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Monday, November 18, 2013

Wrap Contracts Symposium, Part I: Ryan Calo

This is the first in a series of posts on Nancy Kim's Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications (Oxford UP 2013).   Today's contributor, Ryan Calo, is an assistant professor at the University of Washington School of Law  and the Faculty Director of the Tech Policy Lab at the University of Washington.  He previously served as a director at the Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society (CIS) where he remains an Affiliate Scholar.  

Ryan Calo

I am delighted to contribute to this online symposium around Nancy Kim’s new book, Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Recommendations.  Even if you are closely familiar, as I am, with Kim’s previous work, I recommend picking up a copy; the author both synthesizes and meaningfully extends her important thinking on the evolving role of contracts in a digital world.  The sophisticated practitioner, too, has something to gain, particularly from later parts of the book where Kim explores the origins and strategic uses of wrap contracts and makes recommendations that attorneys may one day encounter in a court opinion or Federal Trade Commission complaint. 

Indeed, Kim is one of only a handful of legal scholars (another is Woodrow Hartzog, whom Kim mentions) who engage in a sustained way with the growing importance of interface design (i.e., the very look and feel of a website or digital product) on contemporary contract formation and enforcement.  You see this, for instance, in her wonderful discussion of responsible drafting in Chapter 11.  And while I cannot show causation, as opposed to correlation, I would note that the Federal Trade Commission has in recent years brought enforcement proceedings based in part on interface design, in one case hiring a human-computer interaction specialist to act as an expert witness.

What has most amazed me in my own examination of this space is the range of possibilities the digital environment offers.  If there were one critical note I would sound about Kim’s otherwise substantively and methodologically comprehensive book, it is that she does not always countenance the full boundaries of consumer experience.  Kim cites to Oren Bar-Gill (at page 83) for the proposition that the growing complexity of contracts hides their true costs from the imperfectly rational consumer.  Kim also develops various scenarios in Chapter 10 meant to underscore the powerlessness consumers feel to address conflicts with web companies.  But the prospect for mischief is worse still: As the short title of Bar-Gill’s book, Seduction By Contract, suggests, companies may leverage what they know about consumer psychology to design purposefully disadvantageous terms.  I would (and do) go further in forthcoming work, arguing that firms increasingly control every aspect of their interaction with consumers.  We should expect this control, coupled with the firms’ meticulous knowledge of consumers and their economic incentive to maximize profit, to lead to a wider variety of digital abuses than Kim acknowledges.  Contract becomes not a just a shield against liability here but, in a few instances, a species of license for ethically questionable business practices.

Wrap ContractsSimilar criticisms could focus on Kim’s pessimistic assessment of the potential prospective advantages that a more mediated world might have for consumers. Kim explores how a better understanding of design can improve disclosure and contract in an online environment.  I certainly agree, as Kim notes, that the digital nature of contemporary commerce could result in enhanced disclosure, and maybe even drag notice beyond inscrutable prose and into the twenty-first century.  But what I expected and did not see—what I hope still to see from Kim—is a response to the work of Scott Peppet.  Peppet argues that increased digitalization could, if anything, strengthen the traditional understanding of freedom of contract by conferring on consumers radical new tools of evaluation and comparison.  I would want to understand why the dangerous ascendance of wrap contracts is not substantially offset by other digital developments that empower consumers.  (Eric Goldman recently made this comment about my work, so it is top of mind).

To summarize: Kim’s is a rich and engaging book that I would recommend to anyone who is intellectually curious about consumer contracts or whose professional life in some way depends on them.  I learned a lot and agree with many of Kim’s recommendations.  By way of critique, I would say only that Kim’s book does not answer every single fascinating question about digital contract.  Perhaps no book could, nor would I necessarily want hers to.  Then I would not so eagerly anticipate Kim’s future work. 

[Posted, on Ryan Calo's behalf, by JT]

November 18, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Recent Scholarship, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, November 17, 2013

Introducing our Virtual Symposium: Nancy Kim's Wrap Contracts

KimThe symposium marks the publication of Nancy Kim's Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications (Oxford UP 2013).   Next wek, this blog will publish posts by experts from around the country commenting on Nancy's work.  Here is Oxford's bullet point summary of the book's virtues:

  • Explains why wrap contracts were created, how they have developed, and what this means for society
  • Uses hypotheticals, cases, and real world examples
  • Discusses court decisions with summary critiques
  • Provides doctrinal solutions grounded in law and policy
  • Defines and distinguishes different types of contract terms
  • Includes actual wrap contract terms, flow charts, checklists and other visual aids to explain legal concepts

The following people will be adding their own thoughts and comments on the blog next week:

CaloRyanRyan Calo is an assistant professor at the University of Washington School of Law.  He researches the intersection of law and emerging technology, with an emphasis on robotics and the Internet. His work on drones, driverless cars, privacy, and other topics has appeared in law reviews and major news outlets, including the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and National Public Radio. Professor Calo has also testified before the full Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate.

Professor Calo serves on numerous advisory boards, including the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the Future of Privacy Forum, and National Robotics Week. Professor Calo co-chairs the Robotics and Artificial Intelligence committee of the American Bar Association and is a member of the Executive Committee of the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) Section on Internet and Computer Law. 

Professor Calo previously served as a director at the Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society (CIS) where he remains an Affiliate Scholar. He also worked as an associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Covington & Burling LLP and clerked for the Honorable R. Guy Cole on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Prior to law school at the University of Michigan, Professor Calo investigated allegations of police misconduct in New York City.

You can read Professor Calo's work on SSRN and follow him on Twitter.

CherryMiriam A. Cherry is a visiting professor at the University of Missouri School of Law and a tneured professor law at Saint Louis University. Her scholarship is interdisciplinary and focuses on the intersection of technology and globalization with business, contract and employment law topics. In her recent work, Professor Cherry analyzes crowdfunding, markets for corporate social responsibility, virtual work and social entrepreneurship. Her articles will appear or have appeared in the Northwestern Law ReviewMinnesota Law ReviewWashington Law ReviewIllinois Law Review,Georgia Law ReviewAlabama Law Review, Maryland Law Review, and the Tulane Law Review, and U.C. Davis Law Review, among others. 

Professor Cherry attended Dartmouth College and Harvard Law School, where she was a research assistant to Professor Martha Minow, the present dean. After graduation from law school, she clerked for Justice Roderick Ireland of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and then for Judge Gerald Heaney of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In 2001, a transition to the private sector took Professor Cherry to the Boston firm of Foley Hoag LLP, where she practiced corporate law with an emphasis on mergers and acquisitions, securities compliance filings, venture capital and private debt financing. She was also associated with the firm of Berman, DeValerio & Pease, where she was involved in litigating several accounting fraud cases including those against former telecom giant WorldCom and Symbol Technologies, which resulted in a $139 million settlement.

Professor Cherry has been on the faculty or visited at a number of law schools, including the University of Georgia, University of the Pacific-McGeorge School of Law and Cumberland School of Law. In 2008, she was elected a member of the American Law Institute.

You can read some of Professor Cherry's scholarship on SSRN.

WhartzogWoodrow Hartzog is an Assistant Professor at Samford University's Cumberland School of Law, which he has taught since 2011. Professor Hartzog writes in the area of privacy law, online communication, human-computer interaction, robotics, and contracts. His work has been or is scheduled to be published in scholarly publications such as the Columbia Law Review, California Law Review, and Michigan Law Review and popular publications such as The Atlantic and The Nation.

Before joining the faculty at Cumberland, Professor Hartzog worked as a trademark attorney at the United States Patent and Trademark Office in Alexandria, Virginia and as an associate attorney at Burr & Forman LLP in Birmingham, Alabama. He has also served as a clerk for the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington D.C. and was a Roy H. Park Fellow at the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Professor Hartzog holds a Ph.D. in mass communication from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, an LL.M. in intellectual property from the George Washington University Law School, a J.D. from the Cumberland School of Law at Samford University, and a B.A. from Samford University. He is an Affiliate Scholar at the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School.

Recent and Forthcoming publications include:

The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2014) (with Daniel J. Solove).

Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming 2014).

Social Data, 74 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming 2013) (symposium).

Obscurity by Design, 88 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 385 (2013) (with Fred Stutzman) (symposium).

The Fight to Frame Privacy, 111 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 1021 (2013) (book review).

The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1 (2013) (with Fred Stutzman).

Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 657 (2012) (symposium).

Morigiello_9970 (1)Juliet Moringiello is a Professor at Widener University School of Law, where she regularly teaches Property, Sales, Secured Transactions, and Bankruptcy, and has taught seminars on Cities in Crisis and Electronic Commerce. From 2004 – 2010, she was the co-author, with William L. Reynolds, of the annual survey of electronic contracting law published in The Business Lawyer. She has recently published articles in the Maryland Law Review, the Wisconsin Law Review, the Fordham Law Review, and the Tulane Law Review. Prof. Moringiello has held several leadership positions in the American Bar Association Business Law Section, most recently in its Cyberspace Law Committee, and she is co-chair of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Business Law Section. 

Recent Publications Include:

MrustadMichael Rustad is the Thomas F. Lambert, Jr. Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Intellectual Property Law Concentration at Suffolk University Law School. He has authored numerous books and articles, including In Defense of Tort Law that he coauthored with Thomas Koenig. His current books are titled Software Licensing: Principles & Practical Strategies (2013) and Global Internet Law in a Nutshell (2013).  Among his recently published articles are “Reconceptualizing Consumer Terms of Use for A Globalized Knowledge Economy” (2012) with Vittoria Onufrio, and “Reconceptualizing the BP Oil Spill as Parens Patriae Products Liability” (2012) with Thomas H. Koenig.  He is writing the first hornbook on Global Internet Law for West Publishing Company.  Professor Rustad received his PhD from Boston College, his JD from Suffolk University and his LLM from Harvard University.

Recent Publications Include:

  • SOFTWARE LICENSES: PRINCIPLES & PRACTICAL STRATEGIES (Oxford University Press, 2d ed., forthcoming 2013 ) 
  • GLOBAL INTERNET LAW (HORNBOOK SERIES) (forthcoming 2013 ) 

ZacksEric Zacks  is an assistant professor of law at Wayne State University Law School. His recent scholarship focuses on the relevance of behavioral sciences to contract formation, breach, and enforcement. His work has been published in the University of Cincinnati Law Review, the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, and the Penn State Law Review, and his forthcoming article, Shame, Regret, and Contract Design, will be published in the Marquette Law Review. 

