Monday, February 20, 2012
Nancy J. King (Vanderbilt Law School) has posted Non-Capital Habeas Cases after Appellate Review: An Empirical Analysis (Federal Sentencing Reporter, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In 2007, a team of researchers from the National Center for State Courts and Vanderbilt University Law School examined district court activity in 2384 randomly selected, non-capital habeas cases, approximately 6.5% of the non-capital habeas cases commenced in federal district courts in 2003 and 2004 by state prisoners. In this article, I follow those same cases into the courts of appeals. Even after appellate review, the number of non-capital petitioners receiving habeas relief remains less than the 1% rate of relief reported prior to AEDPA. Descriptive findings include appeals and requests to file successive petitions by circuit, and rulings on certificates of appealability by district and circuit. Detailed information on each case receiving relief in federal court is also included.
Malcolm Thorburn (Queen's University (Canada) - Faculty of Law) has posted Identification, Surveillance, and Profiling: On the Use and Abuse of Citizen Data (PREEMPTING CRIMINAL HARMS, Dennis, Sullivan, eds., Hart, 2012) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In this chapter, I do two things. First, I identify three conceptually distinct aspects of what is loosely called "surveillance." And second, I distinguish two ideal types of systems of surveillance: common law and continental. I argue that there is much to recommend the continental ideal type.
The first form of "surveillance" is identification. This is simply a mechanism for ensuring the continuity of identity over time and across space of individuals. This is not only relatively benign but actually a requirement of a well-ordered modern society. The second (surveillance, properly speaking) is more troubling. It is a mechanism for collecting specific information about specific individuals. But this is not nearly so worrisome as the third type: profiling. Here, the collate bits of specific information about specific individuals to form a profile that we may use to treat people differently according to the category that that profile falls into. This is often a mechanism for illegitimate discrimination and it often runs afoul of the presumption of innocence in the criminal process.
Mark Godsey (pictured) (Cincinnati Law) is the editor of this new blog, with a number of contributing editors, including international experts. Recent postings include "Japan: DNA Mistake and Possible Retrial in Mainali’s Case?," "The First Latin American Conference on Innocence Work to Take Place July 5th and 6th in Santiago, Chile," "Tipping Point: Is America finally saying no to prosecutorial overreach?," "Trial by Jury: Is It About Time for Nigeria?," and "Injustice to increase due to cuts in interpreter service?"
Basyle J. Tchividjian (Liberty University School of Law) has posted Predators and Propensity: The Proper Approach for Determining the Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The admissibility of prior bad act evidence in child sexual abuse prosecutions oftentimes makes the difference between a guilty and not guilty verdict. Recently, jurisdictions have growingly embraced the admission of such evidence for the purpose of establishing the defendant’s propensity to sexually victimize children. Due to the potentially high prejudicial effect of admitting propensity evidence, it is more critical than ever that courts carefully apply the decisive evidentiary gatekeeper, the probative value balancing test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and its state equivalents. Over the years, courts and legislators have attempted to develop analytical frameworks to be used by trial judges when evaluating the probative value of prior bad acts propensity evidence in child sexual abuse cases. Unfortunately, the framework most often applied by the courts in these cases has minimal correlation to the determination of propensity, but instead is premised upon the traditional Rule 404(b) basis of establishing proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, or accident. As a result, courts end up applying differing, and sometimes inconsistent frameworks that bear no rational relationship to one’s propensity to commit a child sexual offense. Without such a relationship, it is virtually impossible to meaningfully engage in a Rule 403 balancing test to determine the probative value of prior bad acts evidence being offered to establish propensity.
