ContractsProf Blog

Editor: D. A. Jeremy Telman
Valparaiso Univ. Law School

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Friday, September 20, 2013

Carnival Cruise and the Contracting of Everything

Carnival_Triumph_Half_Moon_Cay

"By now, you’ve heard the stories of passengers urinating in bags, slipping on sewage, and eating stale cereal aboard the Carnival Cruise ship that was stranded in the Gulf of Mexico — not exactly the fun-filled cruise for which the passengers had signed up and paid."   My post on "Carnival Cruise and the Contracting of Everything" is available here.

 

[Nancy Kim]

September 20, 2013 in Current Affairs, In the News, Miscellaneous, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, August 7, 2013

Response to Jeremy Telman's Post about Op-Ed on Wrap Contracts

This post responds to the thoughtful comments offered by my co-blogger Jeremy Telman in his post about my op-ed.  As he hinted, an op-ed provides a great forum for raising issues to a larger, non-academic audience but it is hardly the place to be thorough. Jeremy’s post gives me an opportunity to briefly touch upon the issues that I address in my forthcoming book.  (Note:  If you use the promotion code 31998 and click here you get a 20% discount).

Danger signJeremy raised the issue of the inadequacy of doctrinal solutions.  In fact, all of my proposed solutions are doctrinal.  There are undoubtedly more effective way to achieve societal changes, but doctrine obviously matters and right now, the law of wrap contracts is a mess.  It’s in a mess in a lot of different ways, yet the courts seem to be in denial, repeating the refrain that wrap contracts are “just like” other contracts. This is simply not so.  Much of my scholarship looks at how technology shapes behavior and argues that courts should consider the role of technology when they interpret and apply the law.  With respect to wrap contracts, courts ignore the ways that digital form affects both user perception and drafter behavior (i.e. overuse).  My proposed solutions seek to make the effects of the digital form part of the court’s analysis. 

One of these solutions, briefly mentioned in the op-ed and discussed in the book and elsewhere,  is a “duty to draft reasonably” which acts to counter the burden of the “duty to read.”  The duty to draft reasonably has very little to do with getting consumers to read contracts – it’s about getting companies to ask for less by making it less palatable for them to ask for more. As I explain in great length in my book, there are plenty of reasons why I am not a big fan of the duty to read –and why I think trying to get consumers to read is an inadequate solution.  Consumers shouldn’t be expected to read online contracts, at least, not as they are now drafted.  Reading wordy online contracts is not efficient and would hurt productivity. It’s also useless, since consumers can’t negotiate most terms.  Instead, we should try to get companies to present their contracts more reasonably/effectively.  We should require them to signal the information in an effective manner, the way that road signs signal dangerous conditions.  For example, I propose using icons, such as the danger icon that accompanies this post, to draw consumers’ attention to certain information.  Currently, courts construe “reasonable notice” to mean something other than “effective notice” – and this places too heavy a burden on consumers to ferret out information.  A “duty to draft reasonably” shifts the focus from the consumer's behavior to the drafting company’s behavior.  Could the company have presented the information in a better way? And if so, why didn’t it?  This is a question that courts used to ask with paper contracts of adhesion – but for some reason, they have moved away from this with wrap contracts. 

A related doctrinal adjustment that I propose in my book is specific assent.  For terms that take away user rights (which I refer to as “sword” and “crook” provisions), the user should be forced to actively assent by, for example, clicking on an icon.  The idea here is also not to get users to read, but to hassle them!  Imagine  having to click to give away each use of your data.  What a pain – and that’s the point.  The incorporation of a transactional hurdle or burden damages the relationship between the website and the user – and the more hurdles, the more annoying it becomes to complete the transaction. 

 Both proposals try to signal the type of company to the consumer.  A website full of danger icons sends a very different message than one with only one or two danger icons.  A website which requires a user to click forty times to complete a transaction won’t be around too long. 

As for better solutions, there are ways to address specific problems by using third party tools and I am all in favor of technical solutions.  For example, you can use duckduckgo or Tor to try to cover your tracks. But technical solutions have their shortcomings or limitations because they only address one part of the larger problem and it gets to be a bit like whack-a-mole as technology shifts and improves. 

Ultimately, any comprehensive solution has to be implemented by the government – either the legislature or the judiciary.  But it’s up to us, the consumers, to raise the issue as one needing a solution and we can do this through the democratic process and by marching with our feet. I agree with Jeremy that there are problems with collective action – there are coordination and resource issues as well as cognition limits, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't do anything. I don’t want to get into the thicket of that in this already too-long post, but I address this issue at great length in my book and propose that one way to deal with this is by reconceptualizing unconscionability.

Consumer advocacy groups and the websites referred to by Jeremy in his post certainly help with the collective action problem.  They inspire us to get off the couch.  Not easy when companies make it so comfortable for us to do nothing but that’s the nature of the beast here – it’s the same in other areas where consumers face the corporate marketing machinery and its expertise in manipulation.  As Kate O'Neill notes in the comments to Jeremy's post, we contracts profs have a role which is to point out the inconsistencies and contradictions in judicial application of doctrine and propose better ways to evaluate legal issues.  Some may scoff that judges don’t read law review articles --or books written by academics-- but it’s our job to keep trying.

 

[Nancy Kim]

August 7, 2013 in Commentary, Current Affairs, Miscellaneous, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, August 4, 2013

Op-Ed on Wrap Contracts and Online Privacy

The Sacramento Bee published my op-ed on wrap contracts and online privacy today.  Here's the link.

