Monday, June 1, 2015
The Supreme Court ruled today that there was no clearly established right to proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention procedures in a prison. The per curiam ruling in Taylor v. Barkes means that the commissioner of the Delaware Department of Correction and a prison warden enjoyed qualified immunity against a claim by the family of a deceased prisoner that they failed to supervise and monitor a private contractor's intake screening and medical treatment of the suicidal prisoner. The family's civil rights case against the commissioner and warden is therefore dismissed.
The case involved a prisoner who had a history of psychiatric treatment, medication, and suicide, but who was not designated for any special suicide prevention measures pursuant to the intake protocol. After intake, the prisoner called his wife and told her he was going to kill himself. Officers observed the prisoner awake and behaving normally the next morning, but later that morning the prisoner hanged himself with a bed sheet.
The family sued the commissioner and warden for violation of the Eighth Amendment. But the Court's ruling today says that the prisoner had no clearly established right to proper implementation of an adequate suicide prevention protocol. As a result, the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity, and the case is dismissed.
Sunday, May 31, 2015
Jeffrey Stern gives the shameful back-story on Clayton Lockett's botched execution over at The Atlantic. In the course, he also gives the shameful back-story on Glossip v. Gross, the case now before the Supreme Court testing whether a state can use a three-drug protocol where the first drug does not reliably induce a a deep, coma-like unconsciousness, and where the second and third drugs can therefore cause excruciating pain.
Stern covers all the details: death-penalty states' initial inability to acquire sodium thiopental (the old first drug); their efforts to get it overseas and from compounding pharmacies; their later inability to get it from these sources (in part because of foreign governments' opposition to the death penalty); their turn to midazolam, a sedative, as an alternative; and their botched executions using this alternative.
The D.C. Circuit declined to intervene to reverse a lower court ruling that requires the government to move toward releasing videos of forced-feeding of a Guantanamo detainee. The decision means that the government and attorneys for detainee Abu Wa'el (Jihad) Dhiab will have to work together to agree on redactions and a proposal as to "how the videotapes can be made available to the public most efficiently," pursuant to the earlier district court orders.
Still, it may be some time, if ever, before the videos are released. That's because the redaction process could take a long time, even assuming the government doesn't foot-drag or tie up the process in further litigation. Or: after redaction, there may be nothing of substance to release; or the district court might decline to order release pursuant to the agreed-upon process; or the appeals court might reject release when the case inevitably comes back. In short: this is a victory for those seeking release, but it doesn't mean that we'll see release any time soon.
The case, Dhiab v. Obama, grows out of Dhiab's habeas petition, his hunger strike, and the government's efforts to force-feed him. Dhiab moved to stop the forced-feeding, and, in considering that motion, the district court reviewed 32 classified videotapes of Dhiab's forced-feedings. News media organizations intervened to get copies of the tapes, and the district court ordered the parties (1) to cooperate to redact the tapes and (2) to propose how the videos could be released. The order did not specifically require release.
The government appealed, but the D.C. Circuit declined to hear the merits. The appeals court ruled that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the case, because the district court's orders weren't final, appealable orders (because they didn't conclusively resolve the matter, and the government still had opportunities under the district court orders to challenge the release). The court also ruled that it didn't have mandamus jurisdiction (for largely the same reasons).
The ruling paves the way for the release of redacted videos. But don't expect that to happen any time soon. Redaction will take some time, and even if the government doesn't deliberately foot-drag, redactions and the joint proposal for release will undoubtedly get tied up in lengthy litigation at the district court, and again on appeal.
Friday, May 29, 2015
The Supreme Court could give Republicans another 8 seats in Congress, according to David Wasserman and Harry Enten at FiveThirtyEight. They analyze the possible political impacts of Evenwel v. Abbott, the case testing how to measure population for compliance with one-person-one-vote. Plaintiffs in the case argue that states should be allowed to apportion seats based on where U.S. citizens over age 18 (the voting-eligible population) live, and not on where everyone, including minors and noncitizens, live. The Supreme Court noted jurisdiction earlier this week.
The Fifth Circuit this week denied the government's motion for a stay of Judge Hanen's nationwide injunction against the government's deferred action program for parents of Americans and lawful permanent residents, or DAPA. The denial is not a final ruling on the merits (the court wrote that "we do not decide whether the Secretary has the authority to implement DAPA" at this "early stage of the case"); it says only that Texas's challenge to the program is sufficiently likely to succeed to withstand the government's motion for a stay. Still, the ruling presages the likely result on the merits and makes the case look even more likely to end up at the Supreme Court.
The court addressed two issues: Texas's standing to challenge DAPA, and the state's claim that DHS violated the Administrative Procedures Act in failing to use notice-and-comment rulemaking before implementing DAPA.
The court held that Texas had standing, because it'll cost the state some $130 under state law to subsidize each driver license for each DAPA beneficiary. The government argued that Texas could avoid the economic injury by changing its license-fee structure, and that in any event the many economic benefits of the DAPA program would offset the costs for the state.
