicts with important aspects of this court's decision in ... Rowley, and it has the effect of depriving children with disabilities of the benefits Congress has granted them by law."
Lawyers for the Douglas County district argued in briefs, including one filed in response to the solicitor general's recommendation to grant review, that the asserted split among the federal appeals courts is "shallow" and that only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, in Philadelphia, "has consistently applied a purportedly more demanding 'meaningful benefit' standard."
"The government contends that the IDEA demands something 'more robust'" than the "some benefit" standard, says the school district brief. "The question is whether a state has satisfied its substantive obligations if the IEP it offers provides a child more than a de minimis educational benefit. Under Rowley the answer is yes."
Despite the district's arguments, the Supreme Court on Sept. 29 granted review, one of eight cases the justices added to their docket just before the formal start of their new term on Oct. 3.
The Endrew F. case is likely to be argued sometime early next year.
Thursday, August 25, 2016
On Tuesday, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the state of Georgia alleging it unlawfully discriminates against students with disabilities through its GNETS program. GNETS stands for Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic Supports. The program, which is over forty years old, consists primarily of separate facilities designated for providing education and supports to students with behavioral disabilities. DOJ contends that the program violates Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits unnecessary segregation on the basis of disability in the public schools. Tuesday’s filing represents the culmination of both years of investigation by DOJ and over a year of negotiations attempting to settle the matter with the state.
DOJ first put Georgia on notice of the potential for such a suit in July 2015, when it sent a Letter of Findings to Governor Nathan Deal and Attorney General Sam Olens. In that letter, DOJ alleged that the GNETS program created incentives for the placement of students with behavioral disabilities in segregated facilities and that those facilities provide opportunities and services that are not equal to those provided in regular education facilities. DOJ found that approximately two-thirds of students in the GNETS program are educated in separate facilities even though the students would benefit from inclusion in the general education environment. It also found that students in these facilities do not have access to art, music, physical education or other non-core classes, unlike students in non-GNETS programs. In addition, DOJ found many stand-alone GNETS program buildings lacked playgrounds, cafeterias, and central or sufficient air conditioning. Some of the stand-alone GNETS programs are housed in the buildings used to educate black students during Jim Crow era segregation.
In response Georgia closed some GNETS facilities and offered to improve others and review each GNETS student’s individualized education plan, which is the special education plan required for every student receiving special education services. However, as DOJ pointed out in its letter of intent to sue earlier this month, the state and school districts already have a legal obligation to review students’ IEPs. DOJ further concluded that improving segregated facilities demonstrates the state’s apparent unwillingness to dismantle a program of segregation.
Time of course will tell whether DOJ can succeed in largely dismantling the GNETS program. Even if the effort does succeed, the victory will be truly won only if students who would have otherwise found themselves in a segregated GNETS program are not simply segregated into separate classrooms within non-GNETS schools. Georgia’s general and special education funding scheme, as the DOJ suit suggests, incentivizes segregation. Being educated in buildings with playgrounds and adequate air conditioning is a vast improvement over being educated in settings without those basic services, but until the system no longer incentivizes segregation, the risk that students with disabilities will be segregated will remain.
Monday, August 8, 2016
First Circuit: Good Academic Performance Is Relevant But Not Determinative For Special Education Eligibility
The First Circuit published an opinion last week dealing with the ambiguity of the "need" provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The parents of a seventh-grader, called Jane Doe in the opinion, sued the local school district after it decided that Jane did not require special education in reading fluency because she was doing well in school. Jane had received special education services for years to improve her reading skills. Jane's parents argued that the "need inquiry" under the IDEA should determine whether a child needs special education to remediate the underlying disability. The school district argued that the need inquiry should determine whether a child needs special education to benefit from the school curriculum. If the child is doing well academically, the district argued, the child no long qualified for special education services. The case centers around the text of Section 1401(3)(A)(ii) of the IDEA that provides that a child determined to have one of the qualifying disorders under the first prong must also, “by reason thereof,” “need[ ] special education and related services” to be eligible for special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(ii). The First Circuit found that "Jane's overall academic performance could potentially be relevant in determining whether she has a reading fluency deficit, the district court erred in relying on such evidence without regard to how it reflects her reading fluency skills." The circuit court vacated and remanded the judgment in favor of the district, holding that the district court weighed Jane's overall academic achievement too heavily when the child's deficiency in reading fluency was sufficient by itself to support eligibility and that the district court afforded excessive deference to the hearing officer's determinations. In a concurrence, Circuit Judge Lipez offered guidance cautioning courts to not solely look at "an absolute standard of educational performance, the satisfaction of which would automatically disqualify a child from eligibility under the need prong." The case is Doe, v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dist., No. 15-1155, 2016 WL 4151377 (1st Cir. Aug. 5, 2016).
