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Editor: D. A. Jeremy Telman
Valparaiso Univ. Law School

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Wednesday, May 20, 2015

Rising Minimum Wages

Should salary levels be regulated or mainly left to individual contractual negotiations between the employee and his/her employer?  The former, according to the Los Angeles City Council and governance entities in several other cities and states.  

On Tuesday, Los Angeles decided to increase the minimum salary to $15 an hour by 2020.  Other cities such as San Francisco, Chicago, New York, and Seattle have passed similar measures.  Liberal strongholds, you say?  Think again.  Republican-leading states like Alaska and South Dakota have also raised their state-level minimum wages by ballot initiative.  Some companies such as Walmart and Facebook have raised their wages voluntarily.

But the effect is likely to be particularly strong here in Los Angeles, where around 50% of the work force earn less than $15 an hour.  That’s right: in an urban area with super-rich movie studios, high-tech companies, hotels, restaurants, health companies and much more, half of “regular” employees barely earn a living salary.  In New York state, around one third of workers make less than $15 an hour.  Take into consideration that the cost of living in some cities such as Los Angeles and maybe even more so San Francisco and New York is very high.  In fact, studies show that every single part of Los Angeles is unaffordable on only $15 an hour if a person spends only the recommended one third on housing.  

“Assuming a person earning $15 an hour is also working 40 a week, which is rare for a minimum wage employee, and that they're not taking any days off, they'd be earning $31,200 a year.  An Economic Policy Institute study released in March found that a single, childless person living in Los Angeles has to make $34,324 a year just to live in decent conditions (and that was using data from 2013).”

Opponents, however, say that initiatives such as the above will make some cities into “wage islands” with businesses moving to places where they can pay employees less.  Others call the initiative a “social experiment that they would never do on their own employees” (they just did...)  But “even economists who support increasing the minimum wage say there is not enough historical data to predict the effect of a $15 minimum wage, an unprecedented increase.  A wage increase to $12 an hour over the next few years would achieve about the same purchasing power as the minimum wage in the late 1960s, the most recent peak.”  

Time will tell if the sky falls from the above initiative or if the system in a rich urban area such as Los Angeles can cope.  Said Gil Cedillo, a councilman who represents some of the poorest sections of the city and worries that some small businesses will shut down, “I would prefer that the cost of this was really burdened by those at the highest income levels.  Instead, it’s going to be coming from people who are just a rung or two up the ladder here.”

This is, of course, not only an issue of the value of low-wage work and fending for yourself to not end up at the bottom of the salary chain.  It is a matter of alleviating urban poverty and improving the nation’s overall economy for a sufficient amount of people to better get the economy back on track for more than the few.

May 20, 2015 in Commentary, Current Affairs, In the News, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, May 6, 2015

Unbridled Growth and Companies that Never Learn

This week, Los Angeles City Attorney Mike Feuer famously filed suit against Wells Fargo claiming that the bank's high-pressure sales culture set unrealistic quotas, spurring employees to engage in fraudulent conduct to keep their jobs and boost the company's profits.  

Allegedly (and in my personal experience as I bank with Wells Fargo), the bank would open various bank accounts against its customer’s wills, charge fees for the related “services,” and refuse to close the accounts again for various official-sounding reasons, making it very cumbersome to deal with the bank.  The bank’s practices often hurt its customers' credit rankings.

Employees have described “how staffers, fearing disciplinary action from managers, begged friends and family members to open ghost accounts. The employees said they also opened accounts they knew customers didn't want, forged signatures on account paperwork and falsified phone numbers of angry customers so they couldn't be reached for customer satisfaction surveys.”  

The city's lawsuit alleges that the root of the problem is an unrealistic sales quota system enforced by constant monitoring of each employee — as much as four times a day.  "Managers constantly hound, berate, demean and threaten employees to meet these unreachable quotas," the lawsuit claims.  Last year, 26% of the bank’s income came from fee income such as from fees from debit and credit cards accounts, trust and investment accounts.  The banking industry is currently set up in such a way that around 85% of institutions would go bankrupt if they do not have fee income.  

This comes only three years after Wells Fargo agreed to pay $175 million to settle accusations that its independent brokers discriminated against black and Hispanic borrowers during the housing boom and treated these borrowers in predatory ways.

All this in the name of “growth,” traditionally thought of as the sine qua non of industrialized economies, even in financially tough times where simply maintaining status quo – and not going out of business - would seem to be acceptable for now from at least a layman’s, logical standpoint. 

In recent years, more and more economists have advanced the view that unbridled growth or even growth per se may simply not be attainable or desirable.  After all, we live on a planet with limited resources – financial and environmental - and limited opportunities.  This especially holds true in relation to the “1% problem.”  Nonetheless, questioning growth has been said to be “like arguing against gasoline at a Formula One race.”  So I’m making that argument here, although I acknowledge that I am not an economist: by setting our national (and personal) economies up for ever-continuing growth, we are playing with fire.  There is only so much of a need for various things and services, as the above Wells Fargo suit so amply demonstrates.  Granted, the global population is growing, but much of that growth is in developing nations where people frankly cannot afford to buy many of the products and services often so angrily pushed by modern companies worldwide.  In the Global North, C-level managers are often rewarded via measurements of growth and if they cannot produce the expected growth results, they risk being fired.  Sometimes, simply doing the right thing by customers and employees may actually be enough as long as the company would remain sound and in business.  Of course, this requires a shift in thinking by shareholders who contribute greatly under our current investment models to the demand for never-ending growth.  Overconsumption and waste is a vast ecological problem as well.  It has been said that “we must reform economics to reflect ecological reality: nature is not, after all, just a pile of raw materials waiting to be transformed into products and then waste; rather, ecosystem integrity is a precondition for society's survival.”

Growth is, of course, good and desirable if possible.  But if, as seems to be the case, it’s coming to a point where we destroy our own chances of healthy long-term survival and wreck the emotional and financial lives of employees and clients in the meantime, something is seriously wrong.

May 6, 2015 in Commentary, Current Affairs, Famous Cases, In the News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, May 5, 2015

The Blogosphere Responds to Our Series on Legal Education

ScholarYesterday's post has inspired quite a bit of traffic here and elsewhere.  Over on Brian Leiter's Law School Reports, Michael Simkovic asks whether conditional scholarships are good for law students.  

