Thursday, October 11, 2012
Professor Rebecca Lee (pictured) notes that "in this age of “diversity talk,” it may seem that the issue of workplace discrimination is somewhat passé, or at least not as much of the problem it was in the past." That was certainly some of the sentiment in yesterday's oral argument in Fisher v. UT. But Lee offers a more sophisticated interpretation, arguing that
Most employers implement models of diversity that promote only what I call “surface diversity” and “marginal diversity,” both of which focus on diversifying the organization’s ranks but which stop short of valuing diversity in full form, thus inhibiting substantive equity. The surface and marginal diversity paradigms neglect to treat the malady of embedded discrimination because they emphasize demographic diversity rather than diversity in a substantive sense. A focus on numerical parity alone, however, will not bring about racial and gender equity. Although women and people of color have been entering various workplaces in increasing numbers, the way in which work gets done has not changed much. This is because simply adding more members of previously excluded groups to the organization may not change dominant organizational practices that remain biased against such groups.
Instead in her 2010 article entitled Core Diversity, available on ssrn, Lee argues that much deeper and more structural change is necessary. This is definitely worth a read.
Lee's follow-up article, Implementing Grutter's Diversity Rationale: Diversity and Empathy in Leadership, available on ssrn, is also essential reading. In this article, Professor Lee makes more explicit the links between educational diversity and employment diversity.
Tuesday, October 9, 2012
The oral argument in Fisher v. UT - - - this term's "affirmative action" case - - - is scheduled for tomorrow and has been receiving much attention as SCOTUSBlog notes. One of the more interesting pieces is Adam Liptak's personalized NYT article that includes quotes from Abigal Fisher, who believes she "probably would have gotten a better job offer" if she had "gone to U.T.," as well as quotes from students. There is noteworthy scholarly attention. And as usual Lyle Denniston over at SCOTUSBlog does an excellent job parsing the issues as well as the possible line-ups of the Justices, asking provocatively "is affirmative action about to end?" Moreover, still one of the best templates of the issues is the "dissental" from en banc review in the Fifth Circuit by controversial Judge Edith Jones.
To the extent constitutional and legal arguments matter - - - and for some, that is a debatable question - - - there are several problematic twists that Fisher v. UT presents.
First, there is the standing of Abigal Fisher and relatedly, her claim for injury. This is not a case in which she was disabled from competing from any specific seat, unlike Bakke, and this is also a case in which she did attend university, unlike Barbara Grutter who did not attend law school. Adam Chandler has a terrific explanation of this aspect of the case, that he expanded here.
Second, there are factual discrepancies, and a problematic concession by Fisher regarding UT's government interest in seeking diversity.
If the Justices seem focused on the facts of the case during oral argument, this might be an indication that the Court would not render a decision on the merits because of these sorts of problems.
Third, there is a doctrinal issue in the case that bears notice. As one of its three sub-arguments that the UT plan fails strict scrutiny, Fisher argues that "UT cannot establish a strong basis in evidence that its use of race is necessary to further a compelling interest in student-body diversity." Sandwiched between the usual first prong of the "compelling interest" requirement and the second prong of the "narrowly tailored" requirement, this argument seeks to introduce a new prong. Fisher's argument in the main brief is telling:
UT also must demonstrate that its use of race in admissions is “necessary to further” an unmet compelling government interest. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237. This demonstration of necessity requires a “strong basis in evidence.” Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277; Croson, 488 U.S. at 500; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Our precedents provide a basis for the Court’s acceptance of a university’s considered judgment that racial diversity among students can further its educational task, when supported by empirical evidence.”) (emphasis added).
Recall that Adarand, Wygant, and Croson each involved "remedying past discrimination" as the compelling government interest (not diversity) and note that the citation from the 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger is from Justice Kennedy's dissent. Kennedy is widely considered the swing vote in Fisher, and much of UT's brief seems addressed to Kennedy.
Nevertheless, this "strong basis in evidence" standard is, of course, directly opposed to the "good faith" standard that Justice O'Connor articulated in Grutter. T he Court could easily "gloss" rather than explicitly overrule Grutter by reading in a high - - - and nearly impossible to meet - - - evidentiary standard.
Thus, at the heart of the matter may be just how much deference the Justices may be willing to pay to a state, including a state university, or how much the "unelected federal judiciary" may substitute its own judgments.
UPDATE: discussion of oral argument here.
October 9, 2012 in Affirmative Action, Current Affairs, Equal Protection, Fourteenth Amendment, Oral Argument Analysis, Race, Reconstruction Era Amendments, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Monday, October 8, 2012
In Towards A Balanced Approach for the Protection of Native American Sacred Sites, 17 Mich. J. Race & L. 269 (2012), available on ssrn, ConLawProf Alex Tallchief Skibine navigates the difficult territory of the First Amendment and RFRA, including the applicability of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, in the context of Native American claims.
