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Monday, September 15, 2014

Video Surveillance and the Right to Privacy: The Case of Janay Palmer

VAWLast week, I was sitting in a waiting room while awaiting an oil change.  CNN was on (too loudly and inescapably for my tastes, but I know my tastes are idiosyncratic).  In urgent tones, the anchors repeatedly warned us that they had disturbing and graphic video that we might not want to watch.  And then they played it.  And then they played it again.  They played it at actual speed; they played it in slow motion.  They dissected it and discussed it, with experts and authorities, between commercial breaks and digressions into other "news," for the entire time I waited for the mechanics to finish with my car.  It took over an hour, but that's another story . . . 

The video showed a now-former NFL player hit a woman in an elevator, knocking her unconscious. The woman was his fiancee, Janay Palmer, and she is now his wife.  What are we to conclude based on the grainy images that we watch because we can't bring ourselves to look away?  My first conclusion is that Janay Palmer would not want us to be watching.  My more tentative conclusion would be that every time we watch that video, we add to her humiliation and degradation.

At what point did Ms. Palmer give her consent to be videotaped, and at what point did she give consent to have this videotape used in this manner?  Let's assume that the surveillance video had a useful purpose -- policing the premises to create a record in case a crime was committed.  Let's also assume that we all are aware that when we are in public spaces, we know that video cameras might be present.  If this video tape were shared with the police and used to prosecute a criminal, I think there would be strong arguments that Ms. Palmer gave implicit consent for the use of the surveillance video for such purposes.  But how did the tape get to TMZ and then on to CNN?  Did somebody profit from trafficking in the market for mass voyeurism?

It may be that we think that her consent is not required.  We all know that we can be digitally recorded whenever we appear in public.  That's just life in the big city in the 21st century.  But perhaps we think that because we suffer from heuristic biases and believe that we and people we care about will never end up being the one being shown degraded and humiliated over and over again on national television and the Internet.  Perhaps if we were less blinkered by such biases we would not ask whether Ms. Palmer has a right not to be associated with those grainy elevator-camera images.  We would ask whether we have any right to view them.

September 15, 2014 in Commentary, Current Affairs, In the News, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, September 11, 2014

California law against non-disparagement clauses

This is big - Governor Jerry Brown just signed a bill into law that would prohibit non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts.  The law states that contracts between a consumer and business for the "sale or lease of consumer goods or services" may not include a provision waiving a consumer's right to make statements about the business.  The section is unwaivable. Furthermore, it is "unlawful" to threaten to enforce a non-disparagement clause.  Civil penalties for violation of the law range from up to $2500 for a first violation to $5000 for each subsequent violations.  (Violations seem to be based upon actions brought by a consumer or governmental authority, like a city attorney.  They are not defined as each formation of a contract!)  Furthermore, intentional or willful violations of the law subject the violator to a civil penalty of up to $10,000.

We've written about the dangers of non-disparagement clauses on this blog in the past.  It's nice that one state (my home state, no less!) is taking some action.  Will we see a California effect as other states follow the Golden State's lead?  As I've said before, those non-disparagement clauses aren't such a good idea- now would be a good time for businesses to clean up their contracts.

 

September 11, 2014 in Current Affairs, In the News, Legislation, Miscellaneous | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, September 9, 2014

Double Dipping at Duke's Place: NY Court of Appeals Oral Argument

640px-Duke_Ellington_-_publicityWe previously blogged about Ellington v. EMI, in which Duke Ellington's grandson essentially claims that EMI is double dipping into foreign royalties because it now owns the foreign subpublishers that are charging fees.  The New York Appellate Division held that Ellington's 1961 royalties agreement is unambiguous and allows EMI to do this.  Ellington has appealed to the New York Court of Appeals and oral argument is scheduled for Thursday.  Oral argument will be streamed live on the Court's website.

Here's the summary of the case from the Court's Public Information Office: 

In 1961, big-band jazz composer and pianist Duke Ellington entered into a then-standard songwriter royalty agreement with a group of music publishers including Mills Music, Inc., a predecessor of EMI Mills Music, Inc. (EMI). The agreement designates Ellington and members of his family as the "First Parties," and it defines the "Second Party" as including the named music publishers and "any other affiliate of Mills Music, Inc."

Regarding royalties for international sales, the agreement requires the Second Party to pay Ellington's family "a sum equal to fifty (50%) percent of the net revenue actually received by the Second Party from ... foreign publication" of his songs. Under such a "net receipts" arrangement, the foreign subpublisher retained 50 percent of the revenue from foreign sales and remitted the remaining 50 percent to EMI. EMI would then pay Ellington's family 50 percent of its net receipts, amounting to 25 percent of all revenue from foreign sales. At the time the agreement was executed, foreign subpublishers were typically not affiliated with American music publishers; but EMI subsequently acquired ownership of foreign subpublishers and, thus, fees that had been charged by independent foreign subpublishers are now charged by subpublishers owned by EMI.

In 2010, Ellington's grandson and heir, Paul Ellington, brought this breach of contract action against EMI, claiming EMI engaged in "double-dipping" by having its foreign subsidiaries retain 50 percent of revenue before splitting the remaining 50 percent with the Ellington family. He alleges this enabled EMI to inflate its share of foreign revenue to 75 percent, and reduce the family's share to 25 percent, in violation of its contractual agreement to pay the family 50 percent "of the net revenue actually received by the Second Party from ... foreign publication."

Supreme Court dismissed the suit, saying the parties "made no distinction in the royalty payment terms based on whether the foreign subpublishers are affiliated or unaffiliated with the United States publisher." The term 'Second Party' does not include EMI's new foreign affiliates, it said, because the definition "includes only those affiliates in existence at the time that the contract was executed."

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed, saying there is "no ambiguity in the agreement which, by its terms, requires [EMI] to pay Ellington's heirs 50% of the net revenue actually received from foreign publication of Ellington's compositions. 'Foreign publication' has one unmistakable meaning regardless of whether it is performed by independent or affiliated subpublishers." It said the definition of 'Second Party' includes only affiliates "that were in existence at the time the agreement was executed," not "foreign subpublishers that had no existence or affiliation with Mills Music at the time of contract."

Paul Ellington argues the agreement was intended to split foreign royalties 50/50 between EMI and his family, while allowing EMI to deduct a reasonable amount for foreign royalty collection costs, and EMI breached the contract by "diverting" half of the revenue to its own foreign subsidiaries. "Per the plain terms of the Agreement..., EMI is 'actually receiv[ing]' all the revenue, and it must, therefore, split it all equally with plaintiff." He argues the definition of Second Party includes affiliates EMI might acquire in the future, since there is no language limiting the term to affiliates then in existence. In any case, he says the language is ambiguous and cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Here's the Appellate Division decision in Ellington v. EMI.  

