Saturday, June 16, 2018
The Seventh Circuit this week denied the Justice Department's request to stay the nationwide injunction against the Department in Chicago's sanctuary cities case. The order says that the Seventh Circuit will wait until the Supreme Court rules in Trump v. Hawaii, the travel-ban case, before ruling on the issue.
Recall that a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit upheld a nationwide injunction issued by the district court against the Department enforcing two conditions imposed by the Attorney General on the DOJ-JAG/Byrne Grant program. DOJ filed a motion to stay the nationwide injunction pending appeal, and the full Seventh Circuit agreed to review the issue.
This latest round of jockeying came when DOJ sent a letter this week to the Seventh Circuit saying that if the Seventh Circuit didn't rule on its motion to stay the nationwide injunction by COB on June 18, DOJ would take it up with the Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit interpreted the letter as a motion for an immediate ruling on DOJ's motion for a stay, and rejected it. The court said that it expected that the Supreme Court would have something to say about this in the travel-ban case, and it would await word from the high Court before ruling here.
The ruling makes it likely (or certain?) that DOJ will try to take this (the nationwide injunction) to the Supreme Court as early as Monday.
Thursday, June 14, 2018
Judge Rosemary Collyer (D.D.C.) ruled yesterday that a journalist's due process claim against the government for including him on a drone-strike kill list can move forward. Judge Collyer ruled that the journalist had standing, and that his due process challenge did not present a non-justiciable political question.
The case originally involved two journalists who challenged their inclusion on the government's drone-strike kill list. They lodged a series of challenges, including violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (because inclusion violated the government's criteria for inclusion, adopted under President Obama); violations of the EO banning assassinations, the Geneva Conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and federal law; and violations of due process.
The government moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing and because it raised a non-justiciable political question. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.
The court ruled that one of the plaintiffs lacked standing, because he failed sufficiently to allege a harm. The court said that the other plaintiff demonstrated harm (and causation and redressability), but that claims based on the APA, the EO, the Geneva Conventions, the ICCPR, and related federal law all raised a political question. As to the APA claim, the court said that it had no judicially manageable standards for resolving it. The court said that the presidential guidance for inclusion on the kill list didn't provide sufficiently determinate standards for judicial review. (The more vague a government policy, the less likely a plaintiff can challenge it under the APA.) As to the other claims, the court merely said that "the process of determining whether Defendants exceeded their authority or violated any of the statutes referenced in the Complaint would require the Court to make a finding on the propriety of the alleged action, which is prohibited by the political question doctrine."
But as to the due process claim, the court concluded that there was no political-question-doctrine bar to moving forward. The court emphasized that the plaintiff's claim was against his inclusion on the kill list, and not that a drone strike was invalid (which might have raised a political question):
[The plaintiff] does not seek a ruling that a strike by the U.S. military was mistaken or improper. He seeks his birthright instead: a timely assertion of his due process rights under the Constitution to be heard before he might be included on the Kill List and his First Amendment rights to free speech before he might be targeted for lethal action due to his profession.
The ruling does not touch on the merits; it merely allows the due process portion of one plaintiff's case to move forward. Still, getting over the political question doctrine in a case like this is a significant victory for the plaintiff.
June 14, 2018 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Political Question Doctrine, Separation of Powers, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, June 7, 2018
Senior Judge Michael M. Baylson (E.D. Pa.) ruled in favor of Philadelphia yesterday in its sanctuary-cities case against the Trump Administration. The court held that the three immigration-enforcement conditions that Attorney General Jeff Sessions imposed on sanctuary cities as conditions of receipt of federal DOJ JAG grants violated federal law and the Constitution.
The ruling goes farther than the Seventh Circuit case also striking the conditions, in that Judge Baylson also ruled Section 1373 unconstitutional. Notably, that portion of the court's decision was based on the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Murphy v. NCAA.