In 2012 and 2013, Professor Zacks was voted Professor of the Year by the second- and third-year law students at Wayne. He teaches a variety of business law courses, including Corporate Finance, Mergers and Acquisitions, Securities Regulation, and Corporations, as well as a first-year Contracts course. 

Prior to joining Wayne State, Professor Zacks was a partner in the corporate and securities department of Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP, a Detroit law firm, with a practice focus on complex acquisitions and divestitures, debt and equity financings, and other aspects of corporate transactions. He received his J.D., magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School and his B.A., with high distinction, from the University of Michigan.

Recent Publications Include:

  • "Shame, Regret, and Contract Design," 97 Marq. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming, 2013)
  • "Contracting Blame," 15 U. Pa. J. Bus. L.. 169 (2012)
  • "Unstacking the Deck? Contract Manipulation and Credit Card Accountability,"78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1471 (2011)
  • "Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the Class Action Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation," 110 Penn St. L. Rev. 1 (2005) (with Joshua D. Blank) reprinted in Class Action Litigation and Limitations (Icfai University Press, 2008).


November 17, 2013 in About this Blog, Books, Contract Profs | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, October 30, 2013

Love, Death and Contracts in "The Forsyte Saga"

John Galsworthy

A contract dispute powers A Man of Property, the first volume of John Galsworthy's The Forsyte Saga, to its conclusion.  Now, I admit, the synopsis that follows is not based on the novels, which I have not read.  It is based on the 2002/2003 television mini-series.  I will happily stand corrected if any Galsworthy fans want to point out discrepancies between the film and novel accounts of the contracts case.

Soames Forsyte loved his wife Irene, but he wanted to possess her, and she only consented to marry him.  Difficulties arose when Irene took an interest in a young architect, Bosinney, who was to wed Soames's second cousin (I believe), June.  

Soames, unaware at this point of the connection between Bosinney & Irene, decides to build a country home to get Irene away from the distractions of London -- in particular he means to separate her from June.  Meanwhile, Bosinney and Irene become lovers, and at the same time, rather unwisely, Bosinney keeps raising the contract price for the home he builds for Soames.

Bosinney and Irene finally push Soames beyond all endurance, and he decides to sue Bosinney for breach of contract because Bosinney has exceeded the agreed-upon, adjusted contract price for the house.  Bosinney is in a bad spot.  He can't afford to pay Soames for the extra costs -- they approach Bosinney's annual income.  Nor can he afford to have a breach of contract claim hanging over him in connection with his first major project.  Indeed, based on the success of his first project, other well-bred Englishmen are beginning to approach him as potential clients, but when they learn of his dispute with Soames, all is put on hold.

From the outset, one senses that Soames has Bosinney cornered and will destroy him.  Bosinney believes, rather absurdly, that he can win the case, but Soames is a solicitor and he can hire the best trial lawyer in London.  Bosinney hasn't a chance.  Perhaps it's all for the best then when he is run over by a carriage and killed just before the case is lost.  Soames ends up selling the house to his Uncle.  The sale price might give us a better sense of the extent of the legal injustice wrought in Forsyte v. Bosinney.



October 30, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Film | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, October 18, 2013

U. of Chicago Law to Host Panel on the Contracts Scholarship of Douglas Baird

Baird, Douglas 2013Lunchtime Panel: Baird's Contracts
Date: Wednesday, October 23, 2013 - 12:15pm - 1:30pm
 Classroom II
Contact info: Marjorie Holme,

Reconstructing Contracts: The Contracts Scholarship of Douglas Baird

A panel of leading scholars discuss Douglas Baird's pathbreaking work on Contract Law published in his new book "Reconstructing Contracts."

  • Avery Katz, Vice Dean and Milton Handler Professor of Law, Columbia Law School
  • Stewart Macaulay, Malcolm Pitman Sharp Professor & Theodore W. Brazeau Professor, University of Wisconsin Madison Law School
  • Ariel Porat, The Alain Poher Chair in Private Law, Faculty of Law, Tel Avivi University

Moderated by Omri Ben-Shahar, Leo and Eileen Herzel Professor of Law and Economics and Kearney Director of the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics, University of Chicago Law School

Lunch will be provided.



October 18, 2013 in Books, Conferences, Contract Profs, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Monday, October 7, 2013

Contracts and "The Little Mermaid"

One of my students, Maison Haines (pictured) gave herself a practice exam by writing up a summary of the contracts issues in Disney's film, The Little Mermaid.  Indeed, there is much of value to be learned from the exercise, some of which relates to defenses and so was beyond Maison's contracts education at this point.  Still, I have used her essay as a point of departure for this post.  

Maison summarizes the plot as follows:

    Ariel, a hopeless romantic mermaid, defies her father by constantly going to the . She dreams of living on land and how wonderful it would be. . . . One night, she notices bright lights in the sky, so she once again wanders to the surface to investigate. She swims upon a ship with none other than Prince Eric aboard it. She notices the dapper prince right away because he is handsome and is playing the snarfflak [flute]. She falls in love immediately. . . .  Meanwhile, the wicked witch Ursula is keeping a close eye on King Triton’s youngest daughter. Ursula is looking to get revenge on King Triton, and what better way than through his curious, love-struck daughter. Ursula proposes an offer to Ariel, which is really where our story begins.

    The wicked witch offers to turn Ariel into a human for three days. Ursula tells Ariel about how she can be with her prince, fall in love, and live happily ever after. Ursula tells Ariel she can remain a human forever if she makes Eric fall in love with her. He has to prove his true love for her by kissing her before “the sun sets on the third day.” The only thing Ursula wants in payment is Ariel’s voice. . . . Next, Ariel signs on the dotted line, loses her voice to the sea witch, and makes her way to the surface of the water where she will live for the next three days.

Now, as it turns out, our blog is not the first blawg to consider the contractual issues in Disney's The Little Princess.  Findlaw's Legal Grounds blog posted on the subject back in August and The Utter Meaninglessness of Everything (Meaninglessness) blog did so back in 2008.  There is considerable overlap among the posts.

All noticed, for example that Ariel's contract with Ursula should have been voidable, because Ariel was an infant (under 18) when she signed it.  Maison expressed outrage that the whole plot of the movie is now implausible to her because the infancy doctrine precludes most of it.  Never fear!  We don't actually know whether the infancy rule applies under the sea.  

In addition, Ariel also has a strong argument that Ursula did not act in good faith.  She interfers in various ways with Ariel's attempts to get Eric to kiss her, sending her eels to interrupt a kiss and ultimately seducing Eric herself with the help of Ariel's purloined voice and a bit of magic.  Once again thought,  it may be asking a bit too much to apply these concepts to the watery realms inhabited by the parties to this agreement.  After all, can one really make a straight-faced claim that Ursula the Sea Witch did not perform her contract in good faith?  She's a sea witch.  If you want a fair deal, try Glinda. 

Legal Grounds thinks the contract may be void for vagueness, as the key term "true love's kiss" is unclear.  I'm not sure I buy that one, as the parties do not seem to be in any doubt.  It's a Disney movie, after all, so the ingredients for true love's kiss are: prince, two-legs, pulse (functioning neurons optional).  

Little MermaidMeaninglesness suggests that Ariel's father, King Triton, could have declared the contract void as contrary to public policy, which seems about right, except that I'm not entirely comfortable with empowering the executive with authority to avoid commercial contracts involving family members.  I think, under the sea, an Article Trident judge ought to make that call.

But getting back to Maison's take on all this, she points out that, after Triton's failed attempt to avoid the contract by blowing it up with his Trident, the contract was effectively modified.  Triton offers himself up in Ariel's place in Ursula's collection of unfortunate souls.  His agreement with Ursula is made in consideration of Ursula's promise to free Ariel.  But Ursula is now no mere sea witch, she is the ruler of the seas, and things don't look so great for Ariel and Eric.  Fortunately, the happy couple is able to impale Ursula, disembowel her and then ride the stream of entrails into calmer and more familiar seas.  Or that's how I remember it.  I haven't watched the movie in a while.

The Hans Christian Anderson story on which the movie is based is similar but much, much stranger.  In Anderson's version (memorialized in the statute above right), the sea witch is even more grotesque than in the movie, and here is what she offers the little mermaid:

 I will mix you a potion. Drink it tomorrow morning before the sun rises, while you are sitting on the beach. Your tail will divide and shrink, until it becomes what human beings call 'pretty legs.' It will hurt; it will feel as if a sword were going through your body. All who see you will say that you are the most beautiful human child they have ever seen. You will walk more gracefully than any dancer; but every time your foot touches the ground it will feel as though you were walking on knives so sharp that your blood must flow. If you are willing to suffer all this, then I can help you.

Some deal!  The little mermaid takes the deal because she is after an immortal soul.  If she fails to make the prince so love her "that he forgets both his father and mother, because his every thought concerns only you, and he orders the priest to take his right hand and place it in yours, so that you become man and wife" (less ambiguity about the promise here!), she will immediately become foam on the ocean.

In Anderson's version, the little mermaid fails to fulfill her end of the bargain, as the prince falls in love with a beautiful princess.  This time, it is the little mermaid's sisters (rather than her father) who offer up a modification of the contract with the sea witch.  They trade their hair for a knife that the little mermaid is to use to kill the prince, but  . . . ah, I don't want to spoil the ending for you.




October 7, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, September 11, 2013

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, Concluding Post

Thursday, September 5, 2013

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, Post VIII: Gordon Smith

This is the eighth in a series of posts in our online symposium on the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay.  More about the online symposium can be found here.  More information about this week's guest bloggers can be found here.

Gordon SmithGordon Smith is Associate Dean and Glen L. Farr Professor of Law at BYU's Reuben Clark Law School.  

Doctrines of Last Resort 

Last week I had occasion to re-read “The Path of the Law” by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., and I was reminded of my many discussions about contract law with Stewart Macaulay (pictured, below left). During my time teaching at Wisconsin, the Contracts professors held weekly lunches to discuss the materials we were covering in class. These discussions would often turn to the fundamental question that Stewart began to wrestle with in his famous study “Non-Contractual Relations in Business” and that has fascinated him ever since, namely, “What good is contract law?”

