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Univ. of San Diego School of Law

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Thursday, July 24, 2014

Pardo & Patterson on Morse, Mind, and Mental Causation

Michael S. Pardo and Dennis Patterson (University of Alabama School of Law and European University Institute) have posted Morse, Mind, and Mental Causation (Criminal Law and Philosophy, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Stephen Morse's illuminating scholarship on law and neuroscience relies on a "folk psychological" account of human behavior in order to defend the law's foundations for ascribing legal responsibility. The heart of Morse's account is the notion of "mental state causation," in which mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, and intentions) cause behavior. Morse argues that causation of this sort is necessary to support legal responsibility. We challenge this claim. First, we discuss problems with the conception of mental causation on which Morse appears to rely. Second, we present an alternative account to explain the link between mental states, reasons, and actions (the "rational-teleological" account). We argue that the alternative account avoids the conceptual problems that arise for Morse's conception of mental causation and that it also undergirds ascriptions of legal responsibility. If the alternative succeeds, then Morse's conception of "mental state causation" is not necessary to support legal responsibility.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/crimprof_blog/2014/07/pardo-patterson-on-morse-mind-and-mental-causation.html

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