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Friday, January 17, 2014

A Lesson in Relational Contracts from James Joyce

JoyceThe main character of James Joyce's short story, "A Mother" (beginning on p, 103 of the link), is a naturally pale woman with  an unbending manner who made few friends at school.  She became Mrs. Kearney out of spite, Joyce tells us, when her friends began to loosen their tongues regarding her impending spinsterhood.  Hoppy Holohan had been attempting for nearly a month to arrange a series of concerts for the Eire Abu Society, but he had no success until he came across Mrs. Kearney, who then "arranged everything."  

She did so because she desired that her daughter, Kathleen, perform as accompanist at the Society's concerts.  Once Mr. Holohan approached her, Mrs. Kearney "entered heart and soul into the details of the enterprise, advised and dissuaded: and finally a contract was drawn up by which Kathleen was to receive eight guineas for her services as accompanist at the four grand concerts." 

The relationship sours as soon as the concerts begin.  Wednesday's concert is poorly attended.  Thursday's concert is better attended, but the audience "behaved indecorously, as if the concert were an informal dress rehearsal."  Moreover, as Mrs. Kearney noted, and Mr. Holohan conceded, "the artistes" were not good. But the real conflict arose over a decision by the "Cometty" of the Society to reduce the number of concerts from four to three.  Mrs. Kearney attempted to protest to Mr. Holohan that any such decision did not alter the contract, and her daughter would be paid for all four concerts.  

 We none of us can help our natures, and Mrs. Kearney's frosty and haughty disposition, coupled with Mr. Holohan's well-intentioned ineptitude combine to form the equivalent of Chekhov's gun introduced in Act I which must be fired in Act III.  When Mrs. Kearney threatens that her daughter be paid in advance or she will not perform in the final contract, Mr. Holohan attempts to disclaim all authority and refers her to the elusive Mr. Fitzpatrick.  

One Mr. O 'Madden Burke was to write a notice of the concert for The Freeman.  Joyce describes him as "a suave, elderly man who balanced his imposing body, when at rest, upon a large silk umbrella. His magniloquent western name was the moral umbrella upon which he balanced the fine problem of his finances. He was widely respected."  After a few rounds of haggling over Ms. Kearney's pay, Mr. O 'Madden Burke declared that "Ms. Kathleen Kearney's musical career was ended in Dublin."

There are dangers in insisting that contractual promises are irrevocable.  

January 17, 2014 in Books, Commentary | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, January 14, 2014

A License to Kill

$350,000.  That’s the value an anonymous American big game hunter is willing to pay to shoot one of the world’s last 5,000 black rhinoceroses.  1,700 of these live in Namibia, which recently auctioned off a permit to kill an old bull through the Dallas Safari Club.

Contracts are meant to assign market values to various items and services in order to facilitate commercial exchanges of these.  But does this make sense with critically endangered species?

Namibia and the Safari Club tout the sustainability of the sale claiming that the bull is an “old, geriatric male that is no longer contributing to the herd.”  All $350,000 will allegedly go to conservation measures.  That is, of course, unless some of the funds disappear to corruptness, not unheard of in the USA and perhaps not in Namibia either.  Although the male may no longer be contributing to his herd, he does contribute to the enjoyment of, just as one example, people potentially able to see him and his likes on safari trips as well as to a much greater number of people around the world who simply enjoy the rich diversity of nature as it still is even if unable to personally see the animals.

Conservationists thus decry the sale, claiming that it is “perverse” to kill even one of a species that is so rapidly becoming extinct.  The argument has been made that critically endangered species should not be valued more dead than alive.  If humans cull the aging, natural predators will have to go one step “down the ladder” for the next one; a healthier one.  Who are we to continually mess with nature in these ways?  Counterarguments are made that poachers are the real problem, not a “single sale.”  And so it goes.

At bottom, the irony in killing such an animal to “increase” the population is, indeed, great.  This particular contract was not.

Myanna Dellinger

January 14, 2014 in Commentary, In the News, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, January 13, 2014

GLOBAL K: Bitcoins – Actually a Virtual Problem

Over the past year, there has been an explosion of interest – and a frenzied up-swing in trading – in bitcoins. Writing in The New York Times in late December 2013, in an article called Into the Bitcoin Mines, Nathaniel Popper noted that “The scarcity — along with a speculative mania that has grown up around digital money — has made each new Bitcoin worth as much as $1,100 in recent weeks.” From a socio-economic perspective, this offers an unusual opportunity to observe the emergence and development of an entirely new, and so far unregulated, kind of market. Scholars like Wallace C. Turbeville interested in the law and policy of financial services regulation are now presented with an important opportunity to test assumptions we often blithely make about the ways in which regulation interacts with business and commercial activity.

Policymakers may confront a moment of truth – to regulate or not to regulate, and when, and how. Earlier this month, National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson argued that the IRS should give taxpayers clear rules on how it will handle transactions involving bitcoin and other digital currencies accepted as payment by vendors. The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held hearings on bitcoins and other “cryptocurrencies” several weeks ago, and may have a report on the situation early next year after further consideration, but Committee Chair Sen. Thomas Carper (D-Del.) seems to be taking a “wait and see” attitude. Meanwhile, the People’s Republic of China has already banned banks from using bitcoins as a currency, while U.S. regulators have not addressed the use of virtual currencies, even as an increasing number of vendors – including Overstock.com – have announced that they will accept them in payment for transactions.

One basic problem is the difficulty in determining what is involved in bitcoin creation and trading. Unfortunately, we are as yet at the mercy of metaphors. For example, within the first six paragraphs of his NYT piece, Popper refers to bitcoins as “virtual currency,” “invisible money,” “a speculative investment,” “online currency,” and “a largely speculative commodity.” In point of fact, bitcoins are book-entry tokens awarded for successfully solving highly complex algorithms generated by an open-source program, The program is disseminated by a mysterious, anonymous sponsor or group known only as Satoshi Nakamoto – the digital world’s version of Keyser Söze.

Determination of the proper legal characterization of bitcoins is essential if we are to choose appropriate transactional and regulatory approaches. For example, if bitcoins really are a “virtual currency” – a meaningless phrase, a glib metaphor – then fiscal supervision by the Federal Reserve might be the most appropriate approach to regulating bitcoin activity. Further, if they are in any significant sense “currency,” then treatment under the U.S. securities regulation framework would be problematic, since “currency” is excluded from the statutory definition of “security” in section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act. Similarly, if bitcoins are viewed as some sort of currency, they would then likely be an “excluded commodity” under section 1a(19)(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act. On the other hand, if bitcoins are viewed as derivatives of currency or futures contracts in currency, then they may be subject to securities regulation, or possibly commodities regulation, depending upon the basic characteristics and rights of the financial product itself. The exact delimitation between treatment as a security and treatment as a commodity is currently the subject of study and proposed rulemakings by the SEC and the CFTC.

Recent news reports have noted that bitcoins are beginning to be accepted by more and more vendors as a form of payment. If in fact it becomes a commonplace that bitcoins operate as a payment mechanism, then we must deal with the possibility that they should be subject to transactional rules of the UCC and the procedures of payment clearance centers. It is at this point that the contractual aspects of bitcoins become critical features of our analysis.

Conceivably, we might go further and argue that bitcoins are functionally a type of note – relatively short-term promises to pay the holder – in which case, they would be subject to UCC article 3, exempt or excluded from securities registration requirements, but possibly still subject to securities antifraud rules. This is an attractive alternative, since it would give us some definite transactional rules to work with, plus antifraud protection against market manipulation – if we could figure out what “manipulation” should mean in the strange new world of cryptocurrencies.

 

Michael P. Malloy

 

January 13, 2014 in Commentary, Current Affairs, E-commerce | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, January 5, 2014

GLOBAL K: Contrasting Attitudes towards Arbitration Clauses

The recent discussion of the December 2013 decision by the Ninth Circuit in In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litigation calls to mind the contrast in attitudes between international and domestic practice. Mention “arbitration” among international practitioners and profs, and you are likely to get a bit of a swoon from most – arbitration, properly structured, rescues us from the risks and uncertainties of unfamiliar legal systems and provides a comfort level in terms of predictability of process if not outcome. Mention "arbitration" in domestic circles, particularly with respect to consumer protection issues, and you encounter a growing skepticism if not outright hostility about the imposition of arbitration as an exclusive contract remedy.