September 9, 2014 in In the News, Music, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, September 8, 2014

Thorough Discussion of the Contractual Issues in the Salaita Case from Robin Kar

Ker

We've posted about Robin Kar's recent legal scholarship here and here.   Readers can have a look at Kar's method in action in this post on the Illinois Law Faculty Blog.

In our first post about the Salaita case, we lamented how few posts really wrestled with the contractual  (or promissory estoppel) issues in the case.  Professor Kar’s post is the most detailed investigation of the contractual issues to appear to date.  We also queried whether Salaita's potential constitutional claims against the University of Illinois might turn on the question of whether or not he had a contract with that institution, which is also the institution at which Professor Kar (pictured, at right) teaches.  Kar notes:

Critics of the Chancellor’s decision argue that, even if there was no contract, Salaita’s rights to academic freedom vis-à-vis the University of Illinois should apply with equal force at the hiring as at the firing stage.

Professor Kar seems to disagree.  He does not rule out entirely the possibility of constitutional and academic freedom claims in the absence of a contract, but he does note that "the existence of a contract should change the nature of the underlying arguments on both sides of this case." 

Peofessor Kar's analysis is both passionate, in dealing with an issue that is creating genuine anguish at his institution, and dispassionate, in treating the Salaita case as a forum for the elaboration of his theory of contract law as empowerment. Based on the publicly-available facts, Professor Kar thinks Salaita's contractual claims are quite strong.  As he puts it, "If the publicly known facts are all there is to know about this case, then I believe there very likely was a contract in this case, and that it may well have been breached."  This is so because (in short), Salaita's offer letter incorporated by reference the American Association of University Professors' (AAUP) principles of academic freedom, and the AAUP interprets those principles to require (at least) warnings hearings before someone in Salaita's position can have his offer letter revoked.  At this point, Professor Kar argues, his view of contract as empowerment becomes relevant to the analysis:

The power of the marketplace—in both academic and non-academic contexts—depends on parties’ capacities to make commitments that have certain objective elements to them. In this particular case, this means that the condition of Board of Trustee approval gave the Board some authority to refuse Salaita’s appointment—but not necessarily the authority it subjectively believes it has. If the Board’s unwillingness to approve this appointment reflects an undisclosed and idiosyncratic understanding of its authority, which diverges too sharply from the shared understandings of the national academic community, then there is likely a contract here.  And it may well have been breached.

Professor Kar then proceeds to a discussion of the way out for the University of Illinois, which probably would involve a retreat.  If the facts are as Professor Kar believes them to be, the Chancellor should "admit that the Salaita decision was in error and state that this matter is—properly speaking—outside of her hands."

I do not disagree with Professor Kar's analysis but I would like to push him on one point that I think is vital in this case and in his theory of empowerment generally.  As a normative theory, I find Professor Kar's theory attractive, but I wonder about its applicability to situations of grossly unequal bargaining power, and I believe the Salaita case is such a situation.  Professor Kar takes up this issue in earnest at the end of the second part of his work on contract as empowerment   On page 73, Professor Kar acknowledges that parties "rarely enter into contracts from perfectly equal bargaining positions" and he notes that, "[i]t would therefore be significantly disempowering if parties were only bound by contracts negotiated in these circumstances."

But parties are routinely bound in circumstances when they have no real bargaining power.   In such circumstances, even if Professor Kar is right that contracts law ought to be about empowerment, much of contract law (and this point has been made at great length by Peggy Radin, Nancy Kim, Oren Bar-Gill and others), is currently extremely disempowering for ordinary consumers and even for small businesses when (as in Italian Colors) they have to contract with corporate behemoths.  

Professor Kar's assessment of Salaita's contractual claims turns on communal understandings of the contractual obligations that arise in such circumstances:

The University of Illinois is part of a much larger academic community, which extends well beyond the confines of Illinois.  Its contractual interactions with other members of this community will thus be subjected to some tests for consistency with national understandings of how these interactions typically work. This includes national understandings about the appropriate relationship between government-appointed entities, like the Board of Trustees, and faculty decisions about hiring at academic institutions that aim to pursue knowledge impartially and in the absence of political influence.

 As the conversation that has been taking place on the blogosphere thus far suggests, there may be no national consensus on the subject.  Some contracts scholars will agree with Professor Kar; others, like Dave Hoffman, think that Salaita's contractual and promissory estoppel claims are weak, and they are weak precisely because Salaita lacked the bargaining power to protect himself.  And if Salaita's case were to go before an adjudicatory body, it will not be decided based on whether contracts ought to be empowering but on whether the already empowered University of Illinois can escape any contractual obligation that might empower Professor Salaita.

 

September 8, 2014 in Commentary, Contract Profs, Current Affairs, In the News, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, September 1, 2014

Another Problem with Arbitration: Panel Bias

Sunday's New York Times has a story by Gretchen Morgenson on the front page of its Business Section that illustrates an additional problem with binding arbitration.  Arbitral panels can make arbitrary decisions to exclude evidence that could be outcome determinative.  Courts do that as well, but while a court's rulings on evidentiary matters are reviewed for reversible errorit is not clear that courts have jurisdiction to review an arbitral body's evidentiary decisions.

NY State Supreme Ct Manhattan
"NYC - New York County Supreme Courthouse" by wallyg - Flickr.com. 

Although Morgenson, a Pulitzer Prize winner, did her best to report all sides of the case, only the plaintiff and his attorney would speak with her.  So we can't pretend we have all the facts.  But here is what Morgenson reports:

Sean Martin, who works at Deutsche Bank, noticed five years ago that the firm was letting hedge fund clients listen in as analysts shared information about the markets before that information was shared with other investors.  Martin reported the conduct at the time and was rewarded with his first ever negative performance review.  He was moved out his work group and suffered a pay cut. In August 2012, he decided to  pursue an arbitration, claiming retaliation and seeking recovery of lost wages.  Under his employment agreement, disputes must be heard by arbitrators associated with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (Finra). 

Streamlined discovery is supposed to be one of the advantages of arbitration.  The purposes of the streamlining is  supposed to be efficient resolution of claims.  That is not happening in this case.  The first hearings took place in March of this year, and at those hearings, the arbitral panel decided to exclude a number of crucial pieces of evidence that Martin sought to introduce.  In addition, the Bank has asked that hearings for the case go on into 2105, six years after the alleged conduct took place and well over two years after Martin sought arbitration.  