Monday, July 11, 2016
Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., No. 14-56464, 2016 WL 3435270 (9th Cir. June 22, 2016) - The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in that a school district's offers to place an autistic student in a small classroom rather than a mainstream one did not deny the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., No. 14-56464, 2016 WL 3435270 (9th Cir. June 22, 2016). The student and his guardian sued the school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) after the district determined that he would benefit from a small class for students with mild to moderate disabilities rather than a mainstream classroom and refused to reimburse the cost of the student's private education during the following two school years. The plaintiffs had previously sued the district for failing to provide a FAPE and won; the Ninth Circuit affirmed in 2011 holding that the student was entitled to full reimbursement of his private tuition costs because the public school did not meet his educational needs. In this most recent decision, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the school district's decision that the smaller classroom would be better for the student's academic needs even though he may have benefited socially from a typical classroom setting.
James v. D.C., No. 14-CV-02147 (APM), 2016 WL 3461185 (D.D.C. June 21, 2016) -- The federal district court found that the District of Columbia Public School (DCPS) system did not comply with an intellectually disabled student's individualized education program (IEP) requiring her to receive specialized instruction, even though the school did not have a special education teacher to provide it. The district court found the student's guardian, her grandmother, was apparently unaware that the school was not carrying out student's IEP, and thus allowed her to remain enrolled in the school throughout the school year even though the school was not able to implement the IEP. The district court remanded the issue of whether the student had a speech and language disability to the Hearing Officer to determine whether DCPS failed to provide a timely speech-language evaluation as required by the IDEA.
Monday, March 21, 2016
Securing legal representation is critical for private enforcement of constitutional and statutory rights, and thus rulings that restrict attorneys' fees in such cases will impact rights enforcement. The Fifth Circuit recently released a decision holding that obtaining a stay-put order under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is not sufficient to qualify a litigant as a “prevailing party" who is entitled to attorneys' fees. The Fifth Circuit now joins the Third and Seventh Circuits in holding that stay-put orders are interim in nature and because such orders do not address the merits, they do not entitle plaintiffs to attorney fee awards. In the case, Tina M. v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, the plaintiff's son, S.M., a student with a disability under the IDEA, was involved in an off-campus incident that prompted his school to propose an Individualized Education Program in which S.M. would receive at-home tutoring. S. M.’s mother disagreed with this proposal and refused to consent to the IEP change. At a due process proceeding, the Administrative Law Judge granted a stay-put order for S.M. to remain in school pending a decision on the merits. After that order, the parties reached a settlement through mediation, and the plaintiffs moved to terminate the pending administrative hearing on the merits. The ALJ terminated the matter and never reached the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs then sought attorneys' fees in the Eastern District of Louisiana under the IDEA's fee shifting provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). Analogizing the ALJ's stay-put order to a successful preliminary injunction, the district court found that the plaintiffs were the prevailing party for purposes of obtaining attorneys’ fees under the IDEA. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under section 1415(j) of the IDEA, the circuit court noted, a court deciding a stay-put request simply determines a child’s placement and enters an order maintaining that placement. The IDEA requires an automatic stay in such cases with no merits component to the finding, unlike a preliminary injunction. The stay-put order also did not permanently alter the legal relationship of the parties so that the plaintiffs could be found to have prevailed. “Rather,” the court stated, “it merely provided that S. M. could continue with his prior educational program until a decision on the merits was made.” While the court nodded to the importance of maintaining a child’s placement during due process proceedings, the interim relief of the stay-put order was not merits-based, and thus ineligible for attorneys’ fees. The case can be found at Tina M. v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, No. 1530220 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2015).