The court rejected the former argument, saying that the "forced choice" itself is an injury:
The flaw in the government's reasoning is that Texas's forced choice between incurring costs and changing its fee structure is itself an injury: A plaintiff suffers an injury even if it can avoid that injury by incurring other costs. And being pressured to change state law constitutes an injury.
The court rejected the latter argument, saying that the economic offsets are of a different type--and that the injury therefore still stands, notwithstanding any economic benefits that the program may bring to the state.
Because the court said that Texas had standing based on its economic harm, it did not rule on Texas's claim that it had standing based on the district court's "abdication theory" (that Texas had standing because the federal government "abdicated" its "responsibility" to enforce the law in an area where it has exclusive authority).
The court said that Texas easily falls within the zone of interests of the INA, because "Congress permits states to deny many benefits to illegal aliens," and "the states seek only to be heard in the formulation of immigration policy before [the government] imposes substantial costs on them." The court also said that the INA doesn't bar judicial review.
The court held that DAPA amounts to "nonenforcement" of the INA, because it is the "affirmative act of conferring 'lawful presence' [quoting Johnson's memo] on a class of unlawfully present aliens." "[T]hat new designation triggers eligibility for federal and state benefits that would not otherwise be available."
On the merits, the court held that DAPA is not a mere policy statement (as the government argued), but rather is a "substantive" rule that requires notice and comment under the APA. According to the court, that's because DAPA doesn't really offer enforcement discretion, and it's more than internal procedural guidance (it's substantive, according to the court).
As to the nationwide injunction, the court only said that anything short of a nationwide ban would result in a "patchwork system" that would detract from the uniformity that Congress sought in the INA.
Judge Higginson dissented. He argued that "Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit caselaw forecloses plaintiffs' arguments challenging in court this internal executive enforcement guideline," and that "DHS is adhering to the law, not derogating from it." He argued that DAPA amounts to discretionary enforcement guidelines that aren't subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA.
Wednesday, May 27, 2015
The D.C. Circuit ruled in National Association of Home Builders v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge settlement terms between the Service and environmental groups that would set designation of endangered species back on pace. The ruling means that the case is dismissed and should put the Service back on course to meet settlement deadlines for designating endangered species.
The case arose out of a ten-year backlog at the Service in designating endangered species. (The backlog grew out of a regulatory designation, "warranted-but-precluded," that allowed the Service to back-burner formal designation of a particular species as endangered. Some 250 species were on the list.) Environmental groups sued to get the Service moving, and the Service entered into settlement agreements designed to put the designation back on pace. But then Homebuilders sued (under the ESA's citizen suit provision and the APA) to stop the implementation of the settlement agreements--to stop the Service from putting endangered species designation back on pace.
The court said that Homebuilders lacked standing. The court ruled that Homebuilders lacked procedural standing (on the theory that the organization and its members didn't have a chance to comment on the settlement agreements), because under circuit law there's no procedural right to comment at the warranted-but-precluded stage. That's because nothing requires notice-and-comment at this stage, nothing gives Homebuilders a statutory right to sue, and Homebuilders couldn't show that the procedures were designed to protect its interests.
The court also ruled that Homebuilders couldn't identify a particular harm. Homebuilders sued to stop the settlement agreement, not to stop a designation of any particular species. And the court said that the settlement agreement simply required the Service to make a decision (one way or the other) within a timeline, and not necessarily to designate any particular species as endangered.
Finally, the court rejected Homebuilders' claim that the settlement would harm members, because members put resources into protected certain species, and designation would moot those efforts. The court said that these efforts were dictated by state and local law, or by members' independent efforts (designed to persuade the Service that a particular species didn't need protection, because it was already protected). Because the efforts weren't Service-mandated, they weren't "fairly traceable" to the Service's challenged actions.
In its divided opinion in Children First Foundation v. Fiala, the Second Circuit held that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicle's rejection of "Choose Life" license plates for the state's specialty plate program is constitutional. Judge Pooler, joined by Judge Hall, reversed the district judge's conclusion that the rejection violated the First Amendment.
The Second Circuit's divided opinion enters the fray of what might be called the developing doctrine of license plates, be they state-mandated, vanity, or as here, "specialty" plates issued by the state as a means of raising revenue. As we've discussed, the Fourth Circuit recently held that North Carolina's provision of a "Choose Life" specialty license plate violated the First Amendment; the New Hampshire Supreme Court invalidated a vanity license plate regulation requiring "good taste"; a Michigan federal district judge similarly invalidated a refusal of specific letters on a vanity plate; and on remand from the Tenth Circuit, the design of the Oklahoma standard license plate was upheld.
The progenitor of this doctrine is the classic First Amendment case of Wooley v. Maynard (1977) involving compelled speech. This Term the Court heard oral arguments in Walker v. Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans; a divided Fifth Circuit had held that the rejection of the Sons of Confederate Veterans plate (featuring the Confederate flag) was a violation of the First Amendment as impermissible content and viewpoint discrimination. The Second Circuit stayed the mandate of its decision pending the outcome of Walker.