Deborah Merritt responds on the Law School Cafe and answers the question in the negative.  She thinks conditional scholarships mostly help law schools, and they hurt students by creating a stressful competitive environment.

Michael Simkovic (again on Leiter) disagrees.  He argues that conditional scholarships motivate students to work hard in law school and cites to studies linking motivation and academic performance.

Deborah Merritt shoots back on the Law School Cafe.

And Michael Simkovic again responds on Leiter.  

It is hard for me to keep up with the pace at which these people blog.

I have only a few quick points to make in response to Professor Merritt, whose remarks are largely critical of the position I have taken here:

  • It seems we are all agreed that the disclosure problems related to conditional scholarships have largely been addressed through the ABA website that enables students to comparison shop among scholarship offers from various schools and know their chances of retaining their conditional scholarships.  Some law schools routinely offer a lot of merit scholarships in the first year knowing that most students will not retain them thereafter.  But that information is now easily available, and we will see if students vote with their feet against such a model.
  • Professor Merritt properly chastises me for treating Wikipedia's listing of normalization curves as authoritative.  I think Wikipedia is a good place to start, but my main point is that information about normalization curves should be readily available for each school a student is considering attending.
  • I find the absence of curves in undergraduate grading perplexing, and I find it astonishing that anybody would think non-curves are better than curves.  I could easily design an exam that all my students would ace (above 90% correct) and an exam that all my students would fail (below 60% correct).  But there is nothing holy about base ten, and my aim should not be to design a test so perfectly calibrated that the difference between a 91% and an 89% is meaningful but the difference between 86% and 84% is not.  My aim in assessment is, among other things, to have a tool that helps me distinguish within a group of students who have had the same educational experience.  A curve helps me do that better than random divisions at every point at which the score passes a 0.  
  • Professor Merritt points to a study in which the J.D. placed only sixth in a  ranking of the best graduate degrees.  As if that were a bad thing!  Three of the degrees that ranked more highly are Ph.D. programs likely to take twice as long as the J.D. and the others likely require higher math or computer programming skills.  This extremely high ranking for the J.D. is terrific news.  By the way, the MBA, a frequent alternative to the J.D., ranked 14th.
  • Professor Merritt tells an anecdote about a student who decided not to pursue a J.D. when she learned of conditional scholarships.  She decided to take her graduate tuition dollars elsewhere, but where?  Unless she earned a Ph.D. in statistics, computer science or physics, or a Masters Degree in human computer interaction or  biostatistics, according to the study cited by Professor Merritt, she made a poor choice.

Professor Merritt's second post turns on an anecdote about teaching the same course (torts) the same way to different students and getting very different results.  As a consequence, she had to give students in the "smart section" who did better on the exam worse grades than some students who did worse on the exam in the weaker section.  Three thoughts:

First, one cannot step into the same river twice.  One semester when I taught history at the College of Charleston in the 1990s, I had four sections of Western Civ., all on a Tuesday/Thursday schedule (they were long days!).  Same readings, same outside materials, same assignments, same lecture notes.  Each section developed its own identity.  They were four different courses.

Second, in fifteen years of teaching at both the college and law school level, I have never had a similar problem.  An anecdote is not an argument.  No system of grading is perfect, and I can live with small injustices around the edges of grade normalization.  Whether or not a student retains a conditional scholarship is not determined by her performance in any one course.  

Third, consider the insight of Professor Merritt's plucky college student who decided against a J.D.  Knowing only undergraduate education, the student remarked, “It’s not like there’s a quota on the number of A’s or anything.”  In that world, the undergraduate professor gives A's to all of the students in the "smart section" who "earned" them according to some mysterious but fixed standard.  Outside of the STEM courses, the undergraduate professor can also give As to the best students in the weaker section, even though the same performance would have earned them a B in the "smart section."  Within the STEM courses, imagine the stampede of angry pre-med students from the weaker section who will decry the injustice that there were no A's in their section but eight in the other. I pity the department chair who has to sort out that mess.

Links to Related Posts:

The Current Series 

XI:Another Transparency Issue: Conditional Merit-Based Scholarships
X: Siloing: The Next Unneeded Import from Undergraduate Education
IX: Legal Education in the News and on the Blogosphere
VIII: Myanna Dellinger, Caveat Emptor and Law School Transparency
VII: Myanna Dellinger, On Issue-Spotting and Hiding the Ball
VI: Issue Spotting: A Response to a Comment
V: Did Legal Education Take a Wrong Turn in Separating Skills and Doctrine?
IV: What Is the Place of Core Doctrinal Teaching and Scholarship in the New Curriculum?
III: My Advice to Law School Transparency: Declare Victory and Move On
II: SLOs and Why I Hide the Ball (and Why You Don't Have To)
I: Why Is the Legal Academy Incapable of Standing Up for Itself? 

Related Posts form 2012:

Thoughts on Curricular Reform VI: Preparing the Academically Adrift for Practice
Thoughts on Curricular Reform V: A Coordinated Curriculum and Academic Freedom
Thoughts on Curricular Reform IV: The Place of Scholarship in the 21st Century Legal Academy
Thoughts On Curricular Reform III: The Costs of Change
Thoughts on Curricular Reform II: Teaching Materials
Thoughts on Curricular Reform I: The Problem

May 5, 2015 in Commentary, Teaching, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (11) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, May 4, 2015

Another Transparency Issue: Conditional Merit-Based Scholarships

ScholarOne of the ways in which law schools are allegedly inadequately transparent is in the award of merit scholarships conditional on the students’ achievement of a certain grade point average (GPA), usually 3.0, in law school.  The New York Times set the ball rolling back in 2011, with this article about a law student who lost her scholarship when she only managed a 2.967 GPA.  Law school critics allege that such conditional merit scholarships are a “bait and switch.”  It is an odd claim.  Law schools offer conditional merit scholarships for the same reasons colleges offer them, and there are no claims that the terms of the scholarship are unclear.  Why are law students assumed to be incapable of looking into standard grade normalizations curves for the first year? 

The real mystery is why conditional scholarships for law students come in for so much criticism when they seem to be generally regarded as valuable and successful on the undergraduate level.   The scholarships are, as their name suggests, conditional, and it would be completely unreasonable to continue to grant students merit scholarships when their performance in law school has been disappointing.  Students who lose their merit scholarship have gotten their first year of legal education for free, so what is their harm?  I think the claim for harm is derivative of the larger (and largely baseless) claim that law schools do not benefit their students.