Tuesday, March 1, 2016
Last year, Texas passed legislation requiring video surveillance of time-out or "calm" rooms used in special education classrooms to discipline students displaying behavioral problems. The law was passed after a Texas television news station broadcast a video of an eight-year-old autistic child being forced into a calm room. Several schools in the Dallas-Forth Worth schools acknowledged having similar rooms, which are about the size of a parking space. The law, intended to protect special-needs students from overaggressive teachers and staff, requires schools to install cameras and videotape interactions in every eligible special education classroom at a parent's request. Currently the law is an unfunded mandate (implementing the law could cost millions--about $3,000 per camera and related equipment--that Texas does not have), but even more troubling for some parents is that one parent could override other parents' objections to having their child videotaped daily. The law currently has no opt-out provision for parents concerned about their children's privacy, particularly as there are no guidelines on where or how long video will be stored. Read more at San Antonio ABC-News here.
Friday, February 26, 2016
The U.S. Department of Education is taking steps to address widespread racial disparities in special education. The Department is proposing a new regulation to better guide districts in their programs and set clear standards by which the Department can enforce non-discrimination in the context of disability disparities. The proposed regulation would
amend regulations under Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) governing the Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities program and the Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities program. With the goal of promoting equity in IDEA, the regulations would (1) establish a standard methodology States must use to determine whether significant disproportionality based on race and ethnicity is occurring in the State and in its local educational agencies (LEAs); (2) clarify that States must address significant disproportionality in the incidence, duration, and type of disciplinary actions, Note: The official version of this document is the document published in the Federal Register. This document has been sent to the Office of the Federal Register but has not yet been scheduled for publication. 2 including suspensions and expulsions, using the same statutory remedies required to address significant disproportionality in the identification and placement of children with disabilities; (3) clarify requirements for the review and revision of policies, practices, and procedures when significant disproportionality is found; and (4) require that LEAs identify and address the factors contributing to significant disproportionality as part of comprehensive coordinated early intervening services (comprehensive CEIS) and allow such services for children from age 3 through grade 12, with and without disabilities.
After a lot of strong words for the Department over the past several years and initial skepticism of Secretary King, he has taken positions and steps over the past month that cannot help but win him a warm spot in the hearts of civil rights advocates and disadvantaged students. Eight years ago, at the very beginning of the Obama Administration, I published an article on racial disparities in education. I argued that if there was a single place in education in which additional federal guidance was needed and on which the Department of Education would find the surest footing for enforcing and specifying disparate impact standards, it would have been in special education. Secretary King is now attempting to do exactly that. This is, of course, on top of his stance to help fund local efforts to reduce racial and socio-economic isolation just two weeks ago.
The full proposed special education regulation and request for comments is here.
My argument for why the Department should take these steps here on pages 419-423.
The Department's Press release is after the jump.
Tuesday, February 23, 2016
According to radio station KPCC, plaintiffs have filed a lawsuit against the Pasadena Unified School District, alleging that the district maintains a school called Focal Point Academy at which it concentrates students with serious mental health needs. The complaint claims that the students are separated from other children, receive inferior educational programs, and are subjected to improper discipline including isolation and restraint, arrests, and needless suspension. Disability Rights California, Mental Health Advocacy Services of Los Angeles, the Bazelon Center, and Morrison and Foerster are representing the plaintiffs.
The suit is a reminder that after forty years of special education law guaranteeing that children with disabilities receive aids and services to enable them to be educated to the maximum extent appropriate with children without disabilities, fully separate, segregated facilities still exist. Concentrating children who may have serious behavior problems into one institution looks more like a way to push the children out of sight than to give them tools to make educational and social progress. Giving poorer services to children with greater needs would be a further dysfunctional policy.
Using seclusion and restraint often reinforces negative behavior and has resulted in serious injury and death. Congress has not yet acted on the Keeping All Students Safe bill, H.R. 927, and the Ending Corporal Punishment in Schools bill, J.R. 2268, which would help end inappropriate physical interventions in school settings. Ample material on the misuse of isolation and restraint is collected by the U.S. Department of Education (see here) and discussed in sources such as a recent article in the Atlantic.
For additional information on the Pasadena suit, go to Disability Rights California.
Thursday, February 11, 2016
Report: Thousands of Wisconsin Students Continue to Be Placed In Seclusion Or Restraints Despite 2012 Ban on Such Practices
Disability Rights Wisconsin (DRW), along with two other community organizations, reports that seclusion and restraints continue to be used in Wisconsin’s public schools, despite the passage of a law in 2012 intended to reduce such measures. The report, called Seclusion & Restraint in Wisconsin Public School Districts 2013-2014: Miles to Go, "details how families continue to report instances in which children, even those as young as five, are being secluded and restrained repeatedly, sometimes daily," according to DRW. Eighty percent of the 3,585 Wisconsin students who were restrained or secluded were students with disabilities. Overall, Wisconsin's school districts reported 20,131 incidents of seclusion and restraint in the 2013/14 school year.
