Monday, March 24, 2014
- Comparative Law Prof Blog, edited by Shawn Marie Boyne (Indiana), Monica Eppinger (Saint Louis), Lissa Griffin (Pace) & Shitong Qiao (NYU)
- Human Rights At Home Blog, edited by Martha F. Davis (Northeastern) & Margaret Drew (Northeastern)
- Law and Economics Prof Blog, edited by Gerrit De Geest (Washington U.), Ben Depoorter (UC-Hastings), Brian Galle (Boston College), David Gamage (UC-Berkeley), Shi-Ling Hsu (Florida State), Murat C. Mungan (Florida State), Eric Rasmusen (Indiana) & Manuel A. Utset, Jr. (Florida State)
- Legislation Law Prof Blog, edited by Kevin Barry (Quinnipiac), Emily Benfer (Loyola-Chicago), Sara K. Rankin (Seattle) & Joel Rogers (Wisconsin)
To all the new start-ups, we say: Welcome and we look forward to your posts.
Wednesday, January 8, 2014
As noted here on the TaxProf Blog, the mother of all LPBN Blogs, the Law Professor Blogs Network enjoyed a record-setting 2013, with traffic up 87.5% over 2012 as total network page views topped 18 million. Eighteen of the network's blogs are among the 50 most popular blogs edited by law professors. Four network blogs were named to the ABA Blawg 100 ("the 100 best Web sites by lawyers, for lawyers, as chosen by the editors of the ABA Journal"), and one network blog was named to the ABA Blawg 100 Hall of Fame.
- Appellate Advocacy Blog, edited by David R. Cleveland (Valparaiso), Kendall D. Isaac (Appalachian), Tonya Kowalski (Washburn) & Todd Bruno (Charleston)
- Business Law Prof Blog, edited by C. Steven Bradford (Nebraska), Joshua P. Fershee (West Virginia), Marcia L. Narine (St. Thomas), Stefan J. Padfield (Akron) & Anne Tucker (Georgia State)
- Civil Rights Law & Policy Blog, edited by Andrew M. Ironside
- Education Law Prof Blog, edited by Derek Black (South Carolina), LaJuana Davis (Cumberland) & Areto Imoukhuede (Nova)
- Elder Law Prof Blog, edited by Kim Dayton (William Mitchell), Rebecca C. Morgan (Stetson) & Katherine C. Pearson (Penn State)
- Gender and the Law Prof Blog, edited by by John Kang (St. Thomas) & Tracy A. Thomas (Akron)
- Law Deans on Legal Education Blog, edited by I. Richard Gershon (Mississippi), Paul E. McGreal (Dayton) & Cynthia L. Fountaine (Southern Illinois)
- Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform, edited by Douglas A. Berman (Ohio State)
- Securities Law Prof Blog, edited by Eric C. Chaffee (Toledo)
Thursday, November 21, 2013
As announced here on the TaxProf Blog, the Mother Ship of the Law Professor Blogs Network, the latter welcomes to its family the Appellate Advocacy Blog edited by David R. Cleveland (Valparaiso), Kendall D. Isaac(Appalachian), Tonya Kowalski (Washburn), and Todd Bruno (Charleston).
It brings us especial pleasure to welcome this blog to the Network because my colleague, David Cleveland (pictured), is a founding editor. Soon the Valpo Blog Network will rival Paul Caron's Blog Empire.
From the inaugural post:
Welcome to the Appellate Advocacy Blog on the Law Professor Blogs Network. On this blog, we plan to address a wide variety of issues related to appellate justice. This includes appellate court advocacy and practice, principles of appellate justice, appellate court jurisprudence on current issues, and legislative developments affecting the courts. We hope to keep our readers informed about cases and issues on appeal as well as scholarship, research, conferences, and news related to appellate courts. Our interest is in appellate advocacy and justice, broadly conceived, including state, federal, tribal, and international appellate courts. We hope that this blog will provide useful information, interesting perspectives, and fodder for engaging discussions.
We look forward to your posts.
Wednesday, October 9, 2013
I am very interested to see what the Law School Deans have to say on their new blog on legal education. This is a subject that interests us over at the ContractsProfs Blog as well. The Deans have already posted in praise of the ABA recommendation that the 20-hour/week limit on employment for full-time students be eliminated. I agree with the logic of the argument -- the ABA does not prohibit students from doing anything else (moot court competition, law review, student government, video games) more than twenty hours a week, so why should it prohibit employment?
Still, I think there is an answer. There may be students who can work more than 20 hours a week and still excel in law school, but I think they would be exceptional. For most students, law school is hard in ways that college is not. And they do not realize that coming in. They worked through college, so they think they can work their way through law school. But by the time they learn that law school presents new challenges, they have already done permanent damage to their transcripts. The 20-hour rule is profilactic, so it is bound to be overinclusive, but this is probably a situation where a bright-line rule makes sense.
