Wednesday, March 4, 2009
I have heard that the parental yearning for grandchildren is a strong one. Based on the recent case of Speranza v. Repro Lab, it is evidently stronger than I initially realized.
In 1997, Mark Speranza deposited a number of semen specimens with Repro Lab. Repro Lab is a tissue bank licensed by the State of New York. The sperm was frozen and stored in Repro's nitrogen vaults.
As part of his agreement with Repro Lab, on July 30, 1997, Mark filled in and signed a form document entitled, "Ultimate Disposition of Specimens," which contained several options for the disposition of the specimens by the tissue bank in the event of Mark's death. Mark checked off the provision stating that in the event of his death: "I authorize and instruct Repro Lab to destroy all semen vials in its possession." The document concludes: "[t]his agreement shall be binding on the parties and their respective assigns, heirs, executors and administrators."
Just six months later, Mark died from cancer. Thereafter, Mark's parents, in the administration of his estate, discovered that he had deposited sperm at Repro. The parents sought a declaration that they were the legal owners of the sperm. They sought to have a surrogate inseminated, with the hope of producing a grandchild for them.
The lab continued to store the sperm for a yearly fee, but refused to turn them over to the parents based upon the document Mark had signed.
A New York trial court dismissed the action. The Appellate Division (Saxe, J.) affirmed on different grounds. The court first reasoned that the parents faced regulatory impediments, namely because Mark fit the definition of a sperm "depositor" rather than a "donor." Based upon this distinction, Repro had not examined and screened Mark's blood and semen and, therefore, could not release the sperm specimens for insemination of a surrogate.
Then, the court held that, even setting aside these regulatory hurdles, the parents' argument for reformation of the contract between the Mark and Repro law was without merit. It reasoned:
Plaintiffs assert that Mark's purpose in storing the sperm was to assure his ability to have a child. The contract, however, is not that vague. It represents a determined choice that the sperm should be available to him so he could protect his ability to procreate if he survived. It does not protect any possibility that his genetic or biological issue could be created after his death; indeed, the directive that his semen be destroyed in the event of his death precludes such a possibility. Since the document conveys a clear intent that the specimens be destroyed upon Mark's death, which intent is not contrary to the asserted intent to assure his ability to have a child while he was alive, it cannot be said that the instrument contains an erroneous expression of the intention of the parties. Accordingly, nothing in plaintiffs' submissions would justify reforming the contract so as to permit them to fulfill their wish after his death, contrary to his express wishes.
Nor does defendant's alleged conduct, in accepting yearly storage fees without revealing the existence of the contract directing the destruction of the specimens in the event of Mark's death, and without initially informing plaintiffs that the specimens could not, under applicable law, be turned over to them, provide plaintiffs with a legal right to claim ownership of the specimens. Whatever remedies Mark's estate might be entitled to seek for the asserted contract breach created by defendant's failure to destroy the specimens, the breach would not engender in Mark's estate a right to an ownership interest. Simply put, under applicable regulations as well as the terms of the contract between Mark and defendant, the specimens are not assets of the estate over which the administrators have possessory rights.
Rather, the legal obligations with regard to the possession and handling of the semen specimens are dictated solely and completely by the applicable Department of Health regulations. At this point, the proposed use of Mark's semen would fundamentally violate 10 NYCRR 52-8.6(g), which requires that a semen donor be "fully evaluated and tested" prior to the use of his semen "by a specific recipient, other than his current or active regular sexual partner." Since the purpose of this statute is to protect the surrogate mother, and thereby the general public, from disease, we cannot countenance avoidance of the regulations' dictates, even though we recognize the joy that ignoring those regulations could bring to plaintiffs.
Speranza v. Repro Lab Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 01543 (App. Div. 1st Dep't Mar. 3, 2009).
[Meredith R. Miller]