 The Critique

Jerry Organ published an interesting article criticizing competitive scholarships and recommending best practices for the law schools that use them, including better disclosure of scholarship retention rates.  Law School Transparency proposed a new ABA standard that would require all law schools to publish on their websites data about the percentage of students who were able to retain their scholarships after the first year.  

As readers of this blog should know, disclosure is no panacea.  Professor Organ was able to find information about how scholarships work at 160 law schools.  That means that the information was out there.  Since Professor Organ was able to gather information about 160 law schools, it should not be difficult for students to gather relevant information about the one law school that they are considering attending.  Many students can find their law school’s curve by looking on Wikipedia.   Since a lot rides on the decision, one would expect students to investigate, especially since the investigation might not take more than a few mouse clicks.

If law schools were more aggressive and sat down with students offered conditional scholarships and walked them all through the statistics, would anything change?  Would a student choose not to go to law school because she had been told that there was a 50/50 chance that she would lose her scholarship after year 1?  I doubt it.  She would feel confident that she would be one of the successful students and, even if not, she would still have enjoyed a year’s free tuition.

 

Continue reading

May 4, 2015 in Commentary, Law Schools, Recent Scholarship, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (14) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, April 28, 2015

Legal Education in the News and on the Blogosphere

I began this series with the question: Why Is the Legal Academy Incapable of Standing Up for Itself?  Paul Campos thinks we are doing far too much of that, going so far as to compare those of us who think legal education is worth defending with Holocaust deniers.   Fortunately for us, I suppose, this blog isn't on anybody's radar, but in any case I think it bears noting that I value the contributions of people who have shed critical light on legal education, although I don't agree that it is anything approaching a scam.  I have gained valuable insights from the work of Law School Transparency, Brian Tamanaha, Deborah Merritt, and Bill Henderson on our sister blog, The Legal Whiteboard, among others.

That said, there is another side of the story.  Legal education is constantly re-forming itself in fundamental ways.  Clinical education has only been with us since the 70s; legal writing programs took off in a major way in the 80s and 90s.  Both represent fundamental shifts in pedagogy in response to perceived deficits in the legal education model.  Those programs continue to develop and expand, now supplemented with robust ASP programs.  All of these things jack up the costs of legal education and all in the name of better preparing students for the profession.  Nobody is fiddling while our students burn.  In fact, at this point, it is clear that everybody in the debate passionately believes that they have the best interests of our students at heart, and I do not doubt their sincerity.  

Meanwhile, just when you thought it was safe to read what the New York Times has to say about legal education, we get another one-sided piece based on a few anecdotes and one piece of scholarship.  I thought I had a lot to say in response, but others have beaten me to it, so I will just provide the links:

Simkovic on Leiter

Stephen Diamond on his own blog

Brian Galle on Prawfsblawg

Deborah Merritt, on whose scholarship the piece relies, on The Law School Cafe 

Links to Related Posts:

The Current Series 

VIII: Myanna Dellinger, Caveat Emptor and Law School Transparency
VII: Myanna Dellinger, On Issue-Spotting and Hiding the Ball
VI: Issue Spotting: A Response to a Comment
V: Did Legal Education Take a Wrong Turn in Separating Skills and Doctrine?
IV: What Is the Place of Core Doctrinal Teaching and Scholarship in the New Curriculum?
III: My Advice to Law School Transparency: Declare Victory and Move On
II: SLOs and Why I Hide the Ball (and Why You Don't Have To)
I: Why Is the Legal Academy Incapable of Standing Up for Itself?

Related Posts form 2012:

Thoughts on Curricular Reform VI: Preparing the Academically Adrift for Practice
Thoughts on Curricular Reform V: A Coordinated Curriculum and Academic Freedom
Thoughts on Curricular Reform IV: The Place of Scholarship in the 21st Century Legal Academy
Thoughts On Curricular Reform III: The Costs of Change
Thoughts on Curricular Reform II: Teaching Materials
Thoughts on Curricular Reform I: The Problem

April 28, 2015 in About this Blog, Commentary, In the News, Law Schools, Teaching, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Caveat Emptor and Law School Transparency

In this blog series, we recently raised the issue of whether there is sufficient transparency in relation to law schools via, for example, third-party “watchdog” websites and the law schools’ required ABA disclosures.

In my opinion, transparency is a boon to potential law students in this context.  Granted, much information is publicly available to anyone considering law school nowadays.  But for now, choosing a law degree still remains a surprisingly popular choice despite so many warning signs.  Caveat emptor is still a quasi-viable doctrine, that’s true, and some potential incoming students should, as potential future lawyers, learn to discern hope and belief from facts.  But do they?  Not so much, it appears.

Unfortunately, statistics still show that nationwide, only 51% of law graduates are employed in law firm jobs, well below the trend over the past 25 years.   I know, I know, not everyone wants to work for a law firm, but still; only half of our graduates getting a typical job is astonishingly shocking, I think.  An ABA website function lets the general public find out the number of “bar passage required” jobs held by 2013 graduates – not impressive unless the school is highly ranked or in a relatively remote area of the nation.  See another list of the best and worst performers here.

To put this in perspective: the average debt taken on by law school graduates is $84,000 (for public law schools) and $122,580 (for private law schools); a 37% increase over eight years.  Another source found the 2012 median debt to be $140,616.   So, a ballpark figure shows that an “average” student may well be more than $100,000 in debt for a – certainly in some states such as California – less than 50/50% chance of getting a “real” law job. 

Of course, hope springs eternal, and many students beat the odds and end up, over time at least, in good and hopefully mentally rewarding jobs.  For now, though, the more pressure that’s exerted on keeping law schools honest in relation to job prospects, debt, etc., the better, in my opinion.

April 28, 2015 in Commentary | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, April 23, 2015

On Issue-Spotting and Hiding the Ball

As for the series on law school instruction and law schools in general that Jeremy started here recently: count me in!

I agree with Jeremy’s views that issue-spotting is very important in helping students develop their “practical skills,” as the industry now so extensively calls for.  As Jeremy and Professor Bruckner do, I also never give up trying to have the students correctly issue spot, which in my book not only means spotting what the issues are, but also omitting from their tests and in-class analyses what I call “misfires” (non-issues).  In my opinion, the latter is very necessary not only for bar taking purposes, but also in “real life” where attorneys often face not only strict time limits, but also word limits.

