Tuesday, June 13, 2017
Here's the announcement:
National Conference of Constitutional Law Scholars
The Rehnquist Center is pleased to announce the inaugural National Conference of Constitutional Law Scholars. The conference will be held at the Westward Look Resort in Tucson, Arizona, on March 16-17, 2018. Its goal is to create a vibrant and useful forum for constitutional scholars to gather and exchange ideas each year.
Adrian Vermeule will deliver a keynote address. Distinguished commentators for 2018 include:
- Jamal Greene
- Aziz Huq
- Pamela Karlan
- Frank Michelman
- Cristina Rodriguez
- Reva Siegel
- Robin West
All constitutional law scholars are invited to attend. Those wishing to present a paper for discussion should submit a 1- to 2-page abstract by September 15, 2017. All constitutional law topics are welcome, and both emerging and established scholars are strongly encouraged to submit. Selected authors will be notified by October 15, 2017. Selected papers will be presented in small panel sessions, organized by subject, with commentary by a distinguished senior scholar.
Please send all submissions or related questions to Andrew Coan (email@example.com). For logistical questions or to register for the conference, please contact Bernadette Wilkinson (firstname.lastname@example.org). The Rehnquist Center will provide meals for all registered conference participants. Participants must cover travel and lodging costs. Hotel information will be provided as the date approaches.
Conference Organizers :
Andrew Coan, Arizona; David Schwartz, Wisconsin; Brad Snyder, Georgetown
The William H. Rehnquist Center on the Constitutional Structures of Government was established in 2006 at the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. The non-partisan center honors the legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist by encouraging public understanding of the structural constitutional themes that were integral to his jurisprudence: the separation of powers among the three branches of the federal government, the balance of powers between the federal and state governments, and among sovereigns more generally, and judicial independence.
Monday, June 12, 2017
In Loving v. Virginia, decided June 12, 1967, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the Virginia statute criminalizing marriage between White and (most)non-White persons violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case has become an iconic one, not only because it explicitly states that the Virginia law was "obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy," but also because it identifies the "freedom to marry" as "one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
Creighton Law Review hosted a symposium for the 50th anniversary of the case and the issue is just published.
Among the terrific articles is one that considers the Hollywood film, released last year, as well as the previous documentary. In the important contribution Filmic Contributions to the Long Arc of the Law: Loving and the Narrative Individualization of Systemic Injustice, Alanna Doherty argues that the film, and to a lesser extent the documentary "repackages the Lovings’ historic civil rights struggle against wider systemic oppression as a personal victory won by triumphant individuals through the power of love." This individualization through narrative, she argues, obscures the collective and civil rights struggle that is the ground of the action the film portrays. Likewise, the "White Supremacy" of the state is attributed to a few rogue individuals. Doherty argues that such individualization is not only limited, but also accounts for the post-Loving developments in equality doctrine regarding affirmative action:
Both Loving (the film) and Fisher [v. University of Texas at Austin] (the case) present their stories of individualized racial harm at the cost of avoiding meaningful recognition of systemic injustice. While in Loving this may seem positive due to the nature of the decision, and although in Fisher the court ultimately upheld the admissions policy, harmful ideological work is still being done to our socio-legal consciousness. In Fisher, the Court set injurious legal precedent in how it evaluates affirmative action programs—under intense scrutiny and with such little deference that fewer, if any, will pass constitutional muster. And because law is an embodiment of social practices interacting with cultural conceptions in noetic space, a trend in cinematic and legal narratives to shirk responsibility for holding oppressive institutions accountable only furthers a reciprocity with cultural ideology that moves the law away from helping those most vulnerable under it.
And yet, even as Loving (the film) is subject to critique as being limited, sentimental, and nostalgic, Doherty ultimately contends that the film has legal relevance given our fraught political landscape:
perhaps the cultural and legal imagining that needs to be done in the noetic space of 2017 is one grounded in the inspiring recognition of triumphant small-scale love. Maybe what Loving truly contributes to such a tumultuous cultural moment is the notion that not only must we continue to commit to fights we should not have to fight, but that if we want to take care of each other even when the law fails us, we must decide to keep loving.