 In “The Path of the Law,” Holmes offered a well-known and provocative perspective on this question: the purpose of law is to constrain “the bad man.” Whether Holmes actually believed that one who “want[s] to know the law and nothing else … must look at it as a bad man” is the subject of some dispute, but the bad man has become an important starting point for thinking about law for generations of law students and remains a powerful image for legal scholars. 

MacaulayIn “Non-Contractual Relations in Business” – and in our lunchtime discussions – Stewart didn’t seem to have much faith in law to constrain the bad man. Mark Suchman deftly summarized the core insight of Stewart’s most famous work: “Legal doctrine and legal recourse often matter very little . . . since most transactions are governed, in practice, by informal community norms, enforced by informal social sanctions.” On more than one occasion, therefore, I pressed Stewart on whether his emphasis on the impotence of contract law undermined our teaching of the course to first-year law students.

But the point for Stewart was never that contract law is irrelevant, only that it is sometimes overemphasized by legal scholars, particularly legal scholars who rely on highly reductionist theories of human behavior. Indeed, in his more recent article, “The Real and the Paper Deal,” Stewart observes, “doc­trine can matter.” In my contribution to the book, I focus on a collection of legal doctrines, which I call the “doctrines of last resort,” and I argue that these doctrines matter because they facilitate contract formation.

The doctrines of good faith and fair dealing, fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment are doctrines of last resort because they are activated only when all other potentially applicable commands from constitutions, stat­utes, regulations, ordinances, common law decisions and contracts have been exhausted. In these circumstances – where positive law and private ordering are otherwise incomplete – contracting parties rely heavily on informal social sanctions to protect against opportunism, but the doc­trines of last resort reinforce these social sanctions. Rather than regulating all of the deviations and adjustments that are common in contractual rela­tionships, doctrines of last resort constrain extreme deviations from social norms, reinforcing agreements precisely in those contexts where informal social sanctions are weakest.

Cropped Cover (1)In my essay, I introduce the notion of “boundary enforcement,” arguing that the doc­trines of last resort are united by a similar objective: the establishment of boundaries on self-interested behavior to mitigate opportunism.  This concept is developed further in my working paper (with Jordan Lee) entitled Discretion, which focuses on the role of the duty of loyalty.  Two insights about boundary enforcement are crucial to that paper and not limited to fiduciary law. First, “boundary enforcement” suggests that courts should respect the reasonable exercise of private decision making within the boundaries established by the doctrines of last resort. In contract law, for example, courts should generally respect the deals struck by the parties, even if the courts would have struck a different deal. Second, when boundaries are not established by the contracting parties, courts often turn to industry customs and social norms to establish the limits of self-interested behavior, and this is a sensible way to meet the reasonable expectations of the parties. By establishing the boundaries of opportunism in this way, the doctrines of last resort not only constrain the bad man, but embolden private parties to form contractual relationships, thus servicing another important value in law: the promotion of entrepreneurial action.

[Posted, on Gordon Smith's behalf, by JT]


September 5, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Contract Profs, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, September 4, 2013

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, Post VII: Peter Linzer

This is the seventh in a series of posts in our online symposium on the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay.  More about the online symposium can be found here.  More information about this week's guest bloggers can be found here.  

LinzerPeter Linzer is a Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center.

Contracts of Adhesion: An Oxymoron? 

Contracts of adhesion are a big topic this year, what with Peggy Radin’s Boilerplate, Oren Bar-Gill’s Seduction By Contract and the ALI’s new Restatement Third of Consumer Contracts.  I’ve been focusing on the notion of adhesion, so my view of the fine book that Jean Braucher, Bill Whitford and the late John Kidwell have put together in honor of Stewart Macaulay (pictured below left) is tilted in that direction.  Macaulay’s 1963 American Sociologicaly Review article referred to non-contractual relations in business, and many of the essays in the Festschrift (Stewart probably finds the term pretentious, but it surely is a celebration of him and his work) are about business contracts.  But only three years later, Macaulay wrote Private Legislation and the Duty to Read – Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contract and Credit Cards, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1051 (1966), which is excerpted in the book.

The reference to IBM machines must sound quaint to younger readers, but like early Kurt Vonnegut stories (“Epicac”) and novels (Player Piano) that saw the problems of technology and people in an era of vacuum tubes, it still rings true.  Most of the Vanderbilt article deals with businesses, but in a footnote Macaualay cited Lawrence Friedman’s discussion of how discrete areas such as labor law and occupational licensing have been spun off from general contract jurisprudence, and made reference to his own discussion of automobile franchising.  (It’s note 5 on page 22 in the book, and note 18 in the Vanderbilt article.)  In a fairly short discussion of consumers, Macaulay considered both case-by-case policing and legislationve regulation of standard terms, as in fire insurance contracts, and didn’t go much beyond that.  But in an article not included in the book, but with the happy short title of Bambi Meets Godzilla, 26 Houston L. Rev. 575 (1989), he looked at consumer and deceptive trade practices laws and showed how they should be an integral part of the Contracts course, even though they had frequently been distorted into windfalls for well-informed consumers (often lawyers), rather than as weapons of defense for the little guy.

MacaulayOthers in the book have built on Macaulay (and Ian Macneil) to suggest that consumer transactions should be treated as a separate form of contract law.  Bob Scott, whom Bob Gordon seems to describe, with respect, as a neo-formalist relationalist, has put forth a strong argument in that a hands-off policy makes no sense with consumer transactions, even if it does when sophisticated businesses are dealing with each other, while Ethan Leib has argued strongly that relationalists should “fragment consumer form contracts into its own sphere for treatment with the reasonable expectations approach,” but that this will require even more fragmented empirical research “to be useful to courts and regulators.” Ethan Leib, What is the Relational Theory of Consumer Form Contract? Chapter 9, at 284).  Chuck Knapp, who has written frequently on adhesion problems, shows in his Is There a ‘Duty to Read’? (Chapter 11), how courts have or should have distinguished consumer transactions, and argues that what he calls a “presumption of knowing assent” should not preclude scrutiny of contracts of adhesion.

I think, however, that the real issue is whether we should treat adhesion contracts as part of contract law at all.  I started teaching forty years ago, and from the beginning I had my doubts about the lines among the basic topics of private law: tort, contract and property, or even about how private private law was, and Peggy’s book in particular has led me to doubt that we should call any legal document a contract when it involves no real agreement, no negotiation or bargaining, little understanding of terms by the non-dominant party and no opportunity to change terms, except by walking away.  In a previous blog, about Boilerplate, I pointed to the removal of products liability from the law of negligence. There, I pointed out that before the great 1914 Cardozo opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., liability for a defective product was based on contract, while the expansion of liability away from the proof of negligence came from the use of implied warranties, which are sort of contractual, until Roger Traynor spoke of strict liability in a res ipsa loquitur case and, half a generation later, the Restatement of Torts Second § 402A took us off to the races. 

Cropped Cover (1)This is hardly the place to review the immense body of writing about adhesion contracts, but I would like to point out that much of the apology for the dominant party imposing terms seems really to treat the issue as a matter of property law – “It’s my widget (or software) and I can set any terms for your license [a property term] to use it.”  In effect, a no trespassing sign.  That’s all right, I suppose, but it isn’t contract, and it should be judged by whether an owner of a thing owes a public duty to treat those who wish to use it with some degree of fairness, ultimately a matter of public law, like antitrust.

 None of this answers the question of how to deal with what Knapp calls “individual contracts,” not just consumer deals, but franchise, employment and at least some professional service contracts (lawyers, brokers, etc.).  We know, as both Stewart Macaulay and Jean Braucher have shown us, that individualized review through litigation, even with a presumption in favor of the little guy, is economically unfeasible in most circumstance, especially with the Supreme Court’s rigid imposition of the Federal Arbitration Act to favor pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion.  Bob Scott points to the European Union’s regulation of consumer contracts through a Council Directive imposing strong rules favoring the consumer, but the EU member states seem more amenable to a regulatory regime than we have been in recent years, though our former colleague and friend, Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has begun to make headway. 

 I think, and have written before, that legislation or administrative regulation forbidding specific terms in various individual adhesion transactions (examples could include choice of a distant forum, mandatory arbitration, limits on consequential damages, waiver of jury trials) is probably the best way.  It is an appropriate area for state legislature, and more important, Congressional intervention, particularly because this issue has almost nothing to do with freedom of contract. 

In fact, it has almost nothing to do with contract.

[Posted, on Peter Linzer's behalf, by JT]

September 4, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, September 3, 2013

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: The Third Week's Contributors

We continue our online symposium inspired by Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the Empirical and the Lyrical (Jean Braucher, John Kidwell, and William C. Whitford, eds., Hart Publishing 2013) with two more posts this week.

LinzerPeter Linzer is a Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center, where he has taught since 1984.  Before going into teaching, Professor Linzer practiced law both as a Wall Street lawyer and as an Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of New York. Professor Linzer is a member of the American Law Institute.  Professor Linzer has served as the Chair of the Contracts Section of the Association of American Law Schools and is a Board Certified civil appellate specialist. He served for nearly a decade on the Pattern Jury Charge Committee of the State Bar of Texas. His principal academic subjects include Contracts; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection; First Amendment; International Contracting; Transactional Clinic; Contract Negotiation and Drafting; Introduction to American Law (for foreign LL. M. candidates); and Torts. Working with experienced practitioners, he pioneered a transactional course in international contracting that sees students negotiate and draft documents in simulated international deals.  

Professor Linzer is a repeat offender, having participated in our last symposium on Peggy Radin's Boilerplate.  A list of his publications can be found here.

Gordon SmithGordon Smith is Associate Dean and Glen L. Farr Professor of Law at BYU's Reuben Clark Law School.  Professor Smith's research focuses on corporate and securities law, with particular emphases on Delaware corporate law and entrepreneurial finance. His work has appeared in many top law reviews, and he has co-authored a popular casebook, Business Organizations: Cases, Problems & Case Studies, with Professor Cynthia Williams of the University of Illinois Law School.

Prior to joining the BYU law faculty, Professor Smith taught law at the University of Wisconsin, where he served as Associate Director of the Initiative for Studies in Technology Entrepreneurship (InSiTE). He also taught at Lewis & Clark Law School and has been a visiting professor of law at Vanderbilt University, Arizona State University and Washington University. He has taught courses at universities in Australia, China, England, Finland, France, Germany, and Hong Kong.

Before entering academe, Professor Smith clerked for Judge W. Eugene Davis in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and was an associate in the Delaware office of the international law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.