But I’ll honestly admit that my students very often fail my expectation on final tests.  Some cannot correctly spot the issues at all.  Many have a hard time focusing on those aspects of the issues that are crucial and instead treat all issues and elements under a “checklist” approach overwriting the minor issues and treating major issues conclusorily.  Yet others seem to cram in as many issues as they can think of “just in case” they were on the test (yes, I have thought about imposing a word limit on the tests, but worry about doing so for fear of giving any misleading indication of how many words they “should” write, even if indirectly so on my part). 

Maybe all this is my fault … but maybe it isn’t (this too will hopefully add to Professor Bruckner’s probably rhetorical question on how to teach issue-spotting skills).  Every semester, I post approximately a dozen or so take-home problems with highly detailed answer rubrics.  I only use textbooks that have numerous practice problems long and short.  I review these in class.  I also review, in class, numerous other problems that I created myself.  I give the students numerous hints to use commercial essay and other test practice sources.  Yes, all this on top of teaching the doctrinal material.  All this is certainly not “hiding the ball.”  Frankly, I don’t really know what more a law professor can realistically do (other than, of course, trying different practice methods, where relevant, to challenge both oneself and the students and to see what may work better as expectations and the student body change).

So what seems to be the problem?  As I see it, it doesn’t help that at least private law schools at the bottom half of the ranking system have to accept students with lower indicia of success than earlier.  But even that hardly explains the problem (who knows what really does).  Some law schools have to offer remedial writing classes and various other types of extensive academic support to students in their first semesters and beyond.  Some of the problem, in my opinion, clearly stems from the undergraduate-level education our students receive.  In large part, this makes extensive use of multiple-choice questions for assessments and not, as future lawyers would benefit from, paper or essay-writing tests or exercises.  Thus, undergraduate-level schools neither teach students how to spot "issues" from "scratch" nor do they teach them how to write about these.  Numerous time have my students told me that they have not really written anything major before arriving in law school.

Why is that, then?  Isn’t that problem one of time and resources; in other words, the fact that not just law professors, but probably most university professors, are required to research and write extensively in addition to teaching and providing service to their institutions?  For example, see Jeremy’s comments on his busy work schedule here.  Something has to give in some contexts.  At the undergraduate level, maybe it’s creating and grading essays and instead resorting to machine-graded multiple-choice questions and not challenging students sufficiently to consider what the crux of a given academic problem is.  Just a thought.  I am, of course, not saying that we should not conduct research.  I am saying, though, that I find it frustrating that lower-level educations, even renowned ones, cannot seem to figure out how to use whatever resources they do, after all, have to train their students in something as seemingly simple as how to write and how to think critically.

At the law school level, some “handholding” and various types of practical assistance is, of course, acceptable.  But to me, the general trend in legal education seems to be moving towards a large extent of explaining, demonstrating, giving examples, setting forth goals, assessments, and so forth.  I agree with what Jeremy said in an earlier post that we should at some point worry about converting the law school education process into one that resembles undergraduate-style (or high school style!) education.

Recall that the United States is not an island unto itself.  Many studies show that our educational system is falling behind international trends.  Where in many other nations in the world (developed and developing), students are expected to come up with, for example, quite advanced research and writing projects for their degrees, we are - at least in some law schools - teaching students just how to write, and what to write about.  This is a sad slippery slope.  Until the American educational sector as such improves, I agree that we should do what we can to motivate and help our students.  But I also increasingly wish that our “millennial” students would take matters into their own hands more and take true ownership of learning what they need to learn for a given project or class with less handholding, albeit of course still some guidance.  Nothing less than that will be expected from them in practice. 

April 23, 2015 in Commentary, Contract Profs, Current Affairs, In the News, Law Schools, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack (0)

Issue Spotting: A Response to a Comment

Howard Law's Matthew Bruckner has posed some challenging questions for me in the comments to the second post in this series.  He writes:

To the point raised in your post though, even experienced lawyers benefit from headnotes on cases, reading treatises, learning to pick up on contextual clues, etc. And your casebook likely has a table of contents that situates the case you're reading in class within a range of issues and sub-issues. I suppose that if you situate the case for the students, there is a risk that students will stop trying to pick up these contextual clues for themselves. But if you don't, there is also a risk that students won't ever appreciate why you read a case in the first instance, etc.

ScholarMatthew has a point.  There are lots of shortcuts to issue spotting for those students who are on top of things enough to use them.  I have a running joke with my students in both contracts and business associations.  If a student has a hard time identifying the issue in the case or (in contracts) tells me that the issue is whether one party breached (always a good place to start), I tell them to check the syllabus and see what subject matter we are covering on that day.  After some laughter and shuffling of papers, we approach an identification of the issue and establish once again that students do not look at syllabi and certainly would not benefit from 12-14 page syllabi identifying SLOs.

But that is just the beginning of an issue-spotting exercise, because as we progress through the semester, I also use issue-spotting as a mechanism of review.  So, for example, when we get to affirmative defenses, we may have cases in which extrinsic evidence, the statute of frauds and interpretive issues also arise.  In discussing damages, in addition to those issues, there might also be questions of affirmative defenses or even problems in formation.  I use Socratic questioning to see if students can find those issues as well.  And I really do aspire to treat the Socratic questions as means of reminding them, through step-by-step questioning, of things they knew in their past life (that is, three weeks ago, when the relevant doctrine was still stored in short-term memory).  For me the Socratic method is, in this instance, both about teaching them the right questions to ask of a case and about reminding them that they can do this on their own.

Matthew Bruckner's comment continues:

We definitely practice reading cases, extracting relevant facts and issues, understanding a case' procedural history in my 1L contracts class. But by second semester, I'm giving them the issue flat out and then we spend the whole class working on legal analysis trying to understand why the court reached the conclusion that it did.

I never give up on issue spotting.  It is not only relevant in the litigation context.  But as I'm sure Professor Bruckner knows, it is also the best mechanism for helping transactional lawyers prevent the contract they are drafting from becoming Exhibit A to the complaint.  Issue spotting is relevant whether the client is coming to you with a transaction gone wrong or a contemplated transaction.  The challenge facing transactional attorneys is all the harder because they have to entertain ideas of what might go wrong and figure out the best way to insulate the client from liability if what might happen does happen.