 

[Nancy Kim]

 

August 4, 2013 in Contract Profs, Current Affairs, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, July 24, 2013

Fox Broadcasting v. Dish Network - let's hop to the contract issues

The Ninth Circuit recently decided an interesting case involving video on demand – or is the Hopper a DVR?  That was one of the questions at the heart of Fox Broadcasting Company v. Dish Network. (Jeremy Telman had previously blogged about the case when the complaint was first filed a year ago).  At issue was the Dish Network’s PrimeTime Anytime service which only works with the Hopper, a set top box with digital video recorder and video on demand functionalities.  PrimeTime Anytime records Fox (and other) network shows and stores the recordings for a certain number of days (typically eight) on the Dish customer’s Hopper.  Dish does not offer video on demand from Fox (but see discussion below).  Dish started to offer a new feature called “AutoHop” that allows users to skip commercials on shows recorded on PrimeTime Anytime (although it doesn’t delete the commercials, the user can press a button to skip them).  Fox sued Dish for copyright infringement and breach of contract and sought a preliminary injunction.  The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of the motion.  The copyright issues are interesting, but I’m going to skip over them using this blog’s virtual AutoHop feature and get right to the contract issues, which are much more interesting to readers of this blog. 

There were two agreements at issue here.  There was a 2002 license agreement and a subsequent 2010 letter agreement (there were others but these were the two relevant ones).  Pursuant to the 2002
agreement, Fox granted Dish a limited right to retransmit Fox’s broadcast signal to Dish’s subscribers.  It also contained several restrictions and conditions and prohibited video on demand.  A 2010 letter agreement, however, agreed to video on demand provided that Dish agreed to certain conditions, the primary one being that it couldn’t show the content without commercials. 

So the basic questions (overly simplified for blog purposes) were – did Dish distribute Fox video on demand content?   If so, did it comply with the terms of the 2010 letter?  (Okay, that’s not exactly how the court or the parties put it, but those were the issues stripped down to their essence).

Fox argued that Dish breached this provision of the 2002 contract:

“EchoStar acknowledges andagrees that it shall have no right to distribute all or any portion of the
programming contained in any Analog Signal on an interactive, time-delayed, video-on-demand
or similar basis; provided that Fox acknowledges that the foregoing shall not restrict EchoStar’s practice of connecting its Subscribers’ video replay equipment.”

The district court construed the word “distribute” as requiring a copyright work to “change hands” (analogous to under the Copyright Act).  Because the copies remained in users’ homes,they did not change hands and there was no distribution.  Fox challenged this construction and argued that the prohibition against distribution meant that Dish would not make Fox programming available to its subscribers on the aforementioned basis.  The Ninth Circuit found both Fox’s and the district court’s constructions plausible (yes I realize there’s a distinction between interpretation and construction but I don’t want to go there right now, although you may). 

The Ninth Circuit withheld judgment on which construction was better but stated that “in the proceedings below, the parties did not argue about the meaning of ‘distribute.’  We express no view on whether, after a fully developed record and arguments, the district court’s construction of ‘distribute’ will prove to be the correct one.”

The court did, however, express skepticism that PrimeTime Anytime was not “similar” to video-on- demand (remember, the 2002 contract prohibited “video-on-demand or similar basis”)(emphasis added by yours truly).  The “distribution” of that, therefore, would violate the 2002 contract. Dish argued that its service was not “identical” to VOD but, as the Ninth Circuit noted, did not explain why it was not “similar.”  (Note: I hope all you contracts profs are feeling ever more relevant!  And our students thought we were just making mountains out of molehills when we focused on the importance of contract language).  The addition of that word “similar” might just save Fox when the case goes to trial.  Especially since, as even the district court held, if PrimeTime Anytime is VOD, then Dish clearly breached the contract which prohibited skipping commercials. The district court, however, wasn’t convinced that it was VOD.  Rather, the district court concluded that it was a hybrid of DVR and VOD and “more akin” to DVR than VOD.

In other words, the district court’s analysis went along these lines – the 2002 contract was not breached because there was no distribution of VOD (or similar) content.  The 2010 contract was not breached because this was not VOD but DVR. In short, this was not VOD and there was no distribution of a VOD-like service.

Query if the 2010 amendment had adopted the “VOD or similar” language instead of just “VOD”; in other words, what if it permitted Dish to offer Fox’s programming as VOD or “similar” service?  My guess is that they specifically drafted it narrowly to include just “VOD” to limit the scope of the license – but that it ended up backfiring to exclude the conditions on “similar” services.  Funny how drafting rules of thumb can sometimes come back to bite you.  Note the problem was created because the definitions were not consistent in the 2002 and 2010 agreements – it created a gap regarding a service (a “VOD similar service”) which required judicial construction.  Distribution of VOD or similar services was prohibited under the 2002 contract but VOD was permitted under the 2010 provided commercials were not skipped.  And what happens to showing (not distributing) "similar services to VOD"?  Mind the gap!

 There was a final issue regarding a “good faith” in performance type clause.  The Ninth Circuit  concluded that there was no evidence that Dish launched PrimeTime Anytime “because it was unwilling to comply with the requirements to offer Fox’s licensed video on demand service, rather than because Dish lacked the technological capability to do so.”  Frankly, I’m not sure why this was not a bigger issue since it seems, at least to me, that Dish is trying to get around the “no commercial skipping” restriction in the 2010 agreement by using the Hopper.

 The Ninth Circuit noted a few times that it was applying a “deferential standard of review” given the request for a preliminary injunction so I don’t think Dish can rest easy just yet.  I think Fox’s case will eventually hinge upon how the contract issues are resolved.  What is the meaning of “distribute”? (I don’t know enough about how Dish technology works to determine whether distribution occurred.  Even under the district court’s definition, could it have occurred?  Does rebeaming signals constitute distribution?  Is the service analogous to a lease?  I think there’s room here).  Is the PrimeTime Anytime service VOD or not?  And isn’t that 2002 agreement relevant in determining what the meaning of VOD is under the 2010 amendment?  Finally, why did the court give the “good faith in performance of contract” such short shrift?

I didn't get to review the actual agreements, but I would look at what exactly is being licensed under the 2002 agreement.  Does it exclude the VOD-like service or include it?  The gap seems odd to me - it must be addressed in one of the agreements.  What exactly does Dish have the right to do?  That seems to me one of the keys to unlocking the "correct" interpretation of the contract - and help determine whether the obligation of good faith is being fulfilled.

The real hammer here is going to be contract renewal - if Dish pisses off Fox and the other networks then it may kiss its business goodbye if they don't renew their contracts.  (As I mentioned, I haven't seen the contracts so don't know what the terms are).