The specialty license plate litigation involves the intersection of a number of First Amendment doctrines. As Judge Pooler's opinion in Children First Foundation expressed its holding:
We conclude that the content of New York’s custom license plates constitutes private speech [rather than government speech] and that the plates themselves are a nonpublic forum. CFF’s facial challenge fails because New York’s custom plate program did not impermissibly vest the DMV Commissioner with unbridled discretion in approving custom plate designs. Furthermore, that program, as applied in this case, was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, which is all that the First Amendment requires of restrictions on expression in a nonpublic forum.
Judge Pooler's well-structured opinion supports this conclusion. First, the court considers whether the license plate is government speech or private speech. If the speech is government speech, then the First Amendment has little application. (Recall that this was the position of the dissenting judge in the Fifth Circuit's decision in Sons of Confederate Veterans). Agreeing with other circuits, the court reasons that an application of Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum (2009) and Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n (2005) leads to " little difficulty concluding that such an observer would know that motorists affirmatively request specialty plates and choose to display those plates on their vehicles, which constitute private property."
bringing to justice individuals who have attacked police officers cannot reasonably compare—either by its very nature or by the level of contentiousness that surrounds it—to the issue of abortion. With respect to the decision to issue a “Union Yes” plate, while the myriad issues pertaining to organized labor in the United States are social and political in nature, there is no basis to conclude that the Department failed to apply the policy against creating plates that touch upon contentious political issues as opposed to having applied the policy and merely reaching a different result than it did with the “Choose Life” plate.
May 27, 2015 in Abortion, Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, First Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Reproductive Rights, Speech, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Tuesday, May 26, 2015
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari today in Foster v. Humphrey to the Georgia Supreme Court denying post-conviction relief.
According to the petition, in 1987, an all-white jury convicted Timothy Tyrone Foster, a "poor, black, intellectually compromised eighteen year old" of the murder of an elderly white woman. At trial, one black potential juror was removed for cause, and the prosecutors removed all four of the remaining black prospective jurors by peremptory strike, and proffered race-neutral reasons when defense counsel raised a challenge under the then-recent case of Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The judge rejected defense counsel's argument that the race-neutral reasons were pretexual and denied the Batson challenge. The Georgia courts affirmed.
Almost twenty years later, pursuant to a request under the state open records act, Foster gained access to the prosecution team's jury selection notes, which included highlighting the black potential jurors (image at right), circling the word "black" as an answer to the race question on the juror questionnaire, identifying the black potential jurors as B#1, B#2, and B#3 in the notes, and a draft affidavit by the prosecution investigator stating "“if we had to pick a black juror then I recommend that [Marilyn] Garrett be one of the jurors; with a big doubt still remaining.” (The affidavit was originally submitted to the court with all mentions of race excised).
In the post-conviction proceeding, the court held that "[t]he notes and records submitted by Petitioner fail to demonstrate purposeful discrimination on the basis that the race of prospective jurors was either circled, highlighted or otherwise noted on various lists." The Georgia Supreme Court declined review.
In granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court could certainly agree with the Georgia courts and simply affirm. Assuming the Court granted certiorari because of some disagreement with the conclusions, the Court might take a broader approach. According to the petition in Foster, the prosecution "proffered a combined forty reasons for striking" the four black potential jurors. Because there are almost always "neutral" reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge - - - given that it can be based on essentially a "hunch" - - - proving racial motivation and discrimination can be difficult. The Court has the opportunity to revisit Batson and the problem of distinguishing between race-neutral and pretextual reasons, perhaps providing a more workable and fair rule.
May 26, 2015 in Courts and Judging, Criminal Procedure, Equal Protection, Federalism, First Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Habeas Corpus, Race, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Saturday, May 23, 2015
Federal appeals courts this week dealt two (more) blows to opponents of Obamacare's religious accommodation to the contraception mandate. A Seventh Circuit panel ruled that the accommodation did not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby, and the full D.C. Circuit declined to re-hear an earlier panel ruling against opponents.
Together the rulings should put an end to this chapter of challenges to Obamacare. But by now we've learned never to say never . . . .
The cases grow out of religious non-profits' opposition to the government-created religious accommodation to Obamacare's contraception mandate. The accommodation requires a religious non-profit to complete a form to notify its health insurer (or third-party administrator) that the non-profit objects to providing contraception as part of its health insurance plan. The law then requires the insurer or third-party administrator to provide contraception coverage directly to plan participants, free of charge.
Opponents say that the accommodation--the form that notifies the insurance company of the religious objection--itself violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, because it "triggers" the provision of contraception coverage to plan participants.
The Seventh Circuit categorically rejected that claim last February. But then the Supreme Court handed down Hobby Lobby, holding that the contraception mandate violated the RFRA as applied to a self-insured, closely-held, for-profit corporation, and requiring an accommodation. But Hobby Lobby also contained language suggesting that an accommodation of the type challenged by religious non-profits would skirt any RFRA problem. The Supreme Court then vacated the Seventh Circuit ruling and remanded for reconsideration in light of Hobby Lobby.