June 12, 2017 in Affirmative Action, Conferences, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Family, Federalism, Film, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, History, Race, Scholarship, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (2)
Thursday, May 4, 2017
Check out the Illinois Law Review's outstanding, mile-wide and mile-deep on-line symposium Examining Trump's First 100 Days in Office: His Plan, Promises, and Pursuit of Making America Great Again.
A very impressive group of thirty-one authors write on topics ranging from governance issues (the judiciary, federalism, administrative law) to every hot area of domestic and foreign policy.
Wednesday, April 19, 2017
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Nelson v. Colorado opened with this seemingly simple question:
When a criminal conviction is invalidated by a reviewing court and no retrial will occur, is the State obliged to refund fees, court costs, and restitution exacted from the defendant upon, and as a consequence of, the conviction?
Writing for the six Justice majority, Justice Ginsburg provided an equally simple response: "Our answer is yes."
The statutory scheme, Colorado's Compensation for Certain Exonerated Persons, provided the "exclusive process" for seeking a refund of costs, fees, and restitution according to the Colorado Supreme Court. However, recovery under this Exoneration Act applied "only to a defendant who has served all or part of a term of incarceration pursuant to a felony conviction, and whose conviction has been overturned for reasons other than insufficiency of evidence or legal error unrelated to actual innocence." The petitioners in the case were not within this category: one was convicted, had her conviction reversed, and was acquitted on retrial; the other was convicted, had one conviction reversed on appeal and another conviction vacated on postconviction review, and the state elected not to retry. The first petitioner was assessed more than $8,000 in costs, fees, and restitution and had $702.10 deducted from her inmate account while she was in jail; the second petitioner was assessed more than $4,000 in costs, fees, and restitution and paid the state $1977.75.
Justice Ginsburg's concise opinion articulates and applies the well-established balancing test for procedural due process from Matthews v. Eldridge (1976), under which a court evaluates a court evaluates (A) the private interest affected; (B) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and (C) the governmental interest at stake.
The Court rejected Colorado's claim that the petitioners' had no private interest in regaining the money given that the convictions were "in place" when the funds were taken. Justice Ginsburg concluded that it makes no difference whether the initial court or a reviewing court adjudged the petitioners not guilty. To rule otherwise would be inconsistent with the presumption of innocence notion fundamental to "our criminal law." As to the risk of erroneous deprivation, Justice Ginsburg made clear that the risk was high and stressed that the petitioners were seeking refund rather than "compensation for temporary deprivation" of those funds such as interest. Finally, Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court found that Colorado has "no interest in withholding" the money "to which the State currently has zero claim of right."
Justice Alito, writing in a concurring opinion only for himself, contended that the correct standard was not Matthews v. Eldridge, but Medina v. California (1992) as Colorado had argued. For Alito, Medina was the correct standard because the refund obligation was part of the criminal process, especially pertinent with reference to restitution. Nevertheless, Alito concluded that even under Medina, stressing an historical inquiry, the Colorado statute failed due process: placing a heavy burden on criminal defendants, providing no opportunity for misdemeanor convictions, and excluding all but claims for actual innocence.
Justice Thomas, also writing only for himself, issued a dissenting opinion, arguing that the issue is whether the petitioners can show a "substantive" entitlement to a return of the money they paid. He concludes that they have no "substantive" right because once the petitioners paid the money - - - however wrongly - - - it became public funds to which they had no entitlement. Thus, because the "Due Process Clause confers no substantive rights," the petitioners have no right to a refund, despite the "intuitive and rhetorical appeal" of such a claim.
While the statute was amended to include vacated convictions effective September 2017, such an amendment may not be comprehensive enough to save the statutory scheme. While the Court does not discuss the widespread problem of carceral debt, there is a burgeoning scholarship on this issue.