Some of Professor Smith's publications can be found here.

Lyrical CoverBelow are links to previous posts from the symposium:

An introduction to the symposium

Biographical information about the first week's contributors

Jay Feinman, Ambitition and Humility in Contract Law

Alan Hyde, Stewart Macaulay, System Builder

Kate O'Neill, The Mess We're In

Deborah Post, One Contracts Professor's Preference for State Court Decisions

An introduction to the second week's contributors

Gillian Hadfield, Maybe Contract Law Isn't Dead After All

Jonathan Lipson, Relational Reorganization


September 3, 2013 in About this Blog, Books, Commentary, Contract Profs, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, August 28, 2013

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, Post VI: Jonathan Lipson

This is the sixth in a series of posts in our online symposium on the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay.  More about the online symposium can be found here.  More information about this week's guest bloggers can be found here

Jonathan Lipson is the Harold E. Kohn Professor of Law at Temple University's Beasley School of Law.

LipsonRelational Reorganization

Although Stewart Macaulay’s contributions to the literature on relational contracting cannot be overstated—for practical purposes, he invented the field—its insights have been absent from an equally important body of literature that also looks at contracts in action:  That of bankruptcy reorganization.

At first glance, the reasons for the disconnect may seem obvious.  Relational contracting is concerned with, well, ongoing relationships.  Bankruptcy reorganization, by contrast, implies the termination or fundamental alteration of those relationships.  Relational contracting imagines a world in which formal law is subordinate to actual custom and practice.  Bankruptcy reorganization, again in contrast, is sometimes said to be the “acid test” for the enforceability (or not) of contracts, where there will be pressure to use special (formal) legal powers to avoid or break those that are burdensome to the debtor and less than “perfect” (in both UCC Article 9 and more general respects) in order to increase recoveries for creditors whose contracts do pass muster.

And, yet it seems to me that relational contracting literature has much to offer those who think about bankruptcy reorganization, and corporate reorganization generally (that is, outside of a formal bankruptcy process). 

Corporate reorganization is usually the response to a cascade of actual or potential contractual breakdowns—general financial default.  In most cases, it would seem that practice follows Macaulay’s observations:  creditors do not race to court to enforce broken debt contracts.  Instead, as I have discussed elsewhere, the parties—the debtor and its major creditors—usually jawbone.  Sometimes (most times, I would venture) they renegotiate the contracts and go on about life.  While the original debt contracts may have provided all sorts of elaborate remedies for the creditor, she will ignore them if she receives a satisfactory substitute promise not contemplated by the original agreements.

When that doesn’t work, whether because some of the debtor’s creditors hold out, or the debtor’s management can’t get its act together, or the debtor defaults on the substitute promises, a formal bankruptcy filing under chapter 11 may ensue.  Chapter 11 creates a complex environment in which both formal law and informal relationships have high salience.  Chapter 11 can be seen as a form of institutional “braiding,” to paraphrase Gilson, Sabel and Scott, in which courts, markets, communities and legislatures (Congress), weave together sets of protocols for rewriting en masse the corporate debtor’s debt (and other) contracts.  Relational contracting is vital to the effectiveness of these protocols, even as the larger environment that uses and creates these protocols is undergoing major change.  Consider three examples.

First, there is the relational contract among the corporate debtor and its many stakeholders.  When Congress enacted chapter 11 in 1978, it probably had an intuitive sense of the relationships it wanted to preserve:  Those between workers, managers and corporate stakeholders. Thus, unlike prior law, chapter 11 presumed that management would remain in possession and control of the debtor while it formulated a reorganization plan that would keep the debtor a going concern (and thus its basic relationships intact). If the plan gained sufficient support (evidenced by creditor voting as well as a number of other formal criteria) it could be confirmed by the bankruptcy court. If not, a trustee might replace management and/or the debtor would be liquidated (thus likely terminating the relational contract).

In order to reach a consensual plan, a significant amount of bargaining would have to occur.  Reorganization is, per Galanter, a “litigotiation”: constant bargaining on courthouse steps (virtual or actual).  A lawyer I knew once referred to chapter 11 as “New York’s largest floating craps game.”  This, in turn, bespeaks a second example of relational contracting in chapter 11: that among the lawyers who manage the process. 

Lyrical CoverAn important goal of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code (which is still in effect) was to remove the stigma associated with bankruptcy practice.  Large law firms were quick to recognize that this practice could be lucrative.  A sophisticated bar of bankruptcy practitioners in high profile cases emerged in New York and Delaware.  This community creates bargaining networks in which repeat players seem to have both a strong sense of formal (e.g., bankruptcy and commercial) law and the capacity and temperament to compromise in order to produce a plan if possible, and to resolve the case otherwise (e.g., through liquidation) if not.

Yet, even as Congress may have imagined that reorganization would preserve a certain class of long-term relationships involving the corporate debtor and its stakeholders, change was afoot.  At about the time the current Bankruptcy Code was coming into force, a market in “claims trading” was beginning to develop.  “Claims trading” is the practice whereby “distress investors” (often private equity or hedge funds) will purchase claims against debtors. 

You might wonder why anyone would want to purchase defaulted debt.  The answer, in most cases, is to make money, either on the spread between what the claims trader buys the claim for and what it ends up being worth in the bankruptcy, or because the trader ends up with a controlling position in the debtor’s bankruptcy (as noted above, claimants often get to vote on the chapter 11 plan).

Claims trading began as an obscure corner of chapter 11, but has now become very important.  Billions of dollars in claims trade regularly.  It seems safe to say that professional claims traders take significant positions in most large corporate reorganizations.

What does claims trading have to do with relational contracting?  The world of distress investors is small, insular and bespoke, a club of sophisticated players in what I have characterized elsewhere as an unregulated secondary securities market.  While little is known about the actual contracting (or extra-contractual, promissory) practices of claims traders, it would appear that they are by and large repeat players. Their relationships increasingly influence the formal and informal contracts that determine the outcome of the chapter 11 process. 

            This transformation bespeaks a third example of relational contracting in reorganization:  professional distress investors bound by complex ties, tensions, and loyalties in contracts of varying degrees of formality. Increasingly, and to some disturbingly, the incentives of this group are to dismantle or auction the debtor rather than to reorganize it internally, as Congress seems to have envisioned in 1978.  The relational contract of distress investors effectively replaces the relational contract of the debtor, its employees, and other stakeholders. 

This third relational contract also suggests that lawyers may play an increasingly subordinate role, executing investors’ strategies, but not necessarily devising or negotiating them.  That many claims traders were once bankruptcy lawyers may in part explain this shift:  even if they have become “clients,” distress investors often know as much formal (and informal) law as their lawyers.

The relational contract in reorganization is, like all other contracting environments, neither purely formal nor purely informal.  That this literature has not influenced the large—and frequently “contractual”—literature on reorganization is not a knock on Macaulay’s contribution or the subject of this Symposium, Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the Empirical and the Lyrical. 

Rather, my goal here is to suggest ways to use his work, and that of the excellent contributions to Revisiting, in a related and important context. Although Stewart Macaulay’s work has not yet been formally introduced to the world of corporate reorganization, it seems to me it could be the basis of a beautiful relationship.

[Posted, on Jonathan Lipson's behalf, by JT]

August 28, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, August 27, 2013

Support the Blog By Doing What You Would Do Anyway!


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Yup.  We're as surprised as you are.  But don't worry.  So far we have been investing all proceeds back into legal scholarship by supporting the annual International Conferences on Contracts like the one this past February in Fort Worth.  With the added revenues derived from the re-design of the blog and the re-organization of the Law Professor Blog Network, of which we are a part, we hope to contribute in a more substantial way in years to come.

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August 27, 2013 in About this Blog, Books | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, Post V: Gillian Hadfield

HadfieldThis is the fifth in a series of posts in our online symposium on the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay.  More about the online symposium can be found here.  More information about this week's guest bloggers can be found here

Gillian K. Hadfield is the Richard L. and Antoinette Schamoi Kirtland professor of law and professor of economics at the University of Southern California. 

Maybe Contract Law Isn't Dead After All

In 1963 Stewart Macaulay asked:  what good is contract law?  His interviews with business(men) in a range of companies—including giants like General Electric, S.C. Johnson and Harley-Davidson—suggested the answer was “not much.”  He was repeatedly told that in practice, formal contracts were rarely drawn up for transactions (and that the boilerplate purchase orders and acknowledgements that might be exchanged weren’t really even seen as “contracts”.)  Any formal contracts that did come into existence were largely ignored, almost never pulled out of the drawer to help resolve transactional problems that might occur along the way.  And the idea of litigating, or even threatening to litigate, to resolve a dispute was dismissed almost entirely.  

MacaulayA dramatic set of findings.  They earned Stewart (pictured), in Grant Gilmore’s famous formulation, the title of “Lord High Executioner” of contract law, sounding the death knell of lawyers’ taken-for-granted assumption that they were essential to doing business.  Economists—introduced to the article fifteen years after it was published in two of the seminal papers in transaction cost economics, Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1979)—were energized.  A great flood of work, much of it game-theoretic, soon followed to explain the puzzle of how business deals were held together without law.  Soon we had a standard distinction in the economics literature:  between formal—court-enforceable—contracts and informal ones—those enforced only by threats of the loss of a valuable long-term relationship or reputational standing.

Given how important Macaulay’s work has been to economists, my co-author Iva Bozovic and I were surprised to find out that almost no-one has attempted to replicate Stewart’s self-styled “preliminary study.”  So we decided to try.  So much had changed in industry since the early 1960s when Stewart did his research (Mad Men anyone?) we wondered whether contract law still was as irrelevant to contracting as it seemed to be back then.  We were particularly interested in the impact of a much more innovation-oriented economy on contracting.  And it was hard to predict how Macaulay’s findings might carry over.  On the one hand, in relationships that are focused on innovation—think collaboration between Facebook and Skype to integrate video chat and social networking, for example—so much is changing so rapidly that often the parties don’t have much of a clue how their relationship is going to develop.  That implies it’s really hard to write complete contracts that can be easily enforced in court.  On the other hand, there is so much novelty that there is almost no time for industry standards to stabilize giving parties guidance about how gaps in contracts are to be filled in.  This is a part of Macaulay’s findings often overlooked among economists (although it is dear to the heart of law and society folks):  in Macaulay’s study, the parties didn’t need well-drafted contracts because they had well-established industry norms to look to for guidance on how problems should be dealt with.  Breach of those norms was bad for business in a stable environment with lots of alternative contracting partners. 