It is true that students can spend time in non-remunerative activities to their heart's content but I think there is a difference. Students can tell both themselves and their professors, "I'm sorry; I don't have time to prepare for your class because I have a job." That excuse will not work as well with any other activity. And to the extent that students are putting in extra hours in activities like moot court competitions, law review, clinical work or pro-bono legal activities, those are all part of their legal educations.
The argument that students need to work to support themselves doesn't necessarily fly, since many of them are working in jobs that pay very little compared to the debt they are incurring. They are far better off getting the most out of their investment in legal education than they are earning pocket money. These sentiments open me up to the accusation of paternalism, and I cannot deny that the accusations score a palpable hit. But in an educational context in which much of the curriculum is required, and a good deal more of it is very strongly recommended, I think we crossed that line long ago in far more substantial ways.
One of the main things that I try to get across, especially to first-year students, is that this, meaning law school, is their job now. There may be personal crises and family emergencies that call out for our students' attention, but students have to negotiate those demands and the demands of law school just as they would those demands and the demands of the working world. The law school curriclum is not going to wait for them. If students are distracted when we go over the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule, they should not expect to be able to catch up when we are covering remedies. There just won't be time.
It is fine with me if the ABA gets rid of the 20-hour rule, but if it did so, I would recommend that my own law school adopt its own 20-hour rule for our students, with the possibility of exemptions (perhaps issued by the Dean of Students) in special cases when we know the student can handle the demands of both work and school. If we are going to have paternalist rules, they should come from within the house rather than from our ABA Big Brother's house.
Tuesday, October 8, 2013
From the inaugural post:
We are pleased to introduce our new blog devoted to legal education from the perspective of law deans. We hope this blog will provide a place where you will find information, opinions, and thoughts about a range of topics and issues related to legal education. The editors of this blog are Dean Richard Gershon of the University of Mississippi School of Law, Dean Paul McGreal of the University of Dayton School of Law, and Dean Cynthia Fountaine of the Southern Illinois University School of Law. We look forward to sharing our thoughts about legal education with you and hope you enjoy our blog.
Tuesday, September 10, 2013
- Business Law Prof Blog, by C. Steven Bradford (Nebraska), Eric C. Chaffee (Toledo), Joshua P. Fershee (West Virginia), Marcia L. Narine (St. Thomas), Stefan J. Padfield (Akron) & Anne Tucker (Georgia State)
- Education Law Prof Blog, by Derek Black (South Carolina) LaJuana Davis (Cumberland) & Areto Imoukhuede (Nova)
- Elder Law Prof Blog, by Kim Dayton (William Mitchell), Rebecca C. Morgan (Stetson) & Katherine C. Pearson (Penn State)
- Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform, by Douglas A. Berman (Ohio State)
We welcome our colleagues to the wonderful world of blogging and wish them all great success.
Friday, August 23, 2013
If you are reading this post, and if it is not the first post you have ever read on the ContractsProf Blog, then you have noticed that we have a new look. All of this is thanks to a global re-design at the Law Professor Blog Network (LPBN), headed up by Paul Caron (pictured).
This is our third day with the new look, and the impact on our readership has been dramatic! Of course, the uptick in our readership is also explained in part by the advent of a new semester, always a good time for people to check in, and by the very exciting symposium on the contracts scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, which ought to be attracting some new readers. Still, our daily readership has tripled since the re-design, and we have never had results like that either at the beginning of a new academic year or in connection with one of our virtual symposia. So, we think a great deal of the credit has to go to the re-design.
The re-design includes a bunch of new features with which we ourselves are not yet fully aware. We will tell you more about them as we play around with the platform and discover its nuances. Paul Caron has himself explained the purposes behind the redesign in this piece that is availabe on SSRN. Here is an excerpt from the abstract:
The re-design will (1) optimize each blog for viewing across a variety of platforms (desktop, laptop, tablet, and smart phone); (2) better integrate social media; (3) provide more robust analytics with richer and more accurate readership data; and (4) strengthen our partnership with Wolters Kluwer/Aspen Publishers and provide additional avenues for monetization
We here at the ContractsProf Blog cannot equal the expertise of the TaxProfs in money matters, but our interpretation of the last line of Paul's abstract is that the re-design is going to make us all rich!
Thursday, August 15, 2013
According to Ken's post, he offered his services as a drafting instructor to two prestigious law schools (Ken has been teaching drating courses every Fall since 2005) and was told that those schools don't offer stand-alone contracts drafting courses. Rather, they teach contracts drafting in the context of courses on "Deals."
