Wednesday, April 22, 2015
Shawn J. Bayern, Offer and Acceptance in Modern Contract Law: A Needless Concept, 103 Cal. L. Rev. 67 (2015)
Frank O. Brown, Jr. Construction Law, 66 Mercer L. Rev. 27 (2014)
Jay M. Feinman, Good Faith and Reasonable Expectations. 67 Ark. L. Rev. 525 (2014)
Peter Murray & Lin Jiang, PRC Shipbuilding Disputes in London Arbitration: The Threat of Parallel Proceedings in China and the Consequences and Possible Alternatives, 39 Tul. Mar. L.J. 183 (2014)
Linda J. Ravdin, Premarital Agreements and the Migratory Same-Sex Couple, 48 Fam. L.Q. 397 (2014)
Darryl Li, Offshoring the Army: Migrant Workers and the U.S. Military, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 124 (2015)
Anthony Niblett, Hostile Takeovers and Overreliance, 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 595 (2015)
Julia Tomassetti,. The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the Collapse of the Mean/Ends Distinction in Employment, 66 S.C. L. Rev. 315 (2014)
Tuesday, April 21, 2015
SSRN Top Downloads For LSN: Contracts (Topic)
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Monday, April 20, 2015
The Texas Lawyer reports that Texas has amended a statute that allows plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees in breach of contract claims. The statute originally allowed for recovery from an individual or a corporation. The amendment permits recovery from any non-government entity. As law Prof. Doug Moll (pictured) explains, the purpose of the policy is to encourage settlement and permit parties that could not pay their own attorneys' fees to sue for breach. "There is not a policy justification I can see for distinguishing between business forms in an attorney fee-shifting statute," Moll noted in defending the amendment. The bill faced some opposition from groups that would not want to exempt state entities and from others who wanted the law to allow either side, not just plaintiffs, to collect attorneys' fees. But lawmakers did not want to mess with Texas law.
From the Philadelphia Business Journal, we get yet another classic municipal contracting case. City meets company, city hires company to do some fancy, technical thing it can't do itself, city and company exchange allegations of breach of contract, and the parties settled for $4.8 million. In this case, the city is Baltimore and the company is Unisys.
As reported here in USA Today, one bi-product of the new nuclear deal with Iran is that Russia now feels free to send Iran S-300 missiles for use in its air-defense system. The missile deal has been suspended since 2010, and Iran had sued Russia in Geneva, alleging breach of contract and seeking $4 billion in damages. Iran now says that it will drop the case if Russia delivers the missiles.
Joint Call for Papers from Section on Commercial and Related Consumer Law and Section on Women in Legal Education
AALS Section on Commercial and Related Consumer Law
AALS Section on Women in Legal Education
Call For Papers
Female Perspectives in Commercial and Consumer Law
The AALS Section on Commercial and Related Consumer Law is pleased to announce a Call for Papers for its program co-sponsored by the Section on Women in Legal Education during the AALS 2016 Annual Meeting. The papers from the program will be published in the Columbia Journal of Gender and Law.
Female scholars have made pivotal contributions to the development of commercial and consumer laws and scholarship in the United States, especially in the past few decades. Not only have specific women’s voices played an important role, but distinctively feminist concerns have engendered changes in legal theory and policy. This panel will discuss the contributions that specific female legal academics have made to the field (as just a few examples, Elizabeth Warren and Jean Braucher). Also, it will reflect on how feminist concerns have influenced commercial and consumer law scholarship. Finally, it will also include scholarship focused on women’s experiences with consumer and commercial law.
The Committee invites submissions from scholars interested in presenting at the program and in publishing their papers with the Columbia Journal of Gender and Law. Two speakers will be selected from this call for papers. The panel is focused on “female perspectives,” broadly construed. The Section strongly encourages proposals from all genders.
There is no formal requirement as to the form or length of proposals. Preference will be given to proposals that are substantially complete and to papers that offer novel scholarly insights.
Per AALS rules, only full-time faculty members of AALS member law schools are eligible to submit a paper to a Section’s call for papers. Fellows from AALS member law schools are also eligible to submit a paper but must include a CV with their proposal. All panelists, including speakers selected from this Call for Papers, are responsible for paying their own annual meeting registration fee and travel expenses.