Martin was so dissatisfied with the panel's discovery decisions that he asked all three aribtrators to withdraw.  They refused to do so.  Martin then brought an action in the New York State Supreme Court (pictured above), seeking a stay of the arbitration proceedings and the removal of the panel.  Mr. Martin's lawyer has done arbitrations before  Finra before.  It's not as if he is hostile to arbitration in principle.  But this panel has gone "off the rails," he claims.  

We'll see if the legal system can provide a remedy.

September 1, 2014 in In the News, Recent Cases | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, August 26, 2014

Intervening Illegality of Underlying Promises Does Not Cause Contract to Fail for Lack of Consideration; Does Not Breach Warranty

ImgresWhat happens when a party to an agreement terminates and begins to make quarterly termination (liquidated damage) payments as promised and then, while payments are being made, a law is past that makes the underlying promised performance illegal?  The parties are sorting this out in a case against Orbitz.

In 2005, Orbitz and Trilegiant entered into an agreement (“Master Service Agreement,” or “MSA”) for Orbitz to provide “DataPass” marketing services.  Pursuant to the MSA, Orbitz marketed Trilegiant’s services to Orbitz customers.  If a customer enrolled in Trilegiant’s services, Orbitz would transfer the customer’s billing and credit card info to Trilegiant and, thereafter, Trilegiant would charge the customer and pay Orbitz a commission.  As a result, customers were charged for Trilegiant’s services without ever affirmatively providing their credit card information to Trilegiant (though, they had arguably agreed to be charged when purchasing travel arrangements on the Orbitz site – I leave that part to Nancy Kim). 

Customers eventually complained about their credit cards being charged without their knowledge.  In 2007, Orbitz notified Trilegiant that it would be terminating the MSA.  The MSA allowed for early termination but required Orbitz to make a series of quarterly termination payments (totaling over $18 million) through 2016.

In 2010, Congress enacted the Restore Online Shopper Confidence Act (“ROSCA”), which made the DataPass marketing practice illegal.  Orbitz stopped making the quarterly termination payments to Trilegiant.  Trilegiant sued Orbitz in New York and a recent decision of the trial court (Supreme Court, New York County, Ramos, J.) granted Trilegiant summary judgment on 3 of Orbitz’s 17 affirmative defenses. 

First, the court rejected Orbitz’s defense of lack of consideration.  The court explained:

Orbitz contends that there had to be consideration for each quarterly termination payment and that Trilegiant's continued use of DataPass is necessary to its claim against Orbitz.  Orbitz argues that the consideration for the termination payments was supposed to be Trilegiant's forfeit of potential earnings, earnings that Trilegiant cannot forfeit if it is not in the business of DataPass (see Orbitz's Memorandum of Law at 8-9).

The law does not support Orbitz's argument. It is well settled that an agreement "should be interpreted as of the date of its making and not as of the date of its breach" (X.L.O. Concrete Corp. v John T. Brady and Co., 104 AD2d 181, 184 [1st Dept 2009]). Additionally, "[i]f there is consideration for the entire agreement that is sufficient; the consideration supports every other obligation in the agreement" (Sablosky v Edward S. Gordon Co., 73 NY2d 133, 137 [1989]).  A single promise "may be bargained for and given as the agreed equivalent of one promise or of two promises or of many promises. The consideration is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is exchanged for more than one promise" (2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.12).

Considerations of public policy also support this conclusion, because a promisor should not be permitted to renege on a promise either because that specific promise lacks textually designated consideration or because the promisor wants to avoid performance of multiple obligations when the promisee has already performed and has no further obligations concurrent with the promisor's performance (see 15 Williston on Contracts §45:7 [4th ed.]).

While Orbitz contends that Trilegiant has been unable to forfeit earnings from new DataPass customers since it ceased the practice in January 2010, that fact has no bearing on whether there was consideration for the termination payment provision in the MSA.  The termination payments were part of the original MSA (see MSA at Ex. B), and Trilegiant is correct when it asserts that the existence of consideration for the MSA itself, whether "consist[ing] of either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee" (Weiner v McGraw-Hill, 57 NY2d 458, 464 [1982]), is not a disputed material fact in this case.

Additionally, courts do not look to the adequacy of consideration provided that there was consideration, "absent fraud or unconscionability" (Apfel v Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 81 NY2d 470, 476 [1993]). There are no allegations that the MSA was fraudulently agreed upon or that it is unconscionable.  Further, this Court has already held that the termination payments in the MSA do not constitute a penalty or unenforceable liquidated damages (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 97 at ¶5, Order entered 12/24/2013).

As this Court has previously stated, if these sophisticated parties to the original MSA wanted Orbitz's promise to pay each quarterly termination payment to be contingent on Trilegiant's continued use of DataPass and subsequent forfeiture of revenues, they could have so stipulated in the MSA (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 89 at p 6, Entered 10/7/2013).  This Court finds that Orbitz's promise to pay all quarterly termination payments is supported by the same bargained-for consideration given by Trilegiant in exchange for Orbitz's various promises in the MSA as a whole.

Second, the court rejected Orbitz’s argument that Trilegiant lacked standing because it could not show that it was “ready, willing and able” to perform its obligations.  The court reasoned:

Orbitz argues that its early termination in 2007 triggered the MSA liquidated damages remedy and that even though Trilegiant was relieved of its obligation to perform it still had to show it was able.  Orbitz further argues that Trilegiant has adduced "no evidence whatsoever to prove that it was ready, willing, and able to perform its obligations under the MSA as of the time Defendants stopped making payments in 2010" (Orbitz's Memorandum of Law at p 10).

Whether the remedy constitutes liquidated damages or a separate provision of the MSA that establishes new obligations for Trilegiant and Orbitz whereby Orbitz is obligated to make quarterly payments and Trilegiant essentially is obligated only to collect them, is irrelevant in light of the fact that Trilegiant claims only general damages, which "include money that the breaching party agreed to pay under the contract" (See Biotronik A.G. v Conor Medsystems Ireland, LTD 22 NY3d 799, 805, [2014] citing Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v AEP Power Marketing, Inc., 487 F3d 89, 109 [2d Cir 2007]). 

Trilegiant is not required to show its ability to perform through September 30, 2016, the date of the final quarterly termination payment.  Even if, arguendo, Trilegiant was required to show it could have performed its obligations under the MSA, Orbitz's argument that those obligations would have included an ability to perform DataPass is unpersuasive.  Whether Exhibit B of the MSA constitutes liquidated damages or a separate provision of the contract, Trilegiant is not textually obligated to do anything except not market to Orbitz's customers.

