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Wednesday, August 21, 2013

Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, Post III: Kate O'Neill

OneillKate

This is the third in a series of posts in our online symposium on the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay.  More about the online symposium can be found here.  More information about this week's guest bloggers can be found here

Kate O'Neill's is Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of Law.  Her principal interests are contracts, copyright, legal rhetoric, and law school teaching.

The Mess We're In

These essays present enlightening, provocative, and well-written analyses of relational contract theory, contract doctrine, legal practice, and social justice.  The editors have sequenced and grouped them skillfully so that the reader can clearly see how the authors’ ideas intersect and diverge.  As a result, the collection is more than its parts.

I want to draw readers’ attention to a problem the collection suggests but doesn’t address directly.  What are we going to do about the contracts course in law school?

Several essays suggest, and Robert Scott’s expressly argues for, an emerging consensus that Macaulay’s original insights remain valid and are foundational for both law & economics and law & society theorists and that these warring camps may have more in common than either has yet recognized.  If Scott and Macaulay are right, then I would wager that most contract courses not only fail to reflect the consensus but camouflage its most promising lessons.


The consensus seems to include two major points of agreement.  First, unmessy doctrine can be handy (“Messy,” of course, was Macaulay’s description of much contract doctrine). Some “sophisticated” contracting parties should be able to make binding commitments on precisely the terms that they negotiate and, in case of dispute, they should be able to limit a judge’s interpretative discretion to alter their allocations of risk.  In particular, they should be able to preclude the judge from resorting to “context” to alter the (presumably) plain meaning of the terms.

Second, consumers and employees should not necessarily be bound by all of the commitments purportedly imposed upon them by adhesion documents. Here, we can see fruit borne from Macaulay’s distinction between the real deal and the paper deal. Terms that are reasonable, typical, or expected are part of the deal; terms that are not are not. The expected nature of the relationship dictates the real contract terms; the paper contract terms do not necessarily govern the relationship. We are freed from the mutually exclusive and entirely fictional alternatives that either a contract was formed on the paper terms or it was not formed at all. 

On the other hand, the collection makes clear that a fundamental policy issue remains contested especially in the consumer context – how much contract law should intervene in the market.  The familiar alternatives are reflected:  1) let the market discipline bad actors even if there are a few casualties before the market works its magic because there is no agency more capable than the market in determining best (read, efficient?) practices; 2) let judges intervene to strike down bad terms – especially those that limit access to courts and class actions – because doing so will hasten market discipline of bad actors and will also relieve hardship in at least a few cases; or  3) regulate certain kinds of terms out of existence.

All the authors think that empirical data could help resolve the policy dispute. Edward Rubin, in particular, suggests that we think of contract law as a management tool.  If we were to focus on whether the tool works well to achieve whatever objectives we set, then the legal system could essentially be taught to treat empirical evidence as intrinsic to the development of law.  This is  encouraging stuff.  A systemic devotion to empiricism within the legal system might enable us, and the body politic, to clarify debates about what laws are fair and efficacious.

So far, so good, but here is the question that keeps troubling me.  If we all are relationists and empiricists now, and we could use data to make contracting law and practice both fairer and more efficient (or whatever other goals we might conceivably agree upon), what and how we should teach law students?

Macaulay Cropped Cover (1)has taught us that contract law has relatively little explanatory power for many of the actual practices involved in the formation, performance, and modification of exchanges, or even the practices involved in resolving disputes.  Serious attention to the nature of exchange relationships makes it hard to characterize contract law as unified, coherent and consistent or if it is unified theoretically, the unity operates at such a high level of abstraction that will matter little to judges or practitioners.

We praise these and other insights from empiricism both for what they tell us about law and society now and what they might teach us about alternatives. Yet most lawyers and judges plod on, oblivious or dismissive. Are we in part responsible? Look at our casebooks, listen to our classroom discussions!  Traditional doctrinal analysis is alive, well, and I suspect dominant. Economic analysis “lite” has crept in, but attention to empirical methods, much less data on context or consequences, is scant. I suspect that even those of us who assign “law & society” contracts casebooks, like the ones edited by Macaulay and Deborah Post, still devote the bulk of class time to doctrinal analysis.

Perhaps this must be.  Perhaps doctrinal analysis is our discipline’s unique identifier and must be taught first because it is foundational; perhaps we need to train litigators to understand the elements of a claim for breach; perhaps there is some utility in using the same basic case method in all 1L courses; or perhaps we are simply boxed in by student expectations, bar examiners, tradition, or confusion about what else to do?

Although there certainly are barriers to changing what and how we teach, I wonder if the core problem is that the work that needs to be done is profoundly interdisciplinary, challenging, and time-consuming.  Many of us lack the skills to do it alone, and the scholarship, promotion standards, and instructional traditions at many law schools still make collaborations difficult.

Contracts teachers may alert law students to Macaulay’s insights, but I don’t think we give students sufficient tools to help clients and or work effectively on big systemic problems.  Stewart might say that’s because we kinda like the mess the way it is.

[Posted, on Kate O'Neill's behalf, by JT]

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2013/08/revisiting-the-contracts-scholarship-of-stewart-macaulay-post-iii-kate-oneill.html

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