[image: "A debtor in Fleet Street Prison, London" by Thomas Hosmer Shepherd, circa first half of the 19th century, via].
Thursday, February 23, 2017
The WZB Berlin Social Science Center, the European University Institute, and the London School for Economics and Political Science invite submissions for the Inaugural Annual European Junior Faculty Forum for Public Law and Jurisprudence, to be held at WZB Berlin Social Science Center on June 28 and 29, 2017.
Authors may be invited to publish in Global Constitutionalism.
Thursday, January 26, 2017
There's a new handy guide collecting resources that will come in handy for ConLawProfs, students, lawyers, and the general public.
In conjunction with the course, Presidential Power, to be offered at University of Washington School of Law by Professors Kathryn Watts and Sanne Knudsen, law librarian Mary Whisner has developed an excellent "Readings and resources concerning presidential power" library guide available here.
Some of the guide tracks the course, and is thus in development, but the "Books about Presidential Power" section is a great place to start understanding the legal, historical, and political dimensions of the issues. The "Useful Reference" portion is a good overview, with a handy link to the Federal Register feed.
Additionally, here are two PBS "crash course" videos - - - from 2015 - - - that are also worth a watch:
Monday, January 16, 2017
While we often think of protest and civil disobedience under the First Amendment, in her article Protest is Different in Richmond Law Review, Professor Jesssica West of University of Washington essentially argues that the First Amendment has not been a sufficiently robust defense criminal prosecutions. Instead, she contends that we should reconceptualize protest relying upon evolving concepts of capital jurisprudence flowing from the Eighth Amendment contention that "death is different." She argues that similar to the complexity of the moral determination inherent in a sentence of death requiring a judgment of community condemnation, a criminal conviction resulting from acts of protest likewise involves deep and complex values of individualization and community conscience.
It's a worthwhile read on this Martin Luther King Day: "One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws." Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Apr. 16, 1963.
Tuesday, December 13, 2016
Wednesday, November 30, 2016
Check out the call for papers for an exciting Symposium on The Separation of Powers: A Global Constitutional Dialogue on May 22, 2017, at the University of Milan.
The topic is inspired by Professor Giovanni Bognetti's (U. Milan) book, La Separazione dei Poteri.
The conveners are Prof. Richard Albert (Boston College), Dr. Antonia Baraggia (U. Milan), Prof. Cristina Fasone (U. Rome), and Prof. Luca Pietro Vanoni (U. Milan).
Wednesday, November 16, 2016
CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS
50 YEARS OF LOVING:
SEEKING JUSTICE THROUGH LOVE AND RELATIONSHIPS
Symposium, March 23-24, 2017
Creighton School of Law, Omaha, Nebraska
The Creighton Law Review, Creighton’s 2040 Initiative, and the Werner Institute invite you to contribute to the Law Review’s June 2017 issue and/or to attend the 50 Years of Loving symposium hosted by the 2040 Initiative and the Werner Institute at the Creighton School of Law. The symposium will explore how the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Loving v. Virginia has influenced U.S society institutionally, demographically, and relationally.
Race in the United States has historically been socially constructed through interlocking cultural narratives, including law, and cultural practice, including institutions. Racism is a social system enacted and perpetuated by the interactions and relationships of individual people. Exploring the disruptive effects of the interracial “mixing” protected by Loving v. Virginia offers an opportunity to deepen understanding of systemic racism and to develop systems-based strategies for continuing the struggle for social justice. At a time when the demographics of the U.S. are shifting away from a white majority, deconstructing systemic racism is an essential project.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), ended legal prohibitions against interracial marriage in the U.S. By eliminating of longstanding legal sanctions against “miscegenation,” Loving disrupted the pre-existing social system. Loving rejected racial separation and hierarchy and endorsed relationships across previously uncrossable racial lines. Since Loving, the number of interracial marriages has grown significantly: “Nearly 15 percent, or one in seven, of all new marriages in 2008 were between people of different races or ethnicities.”*
The effects of these marriages extend beyond those who are themselves married. “[M]ore than a third of all adults surveyed reported having a family member whose spouse is of a different race or ethnicity – up from less than a quarter in 2005.”* Since Loving, the proportion of the U.S. population with multiple racial heritages has grown dramatically. Moreover, the children born as a result of Loving also have disrupted the social construction of race itself, with more people self-identifying as of more than one race, biracial, multiracial, or mixed.
