Thursday, June 23, 2016
Looking for an interesting new case on the statute of frauds, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and constructive trust by a son against his father? Here’s one for you:
It is California. The year is 1994. Father Sardul allegedly promises son Paul that if he if he “stayed in school, was a good son, continued to work on the [family] ranches, and married an Indian girl, i.e., a Sikh girl, Sardul and [mother] Jitendra would take care of him financially.”
According to the court, this happened next: “In 1996, Sardul and Jitendra were looking for a wife for Paul. The family traveled to India for this purpose. While in India they conducted numerous interviews of the parents of potential brides. In the Sikh culture, the boy’s parents take responsibility for finding a suitable wife. If both sets of parents think a match looks promising, the boy and girl spend some time alone together. Thereafter, if the boy and girl are interested, the match will be pursued. Paul’s family and Rajneet’s family first met on February 21, 1996 and Paul and Rajneet were married on March 16, 1996.”
The couple lived in one of the family’s ranch houses without ever paying rent, never making a mortgage, and with father Sardul making certain other payments for the young couple. Paul did, however, work on the family grape ranches until 1999. At that time, he got a full-time job for other employers.
In 2002, grape growers in California encountered hard times financially. Sardul tells Paul that he (Sardul) needed to sell the ranch on which Paul and his wife lived as they risked otherwise being foreclosed on both on the ranch in question as well as others. One of the family’s properties had a “little bit of equity” on it. Paul and his wife sign a deed for that property. The couple later stated that the father had promised “to give them” the ranch on which they previously lived when “things got better financially.” The father never did so, but instead offered the couple a 99-year lease on the property in 2012. Paul subsequently filed suit, claiming breach of three separate contracts: 1) To be a good son and stay in school, work on the ranches, and marry an Indian girl, 2) to take care of his father, and 3) the transfer of the above-mentioned ranch.
The court concluded that it did not matter how many contracts were alleged because it was questionable whether “any contract was formed at any time.” The alleged promises to “be a good son and stay in school” were vague, the promise “to continue to work on the ranches” was unsupported by the evidence, and the “marry an Indian girl” term was illegal as a restraint on marriage. The alleged oral promise to transfer a ranch violated the statute of frauds.
Paul and his wife also argued equitable estoppel and that, accordingly, the contract was not barred by the statute of frauds. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that neither Paul nor his wife Rajneet detrimentally relied on the alleged contract to transfer the ranch to them or suffered unconscionable injury. The court concluded that Paul did not forbear all other employment opportunities to work on the ranches. Rather, Paul began working full time for other employers in 1999 and was permitted to live rent free on the Elkhorn Ranch until 2012. The court noted that in 2012, Paul and wife Rajneet were able to purchase a $650,000 house and had saved enough money to make a $200,000 down payment.
But wait!! What about the wife? Did she not have any arguments? You bet: Rajneet appeared to claim unconscionable injury or detrimental reliance based on marrying Paul and moving to the United States in part because of Sardul's promise that they would be given a ranch. The court concluded that Rajneet did not prove her claims noting that Rajneet was still married to Paul, they both were employed with good jobs, and they were able to purchase a home after living rent free for many years.
Finally, Paul and Rajneet claimed that they partially performed when they bought the one ranch from the father in reliance on Sardul's promise to transfer another to them in exchange. Part performance of an oral agreement for the transfer of an interest in real property may, under certain circumstances, except the agreement from the statute of frauds. (Sutton v. Warner (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 415, 422.) However, the trial court found that no Sardul’s testimony that no such promise was ever made to be credible. The appellate court supported this as issues of credibility are for the trial courts to decide.
Talk about a family relationship gone sour, and then only over money. What a shame!
Wednesday, June 22, 2016
The Olympics are almost here, and as we all know, they're big business: lots of television ratings, lots of advertising, lots of endorsements.
Today the District of Oregon is hearing an argument on a preliminary injunction in a contract case with Olympic implications (or an Olympic case with contract implications), Nike USA, Inc. v. Berian, Docket No. 3:16-cv-00743 (behind paywall).
The dispute, which has been widely reported online, is based on Nike's endorsement contract with Boris Berian, a track and field competitor with Olympic hopes. The contract, according to the complaint, gave Nike the right to match any offers made to Berian during a particular period of time. During that time, Berian received an endorsement offer from New Balance. Nike claims in its complaint to have matched the offer, and that Berian breached his contract with Nike when he refused to continue his relationship with Nike.
Berian kept racing. And kept winning. While wearing New Balance gear. So Nike, to keep Berian from furthering his relationship with Nike's competitor New Balance, sued him, serving him with the lawsuit during a big track meet.