 

There are delicate ironies in these contrasting attitudes. Many would say that the contrast – to the extent it actually exists – simply reflects the difference between complex disputes at the “wholesale” level, between commercial actors with more or less equal bargaining power, and consumer disputes in which arbitration is imposed by the dominant party on the “retail” party. However, In re Wal-Mart itself undermines that neat dichotomy, since it involves parties with, presumably, more or less equal bargaining power. In any event, there is certainly nothing in principle or in text that suggests a wholesale-retail split in the approach to deciding arbitration challenges. (Consider, for example, the Supremes’ 2011 AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, upholding an arbitration provision in a class-action consumer suit, and the Ninth Circuit’s own 2003 en banc decision in  Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential–Bache Trade Servs., Inc., upholding arbitration in what was ostensibly a “wholesale” transaction between commercial parties.) It is nevertheless clear that there is a growing conception – or preconception – that arbitration clauses may be hostile to, or at least incompatible with, consumer interests.

 

This conception does have textual support in the 2010 enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Section 1414(a) of the Act added a provision to the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1), that prohibits the inclusion in any home mortgage or home equity loan of “terms which require arbitration or any other nonjudicial procedure as the method for resolving any controversy or settling any claims arising out of the transaction.” However, as with so many of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, § 1639c contained a special delayed effective date, namely, the date on which final regulations implementing the prohibition took effect, or a date 18 months after the transfer of authority to the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, whichever is earlier. Nevertheless, in the November 2013 case State ex rel. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Webster, the Supreme Court of Appeal of West Virginia found that the delayed effective date “only applies to those portions of Title XIV that require administrative regulations to be implemented.” Accordingly, the effective date of this prohibition was the general effective date of the act, July 22, 2010. Good for us, not so good for the consumer plaintiffs suing the mortgage servicer, since their mortgage agreement containing an arbitration clause was entered into several years prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. The West Virginia court refused to apply the Dodd-Frank Act retroactively, and proceeded to decide that it was compelled to enforce the arbitration clause in light of the mandate of the Federal Arbitration Act, which generally favors the application and enforcement of such clauses, despite the plaintiffs’ claims that the arbitration clause was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Ocwen Loan Servicing is worth a careful read, particularly in light of its consideration of the interplay among emerging statutory policy with respect to consumer protection, general federal policy in favor of arbitration, and the contract doctrine of unconscionability.

 

 

Michael P. Malloy

 

January 5, 2014 in Commentary, Recent Cases | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Monday, December 30, 2013

Ninth Circuit Strikes Down Arbitration Clause that Renders Arbitral Decision Unappealable

I have been thinking a lot about Peggy Radin's book Boilerplate and her arguments about how boilerplate contacts threaten a democratic degradation (discussed elsewhere on the blog by Brian Bix, with Peggy Radin responding here, and by David Horton) because they permit private parties, powerful companies, to negate statutory or common law rights.  The Ninth Circuit has put its foot down and refused to permit a potential innovation in the direction of democratic degradation, but the odd thing about the case is that the arbitration agreement at issue here seems to have been among parties with fairly even bargaining power.  

9th CircuitOn December 17, 2013, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litigationaffirming the District Court's confirmation of an arbitration award and rejecting appellee's argument that the Court was without jurisdiction because the parties agreed to binding, non-appealable arbitration.

The dispute at issue arose in the aftermath of an $85 million settlement agreement between Wal-Mart and a class of employee-plaintiffs.  As part of that settlement, the parties agreed to have all disputes as to fees decided by an arbitrator.  The District Court awarded $28 million in attorneys' fees, but plaintiffs' counsel quarreled over the proper allocation of that fee award.  That dispute was submitted to "binding, non-appealable arbitration." 

The arbitrator divided the fee among three law firms, and one of them brought suit in District Court challenging the allocation.  The District Court found no grounds to vacate the arbitrator's award, and the law firm that challenged the award appealed.  The firm that got the lion's share of the fee award argued that there could be no appeal due to the "non-appealable" language in the arbitration agreement.

The Ninth Circuit found the language of the agreement ambiguous.  "Non-appealable" could just preclude courts from reviewing the merits of the arbitrator's decision, or it could mean that no federal court could exercise jurisdiction in the case.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the second meaning would be unenforceable in any case, as inconsistent with the provision for judicial review of arbitration awards under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).  Citing Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), in which the Supreme Court rejected an arbitration agreement that expanded the grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[j]ust as the text of the FAA compels the conclusion that the grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award may not be supplemented, it also compels the conclusion that these grounds are not waivable, or subject to elimination by contract."  As if the Court had the concept of democratic degradation in mind, the opinion continues:

Permitting parties to contractually eliminate all judicial review of arbitration awards would not only run counter to the text of the FAA, but would also frustrate Congress’s attempt to ensure a minimum level of due process for parties to an arbitration. . . .  If parties could contract around this section of the FAA, the balance Congress intended would be disrupted, and parties would be left without any safeguards against arbitral abuse.

Well, yeah.  

In a separate memorandum disposition, the panel affirmed the District Court's confirmation of the aribral award.

[JT]

December 30, 2013 in Commentary, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, December 17, 2013

The Online Scourge of Wrap Contracts

It's not just about privacy anymore. Companies are using wrap contracts to deprive users of other fundamental rights, such as free speech.  My thoughts on some recent cases here.

 

[Nancy Kim]

December 17, 2013 in Commentary | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, December 15, 2013

GLOBAL K: SANCTIONS APPLIED, LESSONS IMPLIED

London, UK: Current events smiled on GLOBAL K last week and offered an example of how contemporary economic sanctions programs interact with transnational contract activity. (See last week’s Global K.)  While I was lecturing at the Centre for Commercial Law Studies in London, the news broke about possible sanctions violations by a British bank in its payment transfer practices.

 

On December 11, 2013, the British press was full of the news that Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS) had agreed to pay £62 million ($100 million) to settle charges by U.S. state and federal banking authorities that it had violated U.S. sanctions against Iran, Burma, Libya and Sudan, and possibly Cuba according to some news accounts. The three agencies involved – the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, and the New York State Department of Financial Services – coordinated their investigation with the UK Financial Conduct Authority. According to OFAC, from 2005 to 2009 (the Daily Mail asserted it was 2002-2011), RBS payment practices impeded U.S. economic sanctions. References to critical information about certain payment transfers that would have triggered a blocking of funds and payments – such as the fact that an Iranian party might be interested in one end or the other of the transfer – were excluded from documentation covering payments sent to or through U.S. financial institutions. By some accounts, these payment transfer practices involved more than 3,500 US dollar transactions worth £320 million ($523 million) routed through US banks. Two aspects of this situation are worthy of specific comment.

 

First, the nature of the claimed violations varies somewhat as you look from one sanctions program to the next, even if the payment activities were essentially the same. For example, under the Iran sanctions, foreign financial institutions such as RBS are quite specifically targeted by prohibitions in the sanctions program. A foreign financial institution would be prohibited from knowingly “[f]acilitat[ing] the activities of ... a person subject to financial sanctions” under U.N. sanctions against Iran,” engaging in “money laundering to carry out” such an activity, or facilitating “efforts by the Central Bank of Iran or any other Iranian financial institution to carry out” such an activity. 31 C.F.R. 561.201 (2013). Under the Burmese Sanctions Regulations, the focus would be on transactions and transfers involving “property and interests in property” of the direct targets of the sanctions, which would be prohibited where the property or interest was “in the United States, ... hereafter [came] within the United States, or … [came] within the possession or control of U.S. persons.” 31 C.F.R. 537.201 (2013). The Sudanese Sanctions Regulations contain a similar prohibition on transactions and transfers (31 C.F.R. 538.201 (2013)), but its facilitation prohibition applies on its face only to “U.S. persons.” 31 C.F.R. 538.206 (2013). Likewise, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations would prohibit transactions and transfers involving “property and interests in property” of any Cuban national. (31 C.F.R. 515.201 (2013).) However, beyond this basic sanction, if RBS were considered to be acting on behalf of a blocked Cuban national in these transfers, then it might be deemed to be a “specially designated national” of Cuba and as such it would itself be a direct target of the Cuban sanctions, See 31 C.F.R. 515.302,515.306 (2013) (defining “national,” “specially designated national”). Hence, given the incidence of significant variation as one moves from one sanctions program to the next, it becomes more difficult in managing risk in transnational contract activity to generalize as to the risks and appropriate risk management strategies.