Sunday, February 19, 2012
Steven Penney (University of Alberta - Faculty of Law) has posted Impulse Control and Criminal Responsibility: Lessons from Neuroscience (International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 2012) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Almost all of the world’s legal systems recognize the “M’Naghten” exception to criminal responsibility: the inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of action. This exception rests on the assumption that punishment is morally justified only if the defendant was able to choose whether to do wrong. Jurists and jurisdictions differ, however, on whether to extend M’Naghten’s logic to cases where the defendant understood the wrongfulness of an act but was incapable of resisting an impulse to commit it. In this article I ask whether contemporary neuroscience can help lawmakers to decide whether to adopt or retain this defence, known variously as the “irresistible impulse” defense or the “control” or “volitional” test for insanity. More specifically, I ask firstly, whether it is empirically true that a person can understand the wrongfulness of an act yet be powerless to refrain from committing it; and second (assuming an affirmative answer to the first), whether the law of criminal responsibility can practically accommodate this phenomenon? After canvassing the relevant neuroscientific literature, I conclude that the answer to the first question is “yes.” After examining the varied treatment of the defence in the United States and other nations, I also give an affirmative answer to the second question, but only in limited circumstances. In short, the defence of irresistible impulse should be recognized, but only when it can be shown that the defendant experienced a total incapacity to control his or her conduct in the circumstances.
Carol S. Steiker (pictured) and Jordan M. Steiker (Harvard Law School and University of Texas School of Law) have posted No More Tinkering: The American Law Institute and the Death Penalty Provisions of the Model Penal Code (Texas Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 2, p. 353, 2010) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This Special Feature contains the full text of the report we wrote for the American Law Institute that provided the scholarly background for the ALI’s eventual withdrawal of the death penalty provisions of the Model Penal Code. The report is exactly as it was submitted to the ALI, and it is preceded by an introduction providing some historical context regarding the ALI’s involvement with the death penalty and describing the report’s production and aftermath.
Summary is from ScotusBlog, which also links to papers:
- Blueford v. Arkansas: Whether, if a jury deadlocks on a lesser-included offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the reprosecution of a greater offense after a jury announces that it has voted against guilt on the greater offense.
|1||379||Big Law's Sixth Amendment: The Rise of Corporate White-Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms
Charles D. Weisselberg, Su Li,
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, University of California, Berkeley- School of Law, Center for the Study of Law and Society,
Date posted to database: January 11, 2012
|2||323||Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Charging and Its Sentencing Consequences
M. Marit Rehavi, Sonja B. Starr,
University of British Columbia, University of Michigan Law School,
Date posted to database: January 16, 2012 [3rd last week]
|3||313||How Law Protects Dignity
New York University (NYU) - School of Law,
Date posted to database: December 17, 2011 [2nd last week]
|4||275||The Effect of Graduated Response Anti-Piracy Laws on Music Sales: Evidence from an Event Study in France
Brett Danaher, Michael D. Smith, Rahul Telang, Siwen Chen,
Wellesley College - Department of Economics, Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management , Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management, Unaffiliated Authors - affiliation not provided to SSRN,
Date posted to database: January 22, 2012
|5||231||Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense
Butler University College of Business,
Date posted to database: January 11, 2012 [7th last week]
|6||173||Thoughts on the Corporation as a Person for Purposes of Corporate Criminal Liability
Joan MacLeod Heminway,
University of Tennessee College of Law,
Date posted to database: January 31, 2012 [new to top ten]
|7||172||The Law and Economics of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies
Murat C. Mungan,
Florida State University - College of Law,
Date posted to database: January 19, 2012 [10th last week]
|8||164||False Justice and the 'True' Prosecutor: A Memoir, Tribute, and Commentary
University of Cincinnati College of Law,
Date posted to database: January 12, 2012
Last Revised: January 13, 2012
|9||134||Scales of Justice: Assessing Italian Criminal Procedure Through the Amanda Knox Trial
Julia Grace Mirabella,
Boston University School of Law,
Date posted to database: January 8, 2012
|10||130||Smooth and Bumpy Laws
Adam J. Kolber,
NYU School of Law,
Date posted to database: January 27, 2012 [new to top ten]