Furthermore, liquidated damage clauses benefit both potential plaintiffs "who [are] relieved of the difficult, if not impossible, calculation of damage, item by item" and potential defendants "who [are] insulated against a potentially devastating monetary claim in the event" of a breach and "[t]hus, public policy is served by the implementation of such clauses" (X.L.O. Concrete Corp. at 186).

Finally, the court rejected Orbitz’s argument that Trilegiant violated a warranty provision in the MSA in which the parties promised that performance of the agreement did not violate any law.  The court reasoned:

While Orbitz contends that Trilegiant and similar DataPass practitioners "violated the rights of millions of Americans" (Orbitz's Response at 13), ROSCA does not refer to the violation of consumers' "rights" when it describes the actions of third party sellers, such as Trilegiant, who purchased consumers' credit card information (15 U.S.C. §8401 at Sec. 2).  ROSCA's findings instead refer to DataPass as something that undermined consumer confidence and "defied consumers' expectations" (id. at Sec. 2(7)).

This Court has already held that ROSCA does not make any violating contracts unenforceable and the MSA is enforceable despite DataPass being presently illegal (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 89 at p 5, Entered 10/7/2013). Moreover, as this Court has already explained, "the primary purpose of ROSCA was to protect consumers (15 U.S.C. §8401), not marketers that were using DataPass as a tool" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 89 at p 4, Order entered 10/7/2013, citing Lloyd Capital Corp. v Pat Henchar, Inc., 80 NY2d 124, 127 [1992]).

Orbitz claims that Trilegiant has failed to show that it was not in violation of Section 6.1 of the MSA, based on the concept that an "express warranty is as much a part of the contract as any other term" (CBS, Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Pub. Co., 75 NY2d 496, 503 [1990]).

A breach of warranty claim is established "once the express warranty is shown to have been relied on as part of the contract," and the claiming party then has "the right to be indemnified in damages for its breach [and] the right to indemnification depends only on establishing that the warranty was breached" (id. at 504).

Orbitz argues that there are disputed issues of fact as to Trilegiant's alleged breach of warranty, but Orbitz has not alleged damages for which it could be indemnified nor has it alleged any evidence of Trilegiant's breach of warranty that is not rooted in ROSCA's condemnation of DataPass. This Court has already held that ROSCA's enactment and findings do not relieve Orbitz from its obligations under the MSA, holding that "as a general rule also, forfeitures by operation of law are disfavored, particularly where a defaulting party seeks to raise illegality as a sword for personal gain rather than a shield for the public good" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 89 at p 4, Entered 10/7/2013, quoting Lloyd Capital Corp. at 128 [internal  quotations omitted]).

Orbitz tries to use ROSCA's findings that DataPass was bad for consumers and the economy and Trilegiant's cessation of DataPass activity as evidence of conduct that would violate the MSA Section 6.1. These allegations do not create a question of fact. This Court has already held that "ROSCA does not provide that any violating contracts are rendered unenforceable or that its provisions were intended to apply retroactively" (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 89 at p 5, Entered 10/7/2013), and Trilegiant ceased DataPass almost a year before ROSCA made the practice illegal.

A case worth watching.

Trilegiant Corp. v. Orbitz, LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 24230 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Aug. 20, 2014)(Ramos, J.).

August 26, 2014 in E-commerce, In the News, Recent Cases, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, August 22, 2014

LA Dentist Gets $5000 for $1605 Default Judgment against Kim Kardashian

This story from the WSJ Law Blog falls right into the ContractsProf Blog sweet spot: 

In October 2002, Los Angeles dentist Dr. Craig D. Gordon won a $1,605.73 default judgment against a 22-year-old former patient who was allegedly fitted with porcelain fillings to replace silver ones but never paid the bill.

The patient was Kim Kardashian, and nearly a dozen years later, Dr. Gordon has finally gotten his money back – with interest and an extra $1,500 thrown in. The twist is the money didn’t come from the now (in)famous Ms. Kardashian but from a California attorney who bought the uncollected judgment for $5,000 in an online auction that ended Thursday.

JudgmentMarketplace.com, a three-year-old site that gives creditors a forum for hawking uncollected debts, said the transaction marked the first time in the company’s history that the selling price for a listed judgment exceeded the total value of the principal and interest.

“Judgments usually sell for only pennies on the dollar,” said the site’s founder, Shawn Porat, a Manhattan resident.

He said the Kardashian judgment may have commanded a premium because of its novelty value. In other words, for $5,000, you can tell people at a cocktail party that a Kardashian is indebted to you.

Ms. Kardashian’s attorney, Todd Wilson, told Law Blog that she “never sought or received treatment by Dr. Gordon of any kind.”

The buyer, said Mr. Porat, could also expect the judgment to increase in value as more interest accrues. Under California civil procedure code, judgments automatically expire after 10 years, but before time runs out, a creditor may file a request for a 10-year renewal with the original court. And there’s no limit to how many times you can extend it.

“Although I wish she had just paid her bill like most of my clients do, I’m really glad to finally have closure on this incident,” Dr. Gordon said in a statement.

Interested in purchasing some celebrity debt of your own?  WSJ Law Blog reports:

JudgmentMarketplace.com is also listing a $9 million wrongful death judgment against O.J. Simpson on behalf of Ronald Goldman’s mother, who is asking for at least $1 million. The 17-year-old judgment has accumulated more than $15 million in interest, according to the site.

August 22, 2014 in Celebrity Contracts, In the News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, August 21, 2014

Contracts and the Case of Steven Salaita

A lot of ink has been spilled over this subject, and I don't have much to add, except to note that I have not seen a very many good discussions of the contract issues.  

The very short version of the story, as best I can cobble it together from blog posts, is that the University of Illinois offered a position in its American Indian Studies program to Steven Salaita, who had previously been teaching at Virginia Tech.  According to this article in the Chicago Tribune, the U of I sent Professor Salaita an offer letter, which he signed and returned in October 2013.  Professor Salaita was informed that his appointment was subject to approval by the U of I's Board of Trustees, but everyone understood that to be pro forma.  In August 2014, Salaita the U of I Chancellor notified Professor Salaita that his appointment would not be presented to the Board and that he was no longer a candidate for a position.  According to the Tribune, the Board next meets in September, after Professor Salaita's employment would have begun.  The Chancellor apparently decided not to present Professor Salaita's contract for approval because of his extensive tweets on the Isreali-Palestinian conflict, which may or may not be anti-Semitic, depending on how one reads them.  