Nike's allegations have been countered by Berian, who claims that New Balance's offer to him did not contain a number of restrictions that Nike's offer did contain. However, Nike has countered that by arguing that Berian did not make that clear to Nike and that Nike would have dropped its restrictions if necessary. (Nike seems to have just assumed there had to be restrictions and that any statement otherwise couldn't possibly be true.)
Endorsements are big money, of course. The Nike and New Balance offers are $125,000 for the year. While he's embroiled in the legal dispute, Berian's agent asked for donations to Berian's legal fund.
The judge has already approved a TRO in the case, prohibiting Berian from racing with any equipment other than Nike's. The hearing for the preliminary injunction is today.
In Strumlauf et al. v. Starbucks Corp., No. 16-01306, a federal district court judge based in San Francisco just ruled that a class action lawsuit against Starbucks.The complaint alleges breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, fraud and violations of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, the California Unfair Competition Law, and the California False Advertising Law.
The company allegedly overcharged its customers by “systematically serving lattes that are 25% too small” in order to save milk. Baristas were allegedly required to use pitchers for heating milk with etched “fill to” lines that are too low. Further, they were told to leave ¼ inch of free space in drink cups. Said U.S. District Judge Thelton Henderson: "This is not a case where the alleged deception is simply implausible as a matter of law. The court finds it probable that a significant portion of the latte-consuming public could believe that a 'Grande' contains 16 ounces of fluid." Starbucks’ cups for “tall,” “grande,” and “venti” lattes are designed to hold exactly 12, 16 and 20 ounces.
Starbucks so far counters that “if a customer is not satisfied with how a beverage is prepared, we will gladly remake it.” Right, but how many customers would really complain that their drink is .25 inch (6 mm) too small?... And does it really matter? Much of what one pays for with a Starbucks drinks is, arguably, the knowledge of what the retail outlets offer, the ambience, convenience, “free” wifi, etc. Having said that, I am certainly not one to promote consumer fraud and recognize that little by little, the alleged milk-saving scheme could, of course, bring even more money into the coffers of already highly profitable Starbucks.
Tuesday, June 21, 2016
Today's dive into the long and storied ContractsProf Blog archives takes us to December 4, 2005. Enjoy this post from Emeritus Editor-in-Chief Frank Snyder about everyone's favorite fashion case:
On this date, December 4, 1917, the New York Court of Appeals handed down its decision in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88 (1917). The opinion by Judge Cardozo is a milestone for several areas of contract law, including consideration, implied terms, and the duty of good faith. And the personality of the defendant, Lady Duff Gordon (the Martha Stewart of her day) hasn't hurt its popularity. Here's an interesting take on the case from Victor Goldberg (Columbia) and some info and pictures involving Lady Duff Gordon from Jim Fishman (Pace). (Image: Lady Duff Gordon, courtesy Randy Bryan Bigham.)
Not so well-known as Cardozo's innovation, however, is the that the reasoning for which the opinion is famous -- that an exclusive license contains an implied clause that the licensee will use its best efforts -- wasn't Cardozo's idea. That theory, and the key cases that Cardozo cites in the opinion, were provided for him in the brief of the plaintiff's lawyer, John Jerome Rooney (1866-1934).
Rooney was a minor celebrity in his own right. He was born in Broome County, New York. His father, a small merchant in Binghamton, died when John was a child, and the family moved to Philadelphia. He attended Mount Saint Mary's College in Emmitsburg, Maryland, graduating in 1884. After service as a Naval officer, he became a lawyer in New York City. A staunch Democrat, he became a leader of the Catholic bar and a power behind the scenes in city politics. He served as President of the Catholic Club of New York, received considerable attention for his work on behalf of the persecuted Armenians in Turkey, and for his pro-Irish nationalist writing. His political service was later rewarded with a job as Presiding Judge of the New York Court of Claims. His wife was president of the Civic Education League and was active in the battle against narcotics in New York City.
But Rooney is best remembered today not for his legal work, but for his poetry. An ardent patriot, his poems about America's military and the Irish struggle for independence earned him great popularity. He was best known for such works as The Men Behind the Guns, Joined the Blues, and Ave Maria.
Monday, June 20, 2016
It isn't something we typically think about but as our world shifts to digital and as more and more of us leave behind large social media footprints, what happens to those accounts when we die? I have thought about it briefly, mostly in thinking that I should give my passwords to someone, so that, if something happens to me unexpectedly, someone will be able to get onto my social media to let my followers know. I have had social media friends vanish with no explanation, and it's always haunted me that maybe something happened to them and I had no way of knowing.