The Law Review seeks submissions exploring these issues – to range from reflections (up to 1000 words) and essays (approximately 2500-3000 words) to articles (no more than 7000 words, not including references and footnotes). Draft abstracts of up to one page and queries may be addressed to Research Editor Sean Nakamoto at email@example.com no later than January 15, 2017. Final submissions will be March 20, 2017. There will be an opportunity at the symposium for selected authors to discuss their submissions at the 50 Years of Loving symposium at Creighton University in March, 2017.**
Authors are also encouraged to join the moderated online discussion on the effects of the Loving decision on our society hosted by the 2040 Initiative and ADRHub at http://blogs.creighton.edu/creighton2040/50-years-of-loving-moderated-online-discussion. Selected excerpts from this discussion will also be featured in the June 2017 Creighton Law Review edition. Discussion entries should respond to the following question: From the perspective of your academic discipline or professional institution, what are the questions, issues, or tensions that have arisen out of 50 Years of Loving?
*john a. powell, Racing to Justice (2012)
** Contact Amanda Guidero at AmandaGuidero AT creighton.edu for more information on the symposium and opportunities to present your work.
Monday, October 24, 2016
Profs. Joanna Shepherd and Michael S. Kang (both of Emory), in cooperation with the American Constitution Society, recently published a comprehensive empirical study of state-court decisions in election cases. The result: State court judges are politically biased in these cases and thus favor their own party's interests in election disputes.
The study provides yet one more reason not to elect judges, especially in partisan elections.
The study, Partisan Justice: How Campaign Money Politicizes Judicial Decisionmaking in Election Cases, forthcoming in the Stanford Law Review, is based on data from over 500 election cases from all 50 states from 2005 to 2014, including over 2,500 votes from more than 400 judges in state supreme courts.
Analyzing a new dataset of cases from 2005 to 2014, this study finds that judicial decisions are systematically biased by these types of campaign finance and re-election influences to help their party's candidates win office and favor their party's interests in election disputes.
The study finds that judicial partisanship is significantly responsive to political considerations that have grown more important in today's judicial politics. Judicial partisanship in election cases increases, and elected judges become more likely to favor their own party, as party campaign-finance contributions increase.
But "[t]his influence of campaign money largely disappears for lame-duck judges without re-election to worry about."
Tuesday, October 18, 2016
The Brennan Center released a new report, The New Era of Secret Law. Here's from the introduction:
Most of all, there is scant public understanding of the depth and scope of the problem. OLC opinions and FISA Court opinions are the only two manifestations of secret law that regularly make headlines. But OLC and the FISA Court are not the only government entities that make law. Moreover, the factor driving secrecy in OLC and FISA Court opinions--namely, a dramatic increase in the scope of national security activities and authorities--is a potent force throughout much of government. How common is security-driven secret law, and where else is it occurring?
Solving the problem of secret law raises its own set of questions. Are there cases in which disclosure of rules or legal interpretations, even with sensitive facts redacted, could harm national security? How great is that risk, and how does it compare with the harms of secret law? What procedural and substantive reforms could help ensure that the public's interests in both transparency of laws and the security of the nation are best served?
This report attempts to shed light on these questions, beginning with the foundational inquiry into what secret law is.