As the court notes, the parties probably didn’t contemplate a hybrid DVR and VOD (this is the old “anticipating the future and new technologies” problem that contract drafters have to which I’ve previously referred) I think the copyright issues weigh more heavily in favor of Dish whereas Fox has the better argument re the contract issues.  Of course, the much larger policy issue is how to strike the balance between contract and copyright – a recurring issue since the late eighties…Generally, it's been advantage contracts.

 [Nancy Kim]

July 24, 2013 in Current Affairs, In the News, Miscellaneous, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, July 3, 2013

A non-disparagement clause and a contract that pushes the limits without one

The NYT's (new) ethicist, Chuck Klosterman tackled the issue of non-disparagement clauses in last Sunday's magazine (you have to scroll down past the first question about the ethics of skipping commercials).  Klosterman stated that, "(n)ondisclosure provisions that stretch beyond a straightforward embargo on business-oriented “trade secrets” represent the worst kind of corporate limitations on individual freedom — no one should be contractually stopped from talking about their personal experiences with any company."  He adds, "You did, however, sign this contract (possibly under mild duress, but not against your will)."  A non-disparagement clause, however, is quite different from a blanket nondisclosure provision - the ex-employee may presumably talk about her personal experiences, as long as she leaves out the disparaging remarks.  "Mild duress" is an oxymoron since duress, by its definition, is not mild and if you sign something under duress, you are signing it against your will.  Despite getting the nuances wrong, the advice -- which is basically to say nothing bad but say nothing good either --  is sound. Sometimes silence speaks volumes.

Non-disparagement clauses in settlement agreements are fairly common and I don't think they are necessarily outrageous (it is a settlement agreement afterall).  That's not the case with this agreement, posted courtesy of radaronline and discussed at Consumerist.  The agreement doesn't contain a non-disparagement clause but still manages to be overreaching.  The agreement, purportedly from Amy's Baking Company , requires that its employees work holidays and weekends, and extracts a $250 penalty for no-shows.  It also forbids employees from using cell phones, bringing purses and bags to work, and having friends and family visit during working hours.  The contract also contains a non-compete clause, prohibiting employees from working for competitors within a 50 mile radius for one year after termination.  What the agreement doesn't contain is a non-disparagement clause - and a clause prohibiting employees from sharing the terms of the agreement with others.  My guess is that those clauses will probably show up in the next iteration of the contract....

 

[Nancy Kim]

July 3, 2013 in Current Affairs, Miscellaneous, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, June 19, 2013

Pay-to-Delay Agreements and the Supremes

On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court  issued a ruling in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis that permitted the Federal Trade Commission to sue pharmaceutical companies for potential antitrust violations when they enter into “pay-to-delay” agreements.  (Lyle Denniston of SCOTUSblog has a good analysis here ).  These agreements are a type of settlement agreement where a pharmaceutical company pays a generic drug company to keep the drug off the market for a certain period of time.  Lower court rulings had held that these agreements were valid as long as they did not exceed the term of the patent held by the pharmaceutical company.  This should be an interesting case for contractsprofs because it is a high profile "limits of contract" case.  In an era where judges have been notoriously reluctant to interfere with freedom of contract even when it hurts consumers, this case is a refreshing change. 

I’m curious though what will happen to the payments that were made to the generic drug companies – are the agreements rescinded and the payments returned?  (I haven’t read the decision thoroughly yet to see whether it’s indicated). That might be a problem for the generic drug companies.  It seems like some sort of restitution should be made - I wonder if the parties thought of putting a provision addressing what would happen in the event of illegality in their agreement?

[Nancy Kim]

June 19, 2013 in Current Affairs, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, May 24, 2013

Dollar Rent a Car and the Borat Problem

Given all the excitement over boilerplate on this blog, I thought it would be a good time to remind readers of problems that might arise that don't exactly involve (just) boilerplate,  It's not just the words in the contract -- the way the contract is presented can create problems, too.   I've been meaning for a while to discuss this NYT article about a lawsuit against Dollar Rent a Car.  According to the article and the complaint, the plaintiffs were customers who specifically declined the insurance coverage that car rental companies are always pushing (and which is often covered by customers’ personal auto insurance policy and/or credit card).  They were then handed a tablet and asked to sign electronically.  When they returned the car, they were surprised with a much larger-than-expected bill that included a “loss damage waiver” which, like insurance, “waives” the customer’s liability for loss or damage to the car.

I planned to blog about this last month, but just as I was about to, I received a reprint of Russell Korobkin’s article, recently published in the California Law Review.   The title, The Borat Problem in Negotiation:  Fraud, Assent and the Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, sounded intriguing and as I started to read it, I realized that the article addressed a lot of the issues raised by the car rental form contract/electronic signature situation.  I thought it might be fun (er, contracts prof style-fun) to view the Dollar Rent a Car problem through the lens of Korobkin’s proposed Borat solution.

According to the article, the Dollar-Rent-A-Car plaintiffs explicitly told the car rental agent that they were declining insurance coverage yet unknowingly signed for it on an electronic tablet.  This illustrates one way that contracting form matters –I suspect it was easier for customers to be misled by the “loss damage waiver” language because they didn’t have an easy way to read the surrounding language.  While paper consumer contracts are generally adhesive, customers do have the option of declining insurance coverage.  While many customers may still have overlooked the meaning of the language, others may have scanned the few sentences immediately before the signature line (this seems particularly true of the plaintiffs, who one of whom is an insurance lawyer). 

Sales agents are typically paid a commission to upsell the insurance coverage and each of the plaintiffs paid a hundred to several hundred dollars more than they expected to pay. 

I tried to get a copy of Dollar’s rental agreement off their website.  While their general policies are posted, which references their rental agreement, the agreement itself is not available.  That’s already a strike against them in my book – why not post the rental agreement on your website since you’re going to have your customer sign it anyway?  I think it’s because the company doesn’t really expect anyone to read the agreement.  Most people don’t read, but that doesn’t mean they wouldn’t if the company made more of an effort to make the agreement accessible and readable. 