So if parties to high-velocity innovative business relationships don’t have established industry norms to look to and it’s so hard to write relatively complete court-enforceable contracts, what do they do? 

Cropped Cover (1)We set out to study this question by interviewing companies in the San Francisco Bay Area and Los Angeles about their use of contracts.  We first asked our respondents—all of whom were senior level executives, almost all of whom were not lawyers—whether they considered their business to be innovative in any way.  Perhaps surprisingly, in our initial random sample of firms, many answered “no”.  We then supplemented our sample with firms we were pretty sure were innovative. In the end we spoke with 30 companies—12 who identified as ‘not innovative’ and 18 who identified as ‘innovative.’  We asked the innovators to talk to us about a relationship with another firm that was important to them for innovation.  We asked the non-innovators to talk to us about a relationship with another firm that was important to them for business success. 

Here’s what we found out.  The non-innovators told us essentially what Macaulay’s respondents told him:  we don’t draft formal contracts, we ignore any that do get drafted, and we never look to litigation as a threat or source of enforcement.  The fascinating twist was from the innovators; only one of Macaulay’s findings held up.  Yes, we spend a lot of time and lawyer money on drafting formal contracts.  Yes, we haul the contracts out of the drawer to consult when trying to resolve transactional problems along the way.  BUT:  no, we never look to litigation as a threat or source of enforcement.  This isn’t because they settle their disputes in the shadow of the law.  It is because a litigation threat is just not credible:  it’s too expensive, takes too long, is too unpredictable and kills precious reputation. 

Our sample, like Macaulay’s “preliminary study,” is small.  It’s not necessarily representative.  But, like Macaulay, we have unearthed a fascinating puzzle:  why draft and consult formal contracts if you have no expectation of ever enforcing contracts in court?  According to the relational contracting literature that economists produced in response to Macaulay’s puzzle (if not contract, then what?), the only reason to write a formal contract is to get the benefit of formal court enforcement. 

Our answer, drawing on work I’ve done with Barry Weingast (see here and here) about the function of law, is that formal contracting serves to coordinate beliefs about what constitutes a breach of a highly ambiguous set of obligations.  This makes relational enforcement mechanisms—loss of a valuable relationship, bad reputation—more effective than they would have been in the absence of a shared template for interpreting events.  We call this scaffolding:  formal contract law and reasoning—implemented by lawyers who share similar interpretation methods and materials that are common knowledge among them—helps to span the (large) gaps in relational mechanisms that arise when ambiguity is high.  It’s not that formal legal reasoning from a formal contract to decide whether a contracting partner is in “breach” is open-and-shut in these settings—there’s still lots of ambiguity to go around.  But our point is that the extent of ambiguity when the parties have at least designated a common methodology for classifying conduct as breach or not is much less than it would be otherwise.  We think the reason law gets singled out to play this role is because it is, as my work with Weingast emphasizes, expressly designed to perform this kind of an ambiguity-reducing and coordinating role—with its emphasis on comprehensive coverage, clarity and the presence of an authoritative steward (eg. courts) that is recognized as the final word on interpretation. 

Our paper (which we wanted to work on more after the conference so it does not appear in the book whose publication this Symposium celebrates) provides lots of quotes from the businesspeople with whom we talked to support our analysis.  It’s hardly the last word on the subject—there’s that “preliminary” again—but it moves our understanding of the role of contract law a little further down the field on which Stewart first called the game—what good is contract law?  Our answer: quite a bit actually, even if almost nobody plans on going to court.  

[Posted, on Gillian Hadfield's behalf, by JT]

August 27, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Contract Profs, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, August 26, 2013

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: The Second Week's Contributors

We continue our online symposium inspired by Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the Empirical and the Lyrical (Jean Braucher, John Kidwell, and William C. Whitford, eds., Hart Publishing 2013) with two posts this week. All of this made possible through the organizational genius of Jean Braucher, who recruited the participants in this symposium.  So we at the blog are all very grateful to her.

HadfieldGillian K. Hadfield is the Richard L. and Antoinette Schamoi Kirtland professor of law and professor of economics at the University of Southern California. She studies the design of legal and dispute resolution systems; contracting; and the performance and regulation of legal markets and the legal profession. 

Her recent publications include “What is Law:  A Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order” (with Barry Weingast, Journal of Legal Analysis 2012); "The Dynamic Quality of Law: Judicial Incentives, Legal Human Capital and the Adaptation of Law (Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2011); "Legal Infrastructure for the New Economy” (I/S:  Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 2012) and "Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans" (Fordham Urban Law Journal 2010).

Professor Hadfield holds a B.A.H. from Queen’s University, a J.D. from Stanford Law School and Ph.D. in economics from Stanford University. She served as clerk to Chief Judge Patricia Wald on the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit. She has been a visiting professor at Harvard, Columbia and NYU law schools, a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, and a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution. She is a member of the American Law Institute, director of the American Law and Economics Association and the International Society for New Institutional Economics and past president of the Canadian Law and Economics Association.  She serves on advisory boards for the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law, LegalZoom,, and Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers, and on the Editorial Committee of the Annual Review of Law and Social Science.  

More of Professor Hadfield's publications can be found here.

Lipson Headshot S11

 Jonathan Lipson is the Harold E. Kohn Professor of Law at Temple University's Beasley School of Law.  Professor Lipson teaches commercial, corporate and bankruptcy law courses, including a deal-based simulation. From 2010-2012, he was the Foley & Lardner Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law School.

His research focuses on business failure systems, with a particular emphasis on the role that information forcing rules play in influencing outcomes. He has written a number of articles about the informational aspects of the U.S. secured credit system, the bankruptcy system, and the role that lawyers play in designing and implementing transactions under the risk of financial failure. He is an occasional empiricist, having authored the first qualitative empirical study of lawyers’ practice of writing third-party closing opinions (which was selected for presentation at the 2005 Yale/Stanford Junior Faculty Forum). He has also developed a unique data set on the use of examiners in large Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. 

He has a side expertise on constitutional issues in bankruptcy. He has authored papers on, among other things, the Catholic diocese bankruptcies, sovereign immunity defenses in bankruptcy, and the larger structural questions presented by the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution.

Before beginning a teaching career, Professor Lipson practiced corporate, commercial and bankruptcy law in Boston, with the firm of Hill & Barlow (1995 – 1999), and in New York with Kirkland & Ellis (1992 – 1995) and Milbank Tweed (1990-1992). 

Cropped Cover (1)He holds several leadership positions in the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association, where he is a Section Content Officer.  Previously, he was Chair of the Publications Board, and Chair of the Committee on Business Law Education. He was the Chair of the Section on Commercial and Related Consumer Law of the Association of American Law Schools (2002-2003). He was elected in 2005 to the American Law Institute.   Professor Lipson speaks and blogs frequently on business law subjects, including corporate reorganization and business law education. He also served as an expert witness in certain complex reorganizations including, most prominently, Enron’s bankruptcy.

His work has appeared in, among others, the UCLA Law Review, the Boston University Law Review, the Notre Dame Law Review, the Business Lawyer, the University of Southern California Law Review, the Washington University Law Review, the Minnesota Law Review and the Wisconsin Law Review . 

More of Professor Lipson's publications can be found here.

Below are links to last week's posts:

An introduction to the symposium

Biographical information about last week's contributors

Jay Feinman, Ambitition and Humility in Contract Law

Alan Hyde, Stewart Macaulay, System Builder

Kate O'Neill, The Mess We're In

Deborah Post, One Contracts Professor's Preference for State Court Decisions

We look forward to another lively week of contributions.


August 26, 2013 in About this Blog, Books, Commentary, Contract Profs, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, August 22, 2013

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, Post IV: Deborah Post

This is the fourth in a series of posts in our online symposium on the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay.  More about the online symposium can be found here.  More information about this week's guest bloggers can be found here

PostDeborah Post is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Faculty Development and Professor of Law at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. 

One Contracts Professor’s Preference for State Court Decisions

In the essay that I contributed to Revisiting the Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the Empirical and the Lyrical, I gave vent to the frustration I experienced over the years reading decisions written by the 7th Circuit Judges Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook. Stewart wrote to me recently and in two sentences, appropriately lyrical, summed up the source of my frustration:  “In theory, of course, the court applies state law in a diversity situation.  About the one thing that you can expect is that Judges Posner and Easterbrook will be off on a frolic of their own.”

I have a healthy respect these days, and a strong preference for, the decisions of state courts. I try to use the best of these to teach contract law to my students.  I admire the tenacity of state courts that insist, for example, that the commentary to the UCC matters in interpreting that statute.  See e.g. Simcala Inc. v. American Coal Trade, Inc. 821 So.2d 197 (Ala. 2001) (the word “center” in comment 3 to UCC section 2-306 means something when used to describe the way a stated estimate limits the “intended elasticity” of an output or requirements contract). 

Cropped Cover (1)I am particularly gratified by the persistence of courts that have used the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate boilerplate arbitration clauses.  Implicit in these cases is a duality. Oppression exists on two levels.  The terms of the transactions are oppressive and unconscionable, and the terms of the arbitration agreement are oppressive. Two cases I discussed previously at the 8th Annual International Contracts Conference at Texas A & M University Law School.

In Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486 (Mo. 2012), the Missouri Supreme Court describes the terms of a loan agreement. Ms. Brewer borrowed $2,215 and paid back $2000, at which point she had reduced the principal balance on the loan by $.06.  The interest rate on that loan was 300%.  Ms. Brewer brought suit under the Missouri consumer protection statute, the Missouri Merchandising Practices Statute.

In Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362 (N.C. 2008), Ms. Tillman and Ms. Richardson, the named plaintiffs in a class action, purchased single premium credit insurance from a lender.  Within a year the North Carolina legislature made this species of loan illegal, but the statute was not retroactive.  Ms. Tillman and Ms. Richardson sued under the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.  The North Carolina Supreme Court found the arbitration clause in the contract, which barred class actions, unconscionable in a 3-2-2 decision.