The main argument in the blogosphere is over whether or not the U of I's conduct is a violation of academic freedom. But there is also a secondary argument over whether Professor Salaita has a breach of  contract of promissory estoppel claim against the U of I.  The list of impressive posts and letters on the whole Salaita incident include:

Michael Dorf on Verdict: Legal Analysis and Commentary from Justia

Katherine Franke, et al. in a letter to the U of I Chancellor

Brian Leiter commenting on the Franke letter on Brian Leiter's Law School Reports

Michael Rothberg, in a letter to the U of I Chancellor

Steven Lubet at The Faculty Lounge here and here

Jonathan Adler on the Volokh Conspiracy here, here and here

Finally, Dave Hoffman stepped in on Concurring Opinions to address the promissory estoppel issues  and then answers Michael Dorf's response 

Hoffman makes strong arguments that there was no breach of contract here, because the offer was clearly conditional on Board approval.  There are arguments that the promise breached was a failure to present Salaita's employment to the Board, but the remedy for that breach would simply be presentment, at which point both the claim and the appointment would go away (unless U of I has a change of heart on the matter).  

We would have to know more about the process to make a more educated guess about whether or not a breach of contract claim here could succeed.  I think it is relevant that, at the point Salaita was informed that the offer was rescinded, the Board could not meet before his employment would have begun.  I suspect that his courses were already scheduled and that students had, at least provisionally, registered for them.  I wonder if there were any announcements on the U of I website crowing about their recent hires.  All of this would be relevant, it seems to me, to the state of mind of the parties regarding whether or not a contract had been made.  It would be very sad for all of us in academia if it turned out to be the case that our offer letters mean nothing until the Board has spoken, as acceptance of a position usually involves major life changes, including giving notice at current jobs, moving to a new city, selling and buying a residence, etc.

I have no doubt that Dave Hoffman is right that promissory estoppel claims rarely succeed.  I do think that some versions of the facts presented here suggest that this one might be a winner nonetheless or, as Hoffman suggests, is the kind of claim that is worth bringing at least in order to make the threat of discovery on the subject a strong inducement to the U of I to settle the case.  But the remedy for promissory estoppel is probably not really the remedy Salaita seeks.  

Professor Salaita's claims -- his academic freedom and constitutional claims -- go beyond the issues of contract and promissory estoppel.  A lot has been written on this situation, and I haven't had a chance to read everything carefully, but I have yet to see a clear discussion of whether those claims hinge on Professor Salaita's contractual claims.  It seems likely to me that if he had no contract, then he had no free speech or academic freedom rights vis a vis the U of I.  And I don't think a promissory estoppel claim would get him such protections either.  Or do people think that universities have a generalizable erga omnes duty to protect academic freedom?

ADDENDUM

Dave Hoffman has an additional post up on Concurring Opinions here.  

August 21, 2014 in Conferences, Contract Profs, In the News, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, August 19, 2014

NJ Appellate Court Refuses to Enforce Exculpatory Clause that Waives Ordinary Negligence Claims

Plaintiff sued the YMCA for injuries sustained when he slipped and fell on stairs that he alleged were negligently maintained.  First, let’s get this out of the way: 

The YMCA argued that plaintiff was contractually barred from seeking damages against the YMCA because plaintiff had voluntarily signed an exculpatory clause in his membership agreement.   That clause provided:

I AGREE THAT THE YMWCA WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY PERSONAL INJURIES OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY ME WHILE ON ANY YMWCA PREMISES OR AS A RESULT OF A YMWCA SPONSORED ACTIVITIES [SIC]. I FURTHER AGREE TO INDEMNIFY AND SAVE HARMLESS THE YMWCA FROM ANY CLAIMS OR DEMANDS ARISING OUT OF ANY SUCH INJURIES OR LOSSES.

A New Jersey trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint.   An appellate court reversed.  The appellate court framed the issue as “whether a fitness center or health club can insulate itself through an exculpatory clause from the ordinary common law duty of care owed by all businesses to … invitees[.]”  The court held that it could not.

While the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld an exculpatory clause in Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., Inc., 203 N.J. 286 (2010), that case was characterized as involving allegations of injury based upon risks inherent in the activity (bike riding in a spin class).  In Stelluti, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not specifically address or decide whether an exculpatory clause may waive ordinary negligence.

The appellate court declined to enforce the YMCA's exculpatory clause, reasoning that it was against the public interest:

Given the expansive scope of the exculpatory clause here, we hold that if applied literally, it would eviscerate the common law duty of care owed by defendant to its invitees, regardless of the nature of the business activity involved. Such a prospect would be inimical to the public interest because it would transfer the redress of civil wrongs from the responsible tortfeasor to either the innocent injured party or to society at large, in the form of taxpayer-supported institutions.

The appellate court also noted that the agreement was presumably a contract of adhesion.

This is a case worth following if appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.  And a good teaching case because it lays bare the tension between freedom to contract and overriding concerns about general public welfare.

 Walters v. YMCA, DOCKET NO. A-1062-12T3 (Superior Ct. of N.J. App. Div. Aug. 18, 2014).

August 19, 2014 in In the News, Recent Cases, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Al Gore Sues Al Jazeera

GoreNow there's a headline that will make Fox News chortle with glee.  The Al Jazeera news network purchased Al Gore's Current TV channel for $500 million.  Gore's suit alleges that Al Jazeera still owed $65 million on the purchase price.

According to this report on the Guardian Liberty Voice, Al Jazeera may be withholding the final payment in an attempt to negotiate a discount on the sale price.  According to the report, Al Jazeera has not garnered as many viewers as it hoped -- an anemic average of 17,000 during prime time, as compared with 1.7 million for Fox News and nearly 500,000 for CNN.  

But with new crises erupting daily in the Middle East, things are looking up for all three.

Hooray.

August 19, 2014 in In the News, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, August 13, 2014

Tour Riders [File this in: Rock 'n' Roll]

DownloadI love concert tour riders -- those sometimes lengthy contract terms that reveal all of a band's idiosyncratic  backstage requests.  The most famous rider term is, of course, Van Halen's requirement of no brown M&Ms.  And we've  blogged about the explanation for this peculiar request more than once: here and here

WNYC's John Schaefer hosted an extended discussion of tour riders on Soundcheck.  My favorite is Iggy Pop's request: "One monitor man who speaks English and is not afraid of death."  

The Brooklyn band Parquet Courts asked for:

  • 1 bottle of communion grade red wine
  • 1 bottle of white wine that would impress your average non-wine-drinking American
  • 1 bottle of lower-middle shelf whiskey – cheap but still implies rugged masculinity
  • Mixers for aforementioned mid-level whiskey, of slightly higher quality than the whiskey
  • A quantity of “herbal mood enhancer”
  • 1 copy of newspaper with the most interesting headline/front page picture (comic section must feature Curtis)

You can listen to the show here:

August 13, 2014 in Celebrity Contracts, In the News, Music | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Researcher Behind Facebook's Emotions Experiment to Help Design Ethical Guidelines

Today's New York Times features an article aptly titled (in the print version) "Under the Microscope."  The article describes researchers' attempts to grapple with the ethical issues relating to projects such as Facebook's experiment on its users, about which we have written previously  here and here.  According to the article, researchers both at universities and at in-house corporate research departments are collaborating on processes to formulate ethical guidelines that will inform future research that makes use of users' information.  