Skibine posits that "Native American religions are land based." He notes that sacred places "used to be located within the tribes' ancestral territories, but as a result of conquest, land cessions, and other historical events, many sacred sites are now located on federal land." Skibine criticizes the tendency, so evident in Lyng, to “equate Indians' religious exercises at sacred sites with Western yoga-like practices.”
In other words, this view portrays Native religious activities at sacred sites as only about spiritual peace of mind. While such benefits are certainly part of the practice, they do not go to the heart of why these sacred places are important to Indian people or why management practices like cutting down trees and spilling recycled sewage water on sacred land are extremely disturbing to many Indian tribes. The importance of sacred sites to Indian tribes and Native practitioners is less about individual spiritual development and more about the continuing existence of Indians as a tribal people. The preservation of these sites as well as tribal people's ability to practice their religion there is intrinsically related to the survival of tribes as both cultural and self-governing entities
Professor Skibine proposes legislative compromise and clarity, including an intermediate scrutiny standard, arguing:
In adopting intermediate scrutiny to review governmental actions jeopardizing sacred sites, I hope to appease some critics who will argue that Native Americans should not be allowed to use religion to reclaim control over an unlimited amount of land that was taken from them throughout history. This is another version of the argument made by some that to the Indians, the whole earth is sacred and if we allow one claim, the floodgates will be open and there will be no end to claims of sacredness.RR
Friday, September 28, 2012
As we discussed earlier this week, the controversial "paid political advertisements" that began appearing at NYC subway stations Monday soon sparked controversy. Recall that the MTA originally rejected the advertisements because they demeaned an individual or group of individuals on account of race or ethnicity, but lost in federal court when challenged by the advertisements' sponsor.
In an emergency meeting yesterday, the MTA promulgated new guidelines, as the NYT reports.
The new guidelines (h/t Gothamist) expand on the previous limitation of advertisements that would be "adverse to the commercial or administrative interests of the MTA or is harmful to the morale of MTA employees" to include an "incitement" provision. The new amended guideline, subsection (a) x, provides the advertisement will be excluded if:
The advertisement, or any information contained in it, is directly adverse to the commercial or administrative interests of the MTA or is harmful to the morale of MTA employees or contains material the display of which the MTA reasonably foresees would incite or provoke violence or other immediate breach of the peace, and so harm, disrupt, or interfere with safe, efficient, and orderly transit operations.
The federal judge's July opinion and order had invited the MTA to consider a "standard of civility" and expressed the latitude of the MTA "to investigate and experiment with alternative mechanisms for using ad space" "productively, profitably, and constitutionally, while ensuring that this space is not used as a tool for disparagement and division." Instead - - - and probably wisely - - - the MTA adopted the more established incitement standard for evaluating restrictions on speech.
Additionally, the MTA added a disclaimer requirement. The new section (b) ii, provides:
An advertisement that primarily or predominately expresses or advocates a viewpoint on a political, moral, or religious issue or related matter shall include, the following statement: “This is a paid advertisement sponsored by . The display of this advertisement does not imply MTA’s endorsement of any views expressed.”
Mandated disclosures are also an established First Amendment strategy. However, the standards' singling out of "viewpoints on a political, moral, or religious issue or related matter" might cause some constitutional consternation. On the other hand, the MTA has a valid argument that such advertisements are distinct: It would be the rare subway rider who would believe that the MTA endorses "Dr. Zizmor" - - - a ubiquitous NYC subway advertisement - - - but one could mistake a noncommercial advertisement as being one of the many "public service" advertisements.
Of course, the MTA could ban all advertisements, closing the limited public forum. As it reportedly stated: "the MTA does not believe the First Amendment compels the MTA to open up its ad spaces in this way to a wide range of expressive communications."
[image at 23rd Street Station via]
Friday, September 21, 2012
Political Science Prof Alec Ewald reviews Pamela Brandwein's book, Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction in Law & Politics Book Review here.
Brandwein (pictured), a political science professor, has written a "bold revisionist book, sure to challenge the assumptions of anyone who has written on or taught Reconstruction-era Constitutional history," according to Ewald.
It's Brandwein's focus on the state action doctrine that will most interest conlawprofs. Here is Ewald's ultimate assessment:
The total disenfranchisement of southern blacks after 1891 had many causes, but “[a] ‘closed’ doctrine of state action, one that shut the door on federal efforts to protect black rights, was not among them” (p.183). When we talk about the state-action doctrine, we are talking about a messy thing rather than a bright line. But the cases themselves, and particularly those all-too-quotable lines from the Civil Rights Cases, can seduce us into thinking the Court of the early 1880s drew a sharp boundary around all non-governmental action and declared it completely off-limits for the federal government. Brandwein shows it wasn’t so.
A good review can tell us whether or not the book is worth our time. Ewald demonstrates that Brandwein's book is a necessary one for anyone teaching or writing on state action.