 

Second, the likely implications of transnational contract activity on domestic contract activity may also vary significantly as our attention shifts from program to program. Take, for example, the situation of a U.S. citizen who is a holder of a credit card issued by RBS NA, a national bank subsidiary of RBS. In many of the sanctions situations identified above, the impact of the RBS violations on her contractual relationship would be adventitious. The substantial fine might marginally raise the cost of doing business with the card issuer, assuming that the bank chose to pass some portion of this indirect cost of doing business throughout the enterprise. Even at $100 million, it is unlikely that the credit card holder would even feel the effects of the event. However, if aggressive action were taken against RBS under the Cuban sanctions – a contingency that is essentially eliminated by the bank’s settlement, one would imagine – the effect on the credit card holder would be quite dramatic. As an ongoing contract party of a specially designated national, she herself would be potentially committing a direct violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, because U.S. persons are prohibited from entering into contracts with Cuban nationals – even with specially designated nationals – in the absence of a license. So unless you are a great humanitarian like Beyoncé and hence above the law, avoid entering into contracts and other transactions with specially designated nationals of Cuba.

 

 

Michael P. Malloy

December 15, 2013 in Commentary, Current Affairs | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, December 12, 2013

Contracts Research: The Actors and the Audience

Kareem-Abdul-Jabbar_LipofskyI happen to agree with the recent New York Times article on the usefulness of legal research.  As many will recall, the basic idea was that a great deal of what is published is only that -- it exists in print and is largely unread or impractical. Part of the problem is that writing is a bit like hazing. Young people must do it to join the fraternity even if they have little new to say.  Another problem is the actor and audience problem. Law professors appear are both. As writers they are the actors and as readers they are the audience  -- the only audience. So they  play their part and then rush back to the audience to applaud the "acts" of  others. In these instances the work may be so theoretical that it is only of interest to very few, if any,  and perhaps useful to no one at all. This is related to or the same as  the skyhook problem as described by Monroe Freedman. As I understand it,  work that is too theoretical and too burdened by assumptions is comparable to engineers talking about the impossible.  Monroe H. Freedman, A Critique of Philosophizing About Lawyers' Ethics," 25 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 91 (2012).

That was how an Article by Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz, "The Myth of the Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectancy Interest," 97 Va. L. Rev. 1939 (2011), struck me.  Why write anything further about the efficient breach?  Of course, as always the joke was on me. I immediately set out to write yet another article about efficient breach which essentially says it does not exist, and Markovits and Schwartz are covering ground that is in large part both old and irrelevant. And with that I became the actor, the audience, and an actor acting out the roles of the actor an audience. I think this means my article, "A Nihilistic View of the Efficient Breach" 2013 Mich St.L. Rev. 167 , was a skyhook for skyhooks. If any of this interest to you and I hope not. Here is the link.

I realized why we do much of our writing. It's fun and we are addicted to ideas. It's a pretty good job! But are we at times too self indulgent?

Jeff "Jake" Harrison

December 12, 2013 in Commentary, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, December 10, 2013

GLOBAL K: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS

In late November 2013, negotiators reached agreement on a temporary accord under which Iran would halt much of its nuclear program and roll back some existing elements of it, and  the United States agreed to $6 billion to $7 billion in sanctions relief, including releasing approximately $4.2 billion in oil revenue “frozen” in banks outside the United States. (The United States would continue to enforce other substantial sanctions that remain in place.) Recent coverage and commentary about the six-month U.S.-Iran deal calls to mind the fact that economic sanctions have become a pervasive feature of the transnational contract environment. (See this Table)

Source: M. P. Malloy (ed.), Economic Sanctions (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming).

 

 

Two things are noteworthy about this situation. First, there is such a considerable array of sanctions in place – unilateral and multilateral, trade and financial, direct and indirect – that a state negotiating with Iran has an extensive menu from which to choose when it starts horse-trading. Second, it is probably not safe, as many casual observers still do, to view economic sanctions as unusual or “exigent,” rather than a commonplace feature of contracting in the transnational market.

 

It could be a year or more before we know the outcome of the ongoing maneuvering between Iran and the “P5-plus-1 countries” – the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany – but contracts practitioners and commentators should learn one thing right now. The immediate lesson to be drawn is that the potential impact of sanctions is an increasingly pervasive risk factor in transnational contracting. The risk factor arises from three distinct circumstances in contemporary transnational practice. 

 

First, the resurgence of U.N. mandatory sanctions practice under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Prior to 1990, U.N. sanctions practice was limited and ineffective – the classic example being the curiously stunted trade sanctions against the break-away Southern Rhodesian regime in the1960s. In response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, however, and largely under the leadership of the George H.W. Bush Administration, U.N. mandatory sanctions broadly and effectively isolated the occupied Kuwait and stymied the Iraqi Government, as a prelude to the first Gulf War. The success of this program led to frequent and pervasive application of mandatory sanctions as the primary U.N. Security Council response to many crises over the decades that followed. This development means that there is now a formidable array of sanctions programs in which implementation is mandatory for all U.N. member states, actively monitored by the Security Council through sanctions committees. As a result, moving contract activities off-shore – a typical maneuver in many pre-1990 sanctions situations (including the Southern Rhodesian sanctions) – is no longer an easy and viable option. In addition, many states – and principally the United States – have continued to promulgate unilateral sanctions programs, often paralleling multilateral sanctions, and these have benefited from the newly pervasive incidence of sanctions as a risk factor in transnational contract practices.

 

Second, the emergence of “smart sanctions” strategies in the design of sanctions programs. Contemporary sanctions are often more carefully targeted, and include specific and distinct sanctions against intermediaries – e.g., business brokers, freight forwarders, purchasing agents, banks and other financial intermediares – which means that the direct and indirect costs of sanctions avoidance and evasion have grown significantly for indirect and secondary contract actors who would not have otherwise viewed themselves as “targets” of sanctions programs. 

 

Third, the existence of licensing authority within sanctions programs. Ironically, the existence of authority within participating member states to license activities and transactions otherwise affected by a sanctions program, subject to oversight by U.N. sanctions committees, has increased the ongoing compliance and enforcement impact of sanctions programs. This feature has resulted in greater accountability for transnational contract parties.

 

The casual observer might respond that generally applicable contract doctrines of impracticability (or impossibility) and frustration would ameliorate the impact of these developments in sanctions practice. To the contrary, I believe that the interaction of these doctrines with current practice in transnational business may be more complicated than one might expect at first glance. 

 

It is true that, under Restatement of the Law - Contracts (Second) § 261, a party to a contract affected by sanctions might claim that performance has been rendered “impracticable,” thus discharging its duty to perform. However, § 261 is grounded on the occurrence of an event “after a contract is made” that occurs “without his fault.” The pervasiveness and persistence of an array of sanctions programs challenges both of these premises. There is no end of sanctions already in place, and in the typical sanctions program the party bears the burden of demonstrating that it did not know, nor had no reason to suspect, that the subject transaction was prohibited or restricted. As comment d to § 261 observes, “If the event that prevents the obligor's performance is caused by the obligee, it will ordinarily amount to a breach by the latter. ... If the event is due to the fault of the obligor himself, this [§ 261] does not apply. As used here ‘fault’ may include not only ‘willful’ wrongs, but such other types of conduct as that amounting to breach of contract or to negligence.” Of course, this dilemma exists quite aside from any administrative or criminal consequences that might be visited on the parties by a sanctions-enforcing state. Goods or services that are the subject of the contract may be susceptible to being “blocked” or “frozen” by the enforcing state.

The same problem would exist for a contracting party who attempted to invoke the doctrine of discharge by a supervening frustration under Restatement (2d) § 265. This may be a particular concern for indirect or intermediary parties, a point that is neatly demonstrated by Illustration 5 under § 265:

 

A contracts to sell and B to buy a machine, to be delivered to B in the United States. B, as A knows, intends to export the machine to a particular country for resale. Before delivery to B, a government regulation prohibits export of the machine to that country. B refuses to take or pay for the machine. If B can reasonably make other disposition of the machine, even though at some loss, his principal purpose of putting the machine to commercial use is not substantially frustrated. B's duty to take and pay for the machine is not discharged, and B is liable to A for breach of contract.

 

Furthermore, given the typical licensing regime that is included in sanctions programs, “impracticability” may be even less apparent in a particular contracting situation. As comment d to § 261 goes on to note, “ ‘impracticability’ means more than ‘impracticality.’ A mere change in the degree of difficulty or expense . . . unless well beyond the normal range, does not amount to impracticability since it is this sort of risk that a fixed-price contract is intended to cover.” 

 

One might respond, however, that if performance of a duty is made impracticable by having to comply with a domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order, then the regulation or order is “an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made,” according to Restatement (2d) § 264. Comment a to § 264 undercuts this argument, however, because “[w]ith the trend toward greater governmental regulation, however, parties are increasingly aware of such risks, and a party may undertake a duty that is not discharged by such supervening governmental actions, as where governmental approval is required for his performance and he assumes the risk that approval will be denied. ... Such an agreement is usually interpreted as one to pay damages if performance is prevented rather than one to render a performance in violation of law.” This problem is underscored by Restatement (2d) § 266, dealing with existing impracticability or frustration. In a situation in which, at the time a contract is made, the party's performance is impracticable without his fault “no duty to render that performance arises,” but only if this fact is one which it had “no reason to know,” a difficult position to maintain in an environment of persistent and pervasive sanctions programs.