The article states that Facebook has apologized for its emotion experiment, in which it manipulated users' feeds to see if those users' own posts reflected the emotional tone of the posts they were seeing. It's not really clear that Facebook apologized for experimenting on its users.  As quoted on NPR, here is what Facebook's Sheryl Sandberg  said on behalf of the company:

This was part of ongoing research companies do to test different products, and that was what it was; it was poorly communicated . . . . And for that communication we apologize. We never meant to upset you.

As the Washington Post noted, Sandberg did not apologize for the experiement itself.  Seen in its full context, Sandberg's statement is more akin to OKCupid's in-your-face admission that it experiements on its users, about which Nancy Kim posted here.

But the Times article focuses on Cornell University's Jeffrey Hancock, who collaborated with Facebook on the experiment.  He seems to have no regrets.  For Hancock, researchers' ability to data mine is to his field what the microscope was to chemists.  Or, one might think, what the crowbar was to people doing research in the field of breaking and entering.  Hancock is now working with people at Microsoft Research and others to lead discussions to help develop ethical guidelines applicable to such research.

The Times quotes Edith Ramirez, Chair of the Federal Trade Commission on the subject.  She says:

Consumers should be in the driver’s seat when it comes to their data. . . . They don’t want to be left in the dark and they don’t want to be surprised at how it’s used.

By contrast, here is the Times's synopsis of Professor Hancock's views on how the ethical guidelines ought to be developed:

Companies will not willingly participate in anything that limits their ability to innovate quickly, he said, so any process has to be “effective, lightweight, quick and accountable.”

If the companies are subject to regulation before they can experiment on their users, it does not really matter whether or not they willngly participate.  And the applicable standards have already been established under Institutional Review Board (IRB) rules.  Significantly, as reported here in the Washington Post, although Professor Hancock works at Cornell, his participation in the Facebook study was not subject to Cornell's IRB review.  In our previous posts, we have expressed our doubt that the Facebook study could survive IRB review (or that it yielded the information that it was supposedly testing for).  

The Times article does not indicate that any of the people involved in devising rules for their own regulation have any expertise in the field of ethics.  Why is letting them come up with their own set of rules in which they will "willingly participate" any better than expecting the wielders of crowbars to design rules for their safe deployment?

August 13, 2014 in Commentary, In the News, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, August 11, 2014

Presidential Executive Order Refuses Government Contracts to Companies that Mandate Employee Arbitration

This informative post from Jean Sternlight (via Art Hinshaw) over at ADR Prof Blog:

President Obama today signed a new Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order refusing to grant government contracts of over a million dollars to companies who mandate their employees arbitrate disputes involving discrimination, accusations of sexual assault, or harassment.  This new order mirrors protections Congress already provided to employees of Defense Department contractors in 2011 in the so-called “Franken amendment.” The order also requires prospective federal contractors to disclose prior labor law violations and will instruct agencies not to do business with egregious violators.

While the executive order is limited in its scope (only protects employees who work for companies with large government contracts and only applies to arbitration of certain kid of claims), it is a step toward the Arbitration Fairness Act, which would prohibit mandatory arbitration more braodly.  More here.  

August 11, 2014 in In the News, Legislation, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, August 7, 2014

Supremes Settle Their Breach of Contract Action

Oblique_facade_3,_US_Supreme_CourtIt is not often that the Supreme Court of the United States entertains a contract issue (which is, coincidentally, one of the main reasons it is such a delight to teach contract law).  The Supreme Court did, however, recently settle a contract dispute of its own.

According to reporting by Tony Mauro at the National Law Journal:

The curious case of the trapezoidal windows at the U.S. Supreme Court is closed.

Documents filed recently in lower courts indicate that a contentious seven-year dispute over mistakes and delays in the renovation project at the high court has been settled.

“Everybody was worn out by the litigation,” Herman Braude of the Braude Law Group said this week. Braude represented Grunley Construction Company, the main contractor for the modernization project on the nearly 80-year-old building. “All good things have to come to an end,” he said.

The most contested feature of the litigation was the belated discovery by contractors that more than 150 large windows, many of which look out from justices’ chambers, were trapezoidal—not strictly rectangular. The building's persnickety architect, Cass Gilbert, designed them that way so they would appear rectangular from below, both inside and outside the building.

But Grunley and its window subcontractor failed to measure all four sides of the windows before starting to manufacture blast-proof replacements, so some of them had to be scrapped.

Grunley claimed it was not obliged to make the measurements, asserting that the government had “superior knowledge” of the odd shape of the windows that it should have shared with contractors. The company asked for an extra $757,657 to compensate for the extra costs of fabricating the unconventional windows.

But the federal Contract Appeals Board in 2012 rejected Grunley’s claim, stating: “We find inexcusable the firms’ failure to measure a necessary component of the windows prior to installation.”

Grunley appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and placed other contract disputes before that court and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Both sides eventually agreed to settlement negotiations.

In February, both parties reported to the federal circuit that “the parties are now in the final process of closing out the underlying construction contract and settling various requests for equitable adjustment.” They also told the federal circuit that “the settlement discussion are at a very high level between the parties … and are being primarily led by the principals of each party, not the litigation counsel.”

Subsequent orders by both courts have dismissed the litigation, but no details of the settlement are available on the docket of either court.

Attempts to obtain details of the settlement have been unsuccessful so far. The Architect of the Capitol—the congressional agency that has jurisdiction over the Supreme Court building and was the defendant in the litigation—did not respond to a request for comment. The U.S. Department of Justice’s civil division, which handled the litigation for the architect's office, did not respond as of press time, and neither did anyone from the Supreme Court.

Braude, Grunley's attorney, was reluctant to give details. “The dollar figure doesn’t matter,” he said. But when pressed, Braude said his client “got some” of the $15 million in extra compensation it was seeking from the government, beyond its original $75 million contract for the work.

“Everybody agreed to an adjusted contract price that recognizes the budget limitations of the government,” Braude said, adding that the settlement was “satisfactory to all parties. Nobody was jumping for joy, but everybody was a little happy.” Braude also said the Supreme Court signed off on the settlement.