Wednesday, September 19, 2012
In a one page Order, Judge Susan Bolton has dissolved the preliminary injunction she issued regarding Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, the so-called "show me your papers" provision.
This was inevitable given her opinion earlier this month ruling that it would be premature to declare the provision unconstitutional, resting her conclusion - - - perhaps erroneously as we discussed - - - on the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Arizona v. United States last June.
Need some midweek teaching inspiration?
Professor Joy Radice shares her observations of the conlaw teaching of the late Derrick Bell (pictured): "Bell’s classroom community was a safe space to learn constitutional law, to discuss difficult but related issues of race, class, and gender, and to take risks when thinking about legal strategies."
Radice's terrific brief essay, "Derrick Bell’s Community-Based Classroom,” is part of the wonderful collection of essays from the conference last year, now available in Columbia Journal of Race and Law:
- “The Post Racial Era: Race, Silence, the Denial of Race/Racism and Optimism,” –Leonard Baynes, St. John’s University School of Law
- “Notes Toward a Critical Contemplation of the Law,” –Sonia Katyal, Fordham University School of Law
- “Derrick Bell’s ‘Afrolantica’ and Gentrification in Harlem,” –Twila Perry, Rutgers University School of Law
- “How Derrick Bell Helped Me Decide to Become an Educator, Not Just a Faculty Member,” –Vanessa Merton, Pace University School of Law
- “Derrick Bell’s Community-Based Classroom,” –Joy Radice, University of Tennessee College of Law
- “ ‘A Living Working Faith’: Remembering Our Colleague Derrick A. Bell, Jr. as Teacher,” –Andrea McArdle, CUNY School of Law
- “A Legacy of Teaching,” –Robin Lenhardt, Fordham University School of Law
- “Derrick Bell’s Children,” –I. Bennett Capers, Brooklyn Law School
- “From Interest Convergence to Solidarity,” –Julie Suk, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University
- “A Multiplicity of Interests,” –Rachel Godsil, Seton Hall University School of Law
- “Racial Fortuity, Rights Sacrifice, and the Promise of Convergence in Prison and Policing Policy,” –Taja-Nia Henderson, Rutgers School of Law – Newark
Each one of these essays is worth a read.
Thursday, September 6, 2012
Judge Bolton Declines Pre-Enforcement Injunction Against Arizona's SB1070's "show your papers" Provision
Judge Susan Bolton, who entered a preliminary injunction against portions of Arizona's controversial SB1070 in July 2010, including the controversial "show me your papers" provision, section 2(b), has issued a new order and opinion in del Sol v. Whiting, refusing to enjoin section 2(b) in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United States last June.
Recall that the Court held several sections of SB1070 preempted by federal law (thus essentially affirming Judge Bolton's initial decision, as affirmed by the Ninth Circuit), but found that Section 2(b) could be read to avoid the concerns of conflict. While section 2(b) requires every Arizona law enforcement officer to verify the immigration status of every person stopped, arrested, or detained if the officer has a “reasonable suspicion” that the person is in the country unlawfully, the Court provided several instances where 2(b) might be compatible with federal law and thus refused a pre-enforcement injunction.
Thus, on the preemption challenge, Judge Bolton's opinion is squarely within the dictates of Arizona v. United States.
However, the challengers also raised Equal Protection and Fourth Amendment challenges. Bolton's opinion subsumes these into the preemption challenge based on the Supremacy Clause. She quotes the Court in Arizona v. US as stating that its "opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect,” adding emphasis. Yet it is unclear how the Court's opinion could possibly foreclose the "other constitutional challenges" even pre-enforcement given that the issue before the Court was solely preemption (a limitation Justice Roberts stressed at the start of the oral arguments).
Bolton's opinion states that she "will not ignore the clear direction in the Arizona opinion that subsection 2(B) cannot be challenged further on its face before the law takes effect," but certainly the Court could not give direction, clear or otherwise, regarding issues that were not before it.
September 6, 2012 in Courts and Judging, Criminal Procedure, Current Affairs, Equal Protection, Federalism, Fourteenth Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Race, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Tuesday, September 4, 2012
Forida Federal Judge: State Tuition Differential for Students of Immigrant Parents Denies Equal Protection
U.S. District Judge K. Michael Moore held unconstitutional Florida regulations that classify U.S. citizen students who reside in Florida as "out of state" residents according to their parents' undocumented federal immigration status in the opinion in Ruiz v. Robinson. (Additional documents are available from Southern Poverty Law Center).