Without a copy of Dollar’s actual rental agreement, I can only make assumptions about what it contains but my guess is that it contains an integration clause and a no-oral modification or “NOM” clause.  The latter may not be enforced but the former brings the contract into the grip of the parol evidence rule.  The PER rule won’t effectively block a fraud claim, but fraud claims may be difficult to prove in this context.   The other avenue for redress is under a consumer protection statute claiming unfair or deceptive trade practices.  But what about contract law – can it do anything here to help the consumers?

Korobkin’s article doesn’t specifically address consumer actions, but he tackles the “Borat Problem” which often occurs in consumer contracting situations.  According to Korobkin, the Borat Problem  occurs when two parties “reach an oral agreement.  The first then presents a standard form contract, which the second signs without reading or without reading carefully.  When the second party later objects that the first did not perform according to the oral representations, the first party points out that the signed document includes different terms or disclaims prior representations and promises.” 

As readers of this blog are well aware, contractsprofs went through a slight obsessive period with the Borat contract when it first arose.  To quickly summarize, several people who were in the 2006 movie, Borat:  Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan sued the producer, Twentieth Century Fox, claiming that they were misled into appearing in it.  Korobkin states that these plaintiffs claimed that the studio obtained their consent using a two part strategy, “false representations followed by standard form contracts that included language designed to contradict or disclaim those representations.” 

Sound similar to the Dollar situation?  Although the Dollar agent didn’t expressly make false representations, they allegedly acted in a way that misled the plaintiffs into believing they were acting consistent with their wishes, and that the contract they were signing reflected their understanding.  Korobkin discusses existing legal remedies to the Borat problem and concludes they are not so satisfying for various reasons.  He then discusses the risk of “bilateral opportunism,” meaning that a “pure duty to read” rule leaves nondrafting parties vulnerable to exploitation by drafters and a “no-exploitation rule” leaves drafters vulnerable to opportunistic behavior (i.e. bad faith claims) by nondrafters.  He discusses the different ways that each party might take advantage of the other under either rule and throws in a good amount of behavioral economics to back up his arguments – for example, “confirmation bias” makes it difficult for even sophisticated nondrafters to notice when a contract term contradicts a prior representation made by the drafter.  Korobkin also discusses the role of trust,  specifically that reading a contract may signal that the nondrafter doesn’t trust the drafter.   I think trust plays a role (even if small) in the Dollar scenario – afterall, nobody wants to be that jerk in line who challenges the smiling service rep.  There's also social pressure in that nobody want to be that jerk holding up the line of foot tapping customers by asking questions about fine print (believe me, I know).

Korobkin’s “Borat Solution” would require specific assent to written terms that are inconsistent with prior representations.  This effectively puts the burden on drafters to include a “clear statement” that the particular provision takes precedence over prior representations and “realistic notice” which would generally mean that the parties actively negotiated the term.   I like this proposal (and have proposed something very similar to it in the context of online agreements) because it recognizes that drafters have the power to make terms more salient.  The notion of blanket assent puts too much of a burden on the nondrafting party instead of the party that has the power to actually communicate the terms more effectively.

So would the Borat solution have changed anything in the Dollar scenario?  I think so, but for a different reason than the actual Borat scenario.  A clear statement and realistic notice would preclude having customers sign on an electronic tablet without also making immediately visible the relevant provision.  In other words, the customer wouldn't be asked to sign without being able to read the waiver provision.  Although it's not expressly stated, it seems implied from the NYT article that the contract provision was not viewable on the tablet.  If that's the case, that provision would not be enforceable.

So, for those of you planning to research the consumer contracts conundrum this summer, in addition to Margaret Jane Radin’s book, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law and Oren Bar-Gill’s book, Seduction by Contract, I recommend that you add Korobkin’s article to your summer reading list.

[Nancy Kim]

May 24, 2013 in Contract Profs, Current Affairs, Miscellaneous, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, May 9, 2013

Harper Lee Sues to Recover Her Rights to To Kill a Mockingbird

TKAMFor many lawyers, To Kill a Mockingbird (TKAM) is at the top of their list of "favorite books/movies about a lawyer." TKAM is about more than lawyering, of course.  It's about racism, family, class and much more.  This week, TKAM also is about "fraudulent inducement," "consideration" (a lack thereof) and "fiduciary duty." All of those subjects are in the complaint filed by TKAM author, (Nelle) Harper Lee, against her purported literary agent.

In the suit, Lee alleges that Samuel L. Pinkus (and a few other defendants) fraudulently induced her to sign her TKAM rights over to one of Pinkus's companies in 2007 and again in 2011. According to Lee, Pinkus, the son-in-law of Lee's longtime agent, Eugene Winick, transferred many of Winick's clients to himself when Winick fell ill in 2006. Pinkus then allegedly misappropriated royalties and failed to promote Lee's copyright in the U.S. and abroad.

For Contracts professors, the Lee v. Pinkus suit provides some interesting hypos to discuss when teaching fraud, consideration, and assignments of rights. Regarding fraud, Lee alleges that Pinkus lied to her about what she was signing at a time when she was particularly vulnerable due to a recent stroke and declining eyesight.  Consideration is in play because there allegedly was no consideration from Pinkus to Lee in exchange for Lee's transfer of rights to Pinkus.  Assignment issues arose because the many companies who owed Lee royalties reportedly struggled to figure out which company or companies they should pay given Pinkus's many shell companies.  Overall, it's a sad story for Ms. Lee but one that students may find particularly engaging.

[Heidi R. Anderson]

p.s. Although there are many quote-worthy passages in TKAM, a favorite of mine (useful when advising students about their writing) is: “Atticus told me to delete the adjectives and I'd have the facts.” Please feel free to share your favorites in the comments.

