Friday, May 3, 2013
So, here's an interesting problem I'm facing. I taught sales for the first time this semester. I would say I devoted about 2/3 of class time to going over problems. In order to maximize active learning, I had the students hand in written answers to three of the problems each week, and that homework counted cumulatively for 40% of the grade).
My students were amazingly diligent, often looking up cases referenced in the questions and reading through the comments to Article 2 of the UCC. I don't know what all the students thought about the assessment system, but a few have told me that they appreciated the fact that they had no choice but to keep up with the material, even if answering the questions was time-consuming and often frustrating because of either ambiguities in the Code or tensions between the Code and the caselaw.
But here's the problem. I wasn't born yesterday. Now that there has been a group of students that has taken the course with me, their notes, including their answers to the homework problems, will circulate. I think it is unrealistic to expect students (especially 3Ls) to refrain from consulting such excellent authority when answering the questions. Unfortunately, the mystic chords of memory will swell when touched not by the better angels of our nature (as represented at left), but by a consultation with last year's students' answers, leading to idle minds with which devils (represented at right) are just as happy to play as with idle hands.
So how can I re-create this year's experience without coming up with my own original questions every time I teach the course?
Any suggestions -- from any perspective: law prof, student, interested practitioner -- would be most welcome.
Thursday, May 2, 2013
David F. Eisenberg, Evolving with the Times: A Push to Legalize Surrogate Parenting Contracts in the State of New York, 33 Pace L. Rev. 302 (2013)
George R. La Noue, Defining Social and Economic Disadvantage: Are Government Preferential Business Certification Programs Narrowly Tailored? 12 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class 2749 (2012)
Wednesday, May 1, 2013
Ave Maria School of Law invites applications for multiple faculty positions from entry-level and lateral candidates, pre- or post-tenure. Ave Maria particularly welcomes applications from candidates with teaching and research interest in Contracts, Business Organizations, Sales, Negotiable Instruments, Secured Transactions, and related commercial subjects. Applicants should have superior academic credentials; a record, or the promise, of excellence in teaching and legal scholarship; and an interest and commitment in exploring his or her teaching and research interests in an institution that strives to integrate the Catholic intellectual tradition into teaching, scholarship, and service. Entry-level applicants may demonstrate scholarly promise by publications in scholarly journals or scholarly works in progress. In the case of any applicant with tenure, a distinguished record of teaching and scholarship is required. Interested candidates should send their materials to Professor Patrick T. Gillen, current chair of the Appointments Committee. Applications can be e-mailed to Professor Gillen at email@example.com or can be mailed to his attention at 1025 Commons Circle, Naples, Florida 34119. Resume review will begin immediately and continue until the positions are filled.
Ave Maria School of Law, providing legal education enriched by the Catholic Faith, seeks employees whose education, experience and beliefs are consistent with its mission. Ave Maria School of Law is an EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/AFFIRMATIVE ACTION employer that values diversity, including diversity in religious affiliation, and strongly encourages applications from persons of diverse backgrounds willing to support the institutional mission; it requires compliance with all state and federal laws governing employment discrimination.
We previously blogged about high-profile reward offers by Donald Trump, Bill Maher, a laptop-seeking music producer, and a Hong Kong businessman. Only one of those (the producer) led to an actual lawsuit. The latest reward offer in the news involves murder.
In February of this year, the City of Los Angeles and other entities collectively offered a $1 million reward for information regarding Chris Dorner. Dorner was the former policeman and Navy officer who (allegedly) killed four people, including two policemen. The manhunt for Dorner, labeled the "Cop Killer," reportedly was one of the largest in LA County's history.
One of the people claiming the reward, Rick Heltebrake, has filed a breach of contract suit in LA Superior Court (the complaint can be obtained here but only for a fee). Heltebrake is suing the City of Los Angeles, and supporting entities for $1 million and is suing three cities that offered separate $100,000 rewards related to Dorner. Heltebrake was a carjacking victim of Dorner's. After he escaped, Heltebrake called the police and told them where they could find Dorner. Because Dorner was found at the location Heltebrake identified, he is seeking the rewards.
The contract controversy is one of interpretation. The rewards reportedly were available for "information leading to the apprehension and capture of" Dorner, for the "identification and apprehension" of Dorner, for the "capture and conviction" of Dorner, and for "information leading to the arrest and conviction of" Dorner (I do not have the complaint so these excerpts are cobbled together from TMZ, Courthouse News Service, ABC and other sources). Police charged Dorner on February 11, 2013. Heltebrake called police on February 12. On February 25, after a shootout with police and structure fire, Dorner was found dead from an apparently self-inflicted gunshot wound.
Given the above facts, some of the intepretations questions are: (i) whether the authorities' shootout and recovery of Dorner's body qualifies as "apprehension" or "arrest," (ii) whether the "and" between "identification and arrest" or between "capture and conviction" means that both are required in order to collect, and many, many more. A complicating factor is that the $1 million reward was merely announced on TV; no written record was made. At least one reward offeror, the City of Riverside, has stated that the lack of a "conviction" means that it won't pay. Although this is a tragic story, I may mention it the next time I teach the Carbolic Smoke Ball case.
If anyone is able to find the complaint for free, please post a link in the comments.