Tuesday, February 2, 2016
The Second Circuit issued a major decision on January 20 in T.K. v. New York City Department of Education, No. 14–3078–CV, 2016 WL 229842, --- F.3d --- (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 2016). The court ruled that the city school system denied a child free, appropriate public education (FAPE) by refusing to discuss severe bullying that she experienced at school, when her parents raised the issue in meetings in connection with her individualized education program (IEP). The child made academic progress and performed at close to grade level in a public school class that had both a special education and a general education teacher. But staff who assisted in the instruction testified that the child’s classmates constantly bullied her. She was tripped, had her toes stomped on, was pinched hard enough to cause bruising, and was routinely called ugly, stupid, and fat. She came home crying almost on a daily basis. The teachers did not intervene, nor did they punish the harassers. Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Lohier reasoned that the refusal to discuss the bullying and address it in the education program was a procedural violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) that denied the child the right to appropriate education. Relying on a concession by the defendant, the court assumed without deciding that bullying is a proper consideration when it substantially restricts child’s learning opportunities. The court stated, “Here, Plaintiffs were reasonably concerned that bullying severely restricted L.K.'s educational opportunities, and that concern powerfully informed their decisions about her education. By refusing to discuss that bullying during the development of the IEP, the Department significantly impeded Plaintiffs' ability to assess the adequacy of the IEP and denied L.K. a FAPE.” (at *5). The court affirmed an award of tuition reimbursement for the private placement the parents made for the child when they did not succeed in having the public school address their concerns.
Tuesday, January 19, 2016
Allegations of Abuse of Students with Disabilities Not Enough to "Shock Conscience" of the Sixth Circuit, by Mark Weber
The Sixth Circuit recently decided Domingo v. Kowalski, No. 14–3957, 2016 WL 76213 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2016). The court affirmed a grant of summary judgment against parents of three special education students on their claims against a special education teacher, her employer, and several officials with supervisory responsibility over her. The parents of one child alleged that nearly every day the teacher removed the six-year-old’s pants, placed her on a training toilet and left her there for as long as a quarter of the school day. The toilet was separated from the classroom only by a partition that students could walk around to see the child on the toilet. The teacher was alleged to have bound one misbehaving nine-year-old student to a gurney in the hallway outside the classroom and gagged him with a bandana, and on several occasions to have restrained him in a chair. She was also alleged to have strapped an eleven-year-old girl to a toilet, alone in the bathroom, for 20 to 30 minutes at a time. The teacher was also said to have a practice of grabbing disruptive students by the face, squeezing their cheeks and turning their heads toward her, and to have a practice of making students who were inattentive fold their arms on their desks, at which point the teacher would force their heads onto their arms. The parents supported their allegations with the statements of a teacher’s aide, though the defendants contested the accuracy of the aide’s account at various points and noted that the aide did not report several of the events until she received a layoff notice near the end of the school year.
The parents said the conduct of the teacher and the failure of the other defendants to act violated the students’ substantive due process rights, and they relied on the cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In affirming summary judgment against the parents, the court applied the “shocks the conscience” standard. The court adapted a framework from Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands School District, 272 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2001), and asked whether there was a pedagogical justification for the teacher’s conduct, whether the force was excessive to meet a legitimate objective, whether the conduct was done maliciously for the purpose of causing harm, and whether there was serious injury. It made analogies to various cases on each of the factors and ruled that the factors weighed in the teacher’s favor. The court said that its rejection of the due process claim against the teacher eliminated any basis for holding the supervisors or the school district liable.
