CrimProf Blog

Editor: Kevin Cole
Univ. of San Diego School of Law

Wednesday, July 24, 2013

Mikhail on New Perspectives on Moral Cognition

Mikhail johnJohn Mikhail (Georgetown University Law Center) has posted New Perspectives on Moral Cognition: Reply to Zimmerman, Enoch, and Chemla, Egré & Schlenker (Jersusalem Review of Legal Studies (Forthcoming)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This essay responds to three commentaries on my book, Elements of Moral Cognition, as part of a symposium that will be published in the Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies. . . .

The essay addresses a number of topics raised by these commentaries, including the debate between rationalism and empiricism; whether the Principle of Double Effect is necessary and sufficient to explain common moral intuitions; whether my trolley problem data are replicable; whether Rawls was a moral psychologist; substantive differences between moral intuitions and linguistic intuitions; whether my normative and metaethical assumptions are defensible; the role of idealization and statistical data in moral psychology; the distinction between categorical and gradient moral judgments; the role of probabilistic factors in moral judgment; and the relation between moral judgments and causal judgments.

The commentaries are:

Aaron Zimmerman, "Mikhail's Naturalized Moral Rationalism," 3 Jerusalem Rev. L. Stud. 1-22 (2013)

David Enoch, "On Analogies, Disanalogies, and Moral Philosophy: A Comment on John Mikhail's Elements of Moral Cognition," 3 Jerusalem Rev. L. Stud. 1-25 (2013)

Emmanuel Chemla, Paul Egré & Philippe Schlenker, "Moral Judgments and Semantic Judgments: A Case Study (Comments on Mikhail)," 3 Jerusalem Rev. L. Stud. 1-18 (2013)

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