I am near the end of teaching a bar prep course for the first time.  I had my 3L students write about twenty practice bar exam essays, and at the end of the semester, I am still reminding them: IRAC, IRAC, IRAC.

Links to Related Posts:

The Current Series 

V: Did Legal Education Take a Wrong Turn in Separating Skills and Doctrine?

IV: What Is the Place of Core Doctrinal Teaching and Scholarship in the New Curriculum?

III: My Advice to Law School Transparency: Declare Victory and Move On

II: SLOs and Why I Hide the Ball (and Why You Don't Have To)

I: Why Is the Legal Academy Incapable of Standing Up for Itself?

Related Posts form 2012:

Thoughts on Curricular Reform VI: Preparing the Academically Adrift for Practice

Thoughts on Curricular Reform V: A Coordinated Curriculum and Academic Freedom

Thoughts on Curricular Reform IV: The Place of Scholarship in the 21st Century Legal Academy

Thoughts On Curricular Reform III: The Costs of Change

Thoughts on Curricular Reform II: Teaching Materials

Thoughts on Curricular Reform I: The Problem

April 23, 2015 in Commentary, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Did Legal Education Take a Wrong Turn in Separating Skills and Doctrine?

This is the fifth in a series of posts on reform in legal education.  Related posts are listed at the bottom of this post.

ScholarA few years ago, I was at a conference on national security law, and one of the scholars there, a Navy veteran, suggested that the military had made a wrong turn in entrusting knowledge of the law of armed conflict to JAG officers.  As impressed as he was with the commitment of those JAG officers to the rule of law, he thought it would be better if all officers were expected to know the law of armed conflict rather than having a rudimentary introduction to the relevant law but relying on the expertise of JAG officers in the decision-making process.  The attendant JAG officers were unanimous in their opposition to this notion, and I'm in no position to judge the merits of the claim, but the idea stuck with me.  

I think we have a similar situation in law schools.  In the 1980s and 1990s, law schools created legal writing programs, and they hired a legal writing faculty to teach in those programs.  Like JAG officers with respect to the law of armed conflict, dedicated legal writing faculty members have thought about legal writing -- and related subject matters such as legal reasoning and legal research -- in different and deeper ways than traditional doctrinal instructors had done or now do.  They are our trusty repository of information about how our students think, write and reason and of pedagogical innovations that will help them do better.  

It is a problematic model.  It creates a hierarchical division of labor within faculties, generating resentments on all sides, and it does not serve our students as well as would an integrated curriculum in which legal writing, reasoning and research were treated as integral to every doctrinal course.  Students think that legal writing is a separate subject matter, and they don't all have the instinct to apply the skills, techniques and intellectual habits to which they are exposed in legal writing to their work for doctrinal courses.  

One response has been to ask doctrinal courses to incorporate more skills training into doctrinal courses.  Another has been to add additional courses and required credits in courses in which students work on legal writing and reasoning skills.  To keep with the theme of this series, the result is that traditional legal education gets squeezed.  We are asked to do more in less time.  I propose we consider doing more in more time by integrating legal writing and reasoning into the traditional doctrinal curriculum and eliminate independent writing programs.

Schools have been  very creative in staffing their legal writing programs (involving visiting faculty, contract faculty, adjuncts, VAPs, and tenured and tenure-track faculty in teaching legal writing and research).  There likewise could be innumerable models (which would preferably involve integrating current legal writing faculty members into traditional classroom teaching) for integrating teaching doctrine and skills.

Let the innovations begin!

Links to Related Posts:

The Current Series 

IV: What Is the Place of Core Doctrinal Teaching and Scholarship in the New Curriculum?

III: My Advice to Law School Transparency: Declare Victory and Move On

II: SLOs and Why I Hide the Ball (and Why You Don't Have To)

I: Why Is the Legal Academy Incapable of Standing Up for Itself?

Related Posts form 2012:

Thoughts on Curricular Reform VI: Preparing the Academically Adrift for Practice

Thoughts on Curricular Reform V: A Coordinated Curriculum and Academic Freedom

Thoughts on Curricular Reform IV: The Place of Scholarship in the 21st Century Legal Academy

Thoughts On Curricular Reform III: The Costs of Change

Thoughts on Curricular Reform II: Teaching Materials

Thoughts on Curricular Reform I: The Problem

April 23, 2015 in Commentary, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, April 17, 2015

My Advice to Law School Transparency: Declare Victory and Move On

I'm going to keep this one brief and provocative.

Six years ago, when Law School Transparency (LST) came into existence, law schools had some problems with transparency.  The problems were not actionable.  As Michael Simkovic details here and elsewhere (and I will have many more positive things to say about Simkovic's and Frank McIntyre's scholarship in later posts), law schools have always disclosed employment outcomes in accordance with federal Bureau of Labor Statistics categories of employment and unemployment.  Now, all law schools include on their websites 509 disclosures that are far more detailed about employment outcomes, as well as lots of other useful information about bar passage rates and the scores of incoming students (new 1Ls only, alas).  

The fight is now mostly over debt loads, but again, as Michael Simkovic puts it:

Data from the U.S. Department of Education shows that law students, even at low ranked law schools, remain much less likely to default than most student borrowers.  This is true even though law students typically graduate with higher debt levels.

While student debt loads are a huge concern, law students still are not defaulting on their loans.  

So, at this point what exactly is the purpose of LST's campaign against law schools? 

LST's website identifies its goals as Reform, Information and Accountability.  I would say that LST has succeeded on Information and Accountability.  Don't take it from me.  Here is what Deborah Merritt, who has been quite critical of Simkovic and McIntyre, has to say on the subject:

[T]oday’s law schools publish a wealth of data about their employment outcomes; most of that information is both user-friendly and accurate.

As to LST's main claim on Reform: "American legal education is broken because it is systematically unfair and unaffordable," LST and I will have to agree to disagree.  Still, two out of three ain't bad.  LST can take credit for having contributed to an environment in which law schools are forced to provide information about student outcomes in a way that really helps students make more informed decisions about whether to go to law school or whether to choose a particular school.

Congratulations, LST.  You've won.  You've done some real social good.  You and others have persuaded college graduates not to go to law school.  Unfortunately, that might not be good advice, since Simkovic and McIntyre's research shows that students who go to law school are, on the whole, better off for having done so.  