The case is one of a large number determining that no reasonable jury could find that school personnel conduct shocks the conscience so as to violate due process. There are, however, cases that come to the opposite result with regard to conduct that looks similar or even less outrageous, for example, Alexander v. Lawrence County Board of Developmental Disabilities, 2012 WL 831769 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (placing student in basket holds and prone restraints), and Covey v. Lexington Public Schools, 2010 WL 5092781 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (demeaning students with disabilities in front of others and making them run laps and do calisthenics). Moreover, some recent physical and psychological abuse cases brought under a Fourth Amendment theory have been successful on summary judgment or dismissal motions, including Preschooler II v. Clark County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2007) (grabbing and slapping of student and forcing him into a chair), and Doe v. Hawaii Department of Education, 334 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2003) (taping of second-grader’s head to a tree). It remains to be seen just what conduct the panel of the Sixth Circuit thinks could shock a jury’s conscience. Notably, one panel member, Judge Boggs, argued in a partial dissent that the claim over the binding and gagging of the nine-year-old ought to have gone to the jury.
Wednesday, January 6, 2016
U.S. Attorney's Office Says New York City Rampant with Schools Inaccessible for Students with Disabilities
Just before the holiday break, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York sent a letter to New York City Schools demanding that they come into compliance with federal disability law. The U.S. Attorney's Office had found widespread and rampant violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act that made most of the city's schools inaccessible to students with disabilities. The letter included systemic data and individual stories, including "one family who went to extreme measures to keep their child enrolled in their zoned local school, rather than subject the child to a lengthy commute to the closest 'accessible' school. A parent of this elementary school child was forced to travel to the school multiple times a day, every school day, in order to carry her child up and down stairs to her classroom, to the cafeteria, and to other areas of the school in which classes and programs were held." The U.S. Attorney gave the district 30 days to respond with an outline and timetable for remedying the violations.
The letter identified the following more specific problems:
- First, looking at the public elementary school system in its entirety, we have concluded that New York City elementary schools are not currently "readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities." 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149,35.150 & 35.151. Using the City's own figures and definition of"fully accessible" schools, only approximately 17% of public elementary schools are "fully accessible." Districts 3, 5, 8, 12, 16 and 21 do not have any "fully accessible" elementary schools. This abysmally low percentage of schools demonstrates that the City has failed to provide program accessibility to individuals with disabilities comparable to the program accessibility available to individuals without disabilities.
- As a result of the lack of accessible schools, students with mobility impairments are often excluded from their local zoned school, the school that their peers in their community all attend. These students may need to spend significant amounts of time traveling to a school that can accommodate their physical disabilities. Requiring elementary students with disabilities to travel extensively at the beginning and end of each school day-a condition which is not imposed upon their peers-can impose particularly onerous physical demands on these children.
- In every school visited by our architect, we identified alterations made after January 1992 that were not compliant with the ADA. Such alterations included, but were not limited to, fire alarm systems, door hardware, toilet partitions, cafeteria seating, main office counters, library furniture, and playground areas. See Exhibit A. The City's failure to make these altered components accessible constitutes an explicit violation of the implementing regulations of the ADA. "Each facility or part of a facility altered by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public entity in a manner that affects or could affect the usability of the facility or pat1 of the facility shall, to the maximum extent feasible, be altered in such manner that the altered portion of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, if the alteration was commenced after January 26, 1992." 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(b)(l).
- Our investigation also revealed that the City has failed to undertake ongoing physical and programmatic changes to ensure that its elementary school program, when viewed in its entirety, is accessible and usable by people with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150. In addition, the City has failed to consider requests by students with disabilities for reasonable modifications that would allow those students to attend their zoned school, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7), including by failing to assess whether requested modifications would be reasonable in a particular case. Subsequent to the start of our investigation, the City made information regarding accessible schools easier to find on its website, implemented a complaint procedure for families encountering issues with physical accessibility, and assigned an individual to consider individual requests to make alterations at a particular school that could allow a disabled student greater access to school facilities. We appreciate the City's efforts to increase the information available to parents and to be more responsive to the needs of individuals with disabilities. However, these efforts fall far short.
Wednesday, December 16, 2015
Newark Settles Civil Rights Complaint Alleging School Closures Were Discriminatory, Reveals Lessons for Other Cases
The Advancement Project and Newark's Parents Unified for Local School Education filed a complaint with the the U.S. Department of Education challenging Newark's school closures. They alleged that the closures disproportionately affected minorities and students with disabilities and violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Newark had closed several traditional public schools during the recession, consolidating them with other traditional public schools and/or replacing them with charters. OCR found that the closures did, in fact, disproportionately affect minorities and students with disabilities and did not produce the benefits that the district claimed was the basis for the closures in the first instance. Last week, Newark agreed to take remedial action. The problem, however, is that school closures cannot reasonably be reversed and Newark still got what it wanted. The remedial steps Newark now promises are relatively mild:
- Identify whether any transferring students have suffered any academic deficiencies and take steps to remedy them.