Ken has eloquent arguments in favor of stand-alone contracts courses, and the comments sections add further support for his position. He will get no argument here. I agree with Ken that drafting should be a stand-alone course, and I suspect that it is at most law schools. Still, I think there are reasons for teaching drafting as part of a substantive course that Ken does not consider, so I throw them out there:
One of the knocks on contemporary legal education (see, e.g. The Carnegie Report and Best Practices) is that the components of legal education (doctrine, practical skills, ethics) have been compartmentalized such that the students do not learn how to become lawyers in the proper contexts and have difficulties translating theoretical constructs into the actual practice of law. So, in an ideal world, one would learn contracts drafting in the context of a substantive course in which one also learned about the legal and business environments in which real contracts are drafting. Such a course would (again, in an ideal world) also include simulations in which students could learn other practical lawyering skills (client counseling, negotiation, etc.), as well as confront ethical challenges.
In a previous post, we called attention to Deborah Zalesne and David Nadvorney's Teaching to Every Student: Explicitly Integrating Skills and Theory into the Contracts Class, which can be used in a course that covers both doctrine and skills. So, I think the sort of integrated approach that certain, unnamed, prestigious law schools are attempting has its theoretical appeal. For my part, since I have only four credits and fourteen weeks to take studens from zero to Llewellyn, I am grateful that my law school has a separate contracts drafting course that students can take in the second year. That doesn't mean that practical exercises have no place in a first-year contracts course, but given everything else we try to accomplish in that course, we can only offer a taste of drafting in the first year.
Friday, June 7, 2013
Next week, we will have two guests posts reviewing Kenneth A. Adams, A Manual of Style for Contract Drafting (3d ed.).
From the book's website:With A Manual of Style for Contract Drafting, Kenneth A. Adams has created a uniquely in-depth survey of the building blocks of contract language. First published in 2004, it offers those who draft, review, negotiate, or interpret contracts an alternative to the dysfunction of traditional contract language and the flawed conventional wisdom that perpetuates it. This manual has become a vital resource throughout the legal profession, in the U.S. and internationally.
This is the third edition of A Manual of Style for Contract Drafting. One-third longer than the second edition (published in 2008) and in a larger format, it contains much new material and has otherwise been revised and supplemented, making it even more essential.
This manual's focus remains how to express contract terms in prose that is free of the archaisms, redundancies, ambiguities, and other problems that afflict traditional contract language. With exceptional analysis and an unmatched level of practical detail, Adams highlights common sources of confusion and recommends clearer and more concise alternatives. This manual is organized to facilitate easy reference, and it illustrates its analysis with numerous examples. Consult it to save time in drafting and negotiation and to reduce the risk of dispute.
Our reviewers are:
Daniel D. Barnhizer, Professor of Law & The Bradford Stone Faculty Scholar, Michigan State University College of Law.
Professor Barnhizer graduated with honors from Harvard Law School, where he served as managing editor of the Harvard Environmental Law Review. After graduation, he was a judicial clerk for the Honorable Richard L. Nygaard, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, and for the Honorable Robert B. Krupansky, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, sitting by designation on the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Professor Barnhizer has practiced as a litigator with the law firms of Hogan & Hartson and Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft. Before joining the MSU College of Law faculty, he was an adjunct professor of law at American University - Washington College of Law, where he taught legal reasoning, research, and writing. At MSU Law, he teaches Contracts, Contract Theory, Business Enterprises, Securities Litigation, and Legal History.
Some of Professor Barnhizers scholarship can be found here.
Irma S. Russell, Dean and Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law.
Prior to coming to Montana, Dean Russell was the NELPI Professor and Director of the National Energy-Environment Law & Policy Institute at the University of Tulsa College of Law. She became Dean of the University of Montana School of Law in 2009.
Dean Russell is immediate past chair of the ABA Section of Environment, Energy and Resources and the immediate past chair of the AALS Section of Natural Resources and Energy Law. She is a newly appointed member of the Board of Dividing the Waters, an organization of judges and lawyers focused on issues of water adjudication in the Western United States. She has served as the chair of the Professionalism Committee of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar and as a member of the ABA Standing Committee on Professionalism and the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. She also has served as a member of the Executive Committee and Secretary of the AALS Natural Resources Section and as chair of chair of the AALS Section on Professional Responsibility, the AALS Section on Socio-Economics, and as a member of the Publications Committee of the Center for Professional Responsibility.
Dean Russell earned undergraduate degrees in liberal arts and education, a master’s degree in English literature, and her law degree at the University of Kansas. She clerked for The Honorable James K. Logan, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Russell engaged in private practice for several years in Kansas, Missouri, and Tennessee.
We look forward to some stimulating reviews and hopefully some fans of the book (and Ken Adams' blog on legal drafting) will chime in as well.
Tuesday, January 22, 2013
There's a post of potential interest to our readers over at the Legal Sklls Prof Blog, courtesy of Scott Fruehwald.
Here's a taste:
Professor Rip Verkerke [pictured] has developed an innovative contracts course at the University of Virginia School of Law. (full story here) He received a grant "to convert a fall-semester course into a 'hybrid technology-enhanced' offering." In addition to using innovative technology in his class, he redesigned his course as a "flipped" classroom model, "in which students watch pre-recorded lectures outside of class and participate in more interactive learning inside the classroom. . ." His goal for this flipped model is "to promote deeper learning for students." The article states, "he has taken a quantum leap this year in reimagining how to teach Contracts with online tools and a new understanding of how students learn."