When the United States Supreme Court vacated the decision in the Brewer case and remanded it to the Missouri court for reconsideration in light of A.T.& T. Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), Chief Justice Richard Teitelman, responded that the unconscionability doctrine in Missouri law was not an “obstacle to the accomplishment of the act’s objectives.”  The arbitration agreement was unconscionable because there was expert testimony that no consumer would pursue a claim against the Title Company.  The cost was too high.  The Tillman court made much the same point.  Of the 68,000 loans that Citifinancial made in North Carolina, no borrower ever pursued arbitration of a claim.  Citifinancial on the other hand, had reserved its right to go to court and had exercised that privilege over 3,000 times in civil suits and foreclosure actions.  The Tillman court also provided information about the actual cost of arbitration, a factual discussion that is missing in a lot of these cases.  It turns out that arbitration is cost prohibitive for most low income consumers. 

Exploitive or predatory contracts saturate the market for credit, housing, furniture for the least well off in our society.  The Montana Supreme Court recently held a payday loan and its arbitration provision unconscionable.  Kelker v. Geneva-Roth Ventures, Inc., 303 P.3d 777 ( Mont. 2013)(780% APR was violation of Montana Consumer Loan Act). If the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari in Kelker, the decision in that payday loan case will probably meet the fate of its progenitors, Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994)(Casarotto I) and Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995)(Casarotto II). Justice Trieweiler maintained in Casarotto I that the Federal Arbitration Act had not pre-empted state laws addressing arbitration because the federal statute had not addressed every aspect or possibility with respect to arbitration agreements. In Casarotto II he argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to strike down an Alabama statute that made pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable was irrelevant to the decision in Casarotto I.  He was reversed in an opinion written by none other than Justice Ginsberg. 

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler, the twice rebuked but unrepentant Montana Supreme Court jurist, actually wrote three Casarotto opinions.  He penned a special concurring opinion in Casarotto I to address “those federal judges who consider forced arbitration as the panacea for their “heavy caseloads” and to single out for criticism Judge Bruce M. Selya, First Circuit Court of Appeals, who called the prevalence in state courts of “traditional notions of fairness” an “anachronism.”  886 P.2d at 940. Justice Trieweiler’s  rejoinder was that some federal judges are arrogant. I think of it as hubris.

The number of cases challenging arbitration agreements has not diminished over time.  I can think of at least two reasons for this phenomenon. One is ever expanding disparity in wealth and power in the United States in this post-industrial society.  There are very few ways individuals can challenge those who have power over them or expose what they feel to be an injustice that has been done to them.  We are conditioned to believe that there is “equal justice under the law” and to believe that a citizen may seek redress in court.  The second reason is the failure of federal courts to recognize that the FAA is indefensible when it is applied in consumer cases. That was the subject of the last series of blog posts discussing Margaret Radin’s book, Boilerplate.   The FAA is a statute frozen in time, applied to transactions almost ninety years after Congress held those hearings on the resistance of state courts to arbitration and used to enforce arbitration “agreements” in contracts that were not even dreamed of when the FAA was passed -- online, clickwrap contracts such as the contract in Kelker.  Contract defenses that police agreements where there is no real consent and no real bargaining are rendered impotent by the FAA.  It does not matter if Certiorari is denied in Kelker, because the 9th Circuit has already used a pre-emption argument to defeat the Montana court’s use of “reasonable expectations” and unconscionability doctrines to invalidate arbitration provisions. Mortensen v. Bresnen Communications, LLC,  2013 U.S. App. Lexis 14211.

Timmons-GoodsonThis past weekend I had the pleasure of meeting the judge who wrote the plurality opinion in the Tillman case, Justice Patricia Timmons-Goodson (pictured), who retired from the North Carolina Supreme Court in December 2012.   I did not plan this meeting.  It was completely serendipitous.  I was looking for the meeting room where the Task Force on the Future of Legal Education was discussing the end of law school as we know it.  I asked her for directions, and then I glanced at her name tag. It took me a moment to realize who she was.  I was told by Judge James Wynn, who is now on the 4th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, but who once served with Judge Timmons-Goodson on the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, that she was a recent recipient of the Legend in the Law award at Charlotte School of Law.

I knew that Justice Timmons-Goodson was a black woman. I looked for background information when I decided to write about the case. I knew, courtesy of North Carolina’s Lawyers Weekly, that two lawyers from Raleigh, John Alan Jones and G. Christopher Olson, obtained a judgment in Tillman and two companion cases in the amount of $81.25 million.  Of the borrowers represented in the Tillman case, 759 received approximately $31,291 each.  Another 9,670 received $544 each.

Taking the admonition of Stewart Macaulay seriously, striving to do something that looks like empirical research, I asked Justice Timmons-Goodson if she would consent to an interview. She hasn’t agreed yet, but I hope she will. I would like to know more about the process that she used to reach a decision in the Tillman case; how she persuaded enough of her colleagues to agree that the contract and the arbitration clause were unconscionable, even if two of them relied on a “totality of the circumstances” analysis that they thought sufficiently different from her opinion to merit a separate concurring opinion. Two justices signed her opinion relying on substantive unconscionability; two joined in finding the arbitration clause unconscionable but stressed the importance of deference to the fact-finding of the trial judge under a “totality of the circumstances” approach, and two justices dissented.

The Justice writing the dissenting opinion, appears to believe that the unconscionabiity doctrine is somehow illegitimate.   He noted that it had never been used in North Carolina to invalidate a contract or a term in a contract. If I do interview Justice Timmons-Goodman, I will ask her about her reaction to the most recent U. S. Supreme Court decisions. She has herself written about the importance of state court judges at every level, particularly in the trial courts. 

I am not sure that she would call her own acts as a justice on the Supreme Court “resistance.”  She might simply say that logic and adherence to an ethic of principled decision-making impelled her to write the decision in Tillman as she did. I cannot be sure that she believes, as I do, that the drafters of the FAA never intended to completely pre-empt state law, especially those contract doctrines that are designed to control avarice and unscrupulous behavior.  I do think, however, she will enjoy discussing the decisions of Justice Trieweiler.  

[Posted, on Deborah Post's behalf, by JT]

August 22, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Contract Profs, Famous Cases, Recent Cases, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, Post III: Kate O'Neill


This is the third in a series of posts in our online symposium on the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay.  More about the online symposium can be found here.  More information about this week's guest bloggers can be found here

Kate O'Neill's is Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of Law.  Her principal interests are contracts, copyright, legal rhetoric, and law school teaching.

The Mess We're In

These essays present enlightening, provocative, and well-written analyses of relational contract theory, contract doctrine, legal practice, and social justice.  The editors have sequenced and grouped them skillfully so that the reader can clearly see how the authors’ ideas intersect and diverge.  As a result, the collection is more than its parts.

I want to draw readers’ attention to a problem the collection suggests but doesn’t address directly.  What are we going to do about the contracts course in law school?

Several essays suggest, and Robert Scott’s expressly argues for, an emerging consensus that Macaulay’s original insights remain valid and are foundational for both law & economics and law & society theorists and that these warring camps may have more in common than either has yet recognized.  If Scott and Macaulay are right, then I would wager that most contract courses not only fail to reflect the consensus but camouflage its most promising lessons.

The consensus seems to include two major points of agreement.  First, unmessy doctrine can be handy (“Messy,” of course, was Macaulay’s description of much contract doctrine). Some “sophisticated” contracting parties should be able to make binding commitments on precisely the terms that they negotiate and, in case of dispute, they should be able to limit a judge’s interpretative discretion to alter their allocations of risk.  In particular, they should be able to preclude the judge from resorting to “context” to alter the (presumably) plain meaning of the terms.

Second, consumers and employees should not necessarily be bound by all of the commitments purportedly imposed upon them by adhesion documents. Here, we can see fruit borne from Macaulay’s distinction between the real deal and the paper deal. Terms that are reasonable, typical, or expected are part of the deal; terms that are not are not. The expected nature of the relationship dictates the real contract terms; the paper contract terms do not necessarily govern the relationship. We are freed from the mutually exclusive and entirely fictional alternatives that either a contract was formed on the paper terms or it was not formed at all. 

On the other hand, the collection makes clear that a fundamental policy issue remains contested especially in the consumer context – how much contract law should intervene in the market.  The familiar alternatives are reflected:  1) let the market discipline bad actors even if there are a few casualties before the market works its magic because there is no agency more capable than the market in determining best (read, efficient?) practices; 2) let judges intervene to strike down bad terms – especially those that limit access to courts and class actions – because doing so will hasten market discipline of bad actors and will also relieve hardship in at least a few cases; or  3) regulate certain kinds of terms out of existence.

All the authors think that empirical data could help resolve the policy dispute. Edward Rubin, in particular, suggests that we think of contract law as a management tool.  If we were to focus on whether the tool works well to achieve whatever objectives we set, then the legal system could essentially be taught to treat empirical evidence as intrinsic to the development of law.  This is  encouraging stuff.  A systemic devotion to empiricism within the legal system might enable us, and the body politic, to clarify debates about what laws are fair and efficacious.

So far, so good, but here is the question that keeps troubling me.  If we all are relationists and empiricists now, and we could use data to make contracting law and practice both fairer and more efficient (or whatever other goals we might conceivably agree upon), what and how we should teach law students?

Macaulay Cropped Cover (1)has taught us that contract law has relatively little explanatory power for many of the actual practices involved in the formation, performance, and modification of exchanges, or even the practices involved in resolving disputes.  Serious attention to the nature of exchange relationships makes it hard to characterize contract law as unified, coherent and consistent or if it is unified theoretically, the unity operates at such a high level of abstraction that will matter little to judges or practitioners.

We praise these and other insights from empiricism both for what they tell us about law and society now and what they might teach us about alternatives. Yet most lawyers and judges plod on, oblivious or dismissive. Are we in part responsible? Look at our casebooks, listen to our classroom discussions!  Traditional doctrinal analysis is alive, well, and I suspect dominant. Economic analysis “lite” has crept in, but attention to empirical methods, much less data on context or consequences, is scant. I suspect that even those of us who assign “law & society” contracts casebooks, like the ones edited by Macaulay and Deborah Post, still devote the bulk of class time to doctrinal analysis.

Perhaps this must be.  Perhaps doctrinal analysis is our discipline’s unique identifier and must be taught first because it is foundational; perhaps we need to train litigators to understand the elements of a claim for breach; perhaps there is some utility in using the same basic case method in all 1L courses; or perhaps we are simply boxed in by student expectations, bar examiners, tradition, or confusion about what else to do?