Deadline: AUGUST 15, 2015. We will make decisions shortly after that date. Please email submissions, in Word or PDF format, to the Program Committee c/o Jim Hawkins at firstname.lastname@example.org with “AALS Submission” in the subject line. Before sending, please remove all identifying information from the Word or PDF document.
When I was a law student, I knew what the core of my legal education was. It consisted of traditional legal courses like contracts, civil procedure, property, torts, constitutional law, criminal law and procedure, etc. In my second and third years, most of my courses continued to be core doctrinal courses. I had the option of doing a clinic in the third year, of course, and for some of my colleagues in law school, that was a central experience, but it was very much optional, especially since in those days, if I wanted real-world legal experience, I got it during the summers, and I could also work a bit during the school year. I don't think there was any doubt in anyone's mind that, for better or worse, doctrinal teaching was the core of legal education. Skills training was regarded as ancillary, and clinics were supplementary, or perhaps a capstone.
Today, I think the message is much more confusing. I have surveyed a number of websites of law schools outside of the top 50 and many push variations of the same themes: come to our law schools and we will give you a practical, hands-on experiential learning experience that will get you a job (or at least qualify or prepare you for one). If traditional doctrinal teaching is mentioned, it is usually in the context of bragging about small class sizes. These law schools do not generally emphasize traditional doctrinal teaching or scholarship.
This is completely understandable. Teaching contracts (and other first year courses) is not sexy. Since the first year curriculum is the same with respect to probably 75% of the subjects at all ABA accredited law schools, the folks who try to market individual law schools will not distinguish their institutions by emphasizing the things that all law schools do. They have to emphasize unique programs, and even if a school really has an outstanding doctrinal teaching faculty, such claims just come off as puffery.
But the problem is that students don't get much experiential education in the first two years of law school. So attracting them based on clinics and externships makes the doctrinal teaching that they get in the first two years seem, for some students, like some sort of ghastly hazing process. The situation reminds me a little bit of the Simpsons episode when Police Chief Wiggum confronts a new recruit who just wants a gun:
Chief Wiggum: All right, you scrawny beanpoles: becoming a cop is *not* something that happens overnight. It takes one solid weekend of training to get that badge.
Man: [screaming] Forget about the badge! When do we get the freakin' guns?
Chief Wiggum: Hey, I told you, you don't get your gun until you tell me your name.
Man: I've have it up to here with your "rules"!
My students don't want freakin' guns (or those that do already have them). They want their own freakin' clients. So when they reach the third year, or do externships in the second year, they think that those experiences are the core of their education and everyone should understand if doctrinal courses takes a back seat. So, for example, some students are non-plussed that their absences caused by clinical or externship obligations are not excused. Or they take it as self-evident that they can show up 15-20 minutes late for class because "a client meeting ran over." And this is not at all because clinicians encourage such attitudes. On the contrary. But students nonetheless pull this conclusion out of the ether.
I get it. In their position, I would do the same thing, but I had a job lined up as after my first summer, and my law school had a 95% or more bar passage rate when I graduated. Things are different in this era of declining bar passage rates. Clinical experiences are invaluable in all sorts of ways, but they do not seem to help with bar passage or with job placement. By the way, I am always surprised by the lack of a link between clinical education and bar passage, as I always assumed that students would really come to appreciate and thus be motivated to learn the law's subtleties when confronted with them in a live-client context. I have only come across a few studies, which tend to be small or idiosyncratic. I would love to see more empirical research in this area.
In addition, we are increasingly moving more skills training into the curriculum, both by devoting more time to skills courses and by introducing more skills training into the doctrinal programs. The candle is burning at both ends, and the class time devoted to traditional coverage of doctrine is shrinking. But the more worrying problem is that some students are unaware of how crucial doctrinal courses are for their future success. They may be led by our marketing efforts and our new curricula into the false hope that if they can actually "be good lawyers" in the clinical context, it could not possibly matter that they do not do well on traditional law school or on standardized exams.
Friday, April 17, 2015
I'm going to keep this one brief and provocative.