Also of concern to me is that, even if someone is designated as a legacy contact, it still might not allow the kind of access that Rosemary was looking for, or that you might want to grant to someone. Facebook limits what a legacy contact can do, meaning that your power over what happens to your Facebook account really ultimately lies with Facebook, not you or your wishes. Which is a reminder, of course, that our control over our Facebook accounts is limited to begin with and pretty much at the whim of Facebook.
Saturday, June 18, 2016
OK, so this post is more about employment law than pure contract law, but for me at least, the issues overlap. Besides, the following is just plain interesting “summer Hollywood” news… who doesn’t need a tiny dose of that from time to time!
Racial bias in Hollywood hiring practices has been discussed widely recently. Now, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (“EEOS”) is expanding its investigations into gender discrimination in Hollywood entertainment contracts. http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/movies/la-et-mn-0512-aclu-women-directors-update-20160509-snap-story.html If the EEOS finds out that there is indeed a pattern of discrimination, it could take legal action or seek mediation. However, the highly complex Hollywood hiring processes make it very difficult to identify any deliberate wrongdoing.
Of the top-grossing 100 films of 2013 and 2014, only 1.9% of the directors were women.
Of 25 Paramount Pictures films that have been announced through 2018, not a single one has a women director. The same is true of the 22 Twentieth Century Fox films that have been announced.
Some women directors have taken action against this problem, but have noticed a backlash for their activism. Says one source: “There has been much lip-service paid to furthering opportunities for women, but few definitive steps and no serious movement in the number of women directors hired. We are confident that the government will corroborate our work and push industry leaders to address the ongoing violations of the legal and civil rights of these directors and of all women in the film and television industries."
This adds to the problem of ageism against women. In 1962, two women over 50 were still able to topline a major studio film. That does not happen today. According to a 2015 USC study, not one of 2014's 100 highest-grossing films featured women over 45 in a leading role. Between 2007 and 2014, women made up less than a quarter of film characters between ages 40 and 64.
Friday, June 17, 2016
Scholarship Spotlight: Noncompete Agreements as Thirteenth Amendment Violations (Ayesha Bell Hardaway - Case Western)
Covenants not to compete have long been recognized as a species of contract raising a host of public policy concerns, but at what point do these concerns rise from being issues of policy to being constitutional concerns? The Thirteenth Amendment often makes a brief appearance in the contracts curriculum in discussions of why specific performance is usually not available for personal services or employment contracts. That is, the notion of an employee being compelled by law to work in a job from which she has resigned raises uncomfortable analogues to slavery and other forced labor. In her recent article, "The Paradox of the Right to Contract: Noncompete Agreements as Thirteenth Amendment Violations," Ayesha Bell Hardaway (Case Western) raises the Thirteenth Amendment in a different setting, the enforcement of noncompetition agreements against at-will low-skilled employees. Here is her abstract:
There is a growing trend across the nation for employers to require low-level, unskilled workers to execute noncompete agreements as a condition of being hired to work as an at-will employee. The application of noncompete agreements in low-wage positions occupied by unskilled workers is outside of the original scope and purpose of such agreements. These individuals lack both bargaining power and protection from being terminated without cause. Moreover, upon termination of their employment, the executed noncompete agreement can legally prevent these workers from securing employment with another company.
The enforcement of noncompete agreements in these circumstances may require low-level, unskilled workers to choose between lengthy bouts of unemployment or what would essentially amount to “wage slavery.” The Reconstruction Era debates reveal that the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against slavery and indentured servitude was intended to prevent such injustices. Though Section 1 of the amendment contains only thirty-two words, the debates held before, during and after the ratification of the amendment provide a full illustration as to what Congress deemed to be “fair and just labor relations” in America. That original notion of “fair and just labor relations” provides timeless and substantive guidance on how to identify and rectify power imbalances in employer-employee relationships.
This paper will argue that contemporary noncompete agreements between employers and unskilled, low-wage workers is a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Part I discusses the original intent of the Thirteenth Amendment to protect both African Americans and working-class white Americans. Part II identifies the types of imbalanced work conditions denounced by the Reconstruction Era Congress as “perpetuations of slavery” as well as benefits of free, or non-enslaved, labor identified by Congress and illustrates why contemporary noncompete agreements between employers and unskilled workers is outside of that original purpose. Part III discusses Bailey v. Alabama and Ford v. Jermon to illustrate that, at one point, the judiciary correctly interpreted and applied the laws to employment-related disputes as the legislature intended. The paper concludes by suggesting that courts should re-examine the Thirteenth Amendment and its historical context to void noncompete agreements for low-wage, at-will unskilled employees.