Scott Fruehwald adds:
This is exactly the type of class that law schools should be teaching to better prepare their students for the contemporary legal world. Problem-solving exercises force students to apply what they have learned to facts, and studies have shown that students learn more when they apply their knowledge. Small-group discussions, along with the problem-solving exercises, make the students active learners, rather than passive receptacles as the Socratic method does. Education scholarship has determined that frequent formative assessment helps students learn more and remember more. I suspect that Verkerke's nightly quizzes are especially effective. He is also developing metacognitive learning by asking metacognitive questions to his students and causing them to self-reflect. (''What aspect(s) of the materials in this module did you find most difficult or confusing?' is a metacognitive question because it forces the students to "think about their thinking.")
In sum, Professor Verkerke's Contracts class is a model of what a law school class should be. Hats off to Professor Verkerke!
The rest can be found here.
Wednesday, December 26, 2012
Over at Prawfsblawg, Jeff Lipshaw (pictured, left) has an extended discussion of "legal realism" and contracts pedagogy, and a few other prawfs jump in with interesting comments.
Meanwhile, over at Concurring Opinions, Gaia Bernstein (pictured right) has a post on legislative prohibitions on egg and sperm donor anonymity and the impact of such prohibitions on surrogacy. According to Bernstein, such prohibitions are common abroad and are gaining ground in the U.S. She has an article on the subject, which can be found here.
Also at Concurring Opinions, Dave Hoffman has this short post about a provision in credit agreements providing that collection calls are not to be treated as "unsolicited." Dave suggests that screening calls from one's bank might then be construed as a breach of contract, but a comment suggests that the provision only protects the bank against any allegation that it has violated "do not call" list regulations.
Wednesday, December 19, 2012
Stop me if you've heard this one before - Facebook changes its Terms in a way that its users find offensive and invasive of their privacy. Uproar ensues and Facebook promises that the changes are harmless and everyone is just overreacting. Facebook backs off, a little, and then pushes the boundaries a little further next time, regaining even more ground against its users. Sound familiar?
I think the public backlash is a very good thing since it reminds companies that there are at least some people who are reading their online agreements. Unfortunately, they are usually only reading the terms of companies that already have a monopoly in the marketplace. It's not easy for unhappy Facebookers, Googlers or Instagramers to pick up their content and go elsewhere - where would they go?
What makes my skin crawl, however, is the misleading reassurances doled out by companies when they are called on their online agreements. Instagram, for example, states on its blog that users shouldn't fear, because it respects them, really it does:"Instagram users own their content and Instagram does not claim any ownership rights over your photos. Nothing about this has changed. We respect that there are creative artists and hobbyists alike that pour their heart into creating beautiful photos, and we respect that your photos are your photos. Period.
I always want you to feel comfortable sharing your photos on Instagram and we will always work hard to foster and respect our community and go out of our way to support its rights."
While it may be true that Instagram users own their content, Instagram does take a pretty broad license from its users:
As Instagram knows, it doesn't need to own your content in order to use it as if it owned it. All it needs is a broad license, like the one it has. Note that it has the right to "use" the content - and doesn't define what that means or restrict that use very much.
- "provide personalized content and information to you and others, which could include online ads or other forms of marketing
- provide, improve, test, and monitor the effectiveness of our Service
- develop and test new products and features
- monitor metrics such as total number of visitors, traffic, and demographic patterns"
I found this sentence particularly sneaky:
"We will not rent or sell your information to third parties outside Instagram (or the group of companies of which Instagram is a part) without your consent, except as noted in this Policy"
Did you like the "except as noted in this Policy" ? And, as Contracts profs know, "consent" means something other than what a layperson might think - it can mean just using a website in many cases. There is similar broad language here:
"We may also share certain information such as cookie data with third-party advertising partners. This information would allow third-party ad networks to, among other things, deliver targeted advertisements that they believe will be of most interest to you."
I'm not as concerned about the targeted advertisements (which doesn't mean I'm not concerned at all) as I am about the "such as" and "among other things."
And remember, the Terms do expressly state:
"Some or all of the Service may be supported by advertising revenue. To help us deliver interesting paid or sponsored content or promotions, you agree that a business or other entity may pay us to display your username, likeness, photos (along with any associated metadata), and/or actions you take, in connection with paid or sponsored content or promotions, without any compensation to you."
The company reassures its users, on its blog that it is not their "intention" to "sell" user photos. The company says it is working on language to make that clear. Let's hope so, but my guess is that they are probably going to use more mealy language like "at the moment" or "sell as a good defined under the UCC," or something that leaves wide open the possibility that it can make money off user photos by selling them to third party advertisers.
I'd suggest you save Granny some embarrassment and delete that photo now.