Although there certainly are barriers to changing what and how we teach, I wonder if the core problem is that the work that needs to be done is profoundly interdisciplinary, challenging, and time-consuming.  Many of us lack the skills to do it alone, and the scholarship, promotion standards, and instructional traditions at many law schools still make collaborations difficult.

Contracts teachers may alert law students to Macaulay’s insights, but I don’t think we give students sufficient tools to help clients and or work effectively on big systemic problems.  Stewart might say that’s because we kinda like the mess the way it is.

[Posted, on Kate O'Neill's behalf, by JT]

August 21, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Contract Profs, Recent Scholarship, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

New in Print: A Special Offer for Our Readers

Contract Law – 2nd Edition 

Cartwright BookAn Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the Civil Lawyer

By John Cartwright

This book gives an introduction to the English law of contract. In this new and fully updated edition the book retains the primary focus of the first edition: it is designed to introduce the lawyer trained in a civil law jurisdiction to the method of reasoning in the common law, and in particular to the English law of contract. It is written for the lawyer-whether student or practitioner-from another jurisdiction who already has an understanding of a (different) law of contract, but who wishes to discover the way in which an English lawyer views a contract. However, setting English contract law generally in the context of other European and international approaches, the book forms an introductory text for the English student, who can see not only how English contract law works but also get a glimpse of different ways of thinking about some of the fundamental rules of contract law. After a general introduction to the common law system-how a common lawyer reasons and finds the law-the book explains the principles of the law of contract in English law covering all the aspects of a contract from its formation to the remedies available for breach, whilst directing attention in particular to those areas where the approach of English law is in marked contrast to that taken in many civil law systems. 

The Author

John Cartwright is Professor of the Law of Contract at the University of Oxford, Tutor in Law at Christ Church, Oxford, Professor of Anglo-American Private Law at the University of Leiden, and a Solicitor. 

August  2013   362pp   Pbk   9781849464796

RSP: £25 / €33  / US$50

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If you would like to place an order you can do so through the Hart Publishing website (link below). To receive the discount please mention ref: ‘CONTRACTSPROFBLOG’ in the special instructions field. Please note that the discount will not be shown on your order but will be applied when your order is processed.

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August 21, 2013 in Books, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, August 20, 2013

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, Post II: Alan Hyde

Hyde headshotThis is the second in a series of posts in our online symposium on the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay.  More about the online symposium can be found here.  More information about this week's guest bloggers can be found here

Alan Hyde is Distinguished Professor and Sidney Reitman Scholar at Rutgers University School of Law, Newark, where he writes mostly about labor, employment, and immigration law. 

Stewart Macaulay, System Builder

I’ve often wondered whether Stewart Macaulay would have had even more influence if he had used his social science research into business practice to construct theories and systems.  In most of his writing, Stewart used empirical research to debunk.  Often, there is a specific target.  For example, Stewart will take on the idea that business professionals want to be sure that the documents they sign constitute contracts that will be enforceable as such in court.  As everyone knows (I hope), Stewart’s research showed, so long ago, that people who did deals cared little about formal enforceability.  My impression is that most American contracts teachers know this, and ignore it in their actual teaching practice.  The typical contracts class probably spends as much time today on the line between unenforceable agreement, and enforceable contract, as it did before Stewart began writing, or was born. 

MacaulayAs a public service, I have synthesized the following Counterstatement (First) of Actual US Contract Law in Action, as Given by the Dealmakers of the US, Under the Interpretation of Stewart Macaulay (Tentative Draft No.1).  Casebooks may now cite it—I grant permission-- as an alternative approach (though with precisely the same claim to legal authority as the product of that Institute in Philadelphia, the name of which I do not choose to recall, that is so often treated by contracts teachers today as if it were the Civil Code).  Authors can argue with it.  For sometimes it takes a system to beat a system.  For convenience, I will synthesize this Counterstatement from Stewart’s fabulous casebook (with Kidwell, Whitford, Braucher, and sometimes others), Contracts: Law in Action, because I teach from it every year and thus get the benefit of hearing Stewart’s voice in my head as I teach.

Counterstatement (First) of Actual US Contract Law . . .

Chapter One: Remedies.  [Since this is a Stewart Macaulay Counterstatement of Actual US Contract Law, it naturally begins with Remedies]

Section 1: Remedies expected and demanded for failures to meet promises shall reflect the expectations of the parties based on the norms of their industry, and their sense of fairness.  Remedies shall not depend on technicalities of formal enforceability as discussed in Chapter Two of this Counterstatement, and in no case shall refer to decisions of courts of law except insofar as these have been incorporated into business norms, which, if parties are rational, would be never.  For example, if a machine sold doesn’t work, “this is not something any lawyer could handle without putting you [Seller] out of business.  This must be handled on a business basis by a salesperson and the person who bought the machine. We don’t look for legal loopholes to avoid obligations like this.  After all, you are selling reliability and your reputation gets around.”

Section 2:  Buyer’s cancellation of an order

  1. A Buyer under a formal or informal arrangement for the sale of goods, whether or not a law court would find it to be a “contract,” may cancel an order when its needs have changed.
  2. In such a case, the Buyer shall be liable to the Seller for cancellation costs, defined as expenses incurred by the Seller that have been turned to waste by Buyer’s cancellation.  Such expenses include completed product scrapped or unsellable after Buyer’s cancellation, and raw materials purchased in order to fulfill Buyer’s order but that cannot be salvaged.
  3. A seller that sues a cancelling Buyer for profits it thinks it would have made from Buyer’s purchase is probably nuts, especially where that Buyer is a consumer.  Such a Seller that sues for lost profits can hardly expect people to continue to deal with it.
  4. Lawyers can call cancellation of an order “breach of contract,” if they like, but that doesn’t mean that their clients will agree with this characterization.

Cropped Cover (1)Section 3: Seller’s cancellation or late delivery

  1. On notification by Seller that it is unable to fulfill Buyer’s order, Buyer may purchase any reasonable substitute and bill Seller for the difference.
  2. If Seller is going to be late, it should try to work things out with the Buyer.  If Buyer had enough notice that the Seller would be late, and didn’t do anything to protect itself, nobody is going to give Buyer any damages.

Section 4: Miscellaneous remedies

  1. All parties understand that failure to keep your word in business is likely to result in people saying bad things about your reputation.
  2. When things go wrong, try to work things out with your contractual partner.  This probably means keeping the lawyers out.  “If business had to be done by lawyers as buyers and sellers, the economy would stop.  No one would buy or sell anything; they’d just negotiate forever.”
  3. The party that drafts the documents will probably disclaim any liability, in vague, illegible gobbledy-gook, and courts that are there to protect wealth and privilege will probably let them get away with it, so really all this study of remedies is somewhat beside the point.

Chapter Two: Enforceability [like you care, anyway] 

Section 5: Enforceability of promises and arrangements made in family settings

Courts should not hesitate to enforce promises made by one family member to another, if the situation permits the court to play a useful role in sorting things out and restoring harmony, which is rare.

Section 6: Contract formation in general

  1. Honest people keep their promises without worrying about any technicalities of contract formation.  The so-called law of offer-and-acceptance is just a bunch of loopholes that lawyers use to get people out from promises that they plainly made but now feel like getting out of.
  2. When the parties’ documents do not appear to create what courts think is an enforceable contract, for example by reserving in one party such freedom of action as to raise the question whether it is even committing to anything, try to imagine that maybe they didn’t intend judicial enforcement, preferring to work things out.
  3. The idea that people have no commitments to each other, and then, after one magic moment (called contract formation), do, is just magical thinking. People should act like moral adults and work out the issues between them, without taking refuge in legal mumbo-jumbo, which is nearly always a very hostile step to take and interpreted by others as such. 

Section 7: Consideration

There is no such doctrine.  A plaintiff who seeks specific performance of a contract to sell valuable real estate in consideration of one peppercorn (tendered) has a great deal of explaining to do.

 Section 8. Excuse.

If you owe $50,000 to a bank, and can’t pay, you are in trouble.  But if you owe $50 million to a bank, and can’t pay, the bank is in trouble.

You get the idea, anyway.  It’s time for Stewart Macaulay fans to move beyond mere debunking.  That Institute in Philadelphia should support the Counterstatement (First) of Actual US Contract Law in Action, as Given by the Dealmakers of the US, Under the Interpretation of Stewart Macaulay.  But who should be Chief Reporter?

[Posted, on Alan Hyde's behalf, by JT]

August 20, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Contract Profs, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, August 19, 2013

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, Post I: Jay Feinman, Ambition & Humility


This is the first in a series of posts in our online symposium on the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay.  More about the online symposium can be found here.  More information about this week's guest bloggers can be found here

Jay Feinman is Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law‒Camden. 

My contribution to Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the Empirical and the Lyrical is a chapter entitled “Ambition and Humility in Contract Law.” The chapter focuses on several of Macaulay’s articles in the 1960s in which he presented an organization of the fundamental policies underlying contract law, the structures through which contract law acts, and some policies of the legal system that influence the fundamental and structural policies. The organization encapsulates in a remarkable 2x2 matrix the essential issues of contract law.

Here is the matrix, which separates the substantive policies that contract law serves (market and other-than-market goals) from the ways in which the legal system can realize those goals (through rules or case-by-case adjudication). (As Macaulay recognizes, the elements of the matrix are actually ends of continua rather than discrete categories.)


Market goals

Other-than-market goals

Generalizing approach (‘rules’)

market-functioning policy

social (or economic) planning policy

Particularizing approach (‘case-by-case’)

transactional policy

relief-of-hardship policy

 Macaulay’s organization clearly and powerfully expresses the underpinnings and operations of the field.  For mainstream scholars, the identification of policies and approaches provides a framework that clarifies analysis in legislation, adjudication, and scholarship. But the matrix also contains the seeds of a critique that demonstrated that contract law is at best badly confused and at worst incoherent and largely ineffective. In that way, Macaulay’s work contributed to critical legal studies’ account of private law through its influence on Duncan Kennedy’s monumental “Form and Substance In Private Law Adjudication,” 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976) and other works.

Cropped Cover (1)Consider just one instance of the way in which the organization reveals these problems, in the relationship between market and other-than-market goals.

For contract law, the market is the primary social institution, so market goals predominate.  Macaulay’s framing of market-promoting goals as primary and market-correcting goals as secondary correctly states the customary objectives of contract law as ambition tempered with humility.  But that framing makes apparent why contract law needs to temper its ambition of serving the market with a large dose of humility.