Contracts professors are not the most frequent residents ofthe realm of Constitutional Law, so an article like Professor Hardaway's that successfully occupies space in both areas is well worth noting. "The Paradox of the Right to Contract: Noncompete Agreements as Thirteenth Amendment Violations" is available at 39 Seattle U. L. Rev. 957 (2016) and is available for SSRN download here.
Thursday, June 16, 2016
This list does not contain a current update by SSRN.
Wednesday, June 15, 2016
I've seen a few cases now come across with people trying to sue their insurance companies after using the appraisal process in their policies to resolve a dispute, so I thought I'd blog about one of them. This one is Clark v. Pekin Insurance Co., Case No. 3:15CV2272 (behind paywall), out of the Northern District of Ohio.
The fact patterns for all these cases is basically the same: Plaintiff makes a claim under an insurance policy. The insurance policy pays less than the plaintiff desires. Plaintiff utilizes the appraisal process found in the insurance policy, in which each side chooses an appraiser and, if they can't agree, an independent umpire then makes a finding. Plaintiff wins the appraisal process and the insurance company promptly pays plaintiff the extra money owed.
However, plaintiff is not pleased--probably because of having had to go through a whole song-and-dance to get the money--and sues anyway. That's what happened in this case.
Breach of contract claims are tricky after the appraisal process has been invoked. Most insurance policies prohibit the insured from recovering damages beyond that awarded through the appraisal process, as the policy did here. Because Clark received what the umpire stated she was entitled to, exactly as required under the policy, the court found there was no breach of the contract.
However, the appraisal process doesn't bar tort claims, and Clark was still alleging that the insurance company had acted in bad faith toward her insurance claim. However, the court found that the insurance company had behaved in a timely fashion and that disagreement over the amount to be paid didn't constitute bad faith on its own, and there was no other evidence on the question, so Clark lost that claim as well. So the appraisal process might still leave you with tort claims, but they would be challenging to establish, I think.
Tuesday, June 14, 2016
A few days ago, I blogged here about a German employee’s national origin discrimination lawsuit against Abbott Laboratories. The company also made legal headlines for firing its American workers in order to farm out the work to cheaper labor overseas. This article describes an interesting argument advanced by some of the terminated workers: national origin discrimination for being … American!
A less juicy, but no less legally interesting, issue is whether non-disparagement clauses are desirable for public policy and other reasons. Disparagement clauses are very commonly used as a tool for preventing former employees for criticizing their former employers after the discontinuation of employment (whether voluntary or not.) “’It’s a very, very common practice,’ said Sheena R. Hamilton, an employment lawyer at Dowd Bennett in St. Louis who represents companies in workplace cases. ‘I’ve never recommended a settlement that didn’t have a clause like that.’”
So what’s the problem with these clauses? “’It is very frustrating that you can’t share your story with the public,’ said one former Abbott manager, who had worked for the company for 13 years, rising to an important supervisory position. He had prepared a 90-page manual for his foreign replacements showing how to perform every detail of his work. With a disabled child who requires medical care, he said he had to take his severance and its nondisparagement clause, since it extended his medical benefits.”
Leading members of Congress from both major parties have questioned the nondisparagement agreements, which are commonly used by corporations but can prohibit ousted workers from raising complaints about what they see as a misuse of the temporary visas known as H-1Bs for foreigners with “a body of specialized knowledge” not readily available in the American labor market. “I have heard from workers who are fearful of retaliation,” said Senator Richard Blumenthal, Democrat of Connecticut. “They are told they can say whatever they want, except they can’t say anything negative about being fired.” This raises the ugly, yet to us familiar, question of whether the American educational system is becoming so mediocre that foreigners simply have better skills than American professionals. (For full disclosure, I should note that I myself was born, raised and educated overseas with a J.D. from this country, so I see these issues from both an American and a “foreign” angle).
From a contract law point of view, the case raised an interesting debate on the AALS Contracts Law listserv. For example, are these kinds of in terrorem clauses unconscionable under § 208 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (which, ironically, is said to be derived from German law)? If so, wouldn’t severance packages simply be discontinued, arguably leaving employees even worse off? Is unfairness a tolerable tradeoff for the benefits of severance pay? Are these types of clauses simply thrown in for good measure on the “what can it hurt” principle as employers will almost never be able to prove damages from an alleged breach? Even recovery of the severance in restitution is, it has been noted, a game not worth the candle for the vast bulk of American employers.
Thanks to my colleagues for interesting comments. I invite them and other readers to comment more below.