Applying established Equal Protection doctrine, Judge Moore concluded that such regulations do not "advance any legitimate State interest, much less the State's important interest in furthering educational opportunities for its own residents." In the relatively brief opinion, Judge Moore extensively discussed Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), distinguishing it because it involved primary education (although university education was more essential than it was twenty years ago), and because the plaintiffs in Plyler were undocumented immigrants while the plaintiffs in Ruiz are themselves citizens. Judge Moore applied heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause - - - requiring the classification to be "substantially related" to "important governmental objectives" - - - because "in a very real way the regulations punish the citizen children for the acts of their parents."
According to Judge Moore, essentially the Florida regulations "classify U.S. citizens as aliens, and in doing so, create a second-tier of U.S. citizenship that depreciates the historic values of Plaintiffs' citizenship by affording Plaintiffs some of the benefits that other similarly situated U.S. citizens enjoy but not all of the benefits." Judge Moore rejected Florida's proffered cost interest by observing that Florida mistakenly argued that by offering in-state tuition to Florida residents with undocumented parents it would be forced to offer in-state tuition to non-Florida residents. Moore made this clear in the opinion:
Indeed, nothing herein should be construed so as to preclude the State of Florida from requiring proof of Florida residency from a dependent U.S. citizen student and the student's parents in order to classify the student as a resident or non-resident for tuition and other related purposes, only that a U.S. citizen student who resides in, and whose parent resides in Florida cannot be denied in-state residency based on a parent's inability to provide proof of his or her federal immigration status.
In an apropos use of student scholarship, Judge Moore cites Michelle J. Seo, Note, Uncertainty of Access: U.S. Citizen Children of Undocumented Immigrant Parents and In-State Tuition for Higher Education, 44 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 311, 316 (2011).
[image: Miami-Dade College opening, circa 1970, via]
Monday, September 3, 2012
ConLawProfs Leong and Garden deploy a variety of theories and doctrines, anchoring their article in "an interdisciplinary literature that includes insights from legal, economic, psychological and sociological scholarly research." They view their narrative as a counter-narrative to the conventional wisdom that the relationship between unions and people of color is one of rivalry. Their first section takes on four pieces of conventional wisdom:
- Interests of White and Non-White Workers Are Fundamentally Opposed
- Unions Benefit Only White Workers
- Unions Lack Racial Empathy
- Unions Don’t Care About Communities of Color
These myths are worth debunking, although Leong and Garden also discuss their genesis in scholarship and doctrine. One of the joys of the paper as a piece of co-authored scholarship is the authors' frank portrayal of their own attempts at understanding and their disagreements. In considering the difficulty in discerning how to interpret the "Black History Month event" organized by the SEIU, Service Employees International Union, the professors agree that there was "overt exoticism," but differed as to how broadly problematic the entire event should be judged.
The constitutional theory is mostly implicit, but this is an important piece bridging racial equality and employment equality for this Labor Day.
[image: Martin Luther King, 1964, via]
Wednesday, August 29, 2012
Ninth Circuit Grants Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Death Row Inmate on Equal Protection and Due Process Grounds
In a divided opinion in Ayala v. Wong, the Ninth Circuit today granted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on equal protection and due process grounds.
As the opinion describes, during the
selection of the jury that convicted Ayala and sentenced him to death, the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to strike all of the black and Hispanic jurors available for challenge. The trial judge concluded that Ayala had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), but permitted the prosecution to give its justifications for the challenges of these jurors in an in camera hearing from which Ayala and his counsel were excluded. The trial judge then accepted the prosecution’s justifications for its strikes without disclosing them to the defense or permitting it to respond.
The failure to disclose the prosecution's rationales and allow defense counsel to demonstrate they were pretextual violates the process the Court mandated in Batson. In Alaya's case, this was compounded by what the opinion labels "the state’s later loss of a large portion of the record." This portion included juror information and the court concluded that because "the state’s loss of the questionnaires deprived Ayala of the ability to meaningfully appeal the denial of his Batson claim, he was deprived of due process."
In a dissenting opinion as lengthy as the majority, Judge Consuelo M. Callahan accuses the majority of not honoring the procedural obstacles to Alaya's claim, of making unwarranted suppositions, and of opening the floodgates. She writes:
In essence, the majority holds that because the record does not affirmatively negate the existence of a possible racial bias, the existence of such a bias may be assumed. Under this approach all Batson challenges in federal habeas petitions must be granted because no one can disprove a negative.
Yet the converse would also be true, of course. If Alaya's petition were not granted, it would allow judges to deny all litigants, including criminal defendants, the ability to refute the proffered race-neutral explanation, and to absolutely insulate a Batson claim from appellate review.
[image: The Jury by John Morgan, 1861, via]
Friday, August 17, 2012
Federal DC Judge Enjoins Small Business Affirmative Action Program as Applied to Military Simulators
In an extensive opinion in DynaLantic Corp. v. United States Department of Defense, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan has enjoined the Small Business Administration and the Department of Defense from awarding procurements for military simulators under the Section 8(a) program without first articulating a strong basis in evidence for doing so.