Saturday, September 3, 2016
American Constitution Society
Junior Scholars Public Law Workshop
(to be held at AALS Meeting January 2017)
deadline for submission: 11:59 p.m. on October 15, 2016
To further its mission of promoting the vitality of the U.S. Constitution and the fundamental values it expresses-- individual rights and liberties, genuine equality, access to justice, democracy and the rule of law—the American Constitution for Law & Policy (ACS) is pleased to announce a call for papers for a workshop on public law to be held the afternoon of January 5, 2017 at the 2017 AALS Annual Meeting in San Francisco. A committee composed of members of ACS’s Board of Academic Advisors will select 10 papers and each selected author will have the opportunity to discuss his/her paper in depth with two experienced scholars.
Papers can be in any field related to public law, including but not limited to: constitutional law, administrative law, antidiscrimination law, criminal law, environmental law, family law, federal courts, financial regulation, public international law, social welfare law, and workplace law.
More submission details at the ACS website here.
Monday, August 29, 2016
The University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
call for papers for its 2017 Symposium:
“Dark Money and Related Issues: New Factors in the Debate on Judicial Appointment versus Election,”
to be held on February 16th and 17th, 2017.
Deadline for submissions of article proposals is Oct. 7, 2016.
Elections leave open the possibility for the corrupting influence of dark money. “Dark money” controversy figured prominently in the last Arkansas judicial elections, so much so that the Arkansas Supreme Court and General Assembly have studied the issue of campaign financing, and the Arkansas Bar Association created the Task Force on Maintaining a Fair and Impartial Judiciary, which issued a report in June recommending appointment of judges and other reforms. Judicial appointment, however, is not without its critics, who contend among other arguments that appointment is undemocratic, and that appointed judges lack authority and legitimacy and are less accountable.
The broad goal of this symposium is to debate the strengths and weaknesses of judicial election systems versus judicial appointment systems, with an eye toward the best solution for Arkansas. Topics of interest include, for example, whether an appointment process would be appropriate for all appellate judges or only Supreme Court Justices; the most effective and bipartisan types of appointment processes; issues surrounding recusal from cases involving contributors; and reforms to protect the election process from the influence of “dark money.” We anticipate panels comprising a mix of academics, judges, and legislators, both Arkansans and out-of-state speakers and contributors.
More submission details at the law review website here.
Thursday, August 18, 2016
The Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative Research Network of Law & Society is a great group and Law & Society is always terrific. Here's the call:
Call for Papers – Friday September 16th Deadline
The Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative Research Network
Seeks submissions for the
Law and Society Association Annual Meeting
Mexico City, Mexico, at the Sheraton Maria Isabel, June 20 – 23, 2017
Dear friends and colleagues,
We invite you to participate in the panels sponsored by the Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative Research Network at the Law and Society Annual Meeting in 2017. The Feminist Legal Theory CRN seeks to bring together law and society scholars across a range of fields who are interested in feminist legal theory. Information about the Law and Society meeting is available at http://www.lawandsociety.org.
This year’s meeting is unique in that it brings us to the Global South, and invites us to explore the theme Walls, Borders, and Bridges: Law and Society in an Inter-Connected World. We are especially interested in proposals that explore the application of feminist legal theory to this theme, broadly construed. This might include papers that explore feminist legal theory in comparative or transnational contexts, as well as in relation to the impacts of globalism and other intersections within particular locations, relationships, institutions, and identities. We are also interested in papers that will permit us to collaborate with other CRNs, such as the Critical Research on Race and the Law CRN, and welcome multidisciplinary proposals.
Our goal is to stimulate focused discussion of papers on which scholars are currently working. Thus, while you may submit papers that are closer to publication, we are particularly eager to receive proposals for works-in-progress that are at an earlier stage and will benefit from the discussion that the panels will provide.
The Planning Committee will assign individual papers to panels based on subject. Panels will use the LSA format, which requires four papers. We will also assign a chair, and one or two commentators/discussants for each panel, to provide feedback on the papers and promote discussion. For panels with two commentators/discussants, one may be asked to also chair.