Monday, June 13, 2016
Stories such as this [https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/i-flew-to-abu-dhabi-for-265-round-trip-heres-how-you-can-do-the-same/2016/06/07/fc33cbea-29a3-11e6-b989-4e5479715b54_story.html] about finding incredibly cheap airlines to both national and international destinations because of airline computer pricing mistakes (real or otherwise…) have become commonplace. In 2012, the Department of Transportation established clear rules against changing the price of a ticket after purchase. But in a new decision by the U.S. Department of Transportation, that rule will no longer be enforced:
“As a matter of prosecutorial discretion, the Enforcement Office will not enforce the requirement of section 399.88 with regard to mistaken fares occurring on or after the date of this notice so long as the airline or seller of air transportation: (1) demonstrates that the fare was a mistaken fare; and (2) reimburses all consumers who purchased a mistaken fare ticket for any reasonable, actual, and verifiable out-of-pocket expenses that were made in reliance upon the ticket purchase, in addition to refunding the purchase price of the ticket.
Travelers’ websites thus now recommend that people hold off making further travel plans until a ticket and confirmation number have actually been issued. Some have further said about the glitch fares that “[t]ravel is not something that is only for the elite or [people] from certain economic brackets.” Of course, it shouldn’t be, but with the deregulation of the airline industry and steadily increasing prices and fees, history seems to be repeating itself: air travel is, for many, becoming unaffordable. This in spite of record-breaking profits for the airline industry benefiting from low oil prices and, I want to say of course, fares increasing, holding steady or certainly not decreasing very much. Airline executives say they are sharing the wealth with passengers by investing some of their windfalls into new planes, better amenities and remodeled terminals. They're also giving raises to employees and dividends to investors. Right… And whereas some years have been marked by bust, many more have been booming for the airlines.
Given that, why would the DOT be amenable to help out the airlines, and not passengers? Under contract law, mistakes that are not easily “spottable” have, traditionally, not been grounds for contract revocation. If one considers the contract to have been executed when the airline accepts one’s online offer, why should the airline, absent a clear error or other mitigating factors, not be expected to follow the common law of contracts as other parties will, depending on the circumstances, of course, likely have to? That beats me.
Some airlines are, however, choosing the honoring the mistake fares. Others don’t. Bad PR, you say? That also does not seem to matter. The most hated airline in the U.S. a few years back – Spirit Airlines – was also (at least then) the most profitable.
Hat tip to Matt Bruckner of Howard University School of Law for bringing this story to my attention.
Why? Because a court is probably going to hold you to it.
This case, Frick Joint Venture v. Village Super Market, Inc., Docket No. A-1441-15T1, out of New Jersey, is a complicated case with a lot of history between the parties which no doubt colors the court's decision but it's also a case that just makes logical sense.
Village Super Market was the anchor tenant of Frick Joint Venture's shopping center. By the terms of the lease, Village had the right to approve certain changes to the shopping center. One of the changes involved a gas station that had gone out of business. Frick desired to set up a Starbucks in the footprint that had been occupied by the gas station; Village refused to provide its consent.
The parties went back and forth trying to resolve the issue, but eventually Frick requested AAA arbitration pursuant to the lease agreement. Through respective counsel, Village responded requesting the choosing of a private arbitrator instead, to avoid AAA fees. The parties agreed on a succession of private arbitrators, and, eventually, to a mediator instead, over the course of several months. However, Village never provided Frick with any dates for the arbitration (later mediation), despite repeated requests on Frick's part to get the thing scheduled. Eventually, ten months after first discussing arbitration with Village, Frick contacted AAA to demand arbitration. AAA contacted Village to set dates, and at that point Village contended that it was not required to go to arbitration under the terms of the lease and thus rejected the arbitration demand.
The court thought that the relevant portion of the contract was "not a model of clarity" but was also comfortable in making its decision regardless of what the lease agreement required, because there had been multiple communications over the course of many months in which Village agreed to arbitration. Therefore, the lease agreement's terms was unimportant in the fact of this ongoing agreement by Village. Even if these communications didn't rise to the level of a contract, Village was estopped from arguing otherwise because Frick had relied on Village's representations about arbitration to its detriment: During the delay in making the arbitration demand, the gas station portion of the shopping center continued to sit vacant.
The court finally concluded that Village's behavior from the very beginning appeared to indicate that it understood the matter should be arbitrated, and so Frick was permitted to demand arbitration.
