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Univ. of San Diego School of Law

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Thursday, May 2, 2013

Inal on Opposite Equilibrium Preferences on Law Enforcement

Hakan Inal (Izmir University) has posted Impossibility of the Existence of Opposite Equilibrium Preferences on Law Enforcement on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Law enforcement is among the key elements of a civil society that ensures the achievement of a higher social welfare. An enforcement authority determines the level of public enforcement of law. In this paper, I show that in a standard model of law enforcement in the literature, it is impossible to have agents with “opposite equilibrium preferences” over the level of public enforcement of law in the same society.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/crimprof_blog/2013/05/inal-on-opposite-equilibrium-preferences-on-law-enforcement.html

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