Six years ago, when Law School Transparency (LST) came into existence, law schools had some problems with transparency. The problems were not actionable. As Michael Simkovic details here and elsewhere (and I will have many more positive things to say about Simkovic's and Frank McIntyre's scholarship in later posts), law schools have always disclosed employment outcomes in accordance with federal Bureau of Labor Statistics categories of employment and unemployment. Now, all law schools include on their websites 509 disclosures that are far more detailed about employment outcomes, as well as lots of other useful information about bar passage rates and the scores of incoming students (new 1Ls only, alas).
The fight is now mostly over debt loads, but again, as Michael Simkovic puts it:
Data from the U.S. Department of Education shows that law students, even at low ranked law schools, remain much less likely to default than most student borrowers. This is true even though law students typically graduate with higher debt levels.
While student debt loads are a huge concern, law students still are not defaulting on their loans.
So, at this point what exactly is the purpose of LST's campaign against law schools?
LST's website identifies its goals as Reform, Information and Accountability. I would say that LST has succeeded on Information and Accountability. Don't take it from me. Here is what Deborah Merritt, who has been quite critical of Simkovic and McIntyre, has to say on the subject:
[T]oday’s law schools publish a wealth of data about their employment outcomes; most of that information is both user-friendly and accurate.
As to LST's main claim on Reform: "American legal education is broken because it is systematically unfair and unaffordable," LST and I will have to agree to disagree. Still, two out of three ain't bad. LST can take credit for having contributed to an environment in which law schools are forced to provide information about student outcomes in a way that really helps students make more informed decisions about whether to go to law school or whether to choose a particular school.
Congratulations, LST. You've won. You've done some real social good. You and others have persuaded college graduates not to go to law school. Unfortunately, that might not be good advice, since Simkovic and McIntyre's research shows that students who go to law school are, on the whole, better off for having done so.
So you can now declare victory and move on to larger projects. Why not use your model to attack other sectors of the economy that, when compared with law schools, are much less transparent, much more important, far less inclined to self-criticism and far more resistant to outside calls for change?
Thursday, April 16, 2015
A potential class-action lawsuit against SeaWorld was filed in Florida on April 8 just two weeks after the company was sued over its killer whale care in San Diego in another purported class action suit. The Florida lawsuit alleges unjust enrichment and fraud, among other issues. The lawsuit claims that if members of the public knew about SeaWorld’s mistreatment of the orcas, they would not visit the theme parks. Plaintiffs asks the court to require SeaWorld to reimburse ticket prices to all the people who purchased tickets to the Orlando park in the past four years. Visitors to the park pay much as $235 per person. The complaint states that more than five million people attended the Florida theme park in the years 2010 through 2012.
SeaWorld finds itself in a lot of trouble these days over its treatment of its killer whales. The park was, for example, subjected to heavy criticism in the CNN documentary “Blackfish” and in a book written by one of its former orca trainers. Perhaps as a result, its shares have been tanking recently…
SeaWorld, in turn, claims that the criticism and in particular the most recent lawsuit “appears to be an attempt by animal [rights] extremists to use the courts to advance an anti-zoo agenda. The suit is baseless, filled with inaccuracies, and SeaWorld intends to defend itself against these inaccurate claims.” It also claims that it is a leader in orca care. SeaWorld’s parks are regularly inspected by the U.S. government and two organizations. The accreditations of the California and Florida parks expire in 2020.
As part of the experience park visitors purchase, they unquestionably expect to see relatively healthy and happy whales kept under standards of good animal husbandry. But in reality, according to the lawsuits and other statements about the park, SeaWorld does not live up to this end of the bargain. Frequent allegations have been made that SeaWorld’s orcas have a shorter lifespan than wild orcas (usually, animals in captivity live longer than their wild counterparts), are kept in chemical-filled and way too small pools, are drugged with antipsychotic medicines, are not provided with sufficient shade, and are subjected to forced breeding.