John Horan of McKenna Long & Aldridge, an expert on government contract disputes, said there is no general rule about the confidentiality of settlements, and sometimes “the government doesn’t go out of its way to make settlements public.” But a document spelling out terms of the agreement is sometimes made part of the public record or can be obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, he said. The Supreme Court and the Architect of the Capitol, an arm of Congress, are exempt from the FOIA.

The modernization project at the Supreme Court broke ground in 2003 and the target completion date was 2008, though some follow-up work is still underway. The court's aging infrastructure—including one of the oldest Carrier air-conditioners in existence—was the trigger for the project, which has cost an estimated $122 million overall.

More here.  Great basis for an exam hypo.  And, wow! -- to be the attorney that sues the Supreme Court!

August 7, 2014 in Government Contracting, In the News, Labor Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, August 6, 2014

Online Contracts Here and Now

Here is my interview  with  Jeremy Hobson of NPR's Here and Now on the subject of online contracts. 

August 6, 2014 in Commentary, Current Affairs, In the News, Miscellaneous, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, August 1, 2014

Did Leonard Offer Too Much Money to Pepsi for the Harrier?

HarrierxvReaders of this blog should already be familiar with the famous Harrier jet case in which plaintiff John Leonard attempted to treat a Pepsi commercial as an offer for the sale of a Harrier jet in exchange for 7 million Pepsi points or the equivalent in cash, which came to about $700,000.  In Leonard v. Pepsico. (edited version available here), Judge Kimba Wood ruled in Pepsico's favor, finding that the commercial that Leonard mistook for an offer was actually a joke.  

We have learned via the Contracts Prof listserv that a Harrier Jet was recently sold at auction for  £ 105,800 -- that is under $200,000.  In this case, the auctioneer specified that the jet was being sold "for display purposes only and is not currently airworthy."  It doesn't even come with any weapons systems.  Bummer.  Still, although the Pepsi commercial suggests an operational Harrier (there is no indication of weapons capabilities), Leonard's offer of $700,000 actually turns out to be way too high for a non-functional jet.  So, if instead of showing a kid landing a jet outside of his school, the commercial had shown the same kid impressing his friends with the grounded jet in his backyard, Judge Wood would have had a harder time construing the ad as a joke.  

Since the notice of the jet for auction claims that this is the first time a Harrier has been sold at auction, Pepsico would  have had a hard time getting its hands on a jet.  Tthat would not have bothered Mr. Leonard, who more likely was interested in the difference in value between a functioning Harrier and the $700,000 he offered.  However, if the court were able to discover the actual value of a non-operational jet, it would have awarded Mr. Leonard no damages for the breach.

Hat tip to Eric Goldman and Gary Neustadter.

August 1, 2014 in Commentary, Famous Cases, In the News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, July 31, 2014

Will Blockchains End the Need for Specific Performance? [File this in: The Future]

FutureAn article by Andrew Hinkes at Inside Counsel begins:

Imagine a world where specific performance of contracts is no longer a cause of action because the contracts themselves automatically execute the agreement of the parties. Or where escrow agents are replaced by rule- and software-driven technology. Imagine instantaneous recording of property records, easements and deeds. Imagine a world where an auto owner who is late on his payment will be locked out of his car. While these scenarios may seem to come from a futuristic fantasy world, innovations offered by the Bitcoin 2.0 generation of technology may create a world where these seeming marvels are an every-day occurrence, and technology renders some contract causes of action obsolete.

How could that be?  Hinkes explains:

Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are powered by blockchain technology, which maintains and verifies all transactions in that virtual currency through a massive, publically available ledger. The transparency created by the blockchain eliminates the need for trusted third parties, like credit card processors or banks, to take part in these transactions. Because anyone can see the transactions, virtual currency cannot be transferred to more than one party, or “double spent,” which is a key feature that preserves the integrity of the blockchain system. This same blockchain technology can be purposed to facilitate, verify and enforce the terms of agreements automatically without the need for human interaction using what are termed “smart contracts.”

The blockchain, of course, cannot physically enforce a contract, or actually compel a person or entity to do anything. Instead, the blockchain can be used to enforce certain pre-determined rules that can move an asset from person to person by agreement. Ownership of goods could be associated with a specialized coin, which can be transferred between parties along with payment in a virtual currency system, or in a specialized implementation of blockchain technology.

Hinkes provides an example of how the technology can ensure performance:

Examining a simple real estate transaction can demonstrate how smart contracts could drastically alter the way business is conducted. Presently, Party A and Party B would enter into a contract that requires Party A to pay $200,000.00 to Party B in exchange for Party B agreeing to convey title to Party B’s condominium unit to Party A upon receipt of payment. If Party A pays the money, but Party B later refuses to convey title, Party A is required to hire an attorney to seek specific performance of that contract, or to obtain damages. The determination of the outcome will be made by a third party- a judge, jury, or arbitrator.

Using a smart contract, however, avoids the potential for one party to perform while the other refuses or fails to perform. Using a smart contract, Party A and Party B can agree to the same transaction, but structure it differently. In this scenario, Party A will agree to pay $200,000.00 worth of virtual currency to Party B, and Party B will agree to transmit the title to the condominium in a specialized type of coin on the blockchain. When Party A transfers the virtual currency to Party B, this action serves as the triggering event for Party B, which then automatically sends the specialized coin which signifies the title to the condominium at issue to Party A. The transfer is then complete, and Party A’s ownership of the condominium is verifiable through a publically available record on the blockchain.

"Simply Incredible":
Old-computer-ad-7-500x680
 
Well worth a read in its entirety.  Technology is posed to change contract performance in some pretty significant ways, ways that make what we've been doing for years look like a Tandy 2000.
 

July 31, 2014 in Commentary, E-commerce, In the News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, July 18, 2014

Overzealous or Legitimate Debt Collection Practices

By Myanna Dellinger

A woman owes $20 to Kohl’s on a credit card.  The debt collector allegedly started to “harass” the woman over the debt, calling her cell phone up to 22 times per week as early as 6 a.m. and occasionally after midnight.  What would a reasonable customer do?  Probably pay the debt, which the woman admits was only a “measly $20.”  What did this woman do?  Not to pay the small debt, telling the caller that they had “the wrong number,” and follow the great American tradition of filing suit, alleging violations of the 1991 Telephone Consumer Protection Act which, among other things, makes it illegal to call cell phones using auto dialers or prerecorded voices without the recipient’s consent.

Consumer protection rules also prohibit collection agencies from calling before 8 a.m. and after 9 p.m., calling multiple times during one day, leaving voicemail messages at a work number, or continuing to call a work phone number if told not to. 