Monday, December 10, 2012
Over on Concurring Opinions, Larry Cunningham has a far stronger response to the decision, noting especially that there were no dissents from the Supreme Court's per curam decision. He calls for Congress to sort out the robes:
In numerous past SCOTUS cases, dissenting opinions were routinely filed exposing the flaws in the Court’s jurisprudence. The recent per curium opinion may signal capitulation, indicating that there are no longer any Justices prepared to object to these mistakes. That defeat means it is clearly time for Congress to rein the Court in. It should make it clear that state courts are responsible for developing and applying state contract law, not SCOTUS, federal courts or private arbitrators.
There is a lively comment section following Larry's post.
Monday, October 22, 2012
Last week, the Concurring Opinions blog hosted an online symposium on Larry Cunningham's new book Contracts in the Real World: Stories of Popular Contracts and Why They Matter. An introduction to the symposium can be found here. With the permission of the authors, we are cross-posting the commentaries here. Here is a listing of the posts:
Miriam Cherry, Post I
Miriam Cherry, Post II
Miriam Cherry, Post III
Ronald K.L. Collins
Larry Cunningham, Post I
Larry Cunningham, Post II
Larry Cunningham, Post III
Susan Schwab Heyman
Law Student Umo Ironbar
Donald C. Langevoort
Jennifer S. Taub
Those of you in the teaching world, we hope that you will have a look at Larry's book and give serious consideration to the possibility of adopting it for your courses or recommending it to your students. To our student readers, this is a really fun book that will enhance your enjoyment of and appreciation of the law of contracts.
Lawrence A. Cunningham is the Henry St. George Tucker III Research Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School. He is also the author of Contracts in the Real World.
Thanks to all participants for their wonderful contributions to the on-line symposium about Contracts in the Real World: Stories of Popular Contracts and Why They Matter.
As the reviews suggest about readers finding the stories fun and the lessons enjoyable, you may be able to guess that I found researching and writing them fun and enjoyable too. Many of the stories were originally written, in a slightly different form, for this blog. Many of those stories generated productive comments.
I therefore must thank not only my fellow perma-bloggers here at Concurring Opinions for the opportunity to develop these ideas on this site, but also to many readers of the site for their thoughtful contributions. Double that gratitude for having allowed so much space to be devoted to the book these past several days.
Beyond contracts, several publishers and I believe that there is a series in this approach to the content and presentation of many law school subjects. That would certainly seem apt for other traditional 1L courses such as Torts, Property, Criminal Law and Civil Procedure.
Many are tempted to envision that such a series would resemble that forged a decade or so ago by Paul Caron, but it would be entirely different in substance and audience. Paul’s series dug deeply into the classics in the spirit of legal archeology, of tremendous interest and value to scholars, but less to students. This series is almost the opposite: using the classics but moving away from them toward contemporary cases that draw upon and illuminate them.
As envisioned, each book in the new series would be written by a single author and consist in drawing on contemporary events to illustrate how the principles from the classic cases continue to be relevant. Professors are a target audience, of course, but as colleagues such as Susan and others stress, students get enormous value from such works. We also continue to believe that such books have strong appeal to some cohort within the segment of general readers of non-fiction.
What else is next for Contracts in the Real World? Miriam has written a full-length review essay of the book, entitled “Learning Contracts Through Current Events,” which will appear in the Hawaii Law Review. (If there ever should be a live symposium of the book, the next book, or the series, I know where I’d propose it be held.) Ron Collins and his colleagues have invited me to come to the University of Washington next term to give a faculty presentation on the book and its pedagogical aims.
In addition, the chief editor at Cambridge University Press, John Berger, promises to have a stack of the books with him at CUP’s booth at the 2013 AALS annual meeting in New Orleans (another potential symposium destination). Scholars noodling on the idea of a series might wish to let John know about that–please let me know as well as I will be eager to coordinate such a project as series editor.
Thanks again to everyone who contributed to this symposium (and to the preparation of the book).
[Posted by JT]
Lawrence A. Cunningham is the Henry St. George Tucker III Research Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School. He is also the author of Contracts in the Real World.
Before wrapping up the symposium about Contracts in the Real World, this is the second of two posts on main themes drawn by the wonderful contributions. This one concerns methodology, the book’s approach, content and organization—and what more might be done in pursuit of such a new model of pedagogy.
The approach of using contemporary examples to illuminate venerable principles and classic cases seems warmly received, for many different reasons, elaborated in many different ways by all the contributors, including two students. It is nice to know the many different ways in which the book has spoken to readers. The value of that reach was summed up best, perhaps, by Nancy, when she stressed that retaining student attention is at least half the battle in law teaching.
I appreciated Tom’s point that reading this book does not feel like work in the way that reading many teaching books can. As Nancy, Don and Ron stated explicitly and others noted implicitly, the current teaching environment imposes new demands on teachers of contracts (really profs throughout the law school and much of the university). Finding ways to draw students in is vital.