So you can now declare victory and move on to larger projects.  Why not use your model to attack other sectors of the economy that, when compared with law schools, are much less transparent, much more important, far less inclined to self-criticism and far more resistant to outside calls for change?

 

April 17, 2015 in Commentary, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

SLOs and Why I Hide the Ball (and Why You Don't Have To)

TeachingThe ABA, and I hear, I other accreditation bodies are now looking for faculty members to identify student learning objectives and student learning outcomes (SLOs) on a class-by-class, hour-by-hour basis.  I have been told that there are model syllabi circulating that include such learning objectives and learning outcomes, and that they are 12-14 pages long. 
 
I have Googled the subject and everything the literature I have seen on student learning outcomes and objectives strikes me as thoughtful, sophisticated, and completely misguided as to the nature and purposes of legal education.  Sophisticated schools like Stanford and the University of Connecticut circulate complex documents with graphs and charts and tables about how to draft the perfect SLOs.   These documents are clearly oriented towards undergraduate education.
 
The model syllabi (and PowerPoints) that Hastings Law provides on the subject provide about as much information about SLOs as I typically include in a course description.  But I don't put that course description in my syllabus because it is more usefully placed in our Bulletin, which students look at when they are deciding what course to take.  I could cut and paste the same information into a syllabus, but students will not read it if it is on the syllabus, and I will just waste paper in distributing it.  What really amazes me about the model syllabi that Hastings supplies is that they lack the things that I think make a syllabus valuable: daily schedules of assigned readings, assignments due and topics to be discussed on a given day (which is my preferred version of SLOs).
 
ScholarYou are not a great educator because you announce student learning objectives and student learning outcomes or because you use the words formative and summative assessments to refer to periodic quizzes, homework assignments and a final exam or because you use the word intentional as an adjective usually preceded by "more" when intention is not really a matter of degrees.  All of that jargon just demonstrates that you have drunk the Kool-Aid and not that your students can pass the bar and function as lawyers.
 
Students already cannot be relied on to read my 3-5 page syllabus.  They certainly would not read a 12-14 page syllabus, so adding SLOs to my syllabus just wastes effort and trees.  But that is not my main objection to SLOs.  My main learning objective is to teach law students how to figure out on their own what lessons they are supposed to be deriving from reading cases, statutes, treaties, regulations, deposition testimony or a news story, etc..  Telling students the SLOs undermines my pedagogy.
 
And hiding the ball is part of the pedagogy.  Unless they are dealing with corporate counsel, my students' clients will not come into their offices and say, "I have a contract dispute and I need you to research how these three jurisdictions (the only three that could possibly matter) will deal with different terms under UCC § 2-207."  Even if corporate counsel did say that, a good lawyer will usually have to look over the entire transaction and see if there are additional issues worth looking at.  But the usual situation is that your client tells you a version of the facts and you have to find the legal issues in a fluid situation in which you discover through the use of your legal skills that your client did not tell you the full story.  The process of dealing with that world has to begin in law school, and it will not begin well if I tell my students  at the beginning of every hour what skills or doctrine they are supposed to develop in the next 50 minutes.  
 
Fellow educators: Perhaps you disagree with me.  Perhaps you had terrible experiences as a law student with professors who never told you what you were supposed to be accomplishing in a course, and you would never teach the way you were taught.  To you I say, fine.  If you have found a way to teach that enables you to transmit the material to your students, and your students emerge enriched and empowered, keep doing what you are doing.  My way would not work for you, and your way might not work for me.  But legal education will not be enriched if we replace one system in which everybody teaches the same way (the myth of the Socratic drone faculty) with another system in which everybody teaches law school as if it were college (or high school).
 
 

April 15, 2015 in Commentary, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, April 3, 2015

Playing Fair Down Under

In New Zealand, a ban on unfair terms in consumer contracts has taken effect and will, according to the Commerce Commission, will be enforced starting immediately.   The regulation forms part of the 2013 Fair Trading Act.  Australia introduced a similar ban in 2010.

The Consumer Organization “Consumer NZ” has launched its “Play Fair” campaign to increase awareness of the new law and related consumer issues.   According to Consumer NZ, companies had been given plenty of notice of the upcoming ban and thus to review their contracts in order to remove unfair terms, but had to a large extent failed to do so.

The Act will apply to standard-form consumer contracts often used by electricity retailers, gyms, TV service providers and many others.

But what makes a term “unfair”?  The Act defines a term as unfair if it would “would cause a significant imbalance between the rights of the company and the consumer, is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the company, [or] would cause detriment, whether financial or otherwise, to the consumer if it were to be applied or relied on.”   The Act contains a list of terms that courts are likely to regard as unfair.  This covers terms that would allow a company to unilaterally vary the terms of the contract, renew or terminate it, penalize consumers for breaching or terminating the contract, vary the price without giving consumers the right to terminate the contract, or vary the characteristics of the goods or services to be supplied.  

After intense lobbying by the insurance industry, that industry was exempted from the ban.

Even though this Act is a consumer protection device, only the New Zealand Commerce Commission can, for now, enforce it.  The contemplated fine for violations is $600,000.

In the USA, there are, of course, various statutory and common law protections against unfair terms such as those contained in the UCC as well as fraud protections.  However, the deterrence effect of these does not seem effective in relation to at least some industries.  Alternatively, perhaps the protections are not broad enough, sufficiently well-known, or sufficiently easy to enforce.  Or perhaps people just give up and deal with other companies, or pay what they are asked to do by the companies. 

I personally just spent no less than two hours chatting online with a major health care provider over their sudden allegation that a certain doctor I had used was “not in network” (with me thus allegedly owing a few thousand dollars to the insurance company) despite that particular provider being listed on the provider’s own website as “in network” and the doctor having confirmed this.  Eventually and after numerous contractual and factual arguments, I was able to persuade provider that I was right.  But how many others in my situation would simply give up and cave in to, as was the case, the provider’s repeated bootstrapping arguments that “their ultimate price was fair”?

Only two days later, I heard from a moving company that had agreed to move a car for me for $500 (and confirmed this twice) that the “price is actually $600.”  When I told them no, it is not, they repeated their allegation that “we did not have a contract.”  After telling them a few things about contract formation and modification principles and after declining listening to their attempted, time-consuming warnings about using other companies that were “scam artists,” I am now looking for a new contract another vendor.