Friday, June 10, 2016
Scholarship Spotlight: "Is Rule of Law an Equilibrium Without Private Ordering?" (Gillian K. Hadfield, USC & Barry R. Weingast, Stanford)
Enforceability of promises by ultimate resort to governmental power is a cornerstone of contract doctrine. If you don't believe that statement, go re-read section 1 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Nonetheless, Professors Gillian Hadfield (University of Southern California, Law) and Barry Weingast (Stanford, Political Science) take a different approach to theorizing about law generally, an approach suggesting--among other things--that the law of contracts does not hinge first and foremost upon the role of government at all. Hadfield and Weingast instead assert that a "legal system cannot achieve rule of law . . . unless there is an essential role for private, decentralized, enforcement of law." Here is the authors' abstract:
Almost all theorizing about law begins with government. In a series of papers we challenge this orthodoxy. Our “what-is-law” approach places private enforcement at the center of a theory of law. The critical public component that distinguishes legal from social order is not public enforcement but rather a public, common knowledge, and stewarded normative classification institution that designates what is and what is not acceptable conduct in a community. Law emerges, we argue, to better coordinate and incentivize decentralized collective punishment (that is, private ordering: sanctions imposed by individuals not in an official capacity.)
Our work to date shows that the social order produced by a centralized classification institution supported exclusively by decentralized enforcement is characterized by several normatively attractive features. We call these features legal attributes. They include features routinely understood in the legal philosophical literature as characteristic of the rule of law: generality, published, clear, prospective, and stable.
Importantly, the legal attributes we identify do not arise from normative claims about law. Rather, they arise from our positive analysis sustaining an equilibrium based on centralized classification when enforcement requires the voluntary participation of ordinary citizens. These legal attributes are necessary to secure coordination and incentive compatibility in a regime of fully decentralized enforcement. Without them, the effort to sustain an equilibrium based on centralized classification fails. A regime characterized by rule of law is only an equilibrium, we argue, when enforcement of public classifications includes an important component of private enforcement. Without the discipline imposed by the need to incentivize and coordinate private enforcers, a government cannot succeed in sustaining law.
"Is Rule of Law and Equilibrium Without Private Ordering?" is a fascinating piece of interdisciplinary scholarship addressing both political science and legal philosophy perspectives on a topic of immense interest to contracts scholars (among many others). Hadfield and Weingast's article is available for SSRN download here.
Thursday, June 9, 2016
Relying on the win-a-car-for-a-hole-in-one case where a Pennsylvania court found that a car dealership was obligated to honor its offer for a unilateral contract posted at the ninth tee when a golfer finally aced a hole-in-one despite the dealership’s subjective intent to end the promotional offer two days earlier, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals court found a unilateral contract to exist under the following circumstances.
A brochure distributed to the customers of Giant Eagle – a chain of retail supermarkets, gas stations, etc. – promised its customers that they could “Earn free gas – it’s easy!” and “You may never pay for gas again!” as long as they spent $50 on supermarket purchases. (See the true images posted here in this blog). The brochure, however, also included fine print provided, among other things, that “discounted fuel cannot exceed 30 gallons and discounts must be used in full on one vehicle in one transaction,” “the promotion is valid for a limited time and may end at any time without prior notice,” and “fuelperks! discounts expire 3 months after the last day of the month in which they’re earned.” However, the court found that none of the published program parameters suggested that Giant Eagle reserved the right to retract rewards that customers had already accrued. In fact, in the entire history of the Giant Eagle fuel program, no such retroactive termination ever occurred.
Said the court, “[l]ike the golfer who teed off with a promise of reward in mind, a customer anticipated the promised fuel discounts when deciding to shop at Giant Eagle in the first place—and thus deciding not to shop at a different store. Because she was then aware that she could apply the discounts as advertised if she spent fifty dollars on supermarket purchases using her Advantage Card, she was indeed a party to a unilateral contract with Giant Eagle. Liability therefore attached upon her performance, i.e., at checkout.”
A fair win for consumers, it seems.
|1||412||Major League Soccer as a Case Study in Complexity Theory
Steven A. Bank
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law
Lauren Henry Scholz
Yale University - Information Society Project
|3||136||The Logic of Contract in a World of Treaties
Brooklyn Law School
|4||125||Contracts Without Terms
University of Pennsylvania Law School
|5||115||(Mis)perceptions of Law in Consumer Markets
Oren Bar-Gill and Kevin E. Davis
Harvard Law School and New York University School of Law
|6||114||Contract as Empowerment
Robin Bradley Kar
University of Illinois College of Law
|7||111||Illegality as a Defence in Contract
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law
|8||89||The Rise of the Platform Economy: A New Challenge for EU Consumer Law?