Philadelphia challenged the three conditions that AG Sessions unilaterally imposed on sanctuary cities in exchange for federal JAG grant money--(1) the requirement that local jurisdictions provide ICE officials access to local prisons, (2) the requirement that local jurisdictions notify ICE when they release aliens from local prisons, and (3) the requirement that local jurisdictions certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373. (1373 says that a local government can't restrict its officers from communicating with ICE about the citizenship or immigration status of a person.)
The court held that the first two conditions amounted to ultra vires conduct not authorized by Congress and violated the separation of powers and the Spending Clause (similar to the Seventh Circuit ruling). The court also held that these conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the Administration Procedure Act (because the government failed to support the putative public-safety reasons for the conditions).
The court went on to strike Section 1373 under the Court's approach in Murphy:
8 U.S.C. Secs. 1373(a) and 1373(b) by their plain terms prevent "Federal, State, or local government entit[ies] or official[s] from" engaging in certain activities. These provisions closely parallel the anti-authorization condition in [the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act] which was at issue in Murphy. Specifically, the PASPA provision violated the Tenth Amendment because it "unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do." Sections 1373(a) and (b) do the same, by prohibiting certain conduct of government entities or officials.
The court said that AG Sessions couldn't condition the receipt of federal funds on compliance with an unconstitutional provision like Section 1373, so the third condition, like the first and second, was also invalid.
Tuesday, June 5, 2018
Check out the response to President Trump's attorneys by a group of prominent ConLawProfs, organized by Protect Democracy. (We posted on President Trump's attorneys' letter here.) Their conclusion:
The Office of the President is not a get out of jail free card for lawless behavior. Indeed, our country's Founders made it clear in the Declaration of Independence that they did not believe that even a king had such powers; they specifically cited King George's obstruction of justice as among the "injuries and usurpations" that justified independence. Our Founders would not have created--and did not create--a Constitution that would permit the President to use his powers to violate the laws for corrupt and self-interested reasons.
In sum, both Article II and the criminal laws of this country forbid the president from engaging in corrupt and self-dealing conduct, even when exercising Article II powers to execute the laws.
Sunday, June 3, 2018
The New York Times released a memo penned by Trump lawyers to Special Counsel Robert Mueller earlier this year outlining their theory of executive power and privilege in relationship to Mueller's investigation.
The memo is only the analysis of President Trump''s lawyers. It's not the law. Getting a judicial decision on these issues would require this extraordinary sequence: (1) Mueller to subpoena President Trump to testify, (2) President Trump to decline, and (3) Mueller to attempt to enforce the subpoena in court.
The memo contains a number of eye-popping claims, highlighted by the Times in its analysis. Here are two broad, even breathtaking, constitutional positions in the memo:
1. The President, by definition, cannot commit obstruction (or even any other federal crime). The memo says that the President, as chief executive, cannot constitutionally commit obstruction of a federal investigation:
It remains our position that the President's actions here, by virtue of his position as the chief law enforcement officer, could neither constitutionally nor legally constitute obstruction because that would amount to him obstructing himself, and that he could, if he wished, terminate the inquiry, or even exercise his power to pardon if he so desired.
The language seems to justify absolute presidential immunity for two different reasons, (1) because prosecution would amount to the president obstructing himself, and (2) because he could terminate the inquiry or issue pardons (presumably even pardon himself). The second reason sweeps beyond obstruction charges and suggests that the President, by definition, cannot violate any federal law, recalling President Nixon's infamous claim that "when the President does it, that means that it is not illegal."
2. The President is protected against an interview with Mueller by executive privilege. Citing In re Sealed Case (the Espy case), the memo concludes that President Trump is protected by executive privilege, because Mueller already has enough information to answer the questions he's investigating:
The records and testimony we have, pursuant to the President's directive, already voluntarily provided to your office allow you to delve into the conversations and actions that occurred in a significant and exhaustive manner, including but not limited to the testimony of the President's interlocutors themselves. In light of these voluntary offerings, your office clearly lacks the requisite need to personally interview the President.