Either somebody is not telling the truth here or people’s expectations of what constitutes good ethics in relation to keeping and displaying orcas as well as other show and zoo animals, for that matter. Does this matter under the law? Of course, the general public has a purely legal right to buy tickets to see various performance and exhibit animals as long as no state or federal law is violated as regards how the animals are treated. Ethics are a different story. But misrepresentation is actionable under contracts law. If the above allegations made by TV producers, former trainers, and numerous consumers are correct, SeaWorld has indeed not lived up to the wholesome, animal-friendly image it portrays of itself in order to sell tickets. Its alleged questionable conduct has been going on for years. It’s been almost twenty since a friend of mine (otherwise not very interested in animals) visited SeaWorld San Diego and went on a backstage tour. He told me about the deplorably small pools in which the animals were kept after their performances. In this area, ethics and contracts law interface and have finally come head-to-head. The eventual outcome may be that SeaWorld will not be able to continue making money off its orca shows as it has in the past. Ringling Bros. is voluntarily phasing out its use of elephants after similar protests about their treatment. This may not be a bad thing from a public policy point of view. Time has come to consider how we treat animals in many contexts, and certainly so for mere entertainment and profit-making motives.
See the Florida complaint here: http://ia902707.us.archive.org/24/items/gov.uscourts.flmd.309289/gov.uscourts.flmd.309289.1.0.pdf
David M. Attwater, Promoting Sustainable Development with Canadian Public Procurement, 44 Pub. Cont. L.J. 79 (2014)
Jonathan M. Barnett, Hollywood Deals: Soft Contracts for Hard Markets, 64 Duke L.J. 605 (2015)
Timothy Bunting, Lost and Found: In Search of a Uniform Approach for Selecting Best Value, 44 Pub. Cont. L.J. 1 (2014)
Samuel F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted Defendant: Should Parties Be Able to Contract around Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation? 2014 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 445
Max Helveston & Michael Jacobs. The Incoherent Role of Bargaining Power in Contract Law, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1017 (2014)
Keisuke Shimizu, The Procurement System of the Japanese Space Agency: A Comparative Assessment, 44 Pub. Cont. L.J. 31 (2014)
James W. Nelson, , Maj., U.S. Army, & Julia A. LoBosco. Understanding the WSCA-NASPO Cooperative Purchasing Organization: It's Time to Invite the Elephant out of the Corner. 44 Pub. Cont. L.J. 113 (2014)
D. Gordon Smith, Contractually Adopted Fiduciary Duty, 2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1783
David Weiss & Brian Hodgkinson. Adoptive Arbitration: An Alternative Approach to Enforcing Cross-Border Mediation Settlement Agreements, 25 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 275 (2014)
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
Tuesday, April 14, 2015
I love my job. It is not high-paying, given the alternatives for people with my credentials. And I work very long hours. I work long hours on weekdays, and I work on most weekends as though they were weekdays. I take work with me when I go on vacation. There is rarely a day when I do not work, vacation days included.
Being a law professor has its perks. I have job security. I get to write about topics that interest me, and I get to share a learning experience with students who are motivated and, if I'm doing my job right, excited about the subject matter. I am part of an institution that I have a role in shaping and part of a community in which my expertise and commitment is valued.
But there are numerous forces that resent the legal academy and do all they can to make the working conditions of legal academics outside of the top tier look more like teaching high school. It is not that legal education ought to be impervious to outside criticism, but the solutions that I am seeing to the problems of legal education tend to be driven by anecdote rather than data and by educational models that are not appropriate for legal education.
My own students, with whom I am happy to say I have very good relationships, sometimes complain to me about how "the law school" or the "career planning center" or "the administration" doesn't do enough to get them jobs, or only cares about the Law Review students, etc. Their experience of my institution does not accord with my own, and since I was an administrator for a couple of years, I have intimate knowledge of the workings of every department in my law school.
Here's what I see. I see faculty and staff members who are dedicated -- if not obsessed -- with the institution for which they work. When we get together outside of the law school for social gatherings, we don't talk about sports or movies or the latest legal issues in our fields or before the Supreme Court. We talk about our students' prospects, about our curriculum and about legal education. My law school is a group of people dedicated to the success of our students. We are constantly experimenting to try to find ways teach students more effectively and to better prepare them for the practice of law. In our experimentation, we take wrong steps, but we monitor those steps and strive to correct them. The institution is filled with imperfections because the institution consists of people, and people have their limitations and faults.