Christoph Busch, Hans Schulte-Nölke, Aneta Wiewiórowska-Domagalska and Fryderyk Zoll
University of Osnabrück - European Legal Studies Institute, European Legal Studies Institute Osnabrueck / Radboud University Nijmegen, Universität Osnabrück - European Legal Studies Institute and Universität Osnabruck
|9||76||Farewell to Unjustified Enrichment?
University of Muenster
|10||75||The Common Law of Contract and the Default Rule Project
Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott
Yale Law School and Columbia University - Law School
Wednesday, June 8, 2016
Words are tricky things, as contracts remind us every day. When I teach contract ambiguity, a lot of the cases seem to revolve around insurance contracts, with the doctrine of contra proferentem coming into play. A recent case out of Michigan, Atlantic Casualty Insurance Co. v. Gustfason, No. 325739, provides another example.
Gustafson operated a landscaping business. While one of his employees was clearing brush on a homeowner's property, the homeowner was watching off to the side and was struck with debris and injured. The homeowner sued Gustafson, and Gustafson contacted his insurance agent. Atlantic Casualty reported that the loss to the homeowner was excluded from the insurance policy, so Gustafson sued Atlantic Casualty, contending that the loss was covered by the policy.
The relevant clause in the policy stated that it didn't apply to bodily injury to any "contractor," and then defined "contractor" using a long string of examples: including but not limited to
any independent contractor or subcontractor of any insured, any general contractor, any developer, any property owner, any independent contractor or subcontractor of any general contractor, any independent contractor or subcontractor of any general developer, any independent contractor or subcontractor of any property owner and any and all persons providing services or materials.
The emphasis there is added, because Atlantic Casualty sought to exclude the homeowner's injuries by asserting that he was "any property owner."
The court pointed out that the phrase "any property owner" was extraordinarily broad and would include almost everyone in the world "except perhaps for a newborn baby," because most people can be found to at least own the clothes they're wearing, which would make that person a property owner. Such a broad reading, excluding virtually the entire planet, would render the policy illusory.
Atlantic Casualty apparently acknowledged that the phrase was broad as written and instead argued that what it really meant was "the owner of the real property upon which the insured is performing work." The court, however, found that it made sense, given the other items in the list, to interpret "any property owner" to mean "those who are being compensated, or who otherwise have a commercial interest, for being on the job site." In that case, "any property owner" would cover not the real property owners whose land was being worked on but owners of any equipment being used (possibly rented) to work on the real property.
Because "any property owner" is an ambiguous term and the court found itself with two reasonable interpretations, it employed contra proferentem and interpreted the contract against Atlantic Casualty, who had drafted the contract. Therefore, it stated that "any property owner" did not include those "without a commercial interest in the project," and therefore did not include the residential homeowners, which meant the policy covered the homeowner.
While I generally like the court's reasoning and interpretation in this case, I do find it slightly odd to decide that a property owner doesn't have a commercial interest in the project being performed on his own land. Presumably he is paying for the work and therefore does have a commercial interest in making sure that the work is being done properly. Even if he's not paying for it, the improvement to his land will likely increase its value, also giving him a commercial interest in what's happening. I think the better phrasing is to interpret it as someone who is being compensated for their presence on the job site.
Tuesday, June 7, 2016
This One Again: Handwritten Contracts Really Are Binding (but Mediation Transcripts Are Highly Recommended)
The Seventh Circuit just reconfirmed the fact that handwritten contracts are enforceable as long as they contain all the material terms of the contract.
In the relevant case,Martina Beverly brought suit against her former employer, Abbott Laboratories, for discrimination and retaliation against her because of her German nationality (not a lot of anti-German discrimination going on in this country these days, one might think, but that was nonetheless the allegation) as well as on the basis of her disabilities. The case went to mediation. A day before the mediation took place, Abbott’s attorney sent Beverly’s attorney a “template settlement agreement in order to avoid any surprises in the event that [the parties] are able to resolve the matter.” That document also stated that Beverly had twenty one days to review it and seven days to revoke any possible acceptance.
During the fourteen-hour mediation session the next day, both parties were represented by counsel. At the end of the session, both parties and their counsel signed a very brief handwritten agreement that, at bottom, stated that Abbott would pay the cost of mediation and “$200,000+” with Beverly demanding $210,000. The parties were probably and understandably tired after such a long session, but still: a quarter million-dollar settlement, and no one had the energy or took the time to type up one measly paragraph?...
Next day, Abbott emailed a typed agreement to Beverly’s specifying the amounts to be paid ($46,000 to Beverly and a relatively whopping $164,000 to her attorneys!). The emailed response from Beverly’s attorneys: “Oh happy days!.. You are a gem.”
