Wednesday, November 20, 2013
Laura Dee (plaintiff) and Dena Rakower (defendant) lived together in a committed, same-sex relationship for nearly 18 years and are the parents of two children. In her complaint, Dee alleges that they had an oral “joint venture/partnership agreement” whereby Dee would share in Rakower's assets, including Rakower’s retirement contributions and earnings, in exchange for Dee leaving her full-time job to care for their children. The couple’s entire relationship pre-dated the passage of New York’s Marriage Equality Act. Upon termination of the couple’s relationship, Dee sued Rakower for, among other claims, breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the cause of action for breach of contract; in a divided opinion, the Appellate Division (Second Department) reinstated that claim.
The majority of the appellate court reasoned that the allegations in the complaint sufficiently plead a cause of action for breach of contract:
The alleged contractual agreement between the parties was supported by consideration. "Consideration consists of either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. It is enough that something is promised, done, forborne, or suffered by the party to whom the promise is made as consideration for the promise made to him [or her]" * * * The consideration here for the alleged contract is the forbearance of the [Dee’s] career, the inability to continue to save toward her retirement during that forbearance, and her maintenance of the household in return for a share in [Rakower’s] retirement benefits and other assets earned during the period of forbearance. * * * Since [Dee] also alleged that [Rakower] breached the alleged agreement and that she has sustained damages as a result of that breach, at this pleading stage, the eighth cause of action [to recover damages for breach of contract] must survive dismissal * * *.
The fact that the alleged agreement was made by an unmarried couple living together does not render it unenforceable. "New York courts have long accepted the concept that an express agreement between unmarried persons living together is as enforceable as though they were not living together, provided only that illicit sexual relations were not part of the consideration of the contract'" (Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 486, quoting Rhodes v Stone, 63 Hun 624, 624 [citations omitted]). "[W]hile cohabitation without marriage does not give rise to the property and financial rights which normally attend the marital relation, neither does cohabitation disable the parties from making an agreement within the normal rules of contract law" (Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d at 486; see Matter of Gorden, 8 NY2d 71, 75).
The case at bar is similar to Morone v Morone (50 NY2d 481). In Morone, the parties cohabited as husband and wife although they were not married. The plaintiff claimed that the parties had entered into an oral partnership agreement whereby, among other things, they agreed that the net profits of their partnership would be used and applied for their equal benefit **. The plaintiff devoted herself exclusively to their relationship and this endeavor. The Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a breach of contract cause of action.
There is no reason, on this record, at this early stage of the litigation to conclude, as the Supreme Court did, that the oral agreement between the parties cannot serve as the basis for a breach of contract cause of action. ***
Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination and the opinion of our dissenting colleague, [Dee’s] failure to specifically allege that there was a "meeting of the minds" as to how the assets would be distributed upon the termination of the parties' relationship does not compel the conclusion that the complaint fails to state a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract. * * * The complaint specifically alleges that the parties agreed to share equally the defendant's retirement account accrued during that period of time that the plaintiff did not work at a job that provided a retirement plan without consideration of the direct and indirect contributions of the parties or when such contributions were made. Thus, as alleged, there is sufficient definiteness to the material terms of the alleged agreement between the parties to establish an enforceable contract (see Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen v Schumacher, 52 NY2d 105, 109). The failure to include the mechanism for the implementation of the parties' alleged agreement does not negate the allegations in the complaint that they entered into an agreement with regard to the rights to their assets.
The dissent, however, took the view of the oral agreement, stating that “the complaint is devoid of any allegation as to whether and how their assets and pension benefits would be divided in the event the parties were to no longer be together.” The dissent opined that “read[ing] such a provision into the parties’ agreement, where none is expressed in the complaint, would result in the invention of an implied contractual provisions which, as noted, is prohibited by our law for agreements between unmarried persons living together.” Then the dissent expressed concern that Dee seeks “equitable distribution” without alleging that the parties had expressly agreed to such a distribution:
Distilled to its essence, the plaintiff in this action seeks "equitable distribution" of the defendant's assets and future pension benefits without alleging in the complaint that the defendant had promised to share them if the parties did not stay together. Indeed, there is no allegation that the parties had any meeting of the minds as to the distribution of property or assets upon a termination of their relationship. Absent such an allegation, and absent an affidavit from the plaintiff clarifying or expanding her description of the parties' agreement to cover such an eventuality, the complaint fails to state a cause of action. The plaintiff's theory of recovery is dependent upon implying terms for the distribution of retirement benefits to circumstances involving the dissolution of the parties' familial relationship. The Supreme Court properly refrained from implying such provisions into the oral contract in determining that, under the circumstances alleged, the "complaint lacks a contract for the court to enforce."
No aspect of this partial dissent speaks to the merits of the New York's more recent enactment of the Marriage Equality Act. This Court is sensitive to the complications occasioned by various forms of familial relationships that necessarily result in financial agreements or entanglements. The judiciary, however, is limited in addressing and determining the ownership and/or distribution of familial assets, absent either the existence of a lawfully recognized marriage or an enforceable expressed contract between persons in a cohabitational relationship.
According to an article in the NYLJ about the case:
The court agreed to resolve the appeal though the parties settled, apparently accepting the position of Dee's pro bono attorney, Michele Kahn of Kahn & Goldberg, that the case involved important issues for both gay and heterosexual couples.
Kahn noted in a letter to the court that there were "tens of thousands of unmarried, mostly gay, couples in the State." Although those couples can now marry, she said "questions will remain" about the application of equitable distribution laws to "specific and identifiable promises and agreements" prior to their marriages.
Kahn also argued that, according to the Census Bureau,"an increasing number of couples are rejecting the institution of marriage."
"The manner in which this couple conducted their lives—relying and acting upon each others' specific promises, without formal writings, is the way that most unmarried couples live their lives," she wrote. "Inevitably, many of these couples will break up, and inevitably many of these couples will be involved in litigation over property and assets that were acquired during the relationship," Kahn wrote.
Dee v. Rakower, 2013 NY Slip Op 07443 (2d Dep't Nov. 13, 2013).
[Meredith R. Miller]