[Heidi R. Anderson]
Tuesday, April 30, 2013
We are grateful to the website Lexology.com and to Ellen D. Marcus of Zuckerman Spaeder LLP for this informative and interesting post about this complaint filed in the Northern District of Illinois by Merry Gentlemen, LLC against actor and director, Michael Keaton. According to the complaint, Keaton breached his contract to act in and direct a film called Merry Gentlemen by failing to deliver it on time and by marketing his own version of the film to the Sundance Film Festival. The film cratered, grossing only $350,000 at the box office. Moreover, the producers allege that Keaton's various breaches caused "substantial delays and increased expenses in the completion and release of the movie," thus causing the producers to suffer "substantial financial loss."
Ms. Marcus's post picks it up there, citing Restatement 2d's Section 347 on the elements of expectation damages and illustrating what sort of sums the producers might be looking to recover. Ms. Marcus has to speculate, as the producers cite no figures beyond those required to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement to get their diversity claim into a federal court.
Whether or not the allegations of the complaint are true, they paint a nice picture of the behind-the-scenes machinanations invovled in getting a film out to the viewing public. According to the complaint, Keaton produced a "first cut" that all agreed was unsatisfactory. There then followed both a "Chicago cut," edited by the producers and by Ron Lazzeretti, the screenwriter and the producers' original choice for director, as well as Keaton's second director's cut.
The producers then shopped the Chicago cut to the Sundance Film Festival, where they were awarded a prime venue. Keaton then allegedly threatened not to appear at Sundance unless his cut was screened. That was a dealbreaker for Sundance, so despite already having sunk $4 million in to the film, the producers claim they had no choice but to agree to screen Keaton's second cut at the festival. They did so through a Settlement and Release (attached to the complaint, but not to the online version) entered into with Keaton, which they now claim was without consideration, despite the recital of consideration in the agreement, and entered into under duress.
Despite all of this, the complaint alleges that the Sundance screening was a success, since the USA Today identified "Merry Gentlemen" as one of ten stand-out films screened that year. But the producers were unable to capitalize on this success, since Keaton's alleged continuing dereliction of his directorial duties resulted in dealys of the release of the film from October of November 2008 to May 2009. The producers allege that the film was a Christmas movie (or at least was set around Christmas time), so Keaton's delays caused the movie to premiere during the wrong season.
The producers allege that Keaton continued to refuse to cooperate with them after Sundance. Somehow, the movie nonetheless was released to some positive reviews:
The movie, as released (based upon Keaton’s second cut and numerous changes made by plaintiff), received substantial critical praise. Roger Ebert called the film “original, absorbing and curiously moving in ways that are far from expected.” The New York Times’ Manohla Dargis called it “[a]n austere, nearly perfect character study of two mismatched yet ideally matched souls.” David Letterman said on his Late Night talk show, “What a tremendous film . . . . I loved it.”
Note to the producers' attorneys: if you've got Roger Ebert and Manohla Dargis in your corner, you don't need Letterman (or The USA Today for that matter).
Nonetheless, the film did not succeed, grossing only $350,000, allegedly because of Keaton's failure to promote it. Indeed, some of the complaints allegations relating to Keaton's promotion efforts suggest some real issues. Upon being asked by an interviewer if she had accurately summarized the film's plot, Keaton allegedly responded that he had not seen it for a while.
We note also that Ms. Marcus's post is cross-posted on Suits by Suits, a legal blog about disputes between companies and their executives, a site to which we may occasionally return for more blog fodder.
Monday, April 29, 2013
A little over a year ago, we reported on a Ninth Circuit case, Kilgore v. Key Bank. Here is a summary of the panel's opinion:
The issue in Kilgore was whether California’s public policy favoring the litigation (rather than arbitration) of claims seeking public injunctions could trump the [Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)] post-Concepcion as it did pre-Concepcion in two California Supreme Court cases, Broughton and Cruz. The Ninth Circuit reluctantly concluded that the Broughton-Cruz line of cases is no longer viable post-Concepcion. As the Supreme Court made clear in Marmet, about which we blogged last month, Concepcion’s reach is broad enough to preempt state public policies other than the specific one addressed in Concepcion. The fact that a state legislature specifically intended to avoid federal preemption under the FAA is irrelevant.
The Court then addressed the unconscionability of the arbitration clause. The Court noted that the arbitration clause at issue here was not buried in the contract and specified the rights that plaintiffs waived under arbitration. In addition, the contract contained clear instructions on how to opt-out. Finding no procedural unconscionability, the Court saw no need to address potential substantive unconscionability in the arbitration clause. The case was remanded to the District Court with instructions to compel arbitration.
On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit held that the case does not fall within the "public injunction" exception to the FAA, recognized in Broughton, Cruz, and Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, and thus the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's denial of the defendant's motion to compel arbitration and remanded with instructions to compel aribration. That exception only applies where the "benefits of granting injunctive relief by and large do not accrue to that party, but to the general public in danger of being victimized by the same deceptive practices as the plaintiff suffered.” The Ninth Circuit found that not to be the case in Kilgore and thus it was able to compel arbitration while leaving the Broughton-Cruz exception to the FAA intact for now.
Judge Pregerson dissented, finding the challenged arbitration clause unconscionable.