 

All of this suggests a need for caution and proactive monitoring of contract activity in the transnational market. It is extremely naïve – if not outright disingenuous – to assume that one can casually rely on traditional doctrines of impracticability (or impossibility) and frustration in transnational commerce. Over-reading these doctrines can result in bitter lessons, and embarrassment, in the modern environment of transnational contract practice.

 

 Michael P. Malloy

 

December 10, 2013 in Commentary, Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, December 9, 2013

Breach of a Promise to Marry

RingEvery once in a while, a student will send me a story about contracts, but when multiple students send me the same story, you know they must be desparate for a study break -- and that there is some rather comical contracts story in the news.

And so it is with this story about a woman who won a $50,000 judgment on her claim that her fiance had breached his promise to marry her.  A Georgia appellate court upheld the judgment, which included an award of attorney's fees, on appeal.   The court more or less treated the couple as married and upheld an award of roughly half the property acquired during the relationship, which was a house valued at $86,000.   The couple had co-habited for ten years and had a child together.  The woman had looked after the child, as well as one she had from a previous relationship.  

The man had had sexual relationships with other women both before and after he led his live-in partner to believe that he would marry her and gave her a ring worth $10,000.  For what it's worth, the woman also had other sexual relationships. 

According to media reports, the defendant's argument on appeal was that his alleged promise arose in the context of a meretricious relationship and was therefore unenforceable. Moreover, he denied any intention to marry.  He claims he never said "will you marry me" or words to that effect. He just gave her a ring.

The meretriciousness argument is rather confusing, as a defense to the claim that he broke a promise, since the promise was to cleanse the relationship of its meretriciousness.  As the appellate court noted, according to FoxNews, “the object of the contract is not illegal or against public policy.”  If we still live in a world in which courts think they can pass judgment on people's long-term relationships (and we seem to), then a court is likely to uphold an agreement that will "make an honest woman" of the plaintiff.  

The award of damages is also confusing.  the effect of the ruling seems to be to treat the couple as married even though they weren't.  In effect, the court is recognizing a common law marriage where such marriages do not seem to be recognized.  I suppose the court could do so as a mechanism of giving the woman her expectation for the broken promise.  The California Supreme Court endorsed such an approach in Marvin v. Marvin, but other courts have rejected marriage by judicial decree where the legislature has expressed its disapproval of recognition of common law marriages.

[JT]

December 9, 2013 in Commentary, In the News, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, December 4, 2013

Unconscionability Shui

RatUnconscionability and the Contingent Assumptions of Contract Theory, 2013 Mich. St. L. Rev. 211  (2013), by Dr. M. Neil Browne and Lauren Biksacky, argues that basic assumptions of liberal contract theory – for example, that contracts are made by rational and informed parties – don’t hold. Therefore, courts should find more contracts unconscionable.

This short article would be a nice primer for law students on basic liberal contract theory, especially in conjunction with some Judge Posner readings. The authors argue that people often yield to irrational motives. They get in bar fights. They have road rage. They buy books on feng shui. Judge Posner might respond that the human rationality economists speak of is that of pigeons or rats, not angels. Dr. Browne, himself an economist, seems to take exception to that conception of human beings.

The article argues courts can do better than simply making people keep their ratty promises. Courts can allow people to be their best, most-informed selves by invalidating “irrational” promises made under distorting influences like advertising and cognitive biases. Courts can and should step in like adults over wayward children and guide them toward eudaimonia.

Yet the article notes that despite research showing people are often irrational and ill-informed, courts are not finding more contracts unconscionable. Why? The article doesn’t answer, but the reason is probably that to do so seems unworkable. If human irrationality were grounds for invalidating a contract, how many contracts would be secure? The law tends to be a great guardian of the status quo, and apparently some people like books about feng shui.

[Kenneth Ching]

[Image by Vicky TGAW]

December 4, 2013 in Commentary, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument on Frequent Flyer Contracts

We have previously reported on Northwest Inc. v. Ginsberhere and here.  SCOTUSblog's Ronald Mann provides a preview of oral arguments here

For those who don't want to click on the links, here is our earlier summary of the facts of the case:

Plaintiff, Rabbi, S. Binyomin Ginsberg had been a member of Northwest's frequent flyer program, WorldPerks, since 1999.  By 2005, he was such a macher, Northwest granted him Platinum Elite Status (oy, what nachas!).  In 2008, Northwest revoked his membership. Ginsberg claims that Northwest took this action because he was a kvetch. . . .

The official reason provided for the termination was that Northwest had discretion "in its sole judgment," to cancel a member's account due to abuse of the program. Apparently, such judgment includes the ability terminate a membership if complaints persist after the "Enough with the complaining already!" warning.   Ginsberg sued, asserting four causes of action, but Northwest moved for dismissal, arguing that the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) preempted all of Ginsberg's claims.

SCOTUS 2010According to the The New York Timessynopsis of oral argument, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor expressed concern that the airline's frequent flyer program was either an illusory contract or subject to the airline's "whim and caprice."  Justice Breyer, however, seemed inclined to think that claims sounding in breach of contract are preempted by the federal Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which was supposed to allow airlines to compete based on, among other things, price.  Since frequent flyer programs are price discounts, Breyer suggested that such programs are governed by the Deregulation Act and cannot be subject to claims based on state laws aimed at regulating the airlines.  However, in 1995, the Court exempted contracts claims from federal preemption in American Airlines v. Wolens

The distinction between regulating airlines through state law and regulating airlines through breach of contract claims is a subtle one.  It seems to turn on whether Rabbi Ginsberg's claim is construed as a breach of contract claim or a claim that the airline breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing.  Paul Clement, arguing for the airline (on page 13 of the transcript) claimed that to permit a claim based on the duty of good faith and fear dealing would "enlarge the bargain."  Since the contract gave the airline discretion to terminate Rabbi Ginsberg's membership, Clement argued, invoking the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing takes his claim outside of the contract.  The claim implicates state policies because in some states the implied duty is not merely a rule of construction but a means of imposing public policy standards of "fairness and decency" on private agreements.  

The Solicitor General joined the case as amicus curiae on behalf of the airline and attempted to clarify the federal uniformity concerns implicated in the case.  Counsel for the Solicitor General contended that state contracts law is fine to help adjudicate the intent of the parties, but where states impose public policy concerns in areas such as implied covenants and the unconscionability defense, there preemption is necessary.  

This is very strange territory, and it was clear that Justices and counsel alike struggled to work out how to put such fine distinctions into place.  It is odd for the Court to say in Wolens that contracts claims are not preempted by the Deregulation Act but for the Court to now say that certain types of contracts claims, like breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or unconscionability defenses are still preempted.

And what about Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preemption?  One of the few ways that parties can get out of arbitration clauses is by arguing that such clauses are unconscionable, because the FAA does not preempt defenses sounding in common law contracts doctrine.  But since unconscionability doctrine varies from state to state, parties seeking to enforce arbitration clauses could argue that the same uniformity concerns that govern preemption in the Deregulation Act context should also apply in the FAA context.  If so, good-bye unconscionability challenges to arbitration clauses.

The Times provides this link to the transcript of oral argument.

[JT]

December 4, 2013 in Commentary, Recent Cases, Travel | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, December 2, 2013

GLOBAL K: BRAZIL AND THE CISG

The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) continues to collect state parties. The CISG will enter into force for Brazil on 1 April 2014, and for Bahrain on 1 October 2014. With that, Brazil and Bahrain will become the 79th and 80th States Party to the CISG, respectively. 

 

The delay in entry into force is built into CISG art. 99, and does not suggest any particular caution on the part of either state. What may require some explanation, however, is why it took almost 25 years after Brazil approved the final text of the CISG and signed the Final Act of the Conference, before it finally acceded to the convention on 5 March 2013. According to local commentators, a large part of the delay is due to extraneous political considerations. Legislative inaction on this front was common under a previous authoritarian political system, as the regime was skeptical of – if not outright hostile to – multilateral initiatives to advance private international law. Efforts by Brazilian academics, the Bar Association of Brazil, and business interests progressively pressed for Brazil to engage in such initiatives, and the end result was that Brazil rejoined the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 2001 and began the internal process for accession to the CISG in 2011.