In a nutshell, the judge found that the constitutionality infirmity resided in the agencies' failure to specifically determine "that it is necessary or appropriate to set aside contracts in the military simulation and training industry." Relying upon City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion), Judge Sullivan stated that " Croson made clear that the government must provide evidence demonstrating there were eligible minorities in the relevant market - in that case, the Richmond construction industry - that were denied entry or access notwithstanding their eligibility," and thus the agencies' lack of specific studies relating to the military simulation industry was fatal.
Yet Judge Sullivan rejected the facial challenge to Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act which permits the federal government to limit the issuance of certain contracts to socially and economically disadvantaged businesses. The corporation argued that the Section 8(a) program - - - a program that evolved from Executive Orders issued by Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon in response to the Kerner Commission - - - violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Applying the rigorous standard of United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). requiring that the "challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,” Judge Sullivan carefully considered reams of studies, data, and information, as well as the corporation's arguments attacking the provision for being both overinclusive and underinclusive.
This litigation began in 1995 when the Navy determined it would award its contract for a flight simulator for the Huey helicopter (pictured above) through the Section 8 (a) program. DynaLantic's lawsuit was dismissed for standing, the D.C. Circuit reversed, and then protracted litigation continued as Congress reauthorized the program and a plethora of studies, evidence, and arguments accumulated.
As the educational affirmative action case of Fisher goes to the United States Supreme Court, DynaLantic is a reminder of the continued legacy of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), as well as Croson in the government procurement context.
Monday, August 13, 2012
Joined by ConLawProfs Bruce Ackerman, Vikram Amar, Jack Balkin, Burt Nueborne, James Ryan, and Adam Winkler, the Constitutional Accountability Center has filed an amicus brief in Fisher v. University of Texas, the "reverse discimination" case set for oral argument in the United States Supreme Court on October 10.
Dissenting from the denial of en banc review in the Fifth Circuit, Judge Edith Jones highlighted the panel decision's deviations from Grutter v. Bollinger. The Constitutional Accountability Center brief argues that UT's policy is constitutional under Grutter, but also makes the wider claim that the "text and history" of the Fourteenth Amendment allows governments to "enact race-conscious measures to ensure equality of opportunity."
ConLawProfs finalizing their syllabi for the semester might consider integrating the amicus brief, other briefs, or one of the scholarly discussions from Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc for the Equal Protection discussion.
Sunday, June 10, 2012
Federal District Judge Robert Dawson declared the Arkansas Public School Choice Act of 1989 unconstitutional on Friday in his opinion in Teague v Arkansas Board of Education. Judge Dawson concluded that the statute's use of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, largely relying on the Supreme Court's 2007 opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, because while there might be a compelling government interest, the statute was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve that interest and therefore survive strict scrutiny.
The statutory scheme is a complex one. Generally, students who attend public school must do so in the school district in which they reside. This general rule has some exceptions, including the Public School Choice Act. However, the choice created is generally subject to a race-based limitation: "No student may transfer to a non-resident district where the percentage of enrollment for the student’s race exceeds that percentage in the student’s resident district." However, even this exception had exceptions. Additionally, the 2011 Legislature amended the School Choice Act to specifically state that the race or ethnicity of a student shall not be used to deny a student the ability to attend a school in the student’s school district of choice if the transfer is "to a school that has been designated by the State as a school performing higher than that in which the student is currently enrolled or to which the student has been assigned." Moreover, the statute provided that if conflicts with the provisions of a federal desegregation court order applicable to a school district, the provisions of the federal desegregation court order shall govern.
Interestingly, Judge Dawson used both the 2011 amendment and the escape clause of federal court desegregation orders to support his conclusion that the statutory scheme was not narrowly tailored. He reasoned that the 2011 amendment was evidence that "some of the state’s lawmakers themselves have determined that the limitation" in the statute "may not pass the strict scrutiny test." He also stressed that the judicial desegregation order exception undermined narrowly tailored because the statutory scheme "applies state-wide without regard to whether a resident or non-resident school district has a history of de jure or de facto segregation." Obviously, however, any limitation to school districts under judicial supervision vitiates the need for the statute.
Not surprisingly then, Judge Dawson declared the statutory provision unconstitutional. More surprisingly, he declared the entre statute unconstitutional, finding that severability is a matter of state law. Looking at legislative intent, he concluded that severing the provision would undermine the legislative interest, including the legislature’s express statement that inter-district transfer is permissible “provided that the transfer by this student would not adversely affect the desegregation of either district."
Judge Dawson was attentive to the history of school segregation in Arkansas, although he sought to expand the portrait beyond the well-known events in Little Rock that resulted in Cooper v. Aaron:
Arkansas has a complicated history with regard to race relations in general, and equal opportunity education in particular. From resistance in the 1950s to minimum compliance in the 1960s, some parts of the state have fought integration even since the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka decision. . . . Arkansas is home to both the first public school in the former Confederate States of America to implement racial desegregation (Charleston) and the high school which drew the nation’s attention in 1957 when the state National Guard was utilized to keep black students from entering Central High School in Little Rock . . .