Soon after that, Beverly – perhaps for good reason – got cold feet and sought to rescind from the deal, arguing that additional terms were needed for a contract to have been formed, that the twenty one days mentioned in the pre-meeting template (which was never used in its original form) were applicable to her settlement offer, and that a “more formal future writing” was anticipated.
The appellate court struck down each of these arguments. First, additional terms such as any future cooperation between the parties and Beverly’s future employment with the company were nonessential details. The language in the original template pertaining to a cool-down period was never actually used. The fact that parties anticipate a more formal writing does not nullify an otherwise binding agreement. The court found the happy exclamation by Beverly’s attorney dispositive of the parties’ intent to enter into a contract when they did (one might also say it was simply an indication of the attorneys’ happiness with a large payment, not their clients’ mood).
Perhaps most importantly, the court pointed out that “[i]t bears mentioning that a transcript (or some other recording) of the private mediation session here may have provided important clarity regarding the parties’ beliefs and intentions relating to the handwritten agreement and the draft proposal. We encourage future litigants to record any communications that directly relate to final settlement agreements.”
Sound advice in days of, apparently, little or no secretarial assistance even when relatively large sums of money are at stake. An assistant could have typed up the agreement in less than one minute. So could an attorney. In the end, though, the handwriting argument did not prevail, but having something in writing or at least an audio recording would have precluded even more costly lawyering.
Monday, June 6, 2016
Scholarship Spotlight: Narrative Techniques and Drafting (Susan M. Chesler - Arizona State & Karen J. Sneddon - Mercer)
Can storytelling have anything useful to inform contract drafting? Perhaps surprisingly, according to Susan Chesler (Arizona State) and Karen Sneddon (Mercer), the answer is yes. As is befitting scholars of narrative, the authors make a persuasive case. In Once Upon a Transaction: Narrative Techniques and Drafting, Chesler and Sneddon argue that techniques usually associated with legal analysis and persuasion have a place in facilitating more effective transactional drafting. Here is their abstract:
A granddaughter joins the family business as a partner. An entrepreneur licenses his newest product. Two parties decide to settle a dispute. A charitable idea materializes as a private foundation. A parent's belief in the power of education is perpetuated by a trust agreement. Each of these events forms a narrative. A transaction is more than the scratch of pens across signature pages or the click of keys to email an executed document. A transaction is itself a story. These stories, made with provisions and clauses, result in the formation of contracts, agreements, and wills. Conceptualizing transactions as narratives benefits the negotiation, drafting, implementation, interpretation, and, ultimately, enforceability of the transactional document.
This article showcases the use of narrative techniques applicable to the drafting of transactional documents. Tethered to the fundamental principles of good drafting, the article will highlight the use of stock stories, plot and narrative movement, character, point of view, narrative setting, themes, and motifs across a spectrum of transactional documents.
After working through drafting examples utilizing narrative methods such as stock stories, point of view, and setting, the authors ultimately conclude that "[r]ather than injecting uncertainty or bloating a document with unnecessary information, narrative techniques can spur innovation while remaining grounded within the principles of good drafting," and that effective drafting can "draw upon narrative techniques to facilitate conceptualization, construction, and ultimately implementation of the transaction."
The potential toolkit for transactional lawyers described in Professors Chesler and Sneddon's article provides a fascinating way to think outside the box for effective drafting. Once Upon a Transaction was recently published in the Oklahoma Law Review and is available for SSRN download here.
I'm one of those apparently rare people who doesn't really use Facebook. But Facebook was evidently very important to City Park Apartments in Salt Lake City, whose management company presented all of the tenants with a "Facebook addendum" to their lease. The addendum allegedly stated that all residents had to befriend the complex on Facebook or be found in breach of their lease agreement.
This seems like an alarming development that I hope is going to be very limited. Is a Facebook account going to start being like a telephone number or an e-mail address, something it's assumed by everyone that you have and should hand over access to in exchange for goods or services? The reason I stopped using Facebook was because of privacy concerns. I wouldn't be thrilled about being told that I'm required by my lease to make sure my landlord can watch my Facebook activities (which often correspond, as we all know, to our real-life activities; if your landlord asked to follow you around through your daily life, or to get e-mailed your vacation photos, I would think many people would consider that a weird request).
And, since I don't do anything on Facebook, does that mean that I wouldn't be allowed to rent an apartment there unless I opened an account? Many people have legitimate, important, in some cases necessary reasons to limit their online presence. Let's hope "Facebook addendums" don't start sweeping the nation.