 

Brazil’s accession is a particularly significant development. Brazil’s economy is the largest among Latin American states, and the second largest in the Western Hemisphere. The existence of a common set of default rules governing trade in goods, irrespective of the significant differences in U.S. and Brazilian legal traditions, creates potential efficiencies for the future of economic relations between the two states. Furthermore, from the perspective of economic development policy, the existence of modern, uniform framework for contracts for the sale of goods involving one of the fastest-growing major economies in the world is a positive feature.

 

The increasing likelihood that regional contract activity in the Americas may implicate the CISG underscores the need for U.S. academics to ensure that our students at least understand that the convention exists as part of U.S. contract law. This generally applicable source of federal contract law constitutes the default rules that apply to an expanding range of regional contract situations. It has been a commonplace that parties can always make a contractual choice of law that would remove the CISG from the mix. However, what you don’t know can’t be planned against, and who is to say that local law – as opposed to the CISG default rules – is necessarily optimal for a given contracting situation? 

 

Michael P. Malloy

December 2, 2013 in Commentary, Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, November 29, 2013

Sixth Circuit Affirms District Court, Rejects Attorney's Bid for Class-Wide Arbitration

6th CirCraig Crockett's law firm had a billing dispute with LexisNexis (Lexis). but his firm's agreement with Lexis had an arbitration clause.  Crockett realized that arbitration of his claim against Lexis as individual claim would be economically unfeasible, so he sougth to create a nationwide class of similarly situated Lexis customers.  The arbitration clause itself was silent about the availability of class claims.  In 5 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding that arbitration clause does not permit class claims.

Crockett's basic claims is that, although his firm was to be charged a monthly fee for unlimited use of certain Lexis databases, and an additional fee for the use of other databases, Lexis charged him for the use of databases that were not identified as extras.  He seeks to bring claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, negligence, gross negligence, unjust enrichment, and violation of New York's consumer protection laws on behalf of classes consisting of law firms using Lexis services and their clients.  On behalf of the two classes, Crockett sought damages in excess of $500 million.

Lexis responded to the claim with a suit in federal District Court seeking a declaration that the arbitration agreement did not allow for class arbitration.  The District Court granted the declaratory judgment sought.  Crockett objected that the issue of whether or not classwide arbitration was available should have been put to the arbiter.  As the Sixth Circuit explained, that issue turns on whether it is a "gateway" or a "subsidiary" question.  There is a presumption in favor of courts answering gateway questions, while subsidiary questions should presumptively be reserved to the arbiter.

Alas, the Supreme Court has yet to decisively address whether classwide arbitrability is a gateway or subsidiary question.  While a plurality of the Justices found the issue to be susbidiary in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003), the Court more recently acknowledged that it had not yet determined whether or not classwide arbitrability is a gateway question.  Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013).  But in other recent cases, Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, the Supreme Court has characterized the difference between bilateral and class arbitration as "fundamental" and thus has indicated fairly strongly that the issue is a gateway question.  

The Sixth Circuit cited various reasons for assigning "gateway" status to the question of classwide arbitration and concluded that "whether an arbitration agreement permits classwide arbitration is a gateway matter, which is reserved 'for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise'" (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)).  The Court then reasons that "the principal reason to conclude that this arbitration clause does not authorize classwide arbitration is that the clause nowhere mentions it."  Because the consequences of class arbitration are "momentous," the Sixth Circuit reasoned, an arbitration agreement must include class arbitration in order for a court to find that the parties have agreed to it.

To which I say, where is the contra proferentem canon when a consumer needs it?  The agreement is silent on the issue and thus unquestionably ambiguous.  The consequences are equally momentous on both sides, since the Sixth Circuit acknowledges that Crockett's claims are not worth bringing as an individual arbitration.  It also characterizes the contract as one of adhesion.  So it was entirely within Lexis's powers to avoid the ambiguity and completely beyond Crockett's power to remedy it.  In such cases, courts should invoke contra proferentem and interpret the agreement in favor of the non-drafting party.

Crockett also argued that the arbitration clause is unconscionable, and the Sixth Circuit seemed to agree that, substantively, it's a lousy agreement.  However, elements of procedural unconscionability are lacking, and Crockett had the option of using Westlaw (which apparently has no arbitration clause -- for now).  This is likely a correct application of the law but it also illuminates a central tension in unconscionability doctrine.  In order to show that substantive unconscionability exists, one has to show that the terms are outrageously lopsided in favor of the drafting party "by the business standards and mores of the time and place."  But if one can make such a showing, then one loses on the procedural unconscionability prong because one then could have chosen to go with a competing business.  And if all of the businesses in the market have equally one-sided terms, then one cannot meet the standard for substantive unconscionability.

[JT]

November 29, 2013 in Commentary, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, November 27, 2013

Dysfunctional Real Estate Contracts

SFKToday’s mini-review is of Dysfunctional Contracts and the Laws and Practices that Enable Them: An Empirical Analysis, 46 Ind. L. Rev. 797 (2013), by Debra Pogrund Stark, Dr. Jessica M. Choplin, and Eileen Linnabery.

Apparently, many real estate contracts limit buyers’ remedies to return of earnest money, and many courts enforce such limitations. The problem is that if a buyer’s only remedy for breach of contract is the return of earnest money, then the seller hasn’t really bound himself to anything. If the seller doesn’t want to perform, all he has to do is return the earnest money. This encourages the kind of strategic behavior that contracts are supposed to prevent. For example, a seller may agree to sell real estate, but if the property's market value increases, the seller can breach the contract, return the earnest money, and sell the property to a second buyer at a higher price. The seller essentially gets to speculate on the buyer's dime.

Further, many buyers don’t understand the meaning of these limitation of remedy clauses, even if they read them. The authors conducted a study which suggests more than a third of people who read a limitation of remedies clause fail to comprehend that their remedies have been limited. The authors use this finding to challenge some courts’ reasoning that buyers knowingly consent to the limitation of their remedies.

The authors offer several reforms, and two are particularly interesting: (1) enacting legislation that prohibits limiting buyers’ remedies to the return of earnest money, and (2) replacing the exacting standards of unconscionability with a "reasonable limitation of remedy” test similar to that used in evaluating liquidated damages.

This article is state-of-the-art in its use of empirical research to aid legal analysis. It not only provides interesting data, but it also marshals that data against flimsy intuitive arguments still common wherever people talk about contracts.

[Kenneth Ching]

[Image by thinkpanama]

November 27, 2013 in Commentary, Contract Profs, Recent Scholarship, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, November 24, 2013

Wrap Contracts Symposium: Response to Rustad, Zacks and Amato and Closing Thoughts

Wrap contracts

 I want to thank all the experts who participated in last week's  symposium on WRAP CONTRACTS:  FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS .  They raised a variety of issues and their insights were thoughtful, varied and very much appreciated.  I also want to thank Jeremy Telman for organizing the symposium and inviting the participants.

Today, I’d like to respond to the posts by Michael Rustad, Eric Zacks and Theresa Amato.  Eric Zacks emphasizes the effect that form has on users, namely that the form discourages users from reviewing terms.  Zack notes that contract form may be used to appeal to the adjudicator rather than simply to elicit desired conduct from the user and that forms that elicit express assent - such as “click” agreements - help the drafter by aiding “counterfactual analysis surrounding the ‘explicit assent’” issue.  In other words, drafters may use contract forms to manipulate adjudicator’s decisionmaking and not necessarily to get users to act a certain way.  (This is a topic with which Zachs is familiar, having just written a terrific article on the different ways that drafters use form and wording to manipulate adjudicators’ cognitive biases). 

Both Michael Rustad and Theresa Amato focus, not on form, but on the substance of wrap contracts – the rights deleting terms that contract form hides so well.  Amato comes up with an alternative term to wrap contracts – online asbestos – to highlight the not-immediately-visible damage caused by these terms.  As a consumer advocate and an expert on how to get messages to the general public, Amato understands the need to overcome the inertia of the masses by communicating the harms in a way that can drown out the siren call of the corporate marketing masters.  So yes, a stronger term may be required to jolt consumers out of their complacency although the real challenge will be getting heard and beating the marketing masters at their own game. 

Michael Rustad notes that my doctrinal solutions fall short of resolving the problem of predispute mandatory arbitration and anti-class action waivers.  He’s right, of course, although I think reconceptualizing unconscionability in the way I propose (by presuming unconscionability with certain terms unless alternative terms exist or the legislature expressly permits the term) would reduce the prevalence of undesirable terms including mandatory arbitration and class-action waivers.  Rustad, who has considerable expertise on this subject, mentions that many European countries are further along than we are in dealing with unfair terms.  Many of those jurisdictions, however, also have legislation which limits class actions, tort suits or damages awards.  In addition, they don’t have the same culture of litigation that we do in this country.  Wrap contracts have their legitimate uses, such as deterring opportunistic consumer behavior and enabling companies to assess and limit business risks. In order to succeed, any proposal barring contract terms or the enforceability of wrap contracts must also consider those legitimate uses. 