The final line of Dawson's 32 page opinion illustrates the continuing legacy of this history: "The Court fully expects this case to be appealed in view of the important issues presented in this case."
Thursday, May 31, 2012
As the Washington Post reports, members of the House of Representatives "voted 246 to 168" on PRENDA, HR 3541, the Prenatal Non-Discrimination Act, that bans sex-selective and race-selective abortions. While the 246 majority voted for PRENDA, it "failed to pass as House Republicans brought it up under a suspension of normal rules that required it to earn a two-thirds majority vote."
PRENDA defines "‘‘sex-selection abortion’’ as an "abortion undertaken for purposes of eliminating an unborn child of an undesired sex," and ‘‘race-selection abortion’’ is "an abortion performed for purposes of eliminating an unborn child because the child or a parent of the child is of an undesired race." The bill is similar to one in Arizona that did become law; the few other states that do have statutes focus on sex-selection.
As I've written elsewhere:
The specter of sex-selection prohibitions in abortion statutes is said to pose a political dilemma for feminists,who can be “torn” between “support for reproductive autonomy” and “distaste for sex-‐selection practices driven by a gendered and patriarchal society.” It also provokes opposing logical constructions. On one account, if there is right to an abortion for any or no reason, this includes a right to an abortion even for a problematical reason.165 On an opposing account, “[t]he right to not have a child for any reason does not logically encompass the right not to have a child for any specific reason.” Whatever the logic, however, an interrogation of a woman’s “reason” for having an abortion demonstrates a distrust of women similar to the distrust apparent in other abortion restrictions that treat women have abortions quite differently than ungendered patients providing informed consent for other medical procedures. However, unlike other abortion restrictions such as mandatory ultrasounds or waiting periods, sex-‐selective prohibitions are not cast as being beneficial to women or assisting decision-‐ making; rather, they clearly seek to remove the power of a woman’s choice to terminate a pregnancy in service to a larger societal and state interest.
Indeed, PRENDA's findings on sex include:
(subsection L) Sex-selection abortion results in an unnatural sex-ratio imbalance. An unnatural sex- ratio imbalance is undesirable, due to the inability of the numerically predominant sex to find mates. Experts worldwide document that a significant sex-ratio imbalance in which males numerically predominate can be a cause of increased violence and militancy within a society. Likewise, an unnatural sex-ratio imbalance gives rise to the commoditization of humans in the form of human trafficking, and a consequent increase in kidnapping and other violent crime.
PRENDA bases this finding on the experience of nations such as China, mentioning "son preference" but not China's accompanying one-child policy. For some, the interest in prohibiting sex-selective abortion is a "manufactured controversy." For others, PRENDA may be part of an election year strategy.
For those teaching a summer course in ConLaw, this could be the basis of an excellent problem. ConLawProfs might want to also consider the constitutional provisions on which Congress grounds its power, including the Thirteenth Amendment.
Wednesday, May 23, 2012
Section on Constitutional Law
Call for Papers for January 2013 AALS Annual Meeting Program:
“Forty Years after Rodriguez, 35 Years after Bakke:
Education, Equality and Fundamental Rights”
The Section on Constitutional Law and the Section on Education Law will be holding a joint program at the January 2013 AALS annual meeting. The program topic is “Forty Years after Rodriguez, 35 Years after Bakke: Education, Equality and Fundamental Rights.” The program will be held on Friday, January 4, from 2:00-5:00pm.
The panel organized by the Education Law Section will emphasize school financing, forty years after the Supreme Court held in Rodriguez that there is no fundamental right to education under the U.S. Constitution and that public school funding disparities are not subject to close scrutiny.
The Section on Constitutional Law panel will deal primarily with the constitutionality of racial affirmative action in higher education admissions. Among other matters, it will consider the implications of the Court’s grant of review in Fisher v. University of Texas, involving an undergraduate affirmative-action admissions program.
The Section on Constitutional Law invites submission of abstracts (of no more than five pages) for purposes of choosing one speaker for this panel. The speaker who is chosen will be expected to produce a paper that can be posted on the AALS web site prior to the annual meeting and that will be published in the Loyola Law Review.
Deadline Date for Submission: August 1, 2012
For more information and submission of abstracts, contact Professor Mark S. Scarberry, Pepperdine University School of Law, mark.scarberry AT pepperdine.edu.
Saturday, May 19, 2012
Felon disenfranchisement is a US reality that conlawprofs from non-US constitutional democracies can find a bit startling. Its justifications are many, but Professor Janai Nelson considers whether the real motivation isn't "viewpoint discrimination" and if so, whether it is susceptible to constitutional challenge.