The Seventh Circuit panel this week again ruled against the challengers, citing the same problems in the original case (before Hobby Lobby)--under the law the non-profit doesn't act as a "conduit" for the provision of contraception (the law itself does this), and the case was under-developed at the trial level. As to Hobby Lobby, the panel said that the Supreme Court recognized the accommodation as valid, but that the Court "did leave open . . . the possibility that the accommodation sought and obtained there would not prevent religious beliefs or practices from being substantially burdened in some cases." But the Seventh Circuit said that those beliefs or practices weren't burdened here, by the accommodation. In particular, the court wrote that Notre Dame couldn't come up with any workable alternative to the accommodation that wouldn't "impede the receipt of [contraception] benefits," especially given the undeveloped factual record in the case.
The D.C. Circuit (also, and again) came to the same conclusion in denying a rehearing en banc. Its earlier panel ruling in Priests for Life came down after Hobby Lobby, so already considered any effects of that case.
The principal problem with the challenges is that, contrary to the challengers' claims, it's not the accommodation that triggers the provision of contraception; it's the law that does that. In the language of the Seventh Circuit, the non-profits don't act as a "conduit" for the provision of contraception, because the law itself requires insurers and administrators to provide contraception. And a mistaken interpretation of the law is not a burden on religion. Or, as Judge Pillard put it in her concurring opinion to the D.C. Circuit's denial of en banc review:
The dispute we resolved is legal, not religious. Under the ACA regulations, a woman who obtains health insurance coverage through her employer is no more entitled to contraceptive coverage if her employer submits the disputed notice than if it does not. The ACA obligation to provide contraceptive coverage to all insured women does not depend on that notice. Nothing in RFRA requires that we accept Plaintiffs' assertions to the contrary.
Thursday, May 21, 2015
The Supreme Court this week upheld Maryland's income tax system against a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge. The sharply divided ruling put on full display the Court's fault lines in this area, even as the five-Justice majority set out a bright line test for tax challenges under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Our preview of the case, Comptroller v. Wynne, is here, with the full factual background. In brief: Maryland income tax consists of a state tax and a county tax. Residents who pay income tax to another jurisdiction (because they earn income there) are allowed a credit against the state tax, but not the county tax. This means that residents who earn out-of-state income are taxed on that income by the other jurisdiction, and by Maryland (under the county tax). (For out-of-staters earning income in Maryland, Maryland imposes a state income tax and a "special resident tax" (in lieu of the county tax).) Maryland residents who earned pass-through income from an S-corporation that earned income in several states sued, arguing that the "double taxation" violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The Court disagreed. Justice Alito wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Alito wrote that the case was an easy application of precedent and the "internal consistency test." That test asks whether, if every state adopted the challenged tax structure, taxes would "inherently discriminate against interstate commerce without regard to the tax policies of other States." If so, the category of taxes "is typically unconstitutional." Justice Alito said that Maryland's tax system violated the rule, because a Marylander earning out-of-state income would be taxed on that income twice (once by the out-of-state jurisdiction, and once by the Maryland county), whereas a Maryland earning in-state income would be taxed only once.
Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justice Scalia and Kagan. She argued that there's a long history "of States imposing and this Court upholding income taxes that carried a similar risk of double taxation," and that the majority's internal consistency test is deeply flawed. She also argued that "[f]or at least a century, 'domicile' has been recognized as a secure ground for taxation of residents' worldwide income," and based on the domicile principle Maryland's tax system (of its own residents) is valid. Justice Ginsburg gave several reasons for this principle, including the benefits that residents receive and the political influence that residents wield--both hotly disputed by Justice Alito. Justice Ginsburg also argued that the cases relied on by the majority involved gross receipts taxes, not income taxes. She said that the difference matters: "For decades--including the years when the majority's 'trilogy' was decided--the Court has routinely maintained that 'the difference between taxes on net income and taxes on gross receipts from interstate commerce warrants different results' under the Commerce Clause."
Finally, Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented separately, maintaining their positions that there is no Dormant Commerce Clause.
The upshot of this fractured ruling is that the internal consistency test is the rule for Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state tax practices, and that the Court will strike tax practices that result in this kind of "double taxation" of out-of-state income.
Monday, May 18, 2015
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan arises from an incident in which two police officers shot Teresa Sheehan, a woman suffering from a schizoaffective disorder who was living in a group home for those with mental illness.
The seemingly primary issue upon which certiorari was granted was whether the Americans with Disabilities Act, ADA, 42 U. S. C. §12132, required law enforcement officers to "provide accommodations to an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect into custody.” The Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, found fault with the attorneys litigating on behalf of San Francisco and dismissed this first question presented as improvidently granted. In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kagan, also faulted the attorneys for San Francisco, noting that the Petition for Certiorari
assured us (quite accurately), and devoted a section of its argument to the point, that "The Circuits Are In Conflict On This Question.”
But, Justice Scalia continued,
Imagine our surprise, then, when the petitioners’ principal brief, reply brief, and oral argument had nary a word to say about that subject.
Instead, the petitioners argued that "the issue is not (as the petition had asserted) whether Title II applies to arrests of violent, mentally ill individuals, but rather how it applies under the circumstances of this case, where the plaintiff threatened officers with a weapon."