Despite whatever legal protections we may officially have in this country against consumer fraud, it is still rampant.  New Zealand’s government enforcement system is interesting, but time will tell if they have more success preventing consumer fraud than we do here.

April 3, 2015 in Commentary, Current Affairs, Legislation, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, April 2, 2015

August Wilson's Two Trains Running and R.2d Section 228

HamI just saw the Goodman Theater's production of August Wilson's Two Train's Running.  It is a great play, and this is a first-rate production in every way.  One character, Hambone, is a reification of contracts injustice.  Hambone painted a fence for an offstage character, Lutz.  Lutz promised to pay Hambone a chicken for his work and a ham if Hambone did an especially good job.  Lutz paid Hambone a chicken.  This occurred nine years prior to the action in the play.  Hambone's lines in the play consist almost entirely of "Give me my ham!" and "He gonna give me my ham!"  At one point, another character teaches him some additional slogans like "Black is beautiful," but Hambone is never too far from his mantra, as the aggrieved non-breaching party.

Although the play never references R.2d § 228, we are clearly in the realm of conditions of satisfaction.  Hambone's entitlement to the ham should have been determined on an objective basis.  All of the characters in the play seem agreed that, were such a standard applied, a finder of fact would certainly award Hambone a ham.  But Hambone is Black, poor, and ill-equipped for a legal battle.  Lutz is white and so powerful that he is able to define Hambone's character without ever suffering the indignity of appearing on stage. 

Does Hambone ever get his ham?  I don't want to give away too much so I will just say, yes and no.

April 2, 2015 in Commentary, Miscellaneous | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, March 30, 2015

On a Lighter Note: Valet Service Companies Needing to Take Crash Course on Contracts

Earlier this month, Los Angeles-area media reported a somewhat humorous of a valet service that gave away a relatively expensive new car to a random guy claiming that he had "lost the [valet] ticket."  Yup, the valet service actually just gave the car to the man who was sporting an Ohio state tattoo.  (Of course, this story is not funny for the frustrated car owner).

But wait, the story gets weirder than that (it is, after all, LA, where we worry a lot about our cars...): the valet service sent the responsible employee home and referred the customer to his insurance company.  Initial reports indicated that the insurance company did not want to pay for this loss as no theft had occurred... as is always the case, however, the media did not follow up on the end of this story, to the best of my knowledge.

Another valet contract that you must read and that was shared today on the AALS listserv for Contract Professors reminded me of this story.  Hat tip to Professor Davis!

Contract

Valet companies may have to brush up on their contract writing skills soon...

March 30, 2015 in Commentary, Contract Profs, Current Affairs, Famous Cases, In the News, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, March 26, 2015

Water Contracts and Adequate Assurances (to Continue Business as Usual)

Some weeks ago, I blogged here about water rights and shortages in drought-ridden California.  Of course, California is not the only state where contractual water rights interface with development and public health concerns. 

In Ohio, shale driller Gulfport Energy recently filed suit against the town of Barnesville for rights to extract water for Gulfport’s fracking operations.  Gulfport had a contract with Barnesville entitling it to draw water from a local reservoir at one cent per gallon.  Under the contract, Gulfport would be able to draw the water unless the village determined that such action would endanger public health.  Water rights were subsequently also issued to another driller.  In the fall of 2014, the village told Gulfport to stop drawing water from the reservoir because of too low water levels.  Gulfport’s suit now asks for adequate assurances of performance of the water contract to ensure that it can continue its fracking operations. 

Whether that is a good idea is another story.  From a short-term perspective: yes, we need energy preferably domestically sourced to avoid international supply interruptions and the geopolitical problems that are associated with importing energy raw materials.  But fracking and fossil fuel production in general are associated with other severe problems including heavy water usage in the case of fracking.  Such water, the argument goes, is better used for other things such as farming and household consumption. 

Business as usual for fracking companies may not be the best idea seen from a societal point of view.  Contracts rights are only a small part of this much bigger problem.  However, time seems to have come for governments to incorporate escape clauses not only for “public health concerns” into water contracts, but also for drought concerns.  This is not always done, as the above case shows, but such a relatively easy step could help solve at least some contractual disputes.  In times of increasing temperatures and decreasing rainfall in some areas, such contract drafting may well make sense.

March 26, 2015 in Commentary, Current Affairs, Food and Drink, Government Contracting, True Contracts | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Where Congress Won't Act, Private Ordering Fills a Gap

ThermometerToday's New York Times reports that Microsoft will require the companies with which it partners, its contractors and vendors who employ more than 50 workers, to provide their employees who do work for Microsoft with 15 days of annual paid sick leave and vacation time.  Microsoft expects that it will have to increase its pay to these partners to help them with the added expense of the policy.  

As the Times points out, it is a very American approach to the protection of workers' rights.   Congress will not act and only a few state legislatures have done so.  Microsoft, like other large technology companies, can afford to provide decent wages and benefits to its workers.  However, companies increasingly prefer to contract work out to small companies that do not treat their workers nearly as well.  

The Times notes that the gap is not only between skilled computer programmers and unskilled or semi-skilled janitors or groundskeepers but also between whites and African Americans and Latinos.  While the latter, traditionally-underrepresented minorities account for our 3-4% of tech workers, they account for 75% of janitorial and maintenance workers.  Eschewing Google's and Facebook's approaches of replacing contract workers with its own employees, entitled to company benefits, Microsoft has explained its move in a manner also consistent with the great American tradition of enlightened self interest.  Microsoft general counsel explained that: 1) happy workers are more productive; and 2) sick workers who come to work can infect others.  

This move can have a big impact, especially if other major companies follow Microsoft's lead, but I'm not sure that the effects will all be good for workers.  If a contractor has some workers that work for Microsoft and some that don't, the Microsoft jobs suddenly become highly sought-after.  A company may try to stay below the 50-employee threshold to avoid the private regulation.  Or it may divide Microsoft work among its staff (in the interests of internal morale), which might dilute the effects of the regulation.  If you do only 20% of your work for Microsoft, do you only qualify for three days of vacation/sick leave?  It may take a few years (and a few contracts disputes) to work out the kinks.