Last year, Bank of America agreed to pay $32 million to settle claims relating to allegations of illegally using robo-debt collectors.  Discover also settled a claim alleging that they violated the rules by calling people’s cell phones without their consent.  Just recently, a man’s recorded 20-minute call to Comcast pleading with their representative to cancel his cable and internet service went viral online.

The legal moral of these stories is that companies are not and should, of course, not be allowed to harass anyone to collect on debt owed to them or refuse to cancel services no longer wanted.  However, what about companies such as Kohl’s who are presumably owed very large amounts of money although in the form of many small debts?  Is it reasonable that customers such as the above can do what she admits doing, simply saying “screw it” to the company and in fact reverse the roles of debtor and creditor by hoping for a settlement via a lawsuit on a questionable background?  Surely not. 

I once owned a small company and can attest to the difficulty of collecting on debts even with extensive accurate documentation.  The only way my debt collecting service or myself were able to collect many outstanding amounts was precisely to make repeat requests and reminders (although, of course, in a professional manner).  As a matter of principle, customers should not be able to get away with simply choosing not to pay for services or products they have ordered, even if the outstanding amounts are small.  If companies have followed the law, perhaps time has come for them to refuse settling to once again re-establish the roles of debtor and creditor.  This, one could hope, would lead irresponsible consumers to live up to their financial obligations, as must the rest of society.

July 18, 2014 in Commentary, Current Affairs, E-commerce, Famous Cases, In the News, True Contracts | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, July 15, 2014

Warning: Burning Gasoline May Kill You

By Myanna Dellinger

The city of Berkeley, California, may become the first in the nation to require that gas stations affix warning stickers to gas pump handles warning consumers of the many recognized dangers of climate change.  The stickers would read:

Global Warming Alert!  Burning Gasoline Emits CO2

The City of Berkeley Cares About Global Warming

The state of California has determined that global warming caused by CO2 emissions poses a serious threat to the economic well-being, public health, natural resources, and the environment of California.  To be part of the solution, go to www.sustainableberkeley.com

Consumers not only in California, but worldwide are familiar with similar warnings about the dangers of tobacco.  The idea with the gas pump stickers is to “gently raise awareness” of the greenhouse gas impacts and the fact that consumers have alternatives.  In their book “Nudge,” Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein addressed the potential effectiveness of fairly subtly encouraging individual persons to act in societally or personally improved ways instead of using more negative enforcement methods such as telling people what not to do.  Gas pump stickers would be an example of such a “nudge.”

But is that enough?  World scientists have agreed that we must limit temperature increases to approximately 2° C to avoid dangerous climate change.  The problem is that we are already headed towards a no less than 5° C increase.  To stop this tend, we must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% or more (targets vary somewhat) by 2050.  Stickers with nudges are great, but in all likelihood, the world will need a whole lot more than that to reach the goal of curbing potentially catastrophic weather-related calamities.

Of course, the oil and gas industry opposes the Berkeley idea.  The Western States Petroleum Association claimsthat the labels would “compel speech in violation of the 1st Amendment” and that “far less restrictive means exist to disseminate this information to the public without imposing onerous restrictions on businesses.”  Why this type of sticker would, in contrast to, for example, labels on cigarette packaging, be so “onerous” and “restrictive” is not clear.  Given the extent of available knowledge of climate change and its potential catastrophic effects on people and our natural environment, the industry is very much behind the curve in hoping for “less restrictive means.”  More restrictive means than labels on dangerous products are arguably needed.  Even more behind the curve is the Association’s claim that the information on the stickers is merely “opinion” that should not be “accorded the status of ‘fact’”.   The Berkeley city attorney has vetted the potential ordinance and found the proposed language to be not only sufficiently narrow, but also to have been adopted by California citizens as the official policy of the state. 

It seems that instead of facing reality, the oil and gas industry would rather keep consumers in the dark and force them to adopt or continue self-destructive habits.  That didn’t work in the case of cigarettes and likely will not in this case either.  We are a free country and can, within limits, buy and sell what we want to.  But there are and should be restrictions.  In this case, the “restriction” is actually not one at all; it is simply a matter of publishing facts.  Surely, in America in 2014, no one can seriously dispute the desirability of doing that.

The Berkeley City Council is expected to address the issue in September.

July 15, 2014 in Commentary, Current Affairs, In the News, Legislation, Science | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, July 9, 2014

Aereo Loses in Supreme Court and so do Consumers – for Now

By Myanna Dellinger

Recently, I blogged here on Aereo’s attempt to provide inexpensive TV programming to consumers by capturing and rebroadcasting cable TV operators’ products without paying the large fees charged by those operators.  The technology is complex, but at bottom, Aereo argued that they were not breaking copyright laws because they merely enabled consumers to capture TV that was available over airwaves and via cloud technology anyway. 

In the recent narrow 6-3 Supreme Court ruling, the Courts said that Aereo was “substantially similar” to a cable TV company since it sold a service that enabled subscribers to watch copyrighted TV programs shortly after they were broadcast by the cable companies.  The Court found that “Aereo performs petitioners’ works publicly,” which violates the Copyright Act.  The fact that Aereo uses slightly different technology than the cable companies does not make a “critical difference,” said the Court.  Since the ruling, Aereo has suspended its operations and posted a message on its website that calls the Court’s outcome "a massive setback to consumers."

Whether or not the Supreme Court is legally right in this case is debatable, but it at least seems to be behind the technological curve.  Of course the cable TV companies resisted Aereo’s services just as IBM did not predict the need for very many personal computers, Kodak failed to adjust quickly enough to the digital camera craze, music companies initially resisted digital files and online streaming of songs.  But if companies want to survive in these technologically advanced times, it clearly does not make sense to resist technological changes.  They should embrace not only technology, but also, in a free market, competition so long as, of course, no laws are violated.  We also do not use typewriters anymore simply to protect the status quo of the companies that made them.

It is remarkable how much cable companies attempt to resist the fact that many, if not most, of us simply do not have time to watch hundreds of TV stations and thus should not have to buy huge, expensive package solutions.  Not one of the traditional cable TV companies seem to consider the business advantage of offering more individualized solutions, which is technologically possible today.  Instead, they are willing to waste money and time on resisting change all the way to the Supreme Court, not realizing that the change is coming whether or not they want it. 

Surely an innovative company will soon be able to work its way around traditional cable companies’ strong position on this market while at the same time observing the Supreme Court’s markedly narrow holding.  Some have already started doing so.  Aereo itself promises that it is only “paus[ing] our operations temporarily as we consult with the court and map out our next steps.”

 

 

July 9, 2014 in Commentary, Current Affairs, E-commerce, Famous Cases, Film, In the News, Music, Recent Cases, Television, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)