In response to the crisis in legal education, my law school has dramatically increased faculty and staff work loads in order to deliver a revised curriculum, devised ways to reduce student debt loads, and greatly increased the resources and opportunities available for students. In my conversations with faculty members from other law schools, I find that while my law school has innovated in unique ways, most law schools are struggling with the same issues and redoubling efforts to meet student needs in new ways.
Law schools are being squeezed. The ABA is creating new standards that will limit the flexibility that educators need to create the best possible learning environments in their classrooms. The legal profession is pressuring law schools to prepare students to practice when those students increasingly arrive at law school without the skills that they will need to succeed as attorneys. Such students need more time, not less, to master doctrine and legal skills, but the profession pushes us to focus on experiential learning, the most complex and expensive form of education, before students have the requisite skills to do so successfully, and at a time of dwindling resources when law schools cannot afford to keep the teaching staff they already have. And students arrive expecting us to hand them jobs when it simply has never been the case that a J.D. guaranteed every student the job of her dreams at the age of 25.
And how do legal academics respond to these attacks that come at them from every direction? With some rare exceptions, we respond with self-flagellation. This is the first of a series of posts in which I plan to defend my profession. Outside perspectives are welcome, but the truth is that we know our own business better than anyone, and we ought to be full-throated in defending those parts of our educational model that work for our students.
Future posts will defend legal pedagogy, including hiding the ball, legal scholarship, and the wisdom of investing in legal education. Stay tuned.
SSRN Top Downloads For LSN: Contracts (Topic)
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Monday, April 13, 2015
A few weeks ago, 17-year old Siobhan O’Dell became known online for her bold and unusual rejection of Duke University’s rejection of her college application. She wrote:
"Thank you for your rejection letter of March 26, 2015. After careful consideration, I regret to inform you that I am unable to accept your refusal to offer me admission into the Fall 2015 freshman class at Duke. This year I have been fortunate enough to receive rejection letters from the best and brightest universities in the country. With a pool of letters so diverse and accomplished I was unable to accept reject letters I would have been able to only several years ago."
Alas, applying for college does not work like that. Accordingly, Duke’s response was simply that Ms. O’Dell’s only option is to appeal the decision, but that her chances of a reversal are not good: “If you choose to appeal, we welcome your request, but I do not wish to raise unreasonable expectations on your part," the university representative writes.
Nice try, though! It sounds like Ms. O’Dell would do well in a Contracts Law class.
On March 20, 2015, in First State Ins. v. National Casualty Co., the First Circuit affirmed a District Court's refusal to vacate an arbitral remedy that the party seeking vacation claimed was "plucked out of thin air" and not derived from any term in the contract at issue. When reviewing an arbitral award, the only question is whether the arbiter was even arguably construing the agreements. Here, the First Circuit found that the arbiter unquestionably was doing so. Moreover, the contracts at issue directed the arbiter to consider each agreement as "an honorable engagement rather than merely a legal obligation" and relieved the arbiters "of all judicial formalities and may abstain from following the strict rules of law." This provision permitted arbiters to grant equitable remedies, which is precisely what they did. Justice Souter sat on the panel and joined in Judge Selya's opinion for the unanimous panel.
On March 25, 2015, the Eight Circuit decided Torres v. Simpatico, Inc. The issue in that case was that a number of franchisees claimed that an arbitration provision in a franchise agreement was unconscionable because the individual arbitration processes were prohibitively expensive. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding that plaintiffs had not met their burden of establishing that the arbitration costs would be prohibitively high for any particular plaintiff. The court also rejected plaintiffs claim that non-signatories to the arbitration agreement could not seek to compel arbitration. In this case, the non-signatories were third-party beneficiaries entitled to invoke the arbitration provision.
On March 27, 2015, the Sixth Circuit decided Shy v. Navistar Int'l, Corp. That case involved claims that Navistar was improperly classifying aspects of its business activities and structuring its business so as to evade its profit-sharing obligations under an agreement relating to a consent decree in a litigation relating to Navistar employee retirement benefits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding that the claims were subject to an arbitration provision in the parties' agreement. However, it reversed the District Court's finding that Navistar's conduct amounted to a waiver of its right to compel arbitration. The case was remanded with instructions to compel arbitration. Judge Clay dissented, finding both that the parties had not contemplated arbitrating claims of this scope that that Navistar had waived its right to arbitration "by engaging in an unmistakable campaign of avoidance and delay both before and after the SBC intervened to enforce the settlement agreement in the instant litigation."