Wrap ContractsI believe there is a place for wrap contracts and boilerplate generally but their legitimate uses are currently outweighed by illegitimate abuses of powers.  Wrap contract doctrine has moved too far away from the primary objective of contract law – to enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties--  and my solutions were an attempt to move the train back on track.  My focus was on doctrinal solutions but the problems raised by wrap contracts are complex and my solutions do not foreclose or reject legislative ones. I’m a contracts prof, so my focus naturally will be on contract law solutions (if you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail, I guess).  Doctrinal responses have the advantage of flexibility and may be better adapted to dynamic environments than legislation which can be quickly outdated when it comes to technology or business practices borne in a global marketplace. 

Admittedly, when it comes to wrap contracts, doctrinal flexibility hasn’t really worked in favor of consumers, but that only makes it more important to keep trying to sway judicial opinion.  I know there are those who question whether judges read legal scholarship, but I know that there are many judges (and clerks) who do. The case law in this area has spiraled out of control so that it makes no sense to the average “reasonable person” and has opened the door to the use of wrap contracts that exploit consumer vulnerabilities.

My book was not intended as a clarion call to rid the world of all wrap contracts; rather, it was intended to point out how much damage wrap contracts have done, how much more they can do, and to provide suggestions on how to rein them in and use them in a socially beneficial manner. 

I’m grateful to have had the opportunity to hear the insightful comments of last week’s highly respected line-up of experts and to share my thoughts with blog readers. 

[Nancy Kim]

November 24, 2013 in Commentary, Contract Profs, E-commerce, Miscellaneous, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, November 22, 2013

Wrap Contracts Symposium, Part VII: Theresa Amato

This is the seventh in a series of posts on Nancy Kim's Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications (Oxford UP 2013). 

Amato

Our seventh guest blogger, Theresa Amato, is the executive director Citizen Works which she started with Ralph Nader in 2001. After earning her degrees from Harvard University and the New York University School of Law, where she was a Root-Tilden Scholar, Amato clerked in the Southern District of New York for the Honorable Robert W. Sweet. She was a consultant to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (Human Rights First) and wrote an influential human rights report on child canecutters in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. She then became the youngest litigator at Public Citizen Litigation Group, where she was the Director of the Freedom of Information Clearinghouse in Washington D.C.  In 1993, Amato founded the nationally-recognized, Illinois-based Citizen Advocacy Center and served as its executive director for eight years. She currently serves as its Board President.  Most recently, she has launched Fair Contracts.org to reform the fine print in standard form contracts.  In 2009, The New Press (New York) published her book, Grand Illusion: The Myth of Voter Choice in a Two-Party Tyranny.  She also appears prominently in the Sundance-selected and Academy Awards short-listed documentary “An Unreasonable Man.”  

Nancy Kim

“Yes,” writes Professor Nancy S. Kim. “As strange as it may seem, under contract law you can legally bind yourself without knowing it.”

Contract law experts nod in accord, some in resignation or with ennui.  Non-lawyers are instead completely shocked when I describe this reality.   They have no idea that by visiting a website, sending an email, tweeting or posting, or any of these now common, everyday acts that they are giving consent to use those services and are therefore binding themselves to the various “terms of use” – even if they may have only “constructive” and not actual notice of them. 

In her valuable book, Wrap Contracts, Foundations and Ramifications, Professor Kim does a service to all by explaining how courts enforce these online contracts “where consumers have no intent of entering into a contract.”  She points out that “[t]he requirement of manifestation of consent seems to be subsumed in wrap contract cases with the issue of notice.”  As a result, “the nondrafting party does not actually need to either receive notice or understand or intend the meaning attributed by the courts to a particular action.”

Court decisions to date have favored corporate vendors over consumers whose actual online navigating experience using these products and services covered by “wrap contracts” is given insufficient acknowledgement.  No consumer wants to fill out an online form only to be then told to click somewhere else to find buried terms of use, thereby putting at risk the time they have spent entering data to confirm the transaction.    Nonetheless, as Kim concludes:

courts have constructed consent in an entirely unreasonable fashion by twisting doctrinal rules, conjuring up notice, inferring action from inaction, and blithely ignoring the central role of intent in contracts.  They engage in this hocus pocus in order to enforce transactions that they believe provide a net benefit to society.

These “wrap contracts” consumers often unknowingly “agree” to may be buried in the hyperlinks and are not merely proprietary instructions for how to use the product or service.  As Professor Kim explains,   consumers are not only under affirmative obligations in these “wrap contracts,” they may be subject to a smorgasbord of rights-reducing language.   Exclusive jurisdiction, forced arbitration, waived class actions, and the vendor’s one-way reserved rights to change the terms whenever it wants to are aggressive consumer rights reducers, often eviscerating decades of public policy and legal decisions that have afforded consumers their rights.  In some cases, consumers are agreeing to muzzle themselves from complaining about the product or service.  Fine print contracts may not only strip mine the legal rights of consumers, but they can also take or “steal” their property and privacy. 

Wrap ContractsThank you, Professor Kim for spelling it out for all to read.  Not only do consumers not need a pen to sign on a dotted line, or in some cases even a button to click that one “agrees” to terms certainly not read, but “wrap contracts” take it even further.  Consumers don’t even need to know they are agreeing, much less to what set of terms.  Nonetheless, “wrap contracts,” now often “multi-wrap contracts,” as Professor Kim notes, “by their form, permit companies to impose more objectionable terms than paper contracts of adhesion.”

When people begin to understand how their rights are treated in the “wrap contract” rabbit hole, this offends sensibilities.  For those not attuned to the “degradation of consent,” so aptly explained in Professor Margaret Jane Radin’s book Boilerplate, The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and The Rule of Law, this sort of contract peonage is not only unwelcome, it runs counter to everything the non-drafting parties think of as fair play. 

Professor Kim’s use of the term “crook provisions” should not be understated and aligns with popular sentiment when consumers are fully informed of this state of affairs.  Companies now grant themselves the right to “appropriate” -- once known otherwise as “stealing” or, charitably, “taking”-- from consumers for no payment.  They then turn around and make a profit on what heretofore we would have considered the possessions of the consumer, e.g. their content, images, personal information and shopping habits. 

As Professor Kim explains:  “a crook provision anticipates no such offensive action by the consumer and has no direct relationship with the product or services offered by the company.  It is simply an attempt to sneak an entitlement from the user without payment, either in terms of money or goodwill.”     Indeed.

So where is the counteraction to this outright mugging of consumer rights and property?  The ubiquity of these contracts has masked the reality of their potential to do serious harm to consumers such that consumers are not even aware of the magnitude of the problem.   

Kim notes that “What we call something matters.” I agree, and after reading her parade of horrible online scenarios in Chapter 10, “Contracts in Wonderland,” and just how far afield these “wrap contracts” are from the fundamental principles of contract law, I started thinking of new labels for these “wrap contracts” and their innocuous, almost blasé sounding, “terms of use.”  

For lack of a better term at the moment, I think we should nonetheless stop calling them “contracts” and start treating them as the equivalent of “online asbestos.”  Like asbestos in its heyday, manufacturers and service providers use “wrap contracts” everywhere.  They have properties that facilitate commerce but that does not mean that they are not toxic and dangerous for those exposed to them. 

Moreover, like asbestos, some of the dangers will not necessarily emerge for decades when content thieves and data aggregators use consumer information to the detriment of the consumers.  Perhaps due attention will be paid when the content providers, i.e. the consumers/users, begin to realize they cannot expunge those posts from their teens or more uncensored moments that now prevent them from getting hired or getting credit.   Or perhaps regulators will begin to pay sufficient attention to the one-sided misappropriations when serious amounts of data are compromised by those with criminal intent (already it is happening) and with frequency for millions of users.

The question is, how long will it take for U.S.  regulation and the courts to catch up to the need to ban or strictly limit the use of these offensive sword and crook provisions? For asbestos it took at least half a century, while manufacturers whined the whole way about regulation even as they knew for decades of its dangers much as “wrap contract” apologists do now.  No, these “contracts” may not kill you, but they can make your life miserable and we would all breathe better if consumers were treated more fairly. 

Though “online asbestos” may sound hyperbolic in academic circles, there needs to be a massive push back on behalf of consumers – for the nomenclature does matter.  “Terms of use” and “wrap contracts” sound far too innocuous when we know that people do not realize they are being exposed to, and through buried notices alone “agreeing” to, the dangerous loss of their rights and the theft of their property.   To get organized, as we at Fair Contracts educate about and encourage, the tide will not turn until people are fully aware of what happens when they alight on a website.  Ubiquity, harmonization of users, inertia, facility, consumer biases, are all operating to the detriment of consumers and to the advantage of corporate profit seekers.