- Determine whether transportation issues affected the ability of transferring students to participate in extracurricular activities.
- Investigate where disabled transferring students were provided with appropriate special education and related aids and services in the receiving school; and if not, whether compensatory or remedial services are necessary.
Nonetheless, advocates saw this as a victory, as they should. A similar and more aggressive and disproportionate set of closures occurred in D.C. in recent years, but the challenge to them failed. As my earlier blog post noted:
In DCPS schools as a whole, 68.4% of students are black; 13.8% are Hispanic; 3.7% are Asian, other, or unknown; and 9.2% are white. In the schools slated for closure, by contrast, 93.7% of students are black; 5.9% are Hispanic; 0.4% are Asian, other, or unknown; and less than 0.1% (2 out of 3053) are white. The figures skew similarly, if less starkly, for disabled students: 27.7% of students in the closing schools are in special education, versus 14.2% of students in DCPS overall."
There, advocates filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunction, but the court denied their injunction and dismissed the case. Thus, by rough comparison, the Newark decision is enormous.
One analytical difference also bears emphasis. OCR evaluated the efficacy of the closures after the fact, which allowed it to find that the justifications for the closures had proven flawed. In D.C., plaintiffs sought to block the closures earlier and argued, based on social science and expert opinion, that the closures would harm students and not produce the benefits the district claimed to seek. The district court, however, ignored these prospective claims and assumed the District's goals to be valid. I have not seen any subsequent research confirming or rejecting plaintiffs factual allegations, but to the extent their factual allegations were not novel, it raises the question of whether courts should take social science and expert opinions more seriously in similar cases. Newark's experience suggests they should.
Friday, November 6, 2015
The New York Times reported yesterday that five students have sued Brooklyn's Achievement First Charter School, alleging that the charter school has failed to provide federally-mandated special education services to students with disabilities. One plaintiff, a mother of a special education student at the school, stated that her child had not received paraprofessional services to which he was entitled for a year. Achievement First is part of a network with schools in New York, Connecticut and Rhode Island. The suit also accuses Achievement First of improperly disciplining special education students, such as on one occasion, sending a third grader to a second grade classroom as punishment for misbehavior. Attorneys for the plaintiffs, the New York Legal Assistance Group, allege that the problems at Achievement First arise in part from the charter network's culture of strict discipline for even minor infractions, which can result in punishing special education students for behaviors related to their disabilities. The NY Times story is here.
Friday, October 30, 2015
Fourth Circuit: Congress' IDEA Amendments Did Not Abrogate Supreme Court's FAPE Definition in Rowley
The Fourth Circuit recently held in O.S. v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 14-1994, 2015 WL 6122986 (4th Cir. Oct. 19, 2015), that the standard for a free appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act were not changed by Congress’ 2004 amendments to the IDEA. Thus, school districts are required to meet no higher standard for a FAPE than that set by the Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Rowley (1982). In the case, the parents of O.S., a second-grader, requested a one-on-one aide, extended school year services, and that Fairfax County, VA, school board assign a full-time nurse to O.S.’s school to address O.S.’s disabilities. The school’s representatives on O.S.’s individualized education program team did not adopt those requests, and O.S.’s parents did not agree to the new IEP. O.S. sued in federal district court, which found that the school board had provided a FAPE. On appeal of that decision, the Fourth Circuit rejected O.S.’s arguments that the preamble to Congress’ 2004 IDEA amendment stating its purpose to remedy “low expectations” of children with disabilities,” meant that the IDEA now requires “meaningful” educational benefit as distinct from “some” educational benefit. Following the Tenth Circuit on this issue (and rejecting a contrary Ninth Circuit case), the Fourth Circuit held that the standard for a FAPE remains the same: so long as a child receives some educational benefit, meaning a benefit that is more than minimal or trivial from special instruction and services, a school district has done enough.
Tuesday, October 27, 2015
This from the Education Law Center:
The Court-appointed Monitor overseeing a class action settlement to improve special education in the State-operated Newark Public Schools (NPS) has raised serious questions about the validity of a key record in the NPS files of children seeking special education services. The questionable records are uniformly written, undated letters containing the date for determining whether NPS has complied with a Court-imposed, 90-day deadline for providing services to children with disabilities. The letters were found only in those files taken from district schools to the NPS central office for purposes of the Monitor’s review.