Wednesday, April 8, 2015
Steven W. Feldman, Expanded Merchant Tort Liability, Democratic Degradation, and Mass Market Standard Form Contracts (Reviewing Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights and the Rule of Law, Part II) 63 Clev. St. L. Rev. 163 (2014)
Avery W. Katz, Contract Theory -- Who Needs It? (Reviewing Douglas G. Baird, Reconstructing Contracts; Brian H. Bix, Contract Law: Rules, Theory, and Context; Melvin A. Eisenberg, Foundational Principles of Contract Law), 81 U. Chi. L. Rev 2043 (2014)
Young, Andrew T. and Daniel Levy. Explicit evidence of an implicit contract. 30 J.L. Econ. & Org. 804-832 (2014).
Eyal Zamir, Contract Law and Theory: Three Views of the Cathedral (Reviewing Douglas G. Baird, Reconstructing Contracts; Brian H. Bix, Contract Law: Rules, Theory, and Context; Melvin A. Eisenberg, Foundational Principles of Contract Law), 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2077 (2014).
Tuesday, April 7, 2015
SSRN Top Downloads For LSN: Contracts (Topic)
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Monday, April 6, 2015
We saw this report over on the Faculty Lounge. This is fallout from the proposed merger of Hamline University School of Law and the William Mitchell College of Law (William Mitchell). Two William Mitchell faculty members are claiming that the merger, which will necessitate the elimination of two tenured faculty lines, is a a breach of contract.
The Complaint alleges that law schools must comply with ABA Standard 405(b) by maintaining policies for academic freedom and tenure. William Mitchell has a faculty handbook that incorporates the AAUP's 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom, which regards tenure as indispensable to such freedom. Under William Mitchell's Tenure Code, tenured professors may only be dismissed for adequate cause or in cases of "bona fide financial exigency."
In February, when the merger of the two law schools was proposed, William Mitchell announced that is was considering amendments to its Tenure Code to permit termination of tenure based on a merger. Plaintiffs allege that William Mitchell now intends to amend its Tenure Code to permit termination of tenure even if the merger does not go through, to permit termination of tenure without cause and without declaring the existence of a financial exigency.
Plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring that the proposed amendment to William Mitchell's Tenure Code would constitute a breach of contract.
Friday, April 3, 2015
In New Zealand, a ban on unfair terms in consumer contracts has taken effect and will, according to the Commerce Commission, will be enforced starting immediately. The regulation forms part of the 2013 Fair Trading Act. Australia introduced a similar ban in 2010.
The Consumer Organization “Consumer NZ” has launched its “Play Fair” campaign to increase awareness of the new law and related consumer issues. According to Consumer NZ, companies had been given plenty of notice of the upcoming ban and thus to review their contracts in order to remove unfair terms, but had to a large extent failed to do so.
The Act will apply to standard-form consumer contracts often used by electricity retailers, gyms, TV service providers and many others.
But what makes a term “unfair”? The Act defines a term as unfair if it would “would cause a significant imbalance between the rights of the company and the consumer, is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the company, [or] would cause detriment, whether financial or otherwise, to the consumer if it were to be applied or relied on.” The Act contains a list of terms that courts are likely to regard as unfair. This covers terms that would allow a company to unilaterally vary the terms of the contract, renew or terminate it, penalize consumers for breaching or terminating the contract, vary the price without giving consumers the right to terminate the contract, or vary the characteristics of the goods or services to be supplied.
After intense lobbying by the insurance industry, that industry was exempted from the ban.
Even though this Act is a consumer protection device, only the New Zealand Commerce Commission can, for now, enforce it. The contemplated fine for violations is $600,000.
In the USA, there are, of course, various statutory and common law protections against unfair terms such as those contained in the UCC as well as fraud protections. However, the deterrence effect of these does not seem effective in relation to at least some industries. Alternatively, perhaps the protections are not broad enough, sufficiently well-known, or sufficiently easy to enforce. Or perhaps people just give up and deal with other companies, or pay what they are asked to do by the companies.