In The First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Felon Disfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, forthcoming in Florida Law Review, available on ssrn, Nelson considers cases regarding viewpoint discrimination in voting regulations, and examines the justifications for felon disfranchisement "identifying both the perceived viewpoint that legislatures intend to exclude and the viewpoint that is ultimately excised from the electoral process." She argues:
in the effort to exclude a ―criminal viewpoint, another potential viewpoint, which I term the ―canary viewpoint is excised from the body politic. The canary viewpoint refers to the miner‘s canary whose death signals atmospheric dangers in the mine. In the context of felon disfranchisement, the canary viewpoint results from the intersectionality of race, crime, and low socio- economic status that combine to create the disfranchised population. Random and disparate breaches of the social contract would suggest individual choice rather than systemic group-based causes produce this phenomenon. . . .
Without the benefit of the political participation of those citizens who have failed to uphold the social contract, it is more difficult to understand or attract sustained attention to the root causes of its breach. As a result, democracy functions by silencing those who might signal its failure.
Of course, any constitutional challenge to felon disenfranchisement must confront Richardson v. Ramirez (1974) in which the Court held that § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized states to deny voting rights based on a felony conviction. Nelson argues that Ramirez does not extend to intentional discrimination in the form of vote denial because of how persons (felons) may vote.
Thursday, March 1, 2012
Two provisions seek to regulate what is generally termed day labor. One provision makes it unlawful for an occupant of a motor vehicle that is stopped on a street,roadway, or highway and is impeding traffic to attempt to hire a person for work at another location. Another provides that it is unlawful for a person to enter a motor vehicle in order to be hired if the vehicle is stopped on a street, roadway, or highway and is impeding traffic.
In Friendly House v. Whiting, Judge Susan Bolton has just ruled on a renewed motion for preliminary injunction against both these provisions, reasoning that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of the First Amendment challenge to the provisions.
Judge Bolton rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the SB1070 provisions were not commercial speech, agreeing with Arizona that the regulated speech did little more than propose a commercial transaction and thus the lesser standard governing commercial speech should apply . Nevertheless, applying the Central Hudson test, Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980), as slightly modified with regard to the last prong when there is content discrimination as in last term's case of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., Judge Bolton held that the provisions were unconstitutional.
On Central Hudson's threshold prong - - - that the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity - - - Bolton focused on the communication itself, rejecting Arizona's contention that "impeding traffic" was unlawful activity and thus the First Amendment did not apply. She noted that Arizona did not (and could not) argue that day labor itself was unlawful.
On Central Hudson's government interest prong, Judge Bolton found that the interest of traffic safety easily met the standard of a substantial interest. With more difficulty, Bolton also found that the restriction directly advanced the substantial interest of safety, even though the ban was content-based and thus "by logical extension underinclusive to some degree."
It was Central Hudson's final prong, especially as modified by Sorrell, that proved fatal to the SB1070 provisions. Central Hudson provides that the regulation "must not be more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest," while makes clear that the law must not seek "to suppress a disfavored message."
Judge Bolton reasoned that there were less burdensome means in the pre-existing traffic regulations, and also noted that "S.B. 1070 contains a purposes clause" stating that the intent of the Act "is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona” and that “[t]he provisions of this act are intended to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.” Importantly, she reasoned, "nowhere does it state that a purpose of the statutes and statutory revisions is to enhance traffic safety." Thus, because the provisions "were created as part of a package of statutes and revisions aimed at perceived problems related to unlawful immigration" weighs against a finding that the provisions are “drawn to” address a traffic problem.
In weighing the standards for a preliminary injunction other than likelihood to prevail on the merits, Judge Bolton found the balance of equities and the public interest were in favor of injunctive relief.
Thus, the day labor solicitation provisions join the other provisions that have been held unconstitutional, and will most likely also provoke extended litigation.
[image: "Street Art" by Kotzian via]
Tuesday, February 21, 2012
In a case that might be called the sequel to Grutter v. Bollinger, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari today in Fisher v. University of Texas, a suit by a white woman challenging the post-Grutter admission plan at UT. (Justice Kagan recused). [Update: There's a terrific explanation of the procedural problems with the case, including Art III standing issues, by Adam Chandler].
The dissenting opinion to the denial of en banc review by the Fifth Circuit, authored by the high profile conservative Chief Judge Edith Jones, sets out the arguments against the panel's opinion, 631 F.3d 213, upholding the UT plan, arguing that the panel extends Grutter in three ways.
- First, it adopts a new “serious good faith consideration” standard of review, watering down Grutter’s reliance on strict narrow tailoring.
- Second, it authorizes the University’s race-conscious admissions program although a race-neutral state law (the Top Ten Percent Law) had already fostered increased campus racial diversity.
- Finally, the panel appears to countenance an unachievable and unrealistic goal of racial diversity at the classroom level to support the University’s race-conscious policy.