First, the conflicting market and non-market goals need to be balanced, and the measures for doing so are controversial.  The case law and literature offer a variety of mechanisms for carrying out this balancing.  Courts employ different tropes including avoidance by doctrinal formalism, casual policy analysis, and ad hoc paternalism.  The Restatement Second frequently lists factors to be balanced without specifying the techniques of balancing.  Economic analysis aims for efficient results, variously defined and sought.  In his later reflections on the systematic presentation of contract law policies, Macaulay recognized the inadequacy of these efforts and the difficulty, perhaps impossibility of this balancing process.  There he entitles the matrix “The Contradictions of Contract Law” and comments that contract law “inconsistently rests on policies that both promote the market and those that attempt to blunt it.”  Macaulay, “Klein and the Contradictions of Corporate Law, 2 Berkeley Bus.  L. J.  119  (2005).

Second, the hierarchy and separation between market and non-market goals needs to be established in practice.  Consider the choice between a rule-oriented market functioning policy and a case-by-case transactional policy.  One of the substantive contract policies Macaulay identifies is self-reliance.  In the conception of the market as private, individual, and self-actuating, self-reliance is crucial.  Macaulay writes of promoting self-reliance by encouraging or requiring parties to look out for themselves, in a world in which the law will rigidly enforce apparent bargains they have made, through a market-functioning or transactional policy.

But implicit in this construction is the illogic of simply promoting the market by promoting self-reliance through a body of contract law that rewards initiative and punishes dependence.  Instead, the law can further self-reliance in either of two opposite ways—by creating a minimal body of contract law that puts parties at risk or an aggressively interventionist body of law that provides parties with security.  A body of contract that provides relief from one’s ill-informed or ill-fated promises encourages self-reliant action by assuring that the consequences of action will not be too severe.  The risk of intervention or non-intervention in this way protects all economic actors, as all are potentially subject to bad decisions or bad luck, although the weak probably more so than the strong.

Stewart Macaulay
Therefore, a combination of the transactional policy and the relief of hardship policy—determining the enforceability of contracts, or not, on a case-by-case basis—may maximize social welfare; whether the social welfare so produced is greater or lesser than that generated by the rule-based market functioning policy ameliorated with social or economic planning policy is an empirical question for which no theoretical answer exists.

Third, as the theoretical conflict about self-reliance illustrates, it is problematic even to attempt to define market and non-market goals as separate.  Inherent in the separation is the conception that market goals involve the facilitation of private activity, a process that is distinct from the imposition of public values such as redressing inequality.  Private activity is fundamentally individual, whereas public goals are collective.  Courts in private law cases are primarily a forum for the adjudication of private disputes; legislatures are the arena in which public goals are primarily enunciated.  And so on.

But these dichotomies are exaggerated.  There is no institution of the market separate from and preexisting non-market activity, just as there is no private law not constituted by public values.  The exchange of goods may be a private activity, but the exchange of goods that the law has made the subject of property and which exchange is enforceable by law is an essentially public activity.  Law constitutes the market for reasons of the public good, so supporting the market through contract law is only another way of advancing the public good, and not a particularly distinct way at that.

Because the market is not distinctively private, the hierarchy of market goals and the need for self-reliance in the service of those goals are not evident.  The justification for contract law and its rules must rest elsewhere than on a claim that the market is distinctive and distinctively important.  And that is a claim that is assumed but seldom justified in the case law or literature.  Part of the power of Macaulay’s organization is the way in which it makes clear the great defects of contract law’s ambition.

[Posted, on Jay Feinman's behalf, by JT]

August 19, 2013 in Books, Commentary, Contract Profs, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, August 16, 2013

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: The First Week's Contributors

We begin our online symposium inspired by Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the Empirical and the Lyrical (Jean Braucher, John Kidwell, and William C. Whitford, eds., Hart Publishing 2013) with four posts next week. In addition to helping edit the book Jean Braucher has also been instrumental in recruiting participants and shaping this symposium.  So we at the blog are all very grateful to her.

This post will serve to introduce next week's guest bloggers.

FeinmanJay Feinman is Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law‒Camden. He writes and teaches in contracts, insurance law, and torts. His books include Delay, Deny, Defend: Why Insurance Companies Don’t Pay Claims and What You Can Do About ItLaw 101: Everything You Need to Know About American Law; and Professional Liability to Third Parties. His contracts scholarship includes articles on relational contract theory (“The Insurance Relationship as Relational Contract and the ‘Fairly Debatable’ Rule for First-Party Bad Faith,” 46 San Diego L. Rev. (2009); “Relational Contract Theory in Context,” 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 737 (1999), critical legal studies (“Critical Approaches to Contract Law,” 30 UCLA Law Review 829 (1983)), and formation doctrine (“Is an Advertisement an Offer? Why It Is, and Why It Matters,” 58 Hastings L.J. 61 (2006)). In the AALS, Feinman  has served as chair of the Section on Contracts and chair of the planning committee for the contracts conference. At Rutgers, he has served as Associate Dean and Acting Dean of the law school and a member of the Rutgers Center for Risk and Responsibility, and he has received every teaching prize awarded by the university.

Links to many of Professor Feinman's publications can be found here.

Hyde headshotAlan Hyde is Distinguished Professor and Sidney Reitman Scholar at Rutgers University School of Law, Newark, where he writes mostly about labor, employment, and immigration law.  He is a member of the American Law Institute and consultant to the Restatement of Employment Law.  He also teaches contracts and discusses contracts in his books Bodies of Law (1997), Working in Silicon Valley (2003), and articles on covenants not to compete and employment contracts that contracts teachers do not read.

Links to many of Professor Hydes publications can be found here.

Kate O'Neill's principal interests are contracts, copyright, legal rhetoric, and law school teaching.  She shares the following biographical details:

OneillKateI am a professor at University of Washington School of Law.  I have been teaching Contracts for about 15 years.  I started out, copying my colleagues, by using the Dawson casebook. I had first encountered contracts as a student with a much earlier edition of the same book.  I embarrassed to admit that I began teaching contracts without much insight into the subject, and I can’t remember exactly when I first discovered Macaulay and relational contracts theory.  I certainly had not encountered them in my own legal education, although my four years of commercial practice did perhaps make me susceptible to their insights.  But what a relief they were!  I have been teaching from Macaulay, et al., contracts: law in Action for many years now.

If you are interested in why we teach contracts as most of us do, you might enjoy a piece I wrote about Richard Posner’s effect on casebooks and law teaching.  Rhetoric Counts: What We Should Teach When We Teach Posner, 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 507 (2009).   

Links to many of Professor O'Neill's publications can be found here.

PostDeborah Post is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Faculty Development and Professor of Law at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. She began her legal career working in the corporate section of a law firm in Houston, Texas, Bracewell & Patterson, now renamed Bracewell & Guiliani. She left practice to teach at the University of Houston Law School and moved to New York to Touro Law Center in 1987. She has been a visiting professor at Syracuse Law School, DePaul Law School, and State University of New Jersey Rutgers School of Law Newark. She also has taught as an adjunct at Hofstra Law School, UMass Dartmouth and St. Johns University School of Law. Professor Post has written for and about legal education. Among her most notable publications are a book on legal education, Cultivating Intelligence: Power, Law and the Politics of Teaching written with a colleague, Louise Harmon and a casebook in Contract, Contracting Law, with co-authors Amy Kastely and Nancy Ota. She has been a member of the Society of American Law Teachers Board of Governors for ten years and was co-president of that organization with Professor Margaret Barry from 2008-2010.

Links to many of Professor Post's publications can be found here.

We look forward to an engaging first round of posts.


August 16, 2013 in About this Blog, Books, Contract Profs, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, August 15, 2013

Introducing our Virtual Symposium: Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay

This symposium marks the publication of Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the Empirical and the Lyrical (Hart Publishing 2013), a volume edited by Jean Braucher, John Kidwell, and William C. Whitford.  Starting next week and continuing for several weeks, this blog will publish entries both by contributors to the book and by others who have engaged with Macaulay’s work in the field of contracts.

MacaulayFifty years ago, the American Sociological Review published Macaulay’s Non-Contractual  Relations in Business—A Preliminary Study, an empirical examination of the use and, more strikingly, the non-use of contracts in business.  One of the 20 most cited articles in the history of ASR, its influence has grown with each passing decade.  Macaulay (pictured) has produced an impressive number of other significant articles in contract law, as well as influential work in law and social science, and is the lead author of the casebook, Contracts: Law in Action, Vol. I and II (LexisNexis 3rd Ed. 2010/2011), co-authored by Braucher, Kidwell, and Whitford (introduction  available here). 

“Bill Whitford, the late John Kidwell, and I wanted to celebrate Macaulay’s contributions to contracts scholarship, particularly his use of law in action and relational perspectives,” explains Jean Braucher, Roger C. Henderson Professor of Law at the University of Arizona.  “We were extremely pleased that leading and rising scholars contributed 15 original chapters to the book, everything from theoretical essays to new empirical work to relational critiques of legal doctrine.”  Braucher adds that Kidwell, who died in 2012, participated fully in the development of the book and edited several of the chapters.

Cropped Cover (1)Kidwell, Whitford, and Macaulay all served for many years on the faculty at the Wisconsin Law School, where the law in action approach is a tradition.  Whitford and Macaulay are both emeritus professors there. Macaulay, who joined the Wisconsin law faculty in 1957, has held two named professorships there, serving as the Malcolm Pitman Sharp Professor and Theodore W. Brazeau Professor of Law.

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay begins with Non-Contractual Relations in Business, reproduced in full, and then provides extended excerpts from two other significant articles by Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards (1966) and The Real Deal and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules (2003).  The book also includes 15 chapters written by other scholars, Brian H. Bix, David Campbell, Jay M. Feinman, Robert W. Gordon, Claire A. Hill, Charles L. Knapp, Ethan J. Lieb, Li-Wen Lin, Deborah Waire Post, Edward Rubin, Carol Sanger, Robert E. Scott, D. Gordon Smith, Josh Whitford, John Wightman, and William J. Woodward, Jr.  The book’s table of contents and preface are available here (giving the title and author of each chapter, briefly describing each chapter, and providing an overview of Macaulay’s career and contributions to contracts teaching).


August 15, 2013 in About this Blog, Books, Contract Profs, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)