May 9, 2013 in Books, Current Affairs, Film, In the News, Recent Cases, Teaching, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, May 2, 2013

Ticketmaster and Those Pesky Bots

Last week, I mentioned a California bill addressing the issue of ticket resales and secondary marketplaces.  I think that the primary problem for consumers is not that these secondary marketplaces exist -- being able to resell tickets is generally a good thing for consumers--but that scalpers use bots (automated software programs) to buy up large quantities of tickets which they then resell at jacked up prices.  Fans get angry because shows are quickly "sold out" and they are forced to pay heart stopping prices in the secondary marketplace if they want to see their favorite performer (or get decent seats).  Well, Ticketmaster has had enough and is suing 21 people involved in circumventing its online security system by buying up vast quantities of tickets.  Ticketmaster's weapon of choice here?  The universally reviled yet oh-too-familiar Terms of Use.  Ticketmaster's TOU prohibits the use of bots.  (It's also suing for copyright infringement, among other things).  In fact, back in the early days of the Internet, bots were one of the reasons companies started to use TOU.  The more things change....

[Nancy Kim]

May 2, 2013 in Current Affairs, E-commerce, Miscellaneous, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, May 1, 2013

"Cop Killer" Reward Offer Leads to Breach of Contract Suit

We previously blogged about high-profile reward offers by Donald Trump, Bill Maher, a laptop-seeking music producer, and a Hong Kong businessman. Only one of those (the producer) led to an actual lawsuit.  The latest reward offer in the news involves murder.

In February of this year, the City of Los Angeles and other entities collectively offered a $1 million reward for information regarding Chris Dorner.  Dorner was the former policeman and Navy officer who (allegedly) killed four people, including two policemen. The manhunt for Dorner, labeled the "Cop Killer," reportedly was one of the largest in LA County's history. 

One of the people claiming the reward, Rick Heltebrake, has filed a breach of contract suit in LA Superior Court (the complaint can be obtained here but only for a fee).  Heltebrake is suing the City of Los Angeles, and supporting entities for $1 million and is suing three cities that offered separate $100,000 rewards related to Dorner. Heltebrake was a carjacking victim of Dorner's. After he escaped, Heltebrake called the police and told them where they could find Dorner. Because Dorner was found at the location Heltebrake identified, he is seeking the rewards.  

The contract controversy is one of interpretation.  The rewards reportedly were available for "information leading to the apprehension and capture of" Dorner, for the "identification and apprehension" of Dorner, for the "capture and conviction" of Dorner, and for "information leading to the arrest and conviction of" Dorner (I do not have the complaint so these excerpts are cobbled together from TMZ, Courthouse News Service, ABC and other sources).  Police charged Dorner on February 11, 2013. Heltebrake called police on February 12.  On February 25, after a shootout with police and structure fire, Dorner was found dead from an apparently self-inflicted gunshot wound.

Given the above facts, some of the intepretations questions are: (i) whether the authorities' shootout and recovery of Dorner's body qualifies as "apprehension" or "arrest," (ii) whether the "and" between "identification and arrest" or between "capture and conviction" means that both are required in order to collect, and many, many more. A complicating factor is that the $1 million reward was merely announced on TV; no written record was made.  At least one reward offeror, the City of Riverside, has stated that the lack of a "conviction" means that it won't pay. Although this is a tragic story, I may mention it the next time I teach the Carbolic Smoke Ball case.

If anyone is able to find the complaint for free, please post a link in the comments.

[Heidi R. Anderson]

 

May 1, 2013 in Current Affairs, In the News, Teaching, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, April 24, 2013

Paperless Tickets and Licenses

 

The Sacramento Bee reports that a California legislative committee (if you really want to know,  it’s called the Assembly Arts, Entertainment, Sports, Tourism and Internet Media committee) “gutted” a bill that would have illegalized “paperless” tickets.  Paperless tickets are more (or is it less?) than what they sound like – they are a way for companies like Ticketmaster to sell seats without permitting purchasers to resell those seats.  Purchasers must show their ID and a credit card to attend the show.  The bill pitted two companies, Live Nation (owner of Ticketmaster) and StubHub, against each other. 

This bill and the related issues should be of interest to contracts profs because it highlights the same license v. sale issues that have cropped up in other market sectors where digital technologies have transformed the business landscape.  Like software vendors and book publishers, Ticketmaster is concerned about the effect of technology and the secondary marketplace on its business.  Vendors, using automated software (“bots”), can quickly purchase large numbers of tickets and then turn around and sell these tickets in the secondary marketplace (i.e. at StubHub) at much higher prices.  Both companies argue that the other is hurting consumers.  Ticketmaster argues that scalpers hurt fans, who are unable to buy tickets at the original price and must buy them at inflated prices.  Stub Hub, on the other hand, argues that paperless tickets hurt consumers because they are unable to resell or transfer their tickets. 

The underlying question seems to be whether a ticket is a license to enter a venue or is it more akin to a property right that can be transferred.  Or rather, should a ticket be permitted to be only a license or only a property right that can be transferred?  The proposed pre-gutted legislation would have taken that decision out of the hands of the parties (the seller and the purchaser) and mandated that it be a property right that could be transferred.  In other words, it would have made a ticket something that could not be a contract.  Of course, given the adhesive nature of these types of sales, a ticket as contract would end up being like any other mass consumer contract – meaning the terms would be unilaterally imposed by the seller. In this case, that would mean the ticket would be a license and not a sale of a property right. 

It’s not just the media giants who are feeling the disruptive effect of technology  - we contracts profs feel it, too. 

[NB:  My original post confused StubHub with the vendors who use the site.  StubHub is the secondary marketplace where tickets can be resold.  Thanks to Eric Goldman for pointing that out].

[Nancy Kim]

April 24, 2013 in Commentary, Current Affairs, E-commerce, In the News, Legislation, Miscellaneous, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, April 22, 2013

Phone "Bill Cramming" and Consent

The FTC recently charged a company, Wise Media, with unfair and deceptive business practices. The FTC complaint alleges that Wise Media charged unwitting mobile phone users for “premium" text services, or junk text messages (horoscopes, love tips, other “useful” information…) that consumers never authorized.  The practice is referred to as “bill cramming,” and consumers  often failed to notice the indefinitely recurring charges of, in this case, $9.99/month.  Even when they did and sent a text to “stop” the messages, the company often failed to comply with the request. 

Consumers often miss these charges because they aren’t aware that their mobile phone bills contain charges by third parties and because the charges are not clearly indicated.  The result?  Wise Media has made millions of dollars by surreptitiously charging consumers.