Notably, the memo does not offer a specific reason for the privilege beyond the President's general need for frank and candid advice from advisers. Instead, it takes the tack that Mueller already has the information he needs, and that he hasn't demonstrated a need to interview the President himself. But this conclusion rests on the many and highly questionable assumptions and conclusions in the rest of the memo, in particular, that the President can't obstruct justice, that he didn't intend to, anyway, and that there was no collusion with Russia.
It also assumes, of course, that Mueller actually has all the information he needs about President Trump's involvement.
Wednesday, May 23, 2018
Check out Garrett Epps's piece at The Atlantic on whether the President can be indicted. Epps surveys the legal opinions on this, and asks several scholars, only to conclude that "[w]e just don't know, and we won't know, whether it's allowed until we open the box . . . ."
Sunday, April 29, 2018
Shugerman wrote after Senator Ben Sasse said during last week's Judiciary Committee debate over the Mueller protection bill that "[m]any of us think we are bound" by Justice Scalia's lone dissent in Morrison.
Here's Steve Vladeck and Eric Posner's letter to the committee explaining why Sasse's position is wrong. Here's our coverage of the Committee's hearing last September on these same issues.
Thursday, April 26, 2018
The Supreme Court this week upheld a congressionally authorized practice called "inter partes review" that allows for reconsideration and cancellation by the Patent and Trademark Office of an already-issued patent. The Court said that inter partes review didn't violate Article III (by assigning a role of the judiciary to the PTO) or the Seventh Amendment.
The case tested inter partes review against Article III, on the argument that inter partes review represents an impermissible delegation of a core judicial function to an executive agency.
The Court, drawing on precedent, said that patents fell within the "public-rights doctrine," which permits executive or legislative bodies to determine matters "arising between the government and others." And moreover, inter partes review "involves the same basic matter as the grant of a patent" in the first place, and is therefore only a kind of "second look at an earlier . . . grant" by the PTO.
Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, saying that "the Court's opinion should not be read to say that matters involving private rights may never be adjudicated other than by Article III courts."
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, dissented, arguing that the practice cut into the unique Article III role and independence of the courts and impermissibly assigned the role to the PTO. (Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Kennedy) also dissented in Patchak, the case earlier this Term holding that a congressional act instructing courts to dismiss a certain class of cases didn't violate Article III, even when the act was targeted at a particular pending case, for similar reasons. These dissents are well worth a read.)
Friday, April 20, 2018
Check out the Yale Journal on Regulation's symposium on Lucia v. SEC, the case testing whether SEC ALJs are principal officers under the Appointments Clause (and, if so, appointed in violation of the Clause). The Court will hear oral arguments in the case on Monday.
Thursday, April 19, 2018
The Seventh Circuit today affirmed a lower court's nationwide injunction against two portions of Attorney General Jeff Sessions's clamp-down on sanctuary cities. The ruling--a significant victory for Chicago and other sanctuary jurisdictions--means that the government cannot enforce the "notice" and "access" conditions on sanctuary cities' receipt of federal law-enforcement JAG grants.
Recall that the lower court ruled that Chicago demonstrated a likelihood of success in its challenge to two key conditions that AG Sessions imposed on sanctuary cities--the notice condition and the access condition--and imposed a nationwide preliminary injunction against the enforcement of those conditions. (The notice condition requires sanctuary jurisdictions to comply with a DHS request to provide advance notice of any scheduled release date and time for a particular alien. The access condition requires sanctuary jurisdictions to allow federal agents to have access to any correctional facility to meet with aliens and interrogate them.) (The lower court did not enjoin the enforcement of the third condition, that sanctuary jurisdictions certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373.)
The government argued that the lower court erred on the merits and that it exceeded its authority in issuing a nationwide injunction. The Seventh Circuit disagreed on both counts.