We were thus deprived of the opportunity to consider, and settle, a controverted question of law that has divided the Circuits, and were invited instead to decide an ADA question that has relevance only if we assume the Ninth Circuit correctly resolved the antecedent, unargued question on which we granted certiorari.
Scalia had especially harsh words for the attorneys for San Francisco, casting aspersion on their integrity:
Why, one might ask, would a petitioner take a position on a Circuit split that it had no intention of arguing, or at least was so little keen to argue that it cast the argument aside uninvited? The answer is simple. Petitioners included that issue to induce us to grant certiorari.
Scalia states that the Court would never have granted certiorari on the first question as it was argued in the briefs and would certainly have never granted certiorari on the"fact-bound" qualified immunity issue. Scalia, with Kagan, dissented from the Court's holding on the qualified immunity issue:
I would not reward such bait-and-switch tactics by proceeding to decide the independently “uncertworthy” second question. And make no mistake about it: Today’s judgment is a reward. It gives the individual petitioners all that they seek, and spares San Francisco the significant expense of defending the suit, and satisfying any judgment, against the individual petitioners. I would not encourage future litigants to seek review premised on arguments they never plan to press, secure in the knowledge that once they find a toehold on this Court’s docket, we will consider whatever workaday arguments they choose to present in their merits briefs.
The Court, absent Justice Breyer who did not participate in the case, did "reward" San Francisco by finding that the police officers were protected by qualified immunity: "no precedent clearly established that there was not 'an objective need for immediate entry' here." The somewhat particular facts - - - the situation involved an entry and then a re-entry of Sheehan's room - - - nevertheless involved a "straightforward" and exceedingly brief qualified immunity analysis.
And a reversal of the Ninth Circuit.
While the attorneys for the City and County of San Francisco may have endured a scolding, Scalia is correct that the Court's decision is ultimately a reward.
In its opinion in Lash v. Lemke, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the grant of a summary judgment in favor of law enforcement officers in a suit filed by an Occupy D.C. protestor for a violation of Fourth and First Amendment rights.
Judge Griffith, writing for the court, and joined by Chief Judge Garland and Judge Kavanaugh, described the arrest of Ryan Lash at the Occupy DC encampment in January 2012 by United States Park Police Officers Tiffany Reed, Frank Hilscher, and Jennifer Lemke:
Officer Tiffany Reed, who had been following Lash as he hurried through the tents, stepped up behind Lash and seized his arms from the rear. Lash pulled his arms away and held them in front of his body, continuing to walk away as he insisted that he was innocent. Reed again sought to restrain Lash from behind and Lash again pulled his arms away from her. Reed then took hold of Lash’s left arm while Hilsher approached and seized his right arm. Lemke approached at the same time and drew her Taser from its holster, holding it ready.
Though Lash’s arms were now held by two different officers, he continued to struggle to keep his feet while Reed and Hilsher worked for several moments to gain control of him. Lemke, standing nearby and behind the trio, fired her Taser into Lash’s lower back. He fell to the ground, and the officers handcuffed him.
Lash argued that Lemke’s use of the Taser constituted excessive force in violation of Lash’s Fourth Amendment rights and was motivated by retaliatory animus against his protected expression in violation of his First Amendment rights. The defendant officers raised qualified immunity and the district judge granted summary judgment in their favor.
Relying on Ashcroft v. al- Kidd (2011), the DC Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the "claimed right, whether it exists or not, is by no means 'clearly established.'" In so doing, however, the court acknowledged that this inquiry cannot be abstract, but must occur "in the specific context of the case." This "context," the court further acknowledged, depended on whether Lash was "resisting arrest."
This would seemingly make summary judgment - - - requiring no genuine disputes of material fact - - - difficult, but the court interestingly relied on multiple video-recordings of the "episode" which rendered Lash's description a "visible fiction."
Here is one of the videos of the incident:
The court further rejected Lash's arguments regarding the video as conclusive:
Lash argues that we may not rely on the videorecordings in this way because they “cannot fully convey everything that people at the scene felt” such as “how much force one person is exerting” or “the level of detail a person will experience in the moment.” This is no argument at all. The Supreme Court has explained that we determine whether a right is clearly established based on the “objective legal reasonableness of an official’s acts,” protecting officers from liability unless “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Subjective factors like those Lash identifies here cannot shed any light on whether a reasonable officer in these circumstances would have believed her actions violated Lash’s clearly established rights. It is that objective test, not Lash’s knowledge or Lemke’s thoughts, that determines the scope of qualified immunity. The videorecordings in the record provide us all we need to determine what a reasonable officer would have known at the scene. And we do not hesitate to conclude from the videorecording that there is “no genuine issue of material fact” regarding Lash’s active resistance.
Given the increased use of videorecordings in cases against police officers, the court's discussion of 'what the video shows' might be expected to be used in other cases.
Here, however, the court concludes that Lash was "actively resisting arrest," and thus there was no clearly established right not be subject to a Taser.