What I find particularly interesting and troubling is the potential interaction of contract law in the area of electronic contracts and consumer protection.  What distinguishes a deceptive business practice (although not necessarily an unfair one) from a “hard bargain” is consent. The FTC complaint, for example, was filed because the charges were “unauthorized” by consumers - they were signed up "seemingly at random" without consumer "knowledge or permission."  The FTC has, in my view, done a pretty terrific job of protecting consumers given the lack of resources and the wide range of consumer-harming activities out there.  Courts have not done so well.  What happens where contractual “consent” (such as in the form of a clickwrap”) is obtained for an unfair practice, such as bill cramming?  What if the consumer had clicked "I agree" on a clickwrap to the premium service?  Would the contract law notion of “consent” mean that the consumer had authorized the “premium text” service, even when we all know that nobody reads clickwraps and browsewraps?  Or would the commonsense version of consent championed by the FTC prevail?

I talk about this disjunction between, what I refer to as “wrap contract doctrine” (since, let's face it, the digital contract cases are not consistent with traditional contract doctrine despite what Easterbrook and others claim) and the FTC’s more commonsense approach to consumer perception and business practices in my forthcoming book on wrap contracts.  (Did you know a plug was coming?  I actually didn’t but there it is.)  The conclusion I reached was that there appears to be a disconnect between contract law notions of “reasonable notice” and the FTC’s notion of “reasonable notice” (which I find more reasonable….)  The takeaway for businesses – just because you obtain consent for a particular business practice via an online contract which may meet the surreal standards of contractual consent set forth by courts doesn’t mean that the practice in question won’t be viewed as an “unfair and deceptive” one by the FTC.

[Nancy Kim] 

April 22, 2013 in Current Affairs, Miscellaneous, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, April 3, 2013

What Jay-Z Can Teach

The entertainment mogul Shawn “Jay-Z” Carter has added another hat, er, baseball cap, to his rather extensive collection.  The NYT reports that his company, Roc Nation Sports, just signed up to represent Robinson Cano, the New York Yankees second baseman.  I’ve long been interested in Jay-Z’s business acumen and his ability to gauge where unpredictable markets are headed (and made a brief mention of it in this short essay).  More than that, he seems to be making the most of these changes rather than resisting them.  When he signed with LiveNation in 2008, Jay-Z was one of the first musicians to work with, rather than fight or deny, the changes in the music business (Madonna, another savvy business person, did too).  He took that money and started Roc Nation (of which Roc Nation Sports is a part).  Now he’s realizing the potential to be found in the blurring of sports and entertainment (and the public's perception of athletes and entertainers) .  An athlete typically has a relatively short shelf life in the field, so why not make that short shelf life as lucrative as possible?  Furthermore, an athlete may have a longer shelf life as a brand.  Gven the coalescence of sports and entertainment, and the way social media makes celebrities so accessible, there's a lot of revenue generating opportunities there.  So why should this be interesting to readers of this blog, many of whom may have no interest in baseball?  Sure, Jay-Z is probably a great negotiator and the contract – if we ever get to see it – will be interesting.  But more than that, we should be like Jay-Z and recognize how quickly the landscape and technology changes – and consider what impact those changes might have on our contracts.  For example, there are outstanding recording/distribution contracts which predate digital distribution formats.  Are digital recordings included under such contracts? ( The Eminem case touches upon a related issue having to do with a failure to anticipate digital tunes). The book publishing industry is another sector that is undergoing much disruption.  While no lawyer is expected to be an oracle, it may help your client – or help your students to help their future clients) to think about future marketplace and technological changes during contract negotiations, especially where the contract is a long term one.

[Nancy Kim]

April 3, 2013 in Celebrity Contracts, Current Affairs, In the News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, March 14, 2013

New York Appellate Court Tosses Prenuptial Agreement Due to Fraudulent Inducement

A Brooklyn-based appellate court recently upheld a trial court ruling (946 N.Y.S.2d 66) that a prenuptial agreement was uneforceable due to fraudulent inducement. The Cioffi-Petrakis v. Petrakis ruling surprised family law experts in New York and nationally because prenuptial agreements like this one generally were seen as unassailable. The Wall Street Journal quotes several prominent divorce lawyers, stating that the ruling is "a game-changer" with "huge implications" that will "be quoted in every single case going forward."

Some appear to contribute the shocking result to Ms. Perakis's lawyer, Dennis D'Antonio, who is a contract litigator and not a family lawyer. Mr. D'Antonio stated told the WSJ that he presented the case as a contract case: "The matrimonial bar tends to do things the way they always did, and they approached the prenup as something you can't challenge," D'Antonio said. "We applied old-fashioned contract law."

Ms. Petrakis alleged that her husband lied to her in order to get her to sign the agreement. Specifically, he reportedly stated that he would tear up the agreement after the couple had a child (the couple had three children together). After she still refused to sign, Mr. Perakis threatened to call the whole thing off 4 days prior to their wedding after Ms. Perakis's parents already had spent $40,000.

The trial court stated the applicable standard as follows: "To sustain a claim for common-law fraudulent inducement, a plaintiff must demonstrate the misrepresentation of a material fact, which was known by the defendant to be false and intended to be relied upon when made, and that there was justifiable reliance and resulting wrong." Ms. Perakis alleged facts sufficient to satisfy that standard. Specifically, the court stated:

"The court credits the wife's testimony...that her fiancé told her 'not to worry' and 'we'll work everything out' to be convincing. Similarly convincing is her testimony that she was told by her fiancé that, 1) if she didn't sign the prenuptial agreement they wouldn't be getting married in a week, 2) that 'everything they get after the marriage would be theirs' and 3) 'after they had a family he would tear up the agreement.' The court concludes that, based on the such promises, the wife called Mr. Hametz to arrange to sign the prenuptial agreement."

The appellate court opinion is rather short. It affirms that contracts may be deemed uneforceable due to fraud or duress but makes no sweeping statements regarding prenuptial agreements. For Ms. Perakis, the result is rather significant. The agreement stated that she would get only $25,000 per year. Her husband reportedly is worth $20 million.