The court ruled that AG Sessions lacked unilateral authority to impose the notice and access conditions on receipt of a federal grant, because that's Congress's job:
The Attorney General in this case used the sword of federal funding to conscript state and local authorities to aid in federal civil immigration enforcement. But the power of the purse rests with Congress, which authorized the federal funds at issue and did not impose any immigration enforcement conditions on the receipt of such funds. In fact, Congress repeatedly refused to approve of measures that would tie funding to state and local immigration policies. Nor, as we will discuss, did Congress authorize the Attorney General to impose such conditions.
The court found nothing in the INA that authorized the AG to impose these conditions, and it rejected the government's claim that general statutory authority for the Assistant Attorney General, under 34 U.S.C. Sec. 10102(a)(6), authorized the AG to impose these conditions. That subsection says that "[t]he Assistant Attorney General shall . . . exercise such other powers and functions as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General, including placing special conditions on all grants, and determining priority purposes for formula grants." (Emphasis added.) The court said that "[t]he inescapable problem here is that the Attorney General does not even claim that the power exercised here is authorized anywhere in the chapter, nor that the Attorney General possesses that authority and therefore can delegate it to the Assistant Attorney General. In fact, as set forth above, the Byrne JAG provisions set forth the duties of the Attorney General and do not provide any open-ended authority to impose additional conditions."
Two judges went on to say that the district court was well within its authority to grant a nationwide injunction:
The case before us presents an example of the type of case in which a district court should properly be able to apply an injunction nationwide. The case presents essentially a facial challenge to a policy applied nationwide, the balance of equities favors nationwide relief, and the format of the Byrne JAG grant itself renders individual relief ineffective to provide full relief.
Judge Manion dissented from this portion of the ruling.
Wednesday, April 18, 2018
Wednesday, April 11, 2018
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (D.D.C.) ruled yesterday that an attorney appearing pro se lacked standing to sue President Trump for alleged deficiencies in his financial disclosure report that he was required to file as a candidate. The ruling ends this challenge.
The case, Lovitky v. Trump, arose when attorney Jeffrey Lovitky obtained a copy of then-candidate Trump's financial disclosure report from the Office of Government Ethics and discovered what he believed to be deficiencies in the reporting. Lovitky sued, arguing that the report included President Trump's personal debts and business debts, and that this "commingl[ing]" of personal and non-personal liabilities "mak[es] it impossible to identify which of the liabilities listed on the financial disclosure report were the liabilities of the President, in violation of [federal law]." Lovitky sought mandamus relief that would "direct the President to amend his financial disclosure report . . . for the purpose of specifically identifying any debts he owed during the [relevant] reporting period." Lovitky also sought declaratory relief.
The court ruled that Lovitky lacked standing to sue, because his requested relief wouldn't redress his claimed injuries. (The court didn't address whether he had a sufficient injury for standing purposes, because he lacked redressability.) As to mandamus, the court surveyed circuit law allowing mandamus against the president as to a ministerial duty, but, quoting the D.C. Circuit, noted that "[i]t is not entirely clear . . . whether, and to what extent, these decisions remain good law after [the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Franklin v. Massachusetts]." Ultimately, the court said that because of this ambiguity it "would hesitate to issue mandamus even if Defendant's duty to specifically disclose personal liabilities were ministerial, but because the Court has found that it is a discretionary duty, the Court cannot do so."
As to declaratory relief, the court noted that it, too, wasn't obviously available against the president post Franklin. Regardless, the court said that because mandamus wasn't available, and because the Declaratory Judgment Act doesn't create an independent basis for jurisdiction, declaratory relief had no jurisdictional hook, and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction.
Wednesday, March 28, 2018
Judge Peter J. Messitte (D. Md.) ruled today that Maryland and D.C. have standing to sue President Trump for violations of the Domestic and Foreign Emoluments Clauses. At the same time, Judge Messitte said that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue with regard to Trump properties other than the Trump International Hotel in D.C.