I personally just spent no less than two hours chatting online with a major health care provider over their sudden allegation that a certain doctor I had used was “not in network” (with me thus allegedly owing a few thousand dollars to the insurance company) despite that particular provider being listed on the provider’s own website as “in network” and the doctor having confirmed this. Eventually and after numerous contractual and factual arguments, I was able to persuade provider that I was right. But how many others in my situation would simply give up and cave in to, as was the case, the provider’s repeated bootstrapping arguments that “their ultimate price was fair”?
Only two days later, I heard from a moving company that had agreed to move a car for me for $500 (and confirmed this twice) that the “price is actually $600.” When I told them no, it is not, they repeated their allegation that “we did not have a contract.” After telling them a few things about contract formation and modification principles and after declining listening to their attempted, time-consuming warnings about using other companies that were “scam artists,” I am now looking for a new contract another vendor.
Despite whatever legal protections we may officially have in this country against consumer fraud, it is still rampant. New Zealand’s government enforcement system is interesting, but time will tell if they have more success preventing consumer fraud than we do here.
Thursday, April 2, 2015
I just saw the Goodman Theater's production of August Wilson's Two Train's Running. It is a great play, and this is a first-rate production in every way. One character, Hambone, is a reification of contracts injustice. Hambone painted a fence for an offstage character, Lutz. Lutz promised to pay Hambone a chicken for his work and a ham if Hambone did an especially good job. Lutz paid Hambone a chicken. This occurred nine years prior to the action in the play. Hambone's lines in the play consist almost entirely of "Give me my ham!" and "He gonna give me my ham!" At one point, another character teaches him some additional slogans like "Black is beautiful," but Hambone is never too far from his mantra, as the aggrieved non-breaching party.
Although the play never references R.2d § 228, we are clearly in the realm of conditions of satisfaction. Hambone's entitlement to the ham should have been determined on an objective basis. All of the characters in the play seem agreed that, were such a standard applied, a finder of fact would certainly award Hambone a ham. But Hambone is Black, poor, and ill-equipped for a legal battle. Lutz is white and so powerful that he is able to define Hambone's character without ever suffering the indignity of appearing on stage.
Does Hambone ever get his ham? I don't want to give away too much so I will just say, yes and no.
Wednesday, April 1, 2015
Indiana Governor Mike Pence (pictured) is in a tough spot. As reported here, Indiana is facing protests, threats of boycotts and possible losses of business opportunities as a result of its version of the state Religious Freedom Restoration Act. As illustrated in the Indy Star here, Indiana's law makes it easier for individuals and business entities to rely on the statute as a defense to allegations of discriminatory treatment. Even Pence's predecessor, Mitch Daniels, in his current capacity as a university president, has distanced himself from the law.
Pence is in a tough spot because he signed the law to show his conservative bona fides, perhaps because he has aspirations to national executive office. But he may have overreached, as the backlash against the new law may hurt his chances to appeal to a national electorate. Pence's position is made more difficult by the fact that he now wants the Indiana legislature to "clarify" the law so that it doesn't look like it was designed to discriminate. But the Indiana legislators may well have exactly the clarity they wanted, and they do not share Pence's national aspirations.
Lambda Legal is among the many organizations that have objected to the law as a license to discriminate against LGBT groups, especially in the context of same-sex marriages. Now Lambba is offering Pence a way out. In a draft contract that the parties have shared with this blog (and only with this blog as far as we know), Pence and Lambda have agreed that Pence will hire LGBT applicants for at least 30% of staff associated with his current position as Governor of Indiana and as part of his election staff leadership for all political campaigns through 2020. "I may lead a red state," Pence told our correspondent, "but I expect to be flying the rainbow flag over the White House in a few years." A Lambda spokesperson said that details of the agreement are still being negotiated but that "all us us are Lambda are looking forward to a faaabulous Inaugural Ball."
Clearly this a win-win.
Maria Augusta Ferreira, The Brazilian Amazon Region Protected Areas (ARPA) Program: The Challenges to a Public-Private Partnership, 26 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 389 (2014)
Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 23 (2014)
Sarah Howard Jenkins, Contract Resurrected! Contract Formation: Common Law ~ UCC ~ CISG, 40 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 245 (2015)