As to the First Amendment claim, the court quickly found that Lash did not show the officer had "retaliatory animus."
Sunday, May 17, 2015
Judge Reggie B. Walton (D.D.C.) ruled in American Freedom Law Center v. Obama that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the federal government's "transitional policy" and "hardship exemption," which permit individuals temporarily to maintain health insurance coverage through plans that are not compliant with the general requirements of the Affordable Care Act.
The ruling deals a blow to opponents of the government's exemption--but a fully predictable one.
The plaintiffs' theory of standing turned on market forces driving up an AFLC staff member's premiums. It goes like this: When the federal government temporarily exempted certain individuals from enrolling in non-compliant plans (in reaction to the political blow-back after many folks received notices that their insurance would be cancelled and changed to comply with the ACA), this depleted the pool of individuals enrolling in ACA-compliant plans; and that drove up the costs of those plans. Plaintiff Muise was enrolled in such a plan, and, indeed, saw his premiums rise.
In short, Muise argued that his premiums rose in his compliant plan because the government's exemption meant that fewer people enrolled in compliant plans.
Judge Walton disagreed. He noted that insurance premiums can fluctuate for any number of reasons, not just the government's exemption, and that the plaintiff's theory suffered from other defects in the causal chain. Quoting from the government's motion to dismiss:
[the] [p]laintiffs have not established any of the links in the causal chain . . . that would be necessary to their apparent theory of standing to challenge this particular exemption. [The] [p]laintiffs have not alleged, for example, that there are individuals in Michigan with cancelled policies; that any such individuals consider the other policies available to them to be unaffordable; that any such individuals have availed themselves of [the defendants'] "hardship" exemption for consumers with cancelled policies; that, but for this exemption, any such individual would have purchased "minimum essential coverage" . . .; that in purchasing such coverage, that individual would have entered the same risk pool as these [p]laintiffs; and that such individual's addition to the risk pool would have lowered [the] [p]laintiffs' premiums.
The ruling is consistent with similar rulings in other district courts.
May 17, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Saturday, May 16, 2015
A three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit ruled in National Association of Home Builders v. EPA that a development association lacked standing to challenge the EPA's determination that two reaches of the Santa Cruz River are traditional navigable waters, subject to federal regulation. The court said that the plaintiff was barred by collateral estoppel, based on the same court's earlier ruling against the same plaintiff lodging the same complaint.
But two judges argued that the earlier ruling was flat wrong, rearguing an issue that the court wrangled over just three years ago. (The full D.C. Circuit denied en banc review of the earlier ruling in 2012.)
Home Builders filed its original lawsuit in 2009, challenging the determination by the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers that two reaches of the Santa Cruz River were traditional navigable waterways. That determination requires any party that wishes to dredge or discharge into the river, or any waterway with a "significant nexus" to the river, to get a federal permit. Parties who don't know whether they need a permit can seek a Jurisdictional Determination from the Corps.
Home Builders sued to stop the designation, on the theory that its members would have to choose between applying for a permit and facing enforcement penalties. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the case, holding that Home Builders lacked standing unless and until the agencies applied the determination to a particular property:
the owner or developer of the property suffers no incremental injury in fact from the [determination] and any challenge to it is therefore premature. In the meanwhile, [Home Builders'] members face only the possibility of regulation, as they did before the [determination]: Any watercourse on their property may (or may not) turn out to be subject to [Clean Water Act] dredging permit requirements because of a nexus (or not) with the two Santa Cruz reaches.
Home Builders came back in this latest suit with additional allegations designed to fill the standing gaps in its original case. But the D.C. Circuit said they weren't enough: Home Builders' standing in the second case has exactly the same problems it did in the first.
The ruling means that Home Builders, and its members, have to wait until later in the process--until the agencies determine that particular land is covered--until they can challenge the original designation of the Santa Cruz.
But two judges on the panel argued that the first ruling was flat wrong. Judges Silberman and Sentelle wrote that any regulated party has standing to challenge an agency rule:
And the law is rather clear; any party covered by an agency's regulatory action has standing to challenge a rule when it issues--it certainly need not wait until a government agency seeks to enforce a rule. That proposition is so clearly established it is beyond question. Nor do parties have to wait until the government takes preliminary steps before enforcing--clearing its throat, so to speak. It is only necessary for a potential litigant to show that it is part of the regulated class and its behavior is likely affected by the government's action.
Wednesday, May 13, 2015
The Seventh Circuit ruled in Armstrong v. Daily that a prosecutor and two crime lab technicians were not entitled to qualified immunity after they bungled an investigation that resulted in a faulty trial and foiled the plaintiff's attempts to demonstrate his innocence. In all, this top-to-bottom outrageous investigation put a wrongfully convicted plaintiff behind bars for 29 years.
Ralph Armstrong brought the civil rights case against prosecutor John Norsetter and state lab technicians Karen Daily and Daniel Campbell. Armstrong was convicted of rape and murder in 1981 and sentenced to life plus 16 years. The prosecution had two key pieces of physical evidence against him: drug paraphernalia found at the crime scene that could have shown who was in the victim's apartment the evening she was murdered; and a bathrobe belt used as the murder weapon.
