Friday, July 11, 2014
Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum (Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics and Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics) have posted Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal Cases on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
We model the strategic interaction between a prosecutor and a defendant when informal sanctions by outside observers (society) may be imposed on both the defendant and the prosecutor. Outside observers rationally use the disposition of the case (plea bargain, case drop, acquittal, or conviction) to impose these sanctions, but also recognize that errors in the legal process (as well as hidden information) means they may misclassify defendants and thereby erroneously impose sanctions on both defendants and prosecutors. If third parties prefer a legal system with minimal regret arising from classification errors, there is a unique equilibrium wherein the guilty defendant accepts the prosecutor’s proposed plea offer with positive (but fractional) probability, the innocent defendant rejects the proposed offer, and the prosecutor chooses to take all defendants who reject the offer to trial.
We also consider the effect of increasing the informativeness of the jury’s decision by extending the model to allow for a three-verdict outcome (not guilty, not proven, and guilty), sometimes referred to as the “Scottish” verdict.