Worth expanding on a bit are Erik’s interesting observations about the book’s layout and compatibility with given casebooks. Susan referenced having assigned Contracts in the Real World as a companion to the Dawson, Harvey, Henderson, Baird casebook, which I have used many times, including during the period when I was writing this. My selections of potential stories, and how to build them (in the ways Dave and Jake and others helpfully explained) was initially strongly influenced by that book.
But I wanted to be sure it fit with others. So I carefully examined a dozen of the most popular casebooks and prepared correlation charts between my discussions and those books. I tried to fill in the connections by drawing on the most often reprinted cases. I tried to find the most interesting stories that could connect to them. I ended up with more than 100 stories in various draft forms and settled on the 45 that are in the book.
That process and inventory posed a challenge concerning organization and sequencing. But it also gave me the advantage of freedom—not being wedded to any given table of contents. Erik notes the effect when he compares my organization to that of the casebook he uses: expanding a reader’s understanding.
There should be other books in this line. I appreciate Jennifer’s suggestion that this could be a stand alone teaching text for a law school course, but Miriam Cherry and I envision a more complete coursebook being built out of this one. Several publishers have expressed interest in such a project and we are working to develop it. Much of the organization would follow that of Contracts in the Real World, with “main cases” or “main deals” consisting of opinions or contracts summarized there, along with the supporting classic cases now found in most books.
It would be a coursebook, as Ron imagines, and could well include the effort to discern questions, to which Don referred, such as “what were they trying to do?” and “was this a good way to do it?” It will continue the bridge-building between worlds that Tom applauded. I think it would be wonderful to include, in the book or in an on-line companion, as Erik suggests, the text of at least some of the contracts for inspection. In preparing Contracts in the Real World, I obtained every contract that I could and have them in electronic form. I hasten to add that not every one of them would prove to be a useful teaching tool, but many would.
It is also important, I believe, as Don and Erik both suggested, to give many more examples of deals not resolved in court—such as the Conan-NBC deal and many others discussed in the book. We will try to develop case study modules to present such material in a way that both works within the prevailing law school teaching model and advances pedagogical imperatives.
[Posted by JT]
Lawrence A. Cunningham is the Henry St. George Tucker III Research Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School. He is also the author of Contracts in the Real World.
Before wrapping up the symposium about Contracts in the Real World, I wanted to offer two posts on main themes of the contributions–which were wonderful.
The first concerns the role of politics in contract law adjudication. It emerged as a theme from several posts, explicitly by Dave and Miriam, implicitly byJake’s discussion of Baby M and by Nancy’s of ProCD, and more obliquely in Tom’s (and Miriam’s) reference to my notion of the “sensible center” in contract law.
Perhaps the safer way to put the point would be to say that the common law of contracts is among the least political of subjects in law. The book does recognize the potential for political factors, of course, including variation among states. And while it celebrates the impressive power of the common law of contracts to deal neutrally with change, it also notes limits.
This is most explicit in the case of Baby M and its contrast with California’s Baby Calvert. I agree with Jake, and his agreement with Dave, that these two cases illustrate the driving role that judicial worldviews, and perhaps local state outlooks, can play in the approach to a case and the outcome.
The pairing of the two cases helps to show such features, in a context where opposition seems particularly acute. This is the context of “public policy,” an area where the common law of contracts is often inferior to administrative or legislative solutions precisely because at stake are exquisitely political decisions. That’s why p. 56 notes that judges on both (or all) sides of the debate about surrogacy contracts “usually concede that better solutions are likely to come from legislation. As magisterial as the common law of contracts is, many of society’s vexing puzzles should be resolved by the legislative branch of government.”
The differences between California and New Jersey on surrogacy contracts reminds me of the differences, to which Dave adverts, between California and New York on the parol evidence rule. In California, Chief Justice Roger Traynor helped to forge a weak parol evidence rule, stressing context and reflecting skepticism of the unity of language, compared to New York, where judges since Andrews and Cardozo (noted at pp 7-8) have shown greater interest in finality and the security of exchange transactions.
Those differences, in the doctrine and underlying attitudes, are real. But as this example shows and Dave notes, this is not so easy to classify in political or ideological terms. It may be due more to New York’s history as a commercial center and may reflect something about how California is just a more relaxed place in general.
I think the example of ProCD, about which Miriam, Nancy and Jake commented, is an instance of the potential but vague role of politics or judicial worldview in contract adjudication. In the book, I summarize the case as a possible precedent for the main case, which concerned consumers “assenting” to inconspicuous terms in an on-line license—the Netscape spyware case. The ProCD precedent, I note, pointed in opposite directions for the Netscape case, forcing the judge to choose whether to follow in its path or not. The judge chose not to. The related facts seem to support that outcome. So far so good.