The drug paraphernalia was never examined; instead, it was tossed in a trash bag, left in an office storage locker at the police station, and eventually lost. The bathrobe belt was tested crudely for DNA in 1980, which didn't rule out Armstrong. (The prosecution also relied on the identification by an eyewitness who Norsetter had hypnotized. Armstrong challenged this evidence in a prior case, where he lost his habeas claim at the Seventh Circuit.)
Armstrong later presented new DNA testing definitively excluding him and, in 2005, won a new trial through the state courts. A state court also ordered the prosecution to inform the defense of future DNA tests and to allow the defense to be present for any handling of the evidence. Armstrong stayed in prison.
Norsetter then ordered new testing of the belt, without telling Armstrong (despite the court order). Daily and Campbell conducted testing that consumed the entire DNA sample from the belt. The results could not confirm or eliminate Armstrong as the source, because the test they used could not distinguish between men with the same father. (This is important, because Armstrong's brother, who died in 2005, earlier confessed to the crime.) Norsetter never disclosed to Armstrong or the technicians that Armstrong's brother might be a suspect.
After Armstrong's attorneys learned that the prosecution's secret testing destroyed the evidence, they moved to dismiss charges against him. The court found that the prosecution acted in bad faith and dismissed the charges because the destruction of that evidence had irreparably compromised his right to a fair trail. Armstrong remained in prison for the three years between the destruction of the evidence in 2006 and the court's dismissal in 2009.
Armstrong then sued Norsetter, Daily, and Campbell, arguing that they violated his civil rights. Norsetter claimed absolute immunity as a prosecutor for the destruction of DNA evidence and qualified immunity for the destruction of the drug paraphernalia; Daily and Campbell claimed qualified immunity. The district court denied these claims, except as to Norsetter's involvement in the destruction of DNA evidence.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. As to Norsetter, it ruled that Norsetter did not enjoy absolute immunity for his investigatory acts, and that he did not enjoy qualified immunity because he acted in bad faith in allowing the destruction of the drug paraphernalia and DNA sample. As to Daily and Campbell, the court said that
we must assume that Daily and Campbell's actions caused Armstrong to suffer a loss of liberty as he languished in prison for three more years after Daily said he was excluded by the earlier DNA tests and after the last sample had been destroyed in the [later] test of the newly discovered stain.
The court rejected the defendant's arguments that a state tort action could have provided Armstrong a remedy sufficient to satisfy federal due process under Parratt v. Taylor. In a lengthy discussion, the court said that the argument was based on a fundamental mis-reading of Parratt. In short:
When Parratt and its progeny are read carefully, then, and are read against the broader sweep of due process jurisprudence, they do not bar Armstrong's claims based on deprivation of his liberty through deliberate destruction of exculpatory evidence. More specifically, Parratt does not bar Armstrong's claims because the defendants' conduct was not "random and unauthorized" and the available state remedies are not adequate.
The court recognized "some disagreement among the courts about the conditions for obtaining a civil remedy for destruction of exculpatory evidence, those disagreements do not support a qualified immunity defense."
Judge Flaum argued that Norsetter should get qualified immunity, because his destruction of the drug paraphernalia was negligent, not "in bad faith."
Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner is looking to amend the state constitution to give the state more flexibility in cutting state worker pensions, according to the Herald & Review. Rauner's idea came in reaction to the state supreme court ruling last week holding that state efforts to cut state pensions violated the state constitutional Pension Protection Clause.
Still, an amendment is unlikely to occur, at least anytime soon. The Illinois Constitution requires a 3/5 vote of state lawmakers in both houses. But the Democratic-controlled state legislature is unlikely to approve any pension amendment at all, much less by this kind of super-majority. Even if the state legislature approved a measure, it'd need to be approved by 3/5 of the voters voting on the measure, or a majority voting in the election.
This is just the latest effort of Governor Rauner to re-make constitutions. Recall that he earlier issued an executive order cutting public-sector union fair-share fees, and filed a preemptive suit against the unions seeking to get mandatory public sector fair share fees declared unconstitutional. This bold move anticipates that the Supreme Court is ready to overturn Abood--a First Amendment mainstay that says that states can require fair share in the interests of preventing free riders and promoting labor peace. Given the Court's recent rulings, Rauner is probably right that Abood is on the chopping block. Still, his very aggressive suit is designed only to hasten Abood's demise.