The ruling says nothing about the merits and only means that the case can move forward, beyond this preliminary stage. Recall that a district judge ruled the other way in CREW's Emoluments Clause case against President Trump.
The case involves Maryland's and D.C.'s challenge to payments that President Trump receives as owner of his world-wide properties. The plaintiffs argue that these payments violate the Domestic and Foreign Emoluments Clauses. The President moved to dismiss the case based on lack of standing. Today the district court denied that motion.
The court ruled that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged injuries-in-fact to their quasi-sovereign, proprietary, and parens patriae interests. As to their quasi-sovereign interest, the court said that other states' use of the Trump International Hotel on official business "rather clearly suggests that Maryland and the District of Columbia may very well feel themselves obliged, i.e., coerced, to patronize the Hotel in order to help them obtain federal favors." As to proprietary interests, the court said that "the President's ownership interest in the Hotel has had an almost certainly will continue to have an unlawful effect on competition, allowing an inference of impending (if not already occurring) injury to Plaintiffs' proprietary interests" in their own properties. Finally, as to the plaintiffs' parens patriae interest, the court said that "[i]t can hardly be gainsaid that a large number of Maryland and District of Columbia residents are being affected and will continue to be affected when foreign and state governments choose to stay, host events, or dine at the Hotel rather than at comparable Maryland or District of Columbia establishments, in whole or in substantial part simply because of the President's association with it."
The court also held that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded causation and redressability, and that the plaintiffs fell within the "zone of interests" of the Emoluments Clauses and that the case was not a nonjusticiable political question.
The court, citing a string of Supreme Court precedent, said that the plaintiffs' request for injunctive and declaratory relief against the President didn't violate the separation of powers.
But the court limited the case to a challenge based on the President's interest in the Trump International Hotel in D.C. (and not based on other Trump properties around the country or around the world). The court did not foreclose challenges based on those other properties in other cases, but said only that Maryland and D.C. had failed sufficiently to plead standing against Trump-owned properties outside D.C.
Tuesday, March 27, 2018
Monday, March 26, 2018
Check out Jeremy Peters's piece in the New York Times on President Trump's litmus test for judicial nominees--shrinking "the Administrative State." "With surprising frankness, the White House has laid out a plan to fill the courts with judges devoted to a legal doctrine that challenges the broad power federal agencies have to interpret laws and enforce regulations," in other words, to overturn Chevron deference.
Wednesday, March 21, 2018
Judge Christopher Cooper (D.D.C.) today dismissed a suit against President Trump for violations of the Presidential Records Act. Judge Cooper ruled that the plaintiffs, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and the National Security Archive, didn't have a valid statutory or mandamus claim, and that they failed to state a Take Care Clause claim (if they even had one). The ruling ends the case, unless and until CREW appeals.
The case involves the White House practice of using instant-delete apps to delete text messages that might otherwise be subject to recording-keeping requirements. The White House has not denied the practice. CREW alleged that it violates the PRA, and that the President's use of executive orders (instead of administrative action) to side-step PRA requirements violates the Take Care Clause. But Judge Cooper ruled that CREW didn't have a cause of action, and that it didn't state a Take Care claim.
As to the statutory causes of action, the court declined to say whether under circuit law the PRA denies judicial review, and instead ruled that even if it didn't, CREW failed to state a valid mandamus claim. The court said that the PRA didn't create a "clear and compelling duty" on the part of the President to issue record classification guidelines, and so CREW couldn't get mandamus:
While the Presidential Records Act may obligate the President to take steps to preserve records, it nowhere dictates which steps to take. And while CREW may question the effectiveness of any guidance the President has issued regarding the preservation of his records, the Act nowhere clearly and definitively directs him to issue particular guidelines. Because CREW has not identified a ministerial duty, it has failed to state a valid mandamus claim.