As a condition of participating as a panelist, you must also agree to serve as a chair and/or commentator/discussant for another panel or participant. We will of course take into account expertise and topic preferences to the degree possible.
The duties of chairs are to organize the panel logistically; including registering it online with the LSA, and moderating the panel. Chairs will develop a 100-250 word description for the session and submit the session proposal to LSA before their anticipated deadline of October 19. This will ensure that each panelist can submit their proposal, using the panel number assigned.
The duties of commentator/discussants are to read the papers assigned to them and to prepare a short commentary about the papers that discusses them individually and (to the extent relevant) collectively, identifying ways that they relate to one another.
If you would like to present a paper as part of a CRN panel, please email:
- An 1000 word abstract or summary,
- Your name and a title, and
- A list of your areas of interest and expertise within feminist legal theory
to the CRN Planning Committee at firstname.lastname@example.org. (Please do not send submissions to individual committee members.)
Note that LSA is imposing a requirement that your summary be at least 1,000 words long. Although a shorter summary will suffice for our purposes, you will be required to upload a 1,000 word summary in advance of LSA’s anticipated deadline of October 19. If you are already planning a LSA session with at least four panelists (and papers) that you would like to see included in the Feminist Legal Theory CRN, please let the Committee know.
In addition to these panels, we may try to use some of the other formats that the LSA provides: the “author meets readers” format, salon, or roundtable discussion. If you have an idea that you think would work well in one of these formats, please let us know. Please note that for roundtables, organizers are now required to provide a 500-word summary of the topic and the contributions they expect the proposed participants to make. Please also note that LSA rules limit you to participating only once as a paper panelist or roundtable participant.
Please submit all proposals by Friday, September 16 to the email provided above. This will permit us to organize panels and submit them prior to the LSA’s anticipated deadline of October 19. In the past, we have accommodated as many panelists as possible, but have been unable to accept all proposals. If we are unable to accept your proposal for the CRN, we will notify you by early October so that you can submit an independent proposal to LSA.
We hope you’ll join us in Mexico City to share and discuss the scholarship in which we are all engaged and connect with others doing work on feminist legal theory.
2017 LSA Feminist Legal Theory CRN Planning Committee
Aziza Ahmed & Elizabeth MacDowell (co-chairs)
Monday, August 15, 2016
This year the American Constitution Society is doing something new at the AALS annual meeting in San Francisco: a public law workshop for junior-ish scholars (legal academics with 10 years or less in full-time teaching).
The announcement explains: "A committee composed of members of ACS’s Board of Academic Advisors will select 10 papers and each selected author will have the opportunity to discuss his/her paper in depth with two experienced scholars, from a group that includes Erwin Chemerinsky, Pamela Karlan, Bill Marshall, Reva Siegel, Mark Tushnet, and Adam Winkler."
It's the afternoon of January 5th in San Francisco. Submissions are due October 15th. More information is available here.
Monday, August 1, 2016
It's August and ConLawProfs in the North America are thinking about classes for the Fall semester. So, it's a good time to focus on pedagogy, as we'll be doing this month.
Yet if August brings the joys of contemplating going back in the classroom, it also brings the panic of impending deadlines, even if those deadlines are self-imposed. The legal academy has a tradition - - - and often incentives of "summer scholarship," although these may be fading given other pressures.
One way to address the annual August anxieties is to reject the idea of a stark separation between "summer" and the "academic year," and look for synergies between scholarship and teaching that enliven both. I've tried to do this in an essay, Enhancing Reciprocal Synergies Between Teaching and Scholarship, published in the Journal of Legal Education last year and available - - - for now - - - on the once-open source ssrn.
The article discusses the types of synergies that exist between teaching and scholarship for the legal academic - - - the professional, methodological, theoretical and doctrinal - - - which are easily adaptable to other academics. As is the overall suggestion that we should try to "pay attention" to the synergies between teaching and scholarship rather than viewing them as discrete, or even conflicting.