Monday, May 11, 2015
In its opinion in United States v. Pierce, the Second Circuit considered the arguments of co-defendant/appellant Melvin Colon regarding the admissibility of a rap video and images of tattoos in the criminal trial. The unanimous opinion, authored by Judge Denny Chin, affirmed the convictions of Colon and his co-defendants for conspiracy, racketeering, murder, narcotics trafficking, and firearms offenses largely related to their activities as members of a "violent street gang, dubbed the Courtlandt Avenue Crew (ʺCACʺ) by the government," as well as a gang known as Godʹs Favorite Children, or ʺGFC.ʺ
Colon contended that his First Amendment rights were violated when the district court permitted the government to present as evidence a rap video and images of his tattoos, some of which he had posted to his Facebook page. The "rap video" portrayed Colon as rapping: ʺYG to OG / Somebody make somebody nose bleed/ Iʹm OG shoot the Ruger / Iʹm a shooter.ʺ A witness, also seen in the video, testified for the prosecution that the Young Gunnaz crew, or YG, was feuding with the OG (formerly the GFC). The images of the tattoos introduced at trial were explained by the Second Circuit as including:
a close‐up of Colonʹs hand, showing his ʺY.G.K.ʺ tattoo, which stands for ʺYoung Gunnaz Killer.ʺ In some of the photographs Colon is pointing a gun at his Y.G.K. tattoo, indicating, according to the government, his desire to harm members of the Young Gunnaz. Other tattoos depicted in the photographs introduced at trial included one on his right arm that read ʺCourtlandtʺ; tattoos on his left arm that referenced [co-defendant] Meregildoʹs nicknames (ʺYoungʺ and ʺKillaʺ); and one stating ʺM.I.P. [Mac In Peace] T‐Money,ʺ referring to Harrison, the former leader of CAC.
The Second Circuit panel rejected the First Amendment challenges to the introduction of the evidence. First, the court noted that the conviction did not rest on the expression: "here, the speech is not 'itself the proscribed conduct,'" interestingly citing United States v. Caronia, the 2012 Second Circuit case reversing a conviction for promoting the off-label use of prescription drugs. Additionally, the Second Circuit considered Colon's argument that the rap lyrics were merely "fictional artistic expressions," and discussed the New Jersey Supreme Court decision last year in State v. Skinner, noting that the court there observed that ʺ[o]ne would not presume that Bob Marley, who wrote the well‐known song ʹI Shot the Sheriff,ʹ actually shot a sheriff.ʺ However, the Second Circuit distinguished Skinner in which the court reversed the conviction (although not explicitly on the basis of the First Amendment), by concluding that here the rap lyrics and tattoos were properly admitted, because they were relevant and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Specifically - - - if cursorily - - - the Second Circuit reasoned:
The government proffered the rap video to show Colonʹs animosity toward the Young Gunnaz, as well as his association with CAC. The government similarly offered the tattoo evidence to help establish his motive for violence against the Young Gunnaz, and to show his loyalty to Harrison and Meregildo ‐‐ indeed other members of CAC had similar tattoos. Hence, the rap video and tattoos were relevant, their probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and Colonʹs First Amendment rights were not implicated when the district court admitted the evidence from his social media account.
As in other cases raising First Amendment challenges to the introduction of expressive evidence, the First Amendment issues are subsumed into the evidentiary one.
Colon also challenged a portion of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1), regarding the subpoenaing of Facebook for page content. Appellant Colon, however, is not challenging the Government's acquisition of his own Facebook content, however, but argued that SCA's prohibition of his subpoena of Facebook content from a witness, denied him his Fifth Amendment due process right to present evidence and his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses. Colon managed to obtain some of the Facebook postings through the work of a private investigator and his attorney used it in cross-examination and introduced portions of it. The Second Circuit declined to reach the constitutional question, given that "Colon possessed the very contents he claims the SCA prevented him from obtaining, and his suggestion that there could have been additional relevant exculpatory material in the Parsons Account is purely speculative."
The court's opinion resolves the issues before it (including a sentencing issue which earned a remand), but does little to elucidate the important First Amendment concerns that remain regarding the admissibility of rap lyrics and tattoos in criminal trials.
Friday, May 8, 2015
Judge Hanen issued a "Supplemental Order" in the state case, led by Texas, against the federal government challenging the President's Deferred Action program, DAPA, doubling down on his earlier conclusion that the government "abdicat[ed] its duty to enforce this country's immigration laws."
The order cites testimony by ICE Director Sarah Saldana before the House Judiciary Committee on April 14, 2015, "reiterat[ing]," according to Judge Hanan, "that any officer or agent who did not follow the dictates of the 2014 DHS Directive would face the entire gamut of possible employee sanctions, including termination." This, according to Judge Hanan, is conclusive evidence that the program represents "the Government's abdication of its duty to enforce the INA," and not lawful discretionary enforcement.
Judge Hanan likened DAPA to the government's non-enforcement of the Civil Rights Act, and active funding of segregating schools, in Adams v. Richardson, the 1973 D.C. Circuit case. Judge Hanan wrote,
Just like HEW giving federal funds to those violating the civil rights laws in Adams, the DHS in this case is giving a variety of rewards to individuals violating the country's immigration laws. This general policy of affirmatively awarding benefits is not merely an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The Government has announced, and has now confirmed under oath, that it is pursuing a policy of mandatory non-compliance (with the INA), and that any agent who seeks to enforce the duly-enacted immigration laws will face sanctions--which could include the loss of his or her job. If the solicitation of voluntary compliance (questioned by taxpayers who are rarely accorded standing) equates to abdication, certainly mandatory non-compliance by the Government (questioned by twenty-six states) does as well.