Professor Kim’s doctrinal adjustments (“a duty to draft reasonably; replacing blanket assents with specific assent; considering contract function when apply existing doctrinal rules, and reinvigorating unconscionability”) are a very solid start, though they are only a beginning.  In some cases, such as replacing blanket assent with specific assents, the proposed remedy may only devolve into the Pavlovian clicking response now exercised by consumers with routine oblivion to the consequences, believing they have little choice if they want the product or service behind the click.  

Courts should be helping consumers enforce their intent, not creating doctrinal chaos as Kim writes by reciting, “law that originates from the paper-based contracting world to this brave new digitally based world when they might be better off acknowledging the difference that contract form and function make to the reasonable expectations of the parties.”  The courts have instead largely given corporations a judicial pass thus far and Professor Kim’s rebalancing of burdens (from the nondrafting party to the drafting party) is the least that they could begin to impose to adjust the invocation of the judicial force of the state.

I think we should be asking for much more on behalf of consumers and could take cues from other countries with more advanced notions of consumer protection and data privacy.  Not only should legislators, regulators and courts protect consumers from exposure to online asbestos by outright banning, or at minimum reforming, many of these harmful provisions, but corporations who have taken rights from consumers should also be required to begin remediation efforts – immediately.  These corporations can start by returning the misappropriated property and other stolen goods to their rightful owners.      

[Posted, on Theresa Amato's behalf, by JT]

 

November 22, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Recent Scholarship, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, November 21, 2013

Wrap Contracts Symposium: Response to Moringiello and Hartzog

 

Wrap Contracts

        It’s my pleasure to respond to Tuesday’s posts from Juliet Moringiello and Woodrow Hartzog.   Juliet Moringiello asks whether wrap contracts are different enough to warrant different terminology.  Moringiello’s knowledge in this area of law is both wide and deep  and her article (Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 1307) greatly informed my thinking on the signaling effects of wrap contracts.  The early electronic contracting cases involved old- school clickwraps where the terms were presented alongside the check box and their signaling effects were much stronger than browsewraps.  Nowadays, the more common form of ‘wrap is the “multi-wrap,” such as that employed by Facebook and Google with a check or click required to manifest consent but the terms visible only by clicking on a hyperlink.  Because they are everywhere, and have become seamlessly integrated onto websites, consumers don’t even see them.  Moringiello writes that today’s 25-year old is more accustomed to clicking agree than signing a contract.  I think that’s true and it’s that ubiquity which diminishes their signaling effects.  Because we are all clicking constantly, we fail to realize the significance of doing so.  It’s not the act alone that should matter, but the awareness of what the act means.   I’m willing to bet that even among the savvy readers of this blog, none has read or even noticed every wrap agreement  agreed to in the past week alone.  I wouldn’t have made such a bold statement eight years ago.    

             Woodrow Hartzog provides a different angle on the wrap contract mess by looking at how they control and regulate online speech.  With a few exceptions, most online speech happens on private websites that are governed by “codes of conduct.”  In my book, I note that the power that drafting companies have over the way they present their contracts should create a responsibility to exercise that power reasonably.  Hartzog expands upon this idea and provides terrific examples of how companies might indicate “specific assent” which underscore just how much more companies could be doing to heighten user awareness.  For example, he explains how a website’s privacy settings (e.g. “only friends” or authorized “followers”) could be used to enable a user to specifically assent to certain uses.  (His example is a much more creative way to elicit specific assent than the example of multiple clicking which I use in my book which is not surprising given his previous work in this area).

                Hartzog also explains how wrap contracts that incorporate community guidelines may also benefit users by encouraging civil behavior and providing the company with a way to regulate conduct and curb hate speech and revenge porn.  I made a similar point in this article.  I am, however, skeptical that community guidelines will be used in this way without some legal carrot or stick, such as tort or contract liability.  (Generally, these types of policies are viewed in a one-sided manner, enforceable as contracts against the user but not binding against the company).   On the contrary, the law – in the form of the Communications Decency Act, section 230- provides website with immunity from liability for content posted by third parties.  Some companies, such as Facebook, Twitter or Google, have a public image to maintain and will use their discretionary power under these policies to protect that image.  But the sites where bad stuff really happens– the revenge porn and trash talking sites – have no reason to curb bad behavior since their livelihood depends upon it.  And in some cases, the company uses the discretionary power that a wrap contract allocates to it to stifle speech or conduct that the website doesn’t like.  A recent example involves Yelp, the online consumer review company that is suing a user for posting positive reviews about itself.  Yelp claims that the positive reviews are fake and is suing the user because posting fake reviews violates its wrap contract.  What’s troubling about the lawsuit, however, is that  (i) Yelp almost never sues its users, even those who post fake bad reviews, and (ii)  the user it is suing is a law firm that earlier, had sued Yelp in small claims court for coercing it into buying advertising.  To make matters worse, the law firm’s initial victory against Yelp (where the court compared Yelp’s sales tactics to extortion by the Mafia) for $2,700 was overturned on appeal. The reason?  Under the terms of Yelp’s wrap contract, the law firm was required to arbitrate all claims.  The law firm claims that arbitration would cost it from $4,000-$5,000.

                I agree with Hartzog that wrap contracts have the potential to shape behavior in ways that benefit users, but most companies will need some sort of legal incentive or prod to actually employ them in that way. 

 

 [Nancy Kim]

November 21, 2013 in Commentary, Contract Profs, E-commerce, Miscellaneous, True Contracts, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wrap Contracts Symposium, Part VI: Eric Zacks on Deciphering the Function of Form in Wrap Contracts

This is the sixth in a series of posts on Nancy Kim's Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications (Oxford UP 2013).   Our sixth guest blogger, Eric Zacks, is an Assistant Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School. 

Deciphering the Function of Form in Wrap Contracts 

Zacks-webForm and function collide again and again in Professor Kim’s engaging Wrap Contracts. As Kim explains, the wrap contract’s form is deeply connected to its function, and her description and devastating critique of these varying forms illuminate the complexities of how we interact with, and are affected by, such contracts. She argues that the form ought to reflect the function of the wrap contract so that users better understand the nature of the contract. In this comment, I seek to address the ways form may already reflect function, albeit not in the manner that Kim necessarily would prefer.

As in industries utilizing paper consumer contracts, competition among businesses that employ wrap contracts demands that they develop a nuanced understanding of how the non-drafting parties and judges interact with contracts. For example, we should not be surprised by contracts that induce deference to the contract as written from the non-drafting parties. To that end, the prevalence of particular wrap contract features, such as the use of multiple hyperlinks to obtain the text of a license or lengthy and complex terms, are unsurprising because they make it more unlikely that non-drafters will try to (or actually) understand the content of the contract. Similarly, delivering the product prior to, or simultaneously with, the “execution” of the contract through the use of shrinkwrap or delaying the opportunity to review contract terms until the website user has sunk time and energy into filling out an order form, deter contract term detection or review and reflect drafters’ sophisticated understanding of individual decision-making processes.

Wrap contracts presumably also could be designed to make the adjudicator comfortable with enforcing the contract as written against the non-drafting party. The “click-through” on a website is a powerful device because it lends itself nicely to a particular counterfactual analysis that “but for” the click, the customer would not have been bound. Because the customer did click, adjudicators typically conclude that she should be held responsible for the terms of the contract. Importantly, this adjudicative response is triggered even though, as Kim notes, “adherents to these contracts to these contracts are typically oblivious to what they have done,” suggesting that the click triggers a psychological response similar to contracts with a more passive means of acceptance (such as simple disclosure of terms).  

Kim’s metaphors of the shield, sword, and crook to explain the different functions of the wrap contracts (Chapter 5) also are helpful because they can help identify the underlying motivation for certain provisions. By understanding whether the primary function of the contract is to protect the drafting party (the “shield”), obtain better transaction terms (the “shield”), or seek benefits beyond the scope of the transaction (the “crook”), we may then speculate as to which form of a wrap contract makes sense from the drafter’s perspective.

Wrap Contracts

If, however, the goal is to prevent the use of the software in a particular manner, then the form of contract as it appears to the adjudicator may be more important than a contract form that deters returns. Accordingly, the contract form may emphasize notice of the terms, if not outright acceptance. I suspect that a “click-through” box may help in this regard, although the blatancy of wrongful or inappropriate use, particularly of free software, may not require an additional volitional act on the part of the user (such as explicit assent to the contract) to convince an adjudicator to enforce the contract as written. The courts, as noted in Kim’s book, typically find notice of non-negotiated terms to be sufficient when such wrongful use has occurred.