Jones continues, arguing that the meaning of "diversity" is less than coherent:
This decision in effect gives a green light to all public higher education institutions in this circuit, and perhaps beyond, to administer racially conscious admissions programs without following the narrow tailoring that Grutter requires. Texas today is increasingly diverse in ways that transcend the crude White/Black/Hispanic calculus that is the measure of the University’s race conscious admissions program. The state’s Hispanic population is predominately Mexican-American, including not only families whose Texas roots stretch back for generations but also recent immigrants. Many other Texas Hispanics are from Central America, Latin America and Cuba. To call these groups a “community” is a misnomer; all will acknowledge that social and cultural differences among them are significant. Whether the University also misleadingly aggregates Indians, Pakistanis and Middle Easterners with East “Asians” is unclear, but Houston alone is home to hundreds of thousands of people from East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. In Texas’s major cities, dozens of other immigrant groups reside whose families have overcome oppression and intolerance of many kinds and whose children are often immensely talented. Privileging the admission of certain minorities in this true melting-pot environment seems inapt. But University administrators cherish the power to dispense admissions as they see fit, which might be reasonable except for two things: the Texas legislature has already spoken to diversity, and the U.S. Constitution abhors racial preferences. Because even University administrators can lose sight of the constitutional forest for the academic trees, it is the duty of the courts to scrutinize closely their “benign” use of race in admissions.
Jones later states,
The effect of the panel’s wholesale deference becomes clear when one considers the important factual distinction between this case and Grutter. In Fisher, the plaintiffs challenged a post-Grutter University plan whereby 19% of the entering freshman class were subject to a race-conscious admissions process to increase diversity. As Judge Garza’s concurrence demonstrates, the number of students actually admitted under this racial preference policy is unclear, but it amounted to no more than a couple hundred out of more than six thousand new students. . . . The panel opinion asserts that the University’s admission process is constitutionally acceptable because it is modeled closely after Grutter. Yet the difference is obvious. The Texas legislature statutorily mandated increased diversity in admissions by means of the Top Ten Percent Law. Under that race- neutral law, covering 80% of University admissions, the top ten percent of graduates from every Texas high school were automatically admitted, and many African-American and Hispanic students matriculated to the University. The challenged preferential policy was adopted on top of the unprecedentedly high numbers (compared to many other universities) of preferred minorities entering under the Top Ten Percent Law.
The pertinent question is thus whether a race-conscious admissions policy adopted in this context is narrowly tailored to achieve the University’s goal of increasing “diversity” on the campus. Contrary to the panel’s exercise of deference, the Supreme Court holds that racial classifications are especially arbitrary when used to achieve only minimal impact on enrollment.
. . . Finally, in an entirely novel embroidering on Grutter, the panel repeatedly implies that an interest in “diversity” at the classroom level—in a university that offers thousands of courses in multiple undergraduate schools and majors—justifies enhanced race-conscious admissions.
While Justice O'Connor ended the Court's opinion in Grutter with an expectation that "25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today," it seems that Grutter will be revisited less than a decade later - - - and with O'Connor no longer on the Court and Kagan recused.
Monday, January 16, 2012
President Obama's Presidential Proclamation on Martin Luther King Day, 2012, includes these words:
At a time when our Nation was sharply divided, Dr. King called on a generation of Americans to be "voices of reason, sanity, and understanding amid the voices of violence, hatred, and emotion." His example stirred men and women of all backgrounds to become foot soldiers for justice, and his leadership gave them the courage to refuse the limitations of the day and fight for the prospect of tomorrow. Because these individuals showed the resilience to stand firm in the face of the fiercest resistance, we are the benefactors of an extraordinary legacy of progress.
Today, Dr. King is memorialized on the National Mall where he once spoke, a symbol of how far our Nation has come and a testament to the quiet heroes whose names may never appear in history books, but whose selflessness brought about change few thought possible. Dr. King's memorial reminds us that while the work of realizing his remarkable dream is unending, with persistence, progress is within our reach.
On the MLK memorial itself, the "drum major" quote has been the subject of controversy and is being "corrected." The government sponsored MLK Day of Service continues to include the Drum Major for Service Award, as well as the correct/full "drum major" quote: "Yes, if you want to say that I was a drum major, say that I was a drum major for justice; say that I was a drum major for peace; I was a drum major for righteousness… We all have the drum major instinct.” Excerpt from The Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "Drum Major Instinct" sermon, given on February 4, 1968.
For ConLaw scholars, it might also be a good day to (re)read Randall Kennedy's "Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott," 98 Yale Law Journal 999 (1989) (available on JSTOR) or Camille Nelson's " The Radical King: Perspectives of One Born in the Shadow of a King," 32 New York University Review of Law & Social Change, 485(2008) (available on ssrn), or view MLK's last speech.
[image: personal collection]