March 26, 2015 in Commentary, In the News, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, March 19, 2015

When Contractual Consent Isn't Enough

The problem with constructive consent, or substituting "manifestations of assent" for actual assent, in consumer contracts is that consumers often aren't aware what rights they've relinquished or what they have agreed to have done to them.  Too bad for consumers, right?  Well, it's also too bad for companies.  Companies that rely on contracts to obtain consumer consent may find that what suffices for consent in contract law just won't cut it under other law that seeks actual consumer consent.  Michaels, the arts and crafts store chain, found that out the hard way.  They were recently hit with two class action lawsuits alleging that their hiring process violates the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).  Job applications clicked an "I Agree" box which indicated "consent" to the terms and conditions which authorized a background check on the applicant.  As this article in the National Law Review explains, the FCRA requires that job applicants receive "clear and conspicuous" standalone notice if they are seeking consent from applicants to obtaining a background report.  A click box likely won't (and shouldn't) cut it.  Contracts that everybody knows nobody reads shouldn't be considered sufficient notice.  It would, of course, be much simpler if contractual consent were more aligned with actual human behavior....

March 19, 2015 in Commentary, Current Affairs, Labor Contracts, Legislation | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, March 16, 2015

Facebook Cares about Privacy (for Facebook Executives)

The New York Times reported yesterday on the rise of a new type of non-disclosure agreement in connection with home construction.  Basically, rich people associated with the tech industry are making everyone who works on their homes sign sweeping non-disclosure agreements.  

Times reporter Matt Richtel posed a number of questions to workers outside a home that, court documents from a different case reveal, is being renovated for an undisclosed Facebook executive (pictured).  He was able to extract only answers like, "I'm an electrician working on a house."  As to which house, workers would gesture towards a neighborhood and say "one of the ones over there."  But the mystery was not too difficult to solve, as workers swarmed "like ants" on the home, and they have been working on it for two years.  

Matt Richtel does a great job highlighting the irony of the situation.  He quotes Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, commenting on Facebook's privacy policies, as follows:  “People have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and different kinds, but more openly and with more people.”  And yet, in correspondence disclosed in the other case referenced above, Mr. Zuckerberg's attorney wrote, "Mr. Zuckerberg goes to great lengths to protect the privacy of his personal life.”

There is no necessary contradiction between Mr. Zuckerberg's desire to maintain his own privacy and his belief that other people choose not to protect their own.  But Facebook has been pretty aggressive in eroding privacy, in part through a libertarian paternalism in which all the default choices lead to a surrender of privacy, or through extracting waivers of privacy rights by contractual means that do not rise to the level of meaningful, knowing consent.

So yeah.  This is ironic.

March 16, 2015 in Commentary, In the News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, March 6, 2015

Twitter and Cyberbullying - Can Contracts Help?

The always excellent Bob Sullivan recently wrote a post on his blog about the nastiness that resulted from Curt Schilling's proud daddy post.  (The nastiness is seriously nasty).  As Sullivan points out, and which I've argued here and here, online companies like Twitter have a business responsibility to make sure the services they offer are safe.  Online, of course, everything turns into a debate about free speech, even when the so-called speech is obviously obscenity (and please, don't argue with me about this one - if you saw the tweets, you would agree that a "reasonable person" would think they were obscene) and even though the billion dollar companies are not state actors.  The problem is that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act has been construed very broadly by courts to protect websites like Twitter from liability for content posted by others.  That gives these companies little incentive to invest resources into policing their sites.  But as Sullivan notes, if they don't start to clean up their sites, people might start leaving in droves. 

So what should businesses do?  One thing they could do is start taking their contracts seriously.  We are all familiar with clickwrap and browsewrap agreements that nobody reads.  They often contain codes of conduct or, in the case of Twitter, "content boundaries."  Companies can start making these agreements more readable and salient.  They can start by actually enforcing them.  For example, Twitter can enforce their content boundaries by kicking users off the site or charging them a fine for violating the rules (maybe after a warning) which may help defray the costs of policing the site....They can also design their contracts so they are more readable and post a "warning" that abusive tweets will be subject to a fine or suspension and force users to "click" to acknowledge they have read the warning.  I suspect that many who tweet impulsively later regret it so a warning at point of posting/sending might make some think twice. 

I realize that hiring people to evaluate each reported post might take time so that the best solution would be software that flags certain posts and sends a warning to the user to reconsider the post.  It could also contain a reminder that the user will be liable for damages if the tweet is defamatory.  All this scary stuff is in the contract - but because it is contained behind a hyperlink, few users will actually read it.  An email delivered to the users, reminding them of their contractual obligations and the scary things (public condemnation, suspension or expulsion from the site, liability for lawsuits, maybe even criminal prosecution if the tweet is threatening enough) that might happen to them if they violate these obligations, might be more effective.  Some users may voluntarily take down the post in response to the automated email which may cut down on the number of tweets subject to human review. 

Of course, contracts can only do so much, but they might help.

 

March 6, 2015 in Commentary | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, March 5, 2015

Artistic license

Artistic License

The official portrait of former President Bill Clinton has been completed.  See it here.   It was painted in the “conservative realistic style” … maybe a little too realistic and not sufficiently conservative?

According to the artist, Nelson Shanks, the bluish shadow of a person that you see on the mantelpiece next to Clinton is that of Monica Lewinski in her infamous blue dress.  You got that right: the artist himself has admitted that he purposefully scarred the picture just as the Lewinsky scandal scarred Clinton’s second term.  The artist has apparently caught quite some flak for having done this.  Regardless of artistic freedom and setting aside all thoughts about the scandal per se, what is, after all, at issue here is a contract for artwork depicting a former President of the United States of America.  A bit more respect may have been in order.  This was not any regular client having a portrait done; it’s in effect the entire nation that commissioned this work.  Perhaps a subjective satisfaction clause would have been in order here.  Even if it had been any “regular” client, deliberately depicting one’s paying client in a highly controversial light seems to me to be in questionable taste. 

On the other hand, the argument has been made that if the artist had been held to certain contractual stipulations, the portrait of the 42nd President would have been “stiff and untrue.”  

That’s not the case?  Take a look and judge for yourself.  While much has been made of Clinton holding an actual, gash, newspaper – so retro – the strange positioning of his fingers on his hip looks more bizarre to me.  An indication of his alleged two-sided look at what constituted “the truth” in certain contexts?  To me, it looks more like the V sign for, perhaps, Clinton’s ultimate victory over at least some of the political and other challenges he faced.  

 

 

 

March 5, 2015 in Commentary, Government Contracting, In the News, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)