Lastly, if the goal is to use the contract as a crook, then a contract that requires a more active acceptance of the contract terms (such as clicking “I agree”) may be preferable from the drafter’s perspective. By being able to point to the specific act of the click and a “better” assent, a drafting party may be better able to extract property rights unrelated to the transaction under adjudicative scrutiny.  The extraction of the property rights by the drafting party may appear wrongful to the adjudicator, but counterfactual analysis surrounding the “explicit” assent to the contract may point to a different result.

With respect to the metaphors described above, I do question whether the distinction between shield and sword holds up sufficiently in many cases. License agreements containing shields and license agreements containing swords essentially provide the user with a restricted license, and the difference between the two types is a bit unclear. For example, Kim describes the restrictions on copying and transferring software discussed in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg as a shield and the restriction on reverse engineering discussed in Davidson & Associates v. Jung as a sword. As each can be described as a shield protecting the licensor from unfair or undesired business practices or a sword preventing the licensee from exercising certain rights, it may be simpler to divide the world of wrap contract provisions into defensive (those that manage business risks related to the license or transaction) and offensive (those that extract rights unrelated to the license or transaction). In any event, the specific categorization does not undercut Kim’s more significant conclusion that the use of shield and sword provisions has enabled the use of crook provisions.

It also would be interesting to know whether these different contract goals and functions do, as an empirical matter, affect the form chosen by the drafting party as described above.  Of course, the judicial slide towards “notice that terms exist” as “consent” noted in Wrap Contracts could somewhat obviate the need for such planning, and the multiple goals of the drafting party also are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Wrap Contracts provides us with a welcome exploration into the connection between form and function in these ubiquitous contracts and suggests how understanding this connection can help us address problematic contracting practices in this still-developing context.  

[Posted, on Eric Zacks' behalf, by JT]

November 21, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Recent Scholarship, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wrap Contracts Symposium, Part V: Michael Rustad on Reforming Wrap Contracts

This is the fifth in a series of posts on Nancy Kim's Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications (Oxford UP 2013).   Our fifth guest blogger, Michael Rustad, is the Thomas F. Lambert, Jr. Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Intellectual Property Law Concentration at Suffolk University Law School. 

Reforming Wrap Contracts

MrustadIn her insightful new book, Nancy Kim contends that “wrap contracts” take the form of a traditional contract but constitute a “coercive contracting environment.” (Nancy S. Kim, Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications 1-3 (Oxford University Press, 2013)). Professor Kim contends that the problem with “wrap contracts” is “their aggressive terms.” (Id. at 4.)  My Suffolk University Law School research team, focusing on contracting practices in social media websites, found strong empirical support for Professor Kim’s argument that wrap contracts are overly aggressive and in need of law reform.  My own empirical work with a team at Suffolk University Law School has uncovered a growing number of social networking sites incorporating mandatory arbitration and anti-class action waivers. (Michael L. Rustad, Richard Buckingham, Diane  D’Angelo, and Kathryn Durlacher, An Empirical Study of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34 University of Arkansas Law Review 1 (2012) (Symposium Issue on ADR in Cyberspace)). 

By incorporating predispute mandatory arbitration clauses into their terms of service, a growing number of social networking sites (SNSs) are divesting consumers of their rights to civil recourse against providers who violate their privacy, commit torts, or infringe their intellectual property rights. SNS users around the world are required to agree to predispute mandatory arbitration as a condition of joining social networking communities. Consumers who enter into “clickwrap” or “browsewrap” terms of service agreements waive their right to a jury trial, discovery, and appeal, without reasonable notice that they are waiving these important rights. American consumers might be surprised that they have agreed to litigate in Mumbai, Hong Kong, or the People’s Republic of China when they clicked agreement to SNS terms of use.  These mandatory arbitration agreements incorporated in terms of use are essentially an anti-remedy because the cost of arbitration will usually exceed the amount at stake.  Requiring consumers to arbitrate in a far-off forum functions is an absolute immunity from liability because the cost and inconvenience of pursuing arbitration will far exceed the damages that could be recovered if they prevail.

Wrap ContractsThe most pernicious of the waivers are those against joining class actions. In our study of predispute mandatory arbitration agreements in social media wrap contracts, we found eleven of the thirty-seven arbitration clauses preclude consumers from initiating or joining class actions. Class action waivers have the practical effect of denying justice to a large number of consumers by divesting them of the right to join with other aggrieved social media users to pursue relief under state consumer law.  Many of the first generation lawsuits against SNSs were class actions or collective proceedings because the damages for any one individual user were too small to make the lawsuit cost-justified. Immunity breeds irresponsibility in the information-age economy, where an increasing number of companies are divesting consumers of any civil recourse by including class action waivers in their terms of service.

The creators of SNS and other wrap contracts are overly aggressive about including anti-class action waivers, in large part, because the U.S. Supreme Court routinely upholds predispute mandatory arbitration clauses and anti-class action waivers.  In a 5-4 decision, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California’s use of state unconscionability law to render class action waivers unenforceable.   Let’s be clear about what Concepcion means for ordinary consumers.  With these rulings, the Court is padlocking the courthouse door to elderly nursing home patients harmed by neglectful caretakers.  Keep in mind that the typical nursing home resident or his caretaker has probably not even read the arbitration clause buried on page 20 or deeper into an admissions contract.  What this means is that if your Mother or Grandmother suffers septic shock from decubitus ulcers caused by neglect, her estate will have no recovery because no lawyer in her right mind will take a case where mandatory arbitration and its running partner, class action waivers are in play.  Trial lawyers do not take nursing home cases to arbitration because of the perception that arbitrators will give lower awards for non-economic damages and almost never award punitive damages.  In my informal survey of attorneys specializing in nursing home neglect, I have been unable to find a single case where a trial lawyer represented a nursing home patient in arbitration.       The Court’s decisions are, in effect, a federal takeover of arbitration, preventing the states and private plaintiffs from challenging one-sided and oppressive consumer arbitration clauses on grounds of unconscionability.  When wrap contracts couple mandatory arbitration clauses with class-action waivers they essentially create a liability-free zone in cyberspace.  Class action waivers preclude Internet users from filing a class action or even joining an existing one. This de facto immunity shields social networking sites from class actions for violations of privacy, contract, tort, or intellectual property rights that would otherwise be recognized in federal and state courts.

Social networking sites that combine mandatory arbitration with anti-class action waivers ensure that these powerful entities will not be accountable for failing to secure and safeguard their users' sensitive personally identifiable information. Social media sites can use the names, likenesses, and personal information of their users with impunity. Consumer class actions are often the only practical alternative in securing legal representation under the contingency fee system in cases where actual compensatory damages are small or nominal. Class actions enable litigants with slight monetary damages claims to combine actions in a representative action.  Without class actions, social networking sites are effectively immunized from the judicial process and may continue unfair practices with impunity.

Professor Nancy Kim’s suggested law reform to police overly aggressive terms in webwraps would be to tip the doctrine of unconscionability on its head.  Her proposed reform for webwraps would presume that these standard forms are unconscionable, except if validated by legislative decree or if there were meaningful alternatives in the marketplace. (Id. at 248).  However, even a revivified unconscionability doctrine will be preempted by the U.S. Supreme Court’s current reading of the Federal Arbitration Act. (“FAA”).  Congress must act to prohibit predispute mandatory arbitration and class action waivers in all types of wrap contracts.  In the end, U.S. companies would benefit from mandatory terms constraining or cabining wrap contracts. 

The golden age of the broad enforcement of U.S. style wrap contracts will end soon because of the increasingly flattened world where U.S. companies license content to European consumers. In Germany, consumers associations have successfully challenged the terms of CompuServe, AOL, and Microsoft: the first was subject to a default judgment; the other two agreed to a binding cease-and-desist declaration. All three American companies have entered into settlements in which they agreed to change their marketing practices. When it comes to consumer rights for wrap contracts, the U.S. is like Mars—and Europe is like Venus.  Europe rejects freedom of contract in consumer transactions, recognizing that this is a legal fiction in non-negotiated standard form contracts. The European Commission takes the position that, even if a consumer assents to an abusive term, it is unenforceable as a matter of law, and European consumers, unlike their American counterparts, cannot be hauled into distant forums and be divested of mandatory consumer protection.  Professor Kim has done a superb job in identifying the problem with wrap contracts, but her solution falls short of addressing problems such as predispute mandatory arbitration and anti-class action waivers.

[Posted, on Michael Rustad's behalf, by JT]

November 21, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Recent Scholarship, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)