[Heidi R. Anderson]

 

March 14, 2013 in Current Affairs | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, February 21, 2013

A Modern Twist on R.R. v. M.H. and Statutory Interpretation?

Jason patricThere's a theory among some of my foodie friends that, when it comes to food, bacon makes everything better.  I'm considering a similar theory for teaching Contracts via hypos: when it comes to Contracts hypos, celebrities make everything better. Hypos work. Sure, they "taste" just fine using names like "Buyer," "Client," and "Sub-Contractor," and I use those names most of the time. But using names like "Jason Patric, you know, the guy from Lost Boys and Narc" often makes the hypo better, at least for the few people over 25 who remember those movies. So, in the interest of making hypos better via celebrity a.k.a. bacon, I bring you this story from TMZ (see, you don't actually have to go to sites of ill repute; you can count on me to go to them for you and only bring you the somewhat good, quasi-clean stuff).  

As TMZ reports, actor Jason Patric is in a custody dispute with his ex-girlfriend, Danielle Schreiber.  Upon their break-up in 2009, Patric allegedly agreed to compensate Schreiber for her troubles via donating his sperm instead of by paying her. Presumably, in exchange for Patric's promised sperm, Schreiber would not sue Patric for support payments. Simple enough (sort of). But wait, there's more! Patric allegedly would donate his sperm to Schreiber only if she also promised not to seek support from him for the child; Schreiber agreed. If this agreement actually was reached, Schreiber must have believed that Patric's sperm was so valuable that she was willing to forgo support payments for herself and for the child that would result. [Insert skepticism here.]

How does this relate to Contracts hypos? It works as a hypo for R.R. v. M.H., which many of us use to teach how a contract can be deemed unenforceable if it violates public policy.  In R.R. v. M.H., the court must decide whether to enforce the surrogacy agreement between a fertile father, married to an infertile wife, and the surrogate mother, who also happens to be married, and who was inseminated with the fertile father's donor sperm. I won't go into the case in more detail here; instead, I would like to focus one part of the case has a direct parallel to the Jason Patric dispute.  

In R.R. v. M.H., a state statute provided that the husband of a married woman inseminated with donor sperm was treated as the legal father of the child, with all of the associated benefits and obligations that fatherhood carried along with it. The statute was supposed to facilitate the common practice of women being inseminated by a (usually anonymous) sperm donor. Strictly applying the statute to the facts in R.R. v. M.H. would have led to an absurd result. Specifically, it would have meant that the legal father of the child born to the surrogate would have been the surrogate's husband, who had no real interest in the child. The court wisely argued its way around that literal application and ruled differently.  

The Patric dispute also involves a law of unintended consequence much like that involved in R.R. v. M.H. A California law states as follows:

"(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon or to a licensed sperm bank for use in artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived, unless otherwise agreed to in a writing signed by the donor and the woman prior to the conception of the child."

Applying this law to the Patric situation could, like the law in R.R. v. M.H., produce an absurd result. Let's paraphrase the statute with applicable facts in parentheses:

"The donor of semen (Patric) for use in artificial insemenation of a woman (Schreiber) other than the donor's (Patric's) wife (they weren't married) is treated in law as if he (Patric) were not the natural father unless otherwise agreed in a signed writing."

So, even though Patric and Schreiber had been romantically involved, the formalized donation and the couple's unmarried status could negate Patric's claims to custody. It is not clear whether the statute applies and, not being admitted in California, I'd rather not analyze it further. But it always surprises me how what seems like a one-in-a-million kind of case does, in fact, repeat itself.  Eventually.

[Heidi R. Anderson]

 

February 21, 2013 in Celebrity Contracts, Current Affairs, Famous Cases, Television | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, February 12, 2013

Update: Maher Takes Aim at Trump's Lawyer

We had previously blogged about the demand letter that Donald Trump sent to Bill Maher.  Maher dedicated a segment on his show to the dispute, taking aim at Trump's lawyer.  Maher begins: “Donald Trump must learn two things: what a joke is and what a contract is.”  

The segment is reminiscent of the Leonard v. Pepsico decision when Judge Wood takes on the task of explaining why the harrier jet commercial was "evidently done in jest." Here, Maher continues the humor in explaining why it was parody when challenged Trump to prove that he (Trump) was not born of an orangutan.

Here's the clip:

[Meredith R. Miller]

February 12, 2013 in Celebrity Contracts, Current Affairs, Film Clips, In the News, Television | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, February 11, 2013

CA fires contractor, providing a helpful breach of K scenario

The LA Times reports that the state of California has terminated its contract with SAP Public Services, a contractor that was supposed to fix the state's outdated computer network system that handles paychecks and medical benefits for 240,000 state employees. 

While both SAP and California are unhappy about the state of events, I have just covered breach, substantial performance, conditions and damages in my Contracts course and was delighted to find a real life scenario to illustrate the relevance of the material we just covered. 

So what triggered CA's termination?  SAP was hired three years ago but when its program was tested, it made errors at "more than 100 times" the rate of the old system. 

Was failing this test a breach?  If so, was it a minor or material breach?  It seems it would depend on what was in the contract. As contracts profs know, the first place to look in a contract dispute is the contract itself.  The are terms in the contract that will be relevant in evaluating whether there was a breach or the applicable measure of damages.  For example, there may be performance targets (i.e. conditions) that SAP had to meet which weren't met.  Those conditions would be relevant in determining each party's obligations (would the contract terminate upon failure to meet the condition, for example?)  There's also likely to be a provision dealing with whether SAP gets paid per deliverable or target met or per person/hour or time spent on a project. If this was a scheduled deliverable, then the facts tend toward finding a breach (or, if the contract language indicates, it could be a condition that was just never met).  If it was a test done in the course of moving the project toward completion, CA may have jumped the gun.  A material breach would allow CA to then terminate its obligation.  If not a material breach, CA should have sought adequate assurance of performance and could itself be in breach by terminating the contract.