As to the Take Care claim, the court said even if CREW could get declaratory relief against the President directly under the Take Care Clause, CREW's claim wouldn't fall within it:
Even assuming some universe of viable Take Care Clause claims exists, CREW's claim here does not fall within it. CREW does not challenge any of the President's executive orders themselves, nor does it argue that they exceed the President's authority to issue. Nor does CREW offer any reason why an administration could not, in good faith, elect to act through executive order rather than administrative action, even if that decision has incidental effects on the preservation of government records and the public's access to them. And the Court is aware of no authority preventing the President from electing to "faithfully execute" the laws by executive order rather than administrative process (assuming, of course, that the particular executive order at issue does not exceed the President's authority). Put another way, CREW does not dispute that the President has the discretion to make policy by executive order. The Supreme Court has advised that "[h]ow the President chooses to exercise the discretion Congress has granted him is not a matter for [the courts'] review." The Court will not ignore that counsel here.
Thursday, March 8, 2018
The D.C. Circuit this week rejected a challenge to the Secretary of State's authorization of a second bridge linking Detroit with Windsor, Ontario, as an impermissible delegation of authority by Congress (among other things).
The case, Detroit International Bridge Co v. Government of Canada, arose in 2012 when the Secretary of State authorized a second bridge pursuant to the International Bridge Act. The IBA provides:
The consent of Congress is hereby granted to the construction, maintenance, and operation of any bridge and approaches thereto, which will connect the United States with any foreign country . . . and to the collection of tolls for its use, so far as the United States has jurisdiction.
The plaintiff, which owns and operates the first bridge (the Ambassador Bridge), sued, arguing that the IBA violated the nondelegation doctrine, among other claims.
The D.C. Circuit this week rejected the plaintiff's nondelegation claim (along with the others). The court, quoting Zemel v. Rusk, said that there's a thumb on the scale against nondelegation challenges in the area of foreign affairs, because Congress "must of necessity paint with a brush broader than it customarily wields in domestic areas." It then compared the case to the congressional delegation in TOMAC v. Norton (D.C. Cir. 2006):
Applying these principles, this court has held that a delegation authorizing the Secretary of the Interior, who has a trust obligation with respect to Indians, "to acquire real property for the [Pokagon Indian] Band," was not unconstitutional because it was "cabined by 'intelligible principles' delineating both the area in and the purpose for which the land should be purchased. Here too, the Secretary's authority is limited by an "area"--navigable waters between the U.S. and Canada or Mexico--and a "purpose"--the construction of international bridges. Thus, the intelligible principle is that in view of the Secretary's mission relating to foreign affairs, the Secretary will review international bridge agreements for their potential impact on United States foreign policy.
Tuesday, February 27, 2018
Check out this NYT editorial on Senator McConnell's refusal to consider President Obama's nominee, Judge Merrick Garland, for the Supreme Court vacancy created by Justice Scalia's passing. We posted on Another Reason Why Justice Gorsuch Matters here.
Thursday, February 22, 2018
Check out Garrett Epps's piece in The Atlantic on What Clarence Thomas Gets Wrong About the Second Amendment. The piece responds to Justice Thomas's dissent this week in the Court's decision not to review a Ninth Circuit ruling that upheld California's ten-day waiting period for gun purchases.
Tuesday, February 20, 2018
Check out Neal Katyal and Kenneth Starr's piece in the NYT on A Better Way to Protect Mueller. They argue that instead of Congress acting to protect the special counsel, DOJ should do what Robert Bork did in Watergate--that is, after he fired Cox:
As acting attorney general, Bork appointed a new special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski. He then issued a regulation that "the president will not exercise his constitutional powers to effect the discharge of the special prosecutor or to limit the independence that he is hereby given." It went on to specify that the special prosecutor could be terminated only for "extraordinary improprieties," and even then, Nixon could do it only with a "consensus" of the House and Senate majority and minority leaders, and the chairmen and ranking members of the chambers' judiciary committees. Bork codified these restrictions in federal regulations, and told the news media that Nixon had agreed to them.
Katyal and Starr argue that DOJ should issue its own "Bork regulation."