But given the charged setting of electronic commerce, I suspected that readers would have a sneaking suspicion that something else is going on. So I identify the judges—something done rarely in the book, as follows: at page 28 “[ProCD was written by] Frank Easterbrook, the federal judge in Chicago appointed by President Ronald Reagan” . . . and at page 27 “Netscape was written by Judge Sonia Sotomayor for a federal appellate court in New York, several years before her promotion by President [Barack] Obama to the U.S. Supreme Court.”
The real problem with ProCD may be more akin to the real problem with Baby M: even the common law of contracts nods. The issues are so novel and vexing that legislatures should act. Even the UCC—part of a long tradition in sales law recognizikng the limits of the common law—may not be readily adaptable to the world of electronic commerce, as Miriam’s post about ProCD hints.
But to return to the broader thrust of the sensible center and the generally apolitical quality of contract law, consider two points Jennifer made in her post. The first concerns the political fury that erupted amid the AIG bonus contracts. While politicians were calling for scalps and the company’s PR team intoned about the sanctity of contracts, Jennifer notes the op-ed I wrote summarizing the comparatively cool tools and results recognized by the common law of contracts.
Jennifer also calls attention to the list of conclusions at the end of Contracts in the Real World. Look at those statements of earthy contract law (some listed here) and it will be difficult to deny the truth or to detect a political or ideological edge within the spectrum of American political discourse. Let contract law do its knitting, and my own answer to Dave’s excellent question is that contract law really is pragmatic.
[Posted by JT]
As promised, the following is contributed by Professor Miriam Cherry's student, Umo O. Ironbar:
As a 1L student at Saint Louis University, reading the conditions materials in Professor Lawrence Cunningham’s Contracts in the Real World Stories of Popular Contracts was refreshing.
We looked at a deal that Kevin Costner went into for the creation of massive bronze bison sculptures which would be put in place in his luxury resort in South Dakota named The Dunbar (a tribute to his successful production of his 1990 movie “Dancing With Wolves). Another case we looked at was Charlie Sheen’s “play-or-pay” contract with Warner Brothers.
These cases are still so vivid in my mind because I actually knew who the parties were. Unlike other cases that could have been found in my regular contracts textbook, I did not have to wait until the notes and questions sections after the cases to know why these cases were so important or infamous, or why they made the selection into the textbook out of the hundreds of thousands of cases that have been tried.
I grew up watching Kevin Costner and Charlie Sheen on the big screen and television. They are both successful actors – and both had more than their share of controversy. When we read about Charlie Sheen our class was abuzz and more people wanted to speak and contribute to the class discussion. For me and many of my fellow classmates, the excitement came in part because Charlie Sheen was everywhere in the news and Internet. Everyone was just waiting to see what new eccentric behavior he was going show at any given time or day.
And here in my contracts class, we were actually talking about his legal issues. For me, it made the concepts we were learning more real. Conditions as defined by Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 224 made more sense to me. Conditions were no longer just words that were only used in law school academia.
I feel like many of the law students who will read Professor Cunningham’s contracts book will find it easier to follow the parties who are involved in the cases. Sometimes the biggest obstacle in understanding a case and what it is about is just being able to follow who the parties are and thus why they are in court. In using cases that involve people and stories we as students are familiar with, the materials make it easier for us to grasp the concepts and laws the courts are using to resolve breach of contract cases.[Posted by JT]
Professor Lawrence Cunningham knows the law and his audience. With Contracts in the Real World: Stories of Popular Contracts and Why They Matter, he brings contract doctrine to life. Cunningham concisely, yet colorfully, covers how courts resolve a variety of deals gone wrong. This book is ideal to help students develop an understanding of how the law is used to sort between those bargains that will be enforced and those that will not, as well as what remedies are available when things do not go as the parties to the agreement initially planned.
Contracts in the Real World has considerable range. It starts with a wrecked wedding party, an event few experience though many may fear. A dispute between a couple and a banquet hall venue results from a regional power outage during the reception. This fact pattern echoes the type of phone call a recent law graduate might receive from an exasperated family member punctuated with the dreaded question — you’re a lawyer, can we get our money back? The book provides a sensible explanation of how the wedding dilemma would resolve, and weaves together this type of personal situation with more public, celebrities’ disputes and classic contract decisions. These classic decisions are better appreciated in this fashion, when they are used to explain the outcomes of more modern disputes. For example, Sherwood v. Walker (the fertile cow – mutual mistake case) dating back to 1887 resonates when it is used to analyze a divorce settlement dispute concerning millions of dollars invested with Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.
What makes the book particularly compelling, is that mixed in with relatable fact patterns and entertaining battles are significant matters of policy.Contracts in the Real World accomplishes this, for example, when it covers some very unpopular contracts. These include the infamous agreements under which American International Group (AIG) paid out $165 million in cash bonuses to roughly 400 employees. According to the New York Times, among those who received more than $1 million a piece were 73 employees of the AIGFP business unit. This was the same business unit that helped enable the housing bubble and related Financial Crisis of 2008 by providing credit protection (selling credit default swaps) on high-risk mortgage-linked securities. The AIG bonuses were announced in 2009, just months after the US government paid $85 billion for a nearly 80% ownership stake in AIG. This was a part of the $182 billion government commitment to rescue the giant insurance firm when it approached insolvency due, in large part, to its inability to make payments to counterparties on its credit default swaps.