In a semi-annual verification report issued this month, the Monitor, Priscilla Petrosky, questioned the “credibility” of the boilerplate letters because the dates for implementing special education services contradicted other information in the files. She also found no evidence that NPS actually provided the letter to parents, as required by law. The Monitor noted that if she excluded the questionable cases, “100% of [NPS] case files would have lacked agreement with the 90 day Annual Compliance Report.”
“The Monitor’s findings that the records may not be authentic suggest the undated letters placed in students’ files may have been an attempt by an employee or employees of the State-operated NPS to improperly raise the district’s compliance rate,” said ELC Senior Attorney Elizabeth Athos. “As NPS’s self-reported progress in meeting court-imposed deadlines has inched forward over the last three years, the all-important rate at which that progress can be verified by the Monitor has sharply dropped.”
Taking the undated letters “at face value,” the Monitor found that Newark’s compliance rate dipped to a dismal 17% of all randomly reviewed cases, even including the cases with questionable records.
Monday, September 28, 2015
Court Limits Special Education Complaint Filing to Two Years from Date Parents Knew or Should Have Known of a Violation, But Leaves Measure of Compensatory Education Open by Mark Weber
Last week, the Third Circuit handed down a major special education law decision, G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School District Authority, No. 14-1387, 2015 WL 5559976 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2015). In brief, it holds that two oddly worded provisions in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act establish a two year limitations period from the date the parent knew or should have known of an IDEA violation for the filing of a due process complaint, but the provisions do not limit the period that may be considered in fashioning a compensatory remedy for claims that are timely filed.
For those teaching education related seminars this fall, this may be a great opportunity for your current or past students to get their seminar papers published and/or win a cash prize. The announcement is as follows:
Thomas Jefferson School of law is pleased to announce the second Jameson Crane III Disability and the Law Writing Competition. Made possible by the generous gift of Thomas Jefferson School of Law alumnus Jameson Crane III, the Crane Writing Competition seeks to encourage outstanding student scholarship at the intersection of law and medicine, or law and the social sciences. The competition promotes an understanding of these topics, furthers the development of legal rights and protections, and improves the lives of those with disabilities.
Thursday, September 24, 2015
Class Action Suit Pending Against Philadelphia District for Failing to Provide Language Translation During IEP Process
Philadelphia parents filed a class action lawsuit against the School District of Philadelphia last month, alleging that the district violated special education law requirements by failing to translate documents and to provide sufficient interpretation services during Individualized Education Program meetings. The class alleges that the Philadelphia school district denied parents and students with limited English proficiency (LEP) an opportunity to participate IEPs on the same basis as their English-speaking counterparts. In 2013, the district reportedly received requests from 19,670 families of students who had requested documents in a language other than English; the district interpreted about 487 special education documents of any type that year. The plaintiffs received a due process hearing in May 2015 at which the Hearing Officer found violations of the parents' meaningful participation in the IEP process due to translation issues, required the district to translate IEPs and other documents for the plaintiffs in the future, and awarded compensatory education. However, the Hearing Officer declined to order that the district change its translation policies system-wide, concluding that the requested relief was outside of his powers. The plaintiffs are represented by the Education Law Center. T.R., by and through Barbara Galarza, v. The School District of Philadelphia, 2015 WL 5011332 (E.D.Pa. filed Aug. 21, 2015).
Tuesday, September 1, 2015
Does the IDEA Obligation to Prepare Students for "Independent Living" Include Preparation to Live in a Religious Community? by Maria Blaeuer
A special education case of note, M.L. ex rel. Leiman V. Starr, PWG-14-1679, was filed last month in Maryland. It involves tuition reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act. The parents' filed for a due process hearing after they unilaterally placed their child, who has Down Syndrome, in an Orthodox Jewish special education school. They lost the due process hearing and then filed a claim in federal district court, where they again lost, this time after cross-motions for summary judgment.
The parents' essential argument is that because of their child's disability, he requires explicit instruction in the traditions and practices of Orthodox Judaism at school if he is to be able to live independently in his Orthodox community after his time in public school ends. The parents argue that this instruction is not available in the public school and, therefore, the school district must pay for his education at an Orthodox special education school. A straight forward and typical argument in these cases, except for the inclusion of the words "Orthodox Judaism".