 Facts matter, as I repeat like a broken record to my students (I guess I should update my reference for the iPod generation) - so it matters what it means to say that SAP failed the test.  The LA Times reports that:

    "During a trial run involving 1,300 employees....some paychecks went to the wrong person for the wrong amoung.  The system canceled some medical coverage and sent child-support payments to the wrong beneficiaries."

Furthermore, because the system sent money to retirement accounts "incorrectly,"' the state had to pay $50,000 in penalties.

Given the late stage of the project, if not a material breach itself, the failed trial seems to at least give rise to a reasonable belief that SAP would breach.  What did CA do then?  Did it immediately terminate or seek explanations/reassurance? 

 Another issue is what damages measure is applicable?  CA paid SAP $50million dollars but it had incurred much more trying to get the system up and running.  It wasn't clear to me whether the $50million dollar amount was the amount paid up to that point, or the total due to SAP.  In class, the cases we study regarding breach of contract to provide services typically involve some type of construction contract.  The standard measure then would be the difference between the cost of completion and the contract price.  But in a situation like this, the cost of completion is a bit funny given the various factors involved - and the period of time it would take to implement a new project (SAP took the project over from a prior contractor).  Furthermore, the purpose of the new system wasn't so CA could make money (no loss profit measure applicable here).  Given that, the standard expectation measure likely would not be appropriate and a reliance (or restitution) measure makes more sense.  Not surprisingly, CA is seeking recovery of the $50million dollars paid. 

What about SAP? Will it claim that it substantially performed?  I don't think it can with a straight face, but again, I am only basing my conclusion upon the facts contained in the newspaper article.  Will SAP seek restitution for the reasonable value of its services to CA?  It very well may, (and any students reading this, should raise it on an exam...) since it has spent three years on this project.  Based upon the information in the article, it doesn't sound as though CA received any benefit from the services rendered.  If SAP is determined to be the breaching party, it may not get awarded anything. The real world problem for SAP is that trying to hang on to money for delivering a system that doesn't work might hurt its reputation even more.  And it doesn't help that the other party is a state entity - meaning lots of future potential business at stake.  (The LA times noted that SAP projects with other CA entities are not going so well, either).

As is true for other contracts profs, I spend a lot time trying to situate doctrine into a problem solving (or minimizing) scenario since this is how most lawyers deal with contract law.  For example, prior to cancelling the contract, the attorneys for the state of CA most likely sat down and discussed its available options under both the contract and contract law.  SAP, too, likely reviewed (or is reviewing) its options under the contract and contract law.  My guess is that the contract terms probably permit CA to cancel under these circumstances, although a spokesperson for SAP stated that it believed it had "satisfied all contractual obligations in this project."

I'm sure I missed a few things in my quick analysis of ths situation, so feel free to note any other issues in the comments.

[Nancy Kim]

February 11, 2013 in Current Affairs, In the News, Miscellaneous, Teaching, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, February 7, 2013

A Unilateral Contract to "Like"

Shades of Hamer v. Sidway!  A man offered his daughter $200 if she quits Facebook for five months.  It seems that the daughter was well aware of the irresistible time-wasting hazards of the popular social networking site, but needed an incentive to quit.  The father even had her sign a contract.  But, as contractsprofs know, it's not the written form that makes the contract but the bargain.  Even though quitting Facebook may be better for productivity (as I keep telling my students....), it is still a legal "detriment" so if she's successful, dad should pay up.

Fbcontract

[Nancy Kim]

February 7, 2013 in Current Affairs, In the News, Miscellaneous, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, February 4, 2013

Did Bill Maher Offer Donald Trump $5mill for Proof that Trump Was Not Born of an Orangutan?

File this under "objective theory" example that even a law professor could not invent.

On national tv Bill Maher challenged Donald Trump to come forward with Trump's birth certificate to prove that Trump was in fact born from a human father (not an orangutan).  Apparently Trump provided his birth certificate and then requested that Maher remit the $5 million.  The discussion on Fox News: what did Donald Trump reasonably believe? Was this an offer to enter into a unilateral contract?  Watch it here:

Who wins: Trump or Maher?

[Meredith R. Miller h/t Steven Crosley]

February 4, 2013 in Celebrity Contracts, Current Affairs, Television | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, January 30, 2013

A New Stambovsky?

Nyack[Edited: Apologies to my co-blogger, Nancy Kim, for posting this before reading our own blog to see that she already covered it. I'll keep this up for the links to the cases but please read Nancy's post for a more in-depth analysis of the materiality issue.]

For professors who teach nondisclosure as a "reason not to enforce a contract," (that's what the book I use calls "defenses"), Stambovsky v. Ackley often is a favorite case due its entertaining facts. In the case, the buyers of a Nyack, NY house (pictured) seek to have the contract rescinded due to the home being haunted by poltergeists. The haunted condition was known by the sellers but was not disclosed to the buyers.

I am particularly fond of the case in part because the opinion is filled with puns such as, "[I]n his pursuit of a legal remedy for fraudulent misrepresentation against the seller, plaintiff hasn't a ghost of a chance, [however,] I am nevertheless moved by the spirit of equity to allow the buyer to seek rescission of the contract of sale and recovery of his down payment.". Puns aside, the case is instructive because it helps students understand the difference between nondisclosure versus misrepresentation and gets some students to question their faith in caveat emptor. The fact that I teach the case right around Halloween is a nice bonus.  

The only potential problem with the case is that it's somewhat dated (yes, something from the 1990s can feel dated to current first-year students).  Thankfully, a student of mine from last semester just sent me a link to this newer version of Stambovsky out of Pennsylvania (what do ghosts love about the mid-atlantic states?).  In this new dispute, the buyer, a recent widow, is seeking to rescind the contract for sale of a home based on the nondisclosure of a murder-suicide in the home in the same year she agreed to purchase it.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the sellers and the appellate court affirmed, finding that, "psychological damage to a property cannot be considered a material defect in the property which must be revealed by the seller to the buyer."  The buyer now has appealed the case to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. No one knows how that court will exorcise its discretion (ba-dum-bum).

[Heidi R. Anderson] 

January 30, 2013 in Current Affairs, Famous Cases, Recent Cases, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)