The public outrage over the AIG bonuses is included in Chapter 3 which covers the concepts of “excuses and termination.” These bonus contracts were entered into in early 2008, well before the bailout. The agreements which promised bonus payments in 2009 and 2010 were designed to encourage employees to stay with AIGFP. In response to an irate public, in 2009, AIG which was by then a ward of the state, insisted that the contracts with these employees were ironclad. Yet, the company did not publicly reveal the actual language of the agreements nor were legal theories that would have excused performance discussed. Those opposed to paying the bonuses, including certain members of Congress suggested imposing up to a 100% tax on them. In this manner even the opposition seemed to treat as true the faulty premise that contract law requires all agreements to be performed without any exceptions. Cunningham attempted to correct this misperception. In a contemporary op-ed in the NYT and in Contracts in the Real World he suggested that contract doctrine might have been a moderating measure, an alternative to either unexamined payments on the one hand or demands for government confiscation, on the other. It also would have been a teachable moment. Though that moment passed, through this book, the lesson is not lost.
Finally, beyond these thoughtful presentations of popular and unpopular contracts, this book includes in the final chapter twenty statements the reader is invited to determine are true or false, to test comprehension of contract law. This useful list serves as a proxy for the book’s (and a course’s) intended learning outcomes. Given the comprehensive scope and easy style of Cunningham’s book, this is a natural choice to assign as a supplement to a casebook. Or, one might be tempted to use it as the primary textbook, and supplement it with the UCC, a number of the referenced cases and other favorites, highlighting where jurisdictions vary. Students may learn faster when they are so guided and engaged. Should this leave extra time in the semester, it might be used for contract negotiation and drafting, skills that nearly all attorneys need but few learn in law school.
[Posted by JT]
Dave Hoffman is the James E. Beasley Professor of Law at Temple University's Beasley School of Law.
I’ll begin by joining the others who’ve written in already to praise Larry’s excellent Contracts in the Real World. It is highly accessible, entertaining, and offers a ream of examples to make concrete some abstract and hard doctrinal problems. Larry has the gift of making complex problems seem simple – much more valuable and rare than the common academic approach of transforming hard questions into other hard questions! This would be an ideal present to a pre-law student, or even to an anxious 1L who wants a book that will connect the cases they are reading, like Lucy, Baby M, or Peevyhouse, to problems that their peers are chatting about on Facebook.
Larry’s typical approach is to introduce a salient modern contract dispute, and then show how the problem it raises was anticipated or resolved in a famous contract case or cases. Larry often states that contract “law” steers a path between extremes, finding a pragmatic solution. This approach has the virtue of illustrating the immediate utility of precedent for guiding the resolution of current disputes, and comforts those who might believe that courts are alwayspolitical actors in (caricatured) Bush v. Gore or Roberts/Health Care Cases sense. It has the vice of de-emphasizing state-by-state differences in how contract law works, as well as the dynamic effects of judicial decisions on future contracts. But I think that for its intended audience, these vices can be easily swallowed.
I wanted to offer one question to provoke discussion: is it actually true that politics is as removed from contract law as Larry’s narrative appears to suggest, and how would we know? The contracts law professor listserve is full of laments about judges turn away from Traynor & his perceived progressive contract doctrines – and I certainly know of colleagues who teach that there are “liberal” and “conservative” versions of the parol evidence rule, for instance. But what does this actually mean, and how does it connect with the scholarship on judicial politics generally? As it turns out, this question has been understudied, probably because political scientists have yet to find a way carefully operationalize what a “liberal” or a “conservative” outcome in a contracts case would be, and thus to usefully regress case outcomes against a judge’s political priors. Many authors (Sunstein et al. 2004; Christy Boyd and I, 2010) have found ideological effects outside of the typical con law regime (particularly in “business law” areas). But I’m aware of a few empirical papers analyzing the political valence of how contract doctrine comes to be. (Snyder et al. n.d.) Some have suggested that contract law is a particularly hard area to study because selection effects loom so large. I would also note that most contract law “work” occurs at the state court level, where ideological measures are either explicit or very obscure.
If we found good measures, my own hypothesis would be that a particular judge’s worldview matters a great deal to how he or she resolves contract disputes – with priors about how much a person should be responsible for their own choices, and their perspective on market discipline, shaping how they understand the facts and thus apply the law. Contract cases are powerfully controlled by judges – probably more so than in other areas of private law. Contract doctrine would reflect these individual choices, and we’d thus be left not withone ”pragmatic” contract law, but rather many competing strands. I’d thus close by urging readers of Larry’s book to think a bit about the cases not picked out and illuminated in the narrative – where the judges are less wise and more human.[Posted by JT]