The article closes with a discussion of three "habits" of paying attention aimed at enhancing the reciprocal synergies between teaching and scholarship: letting the subconscious work, commemorating one's thoughts & ideas, and engaging - - - or not - - - in "daily practice."
Monday, July 11, 2016
In a just-published article, Black Lives Matter and Respectability Politics in Local News Accounts of Officer-Involved Civilian Deaths: An Early Empirical Assessment, 2016 Wisconsin Law Review 541, ConLawProf Osagie K. Obasogie (pictured below) and UC Hastings law student Zachary Newman present a compelling discussion of how news media - - - and by extension the general public - - - engage in the politics of respectability with regard to allegations of police misconduct, focusing on the conduct or character of the victim.
The authors argue that although " sustained media attention to Black Lives Matter may lead some to conclude that journalists have become more sensitive to how respectability politics can lead to inaccurate reporting and encourage more balanced descriptions of these events, our qualitative assessment of the selected data suggests that journalists’ reporting of these incidents continues to reflect a troubling respectability politics that minimizes the lives lost and overstates the legitimacy of police use of deadly force."
In looking at news reports from 2013 until July 2015, the authors conclude that
overall, as a qualitative matter, there is a notable discursive consistency across pre– and post–Black Lives Matter reporting on officer-involved killings, suggesting that the movement’s concerns over race and respectability are not reflected in journalists’ accounts. This overall finding is empirically supported by three persistent themes throughout the data: (1) a strong commitment to colorblindness in discussing the race of the parties involved, (2) the dominance of the police perspective in reporting these incidents, and (3) continued use of criminalizing language unrelated to the incident itself to characterize the victim’s respectability.
The authors insights could be extended to more recent events, including those of this past week, which will be sure to still be on the minds of law students in our classes and this article could be a great introductory reading for 1L students.
Additionally, more must-read discussions of respectability politics including the events of the last week is over at Race and the Law Prof Blog, including Atiba Ellis's, On Respectability, the Dallas Shootings, #BlackLivesMatter, and Reasoned Discourse which links to that blog's online symposium on Respectability Politics.
July 11, 2016 in Current Affairs, Equal Protection, Fourteenth Amendment, Interpretation, News, Profiles in Con Law Teaching, Race, Reconstruction Era Amendments, Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (4)
Tuesday, April 5, 2016
Check out Prof. Tim O'Neill's (John Marshall) excellent piece in the Cal. Law Review on Chief Justice Roberts's approach to deference in the Obamacare case, NFIB v. Sebelius: Harlan on My Mind: Chief Justice Roberts and the Affordable Care Act.
O'Neill notes that "Chief Justice Roberts has never been shy about finding acts of Congress to be unconstitutional," but that he nevertheless extolled the virtues of deference to the legislature and ultimately upheld the individual mandate in NFIB. O'Neill asks: Where did this "newly minted Thayerian justice" come from?
This essay will attempt to answer that question. It will begin by further examining Posner's article and the reasons he provided for the death of Thayerian review. It will then turn to an examination of one justice in particular whom Chief Justice Roberts has cited as his model: the younger Justice John Marshall Harlan, perhaps the last justice on the Court who exhibited Thayer-like restraint. It will conclude by contending that when faced with the most important case of his judicial career, Roberts took a Thayer-like approach that might have been similar to the approach his judicial model, Justice Harlan, would have taken. Thayer-like restraint may be dead, but it appears to have come back to life for at least one decision on June 28, 2012.
Thursday, March 17, 2016
Check out Prof. Colin Starger's (U. Balt., U. Balt. Sup. Ct. Mapping Project) nifty new online Supreme Court citation network tool. This site, which Starger produced in collaboration with Free Law Project, allows you to map Supreme Court case citations against Spaeth data on the decision direction (liberal-conservative) in The Supreme Court Database, with links to the decisions and a ton more information. Starger already posted a bevy of maps, but you can create your own, too. Here's a sample, mapping from Buckley to McCutcheon: