Monday, June 23, 2014
The Second Circuit today released a redacted version of the DOJ/OLC memo outlining the government's legal authority for the use of a drone attack to kill Anwar al-Aulaqi (sometimes spelled al-Awlaki). We've blogged extensively about this issue, including here, on the earlier released white paper outlining the government's authority to conduct the same attack.
The released version does not include the first 11 pages of the memo, presumably including the information that the government passed on to the OLC about al-Awlaki that formed the basis of the analysis. It's not clear whether that first 11 pages included other material or analysis. (The released version starts with "II.") There are other redactions throughout, especially in the portion analyzing the CIA's authority to conduct drone attacks.
The analysis in the memo differs slightly from the analysis in the earlier white paper, but, because of the redactions, it's not clear how much this matters. Thus, for example, the analysis released today makes a careful distinction between DoD authority and CIA authority to conduct a targeted drone attack. (The earlier white paper didn't make this clear distinction.) But it's not entirely clear why or how that distinction is significant, given that much of the CIA analysis is redacted. The analysis released today is also more fact specific. (The earlier white paper didn't so clearly limit itself to the facts of one case.) But the memo today redacts the facts, so we don't know them.
Other than those points, the analysis released today doesn't appear to be importantly different than the earlier white paper.
As we've noted, and as others have noted, the analysis leads to the surprising result that the government may be able to kill someone by drone attack more easily than it may detain them (with due process under Hamdi). Still, we don't know this for sure, because we don't know precisely what processes the government used in killing al-Awlaki: that detail is redacted from the memo.
The memo starts by outlining the statutory prohibition on foreign murder of a U.S. national--the federal provision that outlaws one U.S. national from killing another overseas. That provision, 18 U.S.C. 1119(b), says that "[a] person who, being a national of the United States, kills or attempts to kill a national of the United States while such national is outside the United States but within the jurisdiction of another country shall be punished as provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113." Section 1111 penalizes "murder," defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought." The memo thus centers on whether al-Aulaqi's killing was "unlawful."
The memo says that the killing was not unlawful, because the prohibition includes the "recognized justification" of "public authority"--that is, the government's ability to kill under its public authority. As to the Defense Department's use of drones, the memo says that (1) the president had executive war powers authorized by Congress under the AUMF, (2) the AUMF authorized the president to use all necessary force against al-Qaida and associated forces (the OLC said that the AUMF included associated forces in an earlier memo), (3) al-Aulaqi was a member of al-Qaida or associated forces (AQAP) who posed a "continued and imminent threat" to the U.S., and (4) the DoD was acting pursuant to statutory authorization in targeting and killing al-Aulaqi. Moreover, the memo says that al-Aulaqi's killing comports with the laws of war. That's because DoD "would carry out its operation as part of the non-international armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaida, and thus that on those facts the operation would comply with international law so long as DoD would conduct it in accord with the applicable laws of war that govern targeting in such a conflict." The memo said that this operation in Yemen is part of that conflict, even though Yemen is not within the area of that conflict. Finally, the memo says that the method of killing complies with the laws of war--that is, that the targeted drone attack complies with the principle of distinction, it would minimize civilian casualties, and it would not violate prohibitions on "treachery" and "perfidy" (because those "do not categorically preclude the use of stealth or surprise, nor forbid military attacks on identified, individual soldiers or officers . . . and we are not aware of any other law-of-war grounds precluding the use of such tactics.").
The memo drew the same, or very similar, conclusions as to the CIA's use of a drone strike, but that section was largely redacted.
(The memo also said that another murder-abroad statute similarly did not prohibit the strike, and that the War Crimes Act did not prohibit it, because al-Aulaqi was still an active, fighting beligerent, and an allowable target under the laws of war.)
As to Fourth- and Fifth Amendment protections, the memo says that a high-level decision-maker ("the highest officers in the intelligence community") can make a determination to use lethal force and authorize a strike. (That's about all it said: this portion of the memo is also highly redacted.)
The memo makes clear that this is all context specific: the "facts" given to OLC that form the basis of its analysis are "sufficient" for the Office to form its conclusions, but the memo declines to say whether those facts are also necessary. (And we don't know them, in any event, because they're redacted.)
June 23, 2014 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Executive Authority, Fifth Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, News, Separation of Powers, War Powers | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
George Will weighed in again today on presidential overreach in Stopping a Lawless President, joining the increasing (and partisan) drumbeat against President Obama's efforts to work around congressional non-action and obstruction. In the piece, Will takes aim at President Obama's "perpetrat[ion] [of] more than 40 suspensions of the law." (Emphasis in original.) Among these: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals and the delayed implementation of the ACA's employer mandate. "Institutional derangement driven by unchecked presidential aggrandizement did not begin with Barack Obama, but his offenses against the separation of powers have been egregious in quantity and qualitatively different."
Will also explores a problem for those who'd like to stop presidential overreach in court: they don't have standing. That's because President Obama's actions have generally helped people, not harmed them, leaving only certain taxpayers and frustrated legislators to complain. As Will points out, David Rivkin and Elizabeth Price Foley floated a theory earlier this year in Politico that would allow legislators to sue. And the House recently passed Rep. Gowdy's cleverly named ENFORCE the Law Act of 2014 ("Executive Needs to Faithfully Observe and Respect Congressional Enactments"), authorizing House or Senate lawsuits against the president to require enforcement of the law. That bill will surely die in the Senate. But Rivkin and Foley's arguments for standing don't depend on legislation.
Still, Rivkin and Foley's arguments run up against language from Justice Scalia's dissent in U.S. v. Windsor (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas), quoted in the dissenting views in the House report on the ENFORCE the Law Act:
Heretofore in our national history, the President's failure to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," could only be brought before a judicial tribunal by someone whose concrete interests were harmed by that alleged failure. Justice Alito would create a system in which Congress can hale the Executive before the courts not only to vindicate its own institutional powers to act, but to correct a perceived inadequacy in the execution of its laws. This system would lay to rest Tocqueville's priase of our judicial system as one which "intimately binds the case made for the law with the case made for one man," one in which legislation is "no longer exposed to the daily aggression of the parties," and in which "the political question that the judge must resolve is linked to the interest of private litigants."
That would be replaced by a system in which Congress and the Executive can pop immediately into court, in their institutional capacity, whenever the President refuses to implement a statute he believes to be unconstitutional, and whenever he implements a law in a manner that is not to Congress's liking. . . .
If majorities in both Houses of Congress care enough about the matter, they have available innumerable ways to compel executive action without a lawsuit--from refusing to confirm Presidential appointees to the elimination of funding.
Thursday, June 19, 2014
Nathaniel Zelinsky, writing over at Concurring Opinions, traces the history and subsequent use of Justice Potter Stewart's famous phrase from his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio. Zelinsky found earlier uses of the phrase, or very similar phrases, but writes that Alan Novak, one of Justice Stewart's clerks, "remembered the phrase emerging out of a conversation with the justice. And it was, according to Novak, Stewart who wrote the actual opinion, including the seven words." Justice Stewart did not intend "to create a widespread sensation"; indeed, news coverage at the time all but ignored the phrase--and all but ignored Jacobellis, in favor of Quantity of Books v. Kansas, another obscenity case handed down that day.
Zelinsky offers this advice:
The unintentional popularity of "I know it when I see it" should be a note of caution for legal authors in the public sphere, from jurists to commentators more generally: it is very difficult to predict in advance what will capture widespread attention among the non-legal public. . . . On the flip side, the legal corpus is full of opinions whose authors hoped would be earthquakes but whose prose was then largely ignored.
Wednesday, June 18, 2014
The Brennan Center released a report this week on the state of voting in the run-up to the 2014 election. Among the highlights:
- Since 2010, 22 states have implemented new voting restrictions, including voter ID requirements, requirements that make registration harder, restrictions on early voting, and restrictions on restoring voting rights for people with past criminal convictions. The report says that "[p]artisanship played a key role" and that "[r]ace was also a significant factor" in enacting restrictions. The 2014 election will be the first election for new restrictions in 15 states, possibly leading to problems on Election Day as those states implement the restrictions for the first time.
- There are ongoing cases challenging restrictions in seven states--Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin. More may come.
- Since 2012, 16 states have passed laws to make it easier to vote, including laws that modernize registration, inrease early voting opportunities, allow pre-restration of 16- and 17-year-olds, restore voting rights to people with past convictions, ease voter ID burdens, and expand access by language and absentee voting. These laws will be in effect in 11 states in the 2014 election.
In an extensive opinion today in Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., Cancellation No. 92046185, a divided Trademark Trial and Appeal Board canceled the trademark of the term "redskins" as violative of section 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), prohibiting registration of marks that may disparage persons or bring them into contempt or disrepute.
The majority opinion relied upon dictionary definitions, expert opinions, and surveys to conclude that the term is disparaging - - - and was so at the time the trademark was approved. The majority rejected the laches defense in part because "there is an overriding public interest in removing from the register marks that are disparaging to a segment of the population beyond the individual petitioners."
Judge Bergsman's dissenting opinion disagreed with the
majority’s decision to grant the petition on the claim of disparagement because the dictionary evidence relied upon by the majority is inconclusive and there is no reliable evidence to corroborate the membership of National Council of American Indians.
To be clear, this case is not about the controversy, currently playing out in the media, over whether the term “redskins,” as the name of Washington’s professional football team, is disparaging to Native Americans today. The provisions of the statute under which the Board must decide this case – §§ 2(a) and 14(3) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a) and 1064(3) – require us to answer a much narrower, legal question: whether the evidence made of record in this case establishes that the term “redskins” was disparaging to a substantial composite of Native Americans at the time each of the challenged registrations issued.
Neither the majority or dissenting opinion - - - both of which are lengthy - - - engage with the possible First Amendment free speech issues or with the possible Equal Protection issues; this is decidely a case interpreting a statutory provision regarding trademark.
Yet the constitutional contours of speech and equality are evident in both opinions, just as constitutionalism has been implicated in the controversies surrounding the use of the term. Thus, while a "trademark case," Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc. is worth consideration by constitutional students and scholars. And its comparison to the "dykes on bikes" trademark case, which I've discussed here, is also worth consideration by those interested in constitutionalism, democracy, and language.
Monday, June 16, 2014
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan (D.D.C.) on Friday dismissed a case brought by a U.S. citizen against FBI agents for torturing and mistreating him as a terrorist suspect in Africa in violation of his constitutional rights.
The plaintiff, Amir Meshal, was visiting Somalia in November 2006. When fighting erupted there, Meshal fled to Kenya. Upon arrival, he was captured by Kenyan soldiers, detained, and later interrogated repeatedly by FBI agents, who used threats, accusations that Meshal was a terrorist, and physical force to intimidate him. Later, Meshal was transferred to Somalia, then Ethiopia, where interrogations by FBI agents continued. Throughout, Meshal was denied outside communication (until U.S. consular officials later gained access to him), access to an attorney, and access to foreign courts. In all, Meshal was detained abroad for four months. He was never charged with a crime.
Meshal filed a Bivens suit for damages against the agents, but Judge Sullivan dismissed the case. Judge Sullivan was highly critical of the U.S. government's treatment of Meshal and of the federal courts' refusal to hear Bivens claims by other U.S. citizens mistreated by government agents. But he nevertheless concluded that the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Doe, the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Lebron, and the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Vance compelled him to dismiss Meshal's case. Doe, Lebron, and Vance all also involved U.S. citizens suing government officers for violations of constitutional right in similar circumstances. The circuit courts all ruled that "special factors" counseled against a Bivens remedy, however, because they all arose in the context of the military and national security.
Given the state of the law, there is no chance of a successful appeal. But that didn't stop Judge Sullivan from delivering a full-throated condemnation of the agents' actions, the courts' rulings, and Congress's failure to create a remedy for U.S. citizens who are mistreated in these situations:
The facts alleged in this case and the legal questions presented are deeply troubling. Although Congress has legislated with respect to detainee rights, it has provided no civil remedies for U.S. citizens subject to the appalling mistreatment Mr. Meshal has alleged against officials of his own government. To deny him a judicial remedy under Bivens raises serious concerns about the separation of powers, the role of the judiciary, and whether our courts have the power to protect our own citizens from constitutional violations by our government when those violations occur abroad.
Wednesday, June 11, 2014
The Sixth Circuit today denied a preliminary injunction to a group of religious employers and religious nonprofits challenging the exemption from and the accommodation to the contraception mandate in the Affordable Care Act. The ruling is just the latest in a line of challenges to the accommodation. We posted most recently here. (These cases are different than the Hobby Lobby case now before the Supreme Court: these cases involve religious nonprofits that take issue with the accommodation to the contraception mandate, where the Hobby Lobby case involves a corporation's challenge to the mandate itself.)
The cases are unusual, even surprising, in that the plaintiffs challenge the government's attempt to accommodate their religious beliefs as itself a violation of their religious rights.
The organizations challenged the exemption from and the accommodation to the mandate under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the First Amendment (speech and religion clauses). The court ruled that they failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and thus affirmed the lower court's denial of a preliminary injunction.
The court noted that some of the plaintiffs were religious employers who qualified for the exemption from the mandate. Because the exemption exempts them, and because it does not require any particular act on the part of the organizations, the court said that the exemption didn't violate the organizations' speech or religious rights.
As to the religious non-profits, the court said that they qualify for the accommodation by simply certifying that they object to the mandate--and that this didn't interfere with their religious or free speech rights. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the certification itself somehow implicated the organizations in providing contraception in violation of their religious rights or free speech rights. In language shy of, but no less certain than, the almost hostile ruling by Judge Posner in the Seventh Circuit rejecting a similar claim the court said,
The appellants are not required to "provide" contraceptive coverage. . . . The appellants are not required to "pay for" contraceptive coverage. . . . Moreover, the appellants are not required to "facilitate access to" contraceptive coverage. . . . Submitting the self-certification form to the insurance issuer or third-party administrator does not "trigger" contraceptive coverage; it is federal law that requires the insurance issuer or the third-party administrator to provide this coverage.
The D.C. Circuit this week rejected a variety of claims by Guantanamo detainees for mistreatment by government officials and guards even after they had been cleared for release by the Combat Status Review Tribunal. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' request to remand the case to amend their complaint.
The case, Allaithi v. Rumsfeld, involved detainee claims of "forced grooming, solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, forced medication, transport in 'shackles and chains, blackened goggles, and ear coverings,' and the disruption of . . . religious practices," even after some of the plaintiffs were cleared for release by the CSRT. The plaintiffs brought claims against government officials and Guantanamo guards under the Alien Tort Statute, the Geneva Convention, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
As to the ATS, the court held that the defendants were acting within the scope of their employment, which, under the Westfall Act, transforms their ATS claim into a Federal Tort Claims Act claim against the government. But the plaintiffs didn't pursue administrative remedies under the FTCA, so their case was dismissed.
As to the Vienna Convention, the court said that the Convention confers a private right of action.
As to the other, Bivens claims, the court held, citing its second Rasul ruling, that the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity, or, alternatively, that the case raised special factors counseling against a Bivens remedy.
June 11, 2014 in Cases and Case Materials, Due Process (Substantive), First Amendment, Foreign Affairs, Fundamental Rights, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Monday, June 9, 2014
The Supreme Court ruled today in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger that the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, or CERCLA, does not preempt a state statute of repose that blocked the plaintiffs' state-law nuisance claim for environmental damage caused by the defendant. (A statute of repose sets a time limit on the filing of a complaint, much like a statute of limitations.) The case means that state-law claims for environmental damage that fall outside a state's statute of repose (because the plaintiffs didn't learn about the damage until years after the defendants caused it), including the plaintiffs' case here, will be dismissed--unless and until Congress changes CERCLA to provide for preemption of state statutes of repose.
The case arose when a group of property owners sued CTS for environmental damage to their land. CTS previously ran an electronics plant on the land, where it manufactured and disposed of electronics and electronic parts. As part of the operation, CTS stored certain chemicals. CTS later sold the property to the plaintiffs, certifying it as environmentally sound.
The plaintiffs realized that the property wasn't environmentally sound--but 24 years after the sale. So when they sued, CTS successfully moved to dismiss the case based on the state statute of repose, which prevents subjecting a defendant to a tort suit more than 10 years after the last culpable act of the defendant. The plaintiffs argued that CERCLA preempted the statute of repose, allowing their case to move forward. The Court today agreed with CTS.
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion and said that the text, the historical understanding of the language, and the Court's "presumptions about the structure of pre-emption" all pointed to preemption. The opinion turned in large measure on the historical understanding of the difference between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose. That's because everyone agrees that CERCLA's plain language preempts state statutes of limitations. The question was whether it also covered statutes of repose. The Court said no. (The Court said that CERCLA's drafters understood that there was a difference between the two, but included only statutes of limitations, not statutes of repose, in the preemption clause.)
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined Justice Kennedy's opinion in full. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined in the result and all but the portion that relied on the Court's "presumptions about the structure of pre-emption."
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Breyer. Justice Ginsburg argued that CERCLA's "discovery rule" displaced the commencement-of-action date in the state statute of repose. She wrote that the CERCLA's discovery rule set the commencement date as the date that the plaintiffs actually knew (or reasonably should have known) that the injury was caused by the defendant, not the date of the defendant's last act or omission (in the state statute of repose). This meant that the plaintiffs filed within the statute of repose, and that their case should be allowed to proceed.
As in all preemption cases, Congress could have the last word. Here, as elsewhere, Congress can change the federal statute to provide for preemption of state law after the Court interpreted it not to preempt state law (or vice versa). That seems unlikely here, though.
Thursday, June 5, 2014
The Michigan Supreme Court ruled this week in Makowski v. Governor that former Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm lacked authority under the state constitution to revoke her valid commutation of a prisoner's sentence. The ruling means that the prisoner, whose sentence was first commuted but whose commutation was later revoked, is now eligible for parole.
The Michigan constitution gives the governor the power "to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after convictions for all offenses . . . ." Art. 5, Sec. 14. Governor Granholm exercised this authority when she granted a commutation on the recommendation of the parole board to an individual who was serving a life sentence for felony murder. But when the family of the victim contacted her office to express its dissatisfaction after the commutation was signed and sealed, she instructed the parole board to halt all commutation proceedings and revoked the commutation.
The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that she couldn't do that it. The court first said that the case did not present a political question, because the state constitution limits the governor's power to commute "to those procedures and regulations that the Legislature enacts," and "[a]ccordingly, the distribution of power between the Legislature and the Governor regarding commutations creates a legal question that this Court must answer." The court said that legislative silence as to those procedures did not mean that the court should defer; instead, the court said that it had a duty to determine the extent and limits of executive authority regarding commutations. The court also ruled that its determination of the merits did not violate the separation of powers, because "this Court may review the Governor's exercise of power to ensure that it is constitutional."
As to the merits, the court held that the text and context of the commutation document indicated that it was final, and that the state constitution provided no power to revoke a commutation.
Monday, June 2, 2014
The Eighth Circuit ruled in Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau that Missouri's statute banning flag desecration was facially unconstitutional. The court held that the statue was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, and that there was no possible narrowing construction. The court also rejected the arresting officer's claim of qualified immunity.
The case arose when a Cape Girardeau police officer arrested an individual for desecrating an American flag, in violation of Missouri law. The officer made the arrest pursuant to a warrant issued by a local judge and based upon the officer's statement of probable cause to the county prosecuting attorney.
The ruling couldn't have been a surprise to anyone, except possibly the officer and the county prosecutor. (The ruling included this telling sentence: "Both Officer Peters and [the prosecuting attorney] stated that they were unaware of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichman, which struck down statutes criminalizing flag desecration as unconstitutional.") The court ruled that Missouri's statute was facially unconstitutional under those cases.
The court also ruled that the officer did not enjoy qualified immunity. The officer argued that he should be entitled to qualified immunity, because the prosecutor and judge signed off on a warrant. He cited Messerschmidt v. Millender, where the Supreme Court granted qualified immunity to an officer who executed a search warrant unsupported by probable cause because, in part, a neutral magistrate issued the warrant.
But the Eighth Circuit noted that the Messerschmidt Court said that the neutral magistrate's involvement did "not end the inquiry into objective reasonableness." The court also noted that the standard in Malley v. Briggs survived Messerschmidt. The Malley standard says that there's no qualified immunity where "if it obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue." Here, it was obvious.
The ruling upholds a lower court ruling granting attorney's fees to the plaintiff.
Tuesday, May 27, 2014
The Supreme Court today ruled in Hall v. Florida that a state's use of a rigid cut-off to determine intellectual disability for the purpose of administering the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Our oral argument preview is here.
The 5-4 ruling, penned by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, is another in a series of blows against the death the penalty. Justice Alito wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
The case tested Florida's use of a rigid cut-off to determine intellectual capacity for the purpose of administering the death penalty. The Court previously ruled in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) that the Eighth Amendment bars the use of the death penalty for persons with intellectual disabilities. Florida defined intellectual disability with reference to an IQ score of 70 or less. That meant that a defendant with an IQ score above 70 (including the defendant in this case) couldn't introduce further evidence of intellectual disability.
The Court held that this violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. It said that Florida's statute could be read to comply with the standard medical definition of intellectual disability (by including consideration of the standard error of measurement in the IQ test), but that the state instead applied it in a rigid way, foreclosing additional evidence of intellectual disability when a defendant has an IQ test above 70. That, the Court said, "disregards established medical practice in two interrelated ways": it takes the IQ score as "final and conclusive evidence of a defendant's intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other evidence"; and it disregards the standard error of measurement in an IQ test. (The standard error of measurement, or SEM, reflects the inherent imprecision in the IQ test and the resulting possible variation in results. It means that an IQ test score really reflects a range of results, not a single number.)
The Court said that a "significant majority of States implement the protection of Atkins by taking the SEM into account." "The rejection of the strict 70 cutoff in the vast majority of States and the 'consistency in the trend' toward recognizing the SEM provide strong evidence of consensus that our society does not regard this strict cutoff as proper or humane."
The ruling is just the latest blow to the death penalty. It means that states can't use a rigid IQ cutoff to determine intellectual disability under Atkins; instead, they have to consider the SEM and other evidence of intellectual disability, consistent with the standard medical approach of measuring intellectual disability.
The Supreme Court ruled today in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community that a Native American Indian Tribe is immune from a suit by the State of Michigan for off-reservation gaming. Our oral argument preview is here.
The 5-4 ruling was an unusual split: Justice Kagan wrote for the majority, which included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Sotomayor filed a separate concurrence. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Alito. Justice Scalia filed a separate dissent.
The Court held that tribal sovereign immunity bars Michigan's suit against the Bay Mills Indian Community for opening a casino outside its tribal lands. The Court ruled that Congress did not abrogate immunity, and the Tribe did not waive it, and that there's no good reason to revisit prior decisions holding that tribes have immunity even when a suit arises from off-reservation commercial activity.
Friday, May 23, 2014
Thirty-five human rights groups are holding a "May 23 Global Day of Action to Close Guantanamo and End Indefinite Detention" today, one year after President Obama (again) made the case for closing the detention facility. Amnesty International's press release is here.
Recent defense authorization acts, called the National Defense Authorization Acts, or NDAAs, restricted the use of funds for transfering detainees from Guantanamo Bay. We posted on those restrictions, and the White House responses (signing statements) to them, here, here, and here, among other places. The 2014 NDAA loosened some restrictions on repatriation of detainees, but maintained the restriction on the use of funds to transfer detainees to facilities in the United States.
Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Cal.) spoke this morning with Steve Inskeep on Morning Edition about the AUMF. The interview came a day after the House rejected a measure to set an end date on the Authorization.
Schiff said that the AUMF has been invoked as legal authority for actions both longer and broader than originally intended. He also said that Congress has abdicated its responsibility in checking its use.
We posted most recently on legislation related to the AUMF here, after Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced that he'd like to reconsider it.
Wednesday, May 21, 2014
The Ninth Circuit yesterday rejected a challenge to California's political contribution disclosure requirement by a group of political committees that backed Prop 8, the state constitutional ballot initiative that defined marriage only as between one man and one woman. The ruling means that the California's disclosure requirement stays in place, and that Prop 8 Committees have to comply.
The Prop 8 Committees in ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen challenged California's requirement that political committees disclose contributors who contribute more than $100, even after a campaign, arguing that some of their contributors had been harassed. The Prop 8 Committees challenged the requirement both on its face and as applied.
The court rejected the challenges. It applied the familiar "exacting scrutiny" standard to disclosures--that the requirement (and the burden it imposes) bears a "substantial relation" to a "sufficiently important" government interest. As to the facial challenge, the court said that the state obviously had sufficiently important interests in disclosure during the campaign, and that the state still had sufficiently important interests even after the campaign:
A state's interests in contribution disclosure do not necessarily end on election day. Even if a state's interest in disseminating accurate information to voters is lessened after the election takes place, the state retains its interests in accurate record-keeping, deterring fraud, and enforcing contribution limits. As a practical matter, some lag time between an election and disclosure of contributions that immediately precede that election is necessary for the state to protect these interests. In this case, for example, Appellants' contributions surged nearly 40% (i.e., by over $12 million) between the final pre-election reporting deadline and election day. Absent post-election reporting requirements, California could not account for such late-in-the-day donations. And, without such reporting requirements, donors could undermine the State's interests in disclosure by donating only once the final pre-election reporting deadline has passed.
As to the as-applied challenge, the court said they weren't justiciable: a request for an injunction to purge records of past disclosures is moot (and not capable of repetition but evading review); a request for an exemption from future reporting requirements is not ripe. Judge Wallace dissented on the as-applied challenge.
May 21, 2014 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, Elections and Voting, First Amendment, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, Mootness, News, Ripeness, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Judge Gladys Kessler (D.D.C.) ordered the government to release videos of force-feeding and medical records of Guantanamo detainee Abu Wa'el Dhiab in today's status conference in Dhiab's habeas case. Recall that Judge Kessler previously entered a temporary restraining order halting force-feedings of Dhiab until today and ordering the government to produce medical records and videotapes.
But Judge Kessler's order today didn't address force feedings. According to Wells Bennet over at Lawfare, that means that force-feedings can resume:
Intriguingly, court and counsel didn't address (so far as I could tell) the TRO's "no force feeding" instruction with respect to Dhiab. Considering that Judge Kessler's prior ruling limiting the ban until today's date of May 21, it seems the prohibition could dissolve as early as tomorrow. For her part, Judge Kessler gestured in this direction, by emphasizing both that her prior ruling was meant to preserve the status quo for so long as needed to handle the emergency motion, and that it did not embody a decision regarding preliminary relief. (The motion for a preliminary injunction, like the larger habeas case, obviously aims to stop Dhiab's force feeding; but the detainee's emergency motion papers did not, strictly speaking, ask the court to take that step.)
The Justice Department will release a memo that makes the case that its drone attacks are legal. The move comes in the wake of a Second Circuit ruling last month ordering the release of a redacted version of the memo, and amid calls in the Senate for the memo's release as that body considers the nomination of David Barron, one of the authors, to a federal appeals court.
Recall that the Department previously leaked a white paper outlining the government's case. We posted most recently on the legal challenges here.
Tuesday, May 20, 2014
Michael Waldman, writing over at Politico, tells the story of how the NRA rewrote the Second Amendment, not through the Article V process, but through persistent and carefully calculated political action and legal argument. Over time, the NRA's position worked its way into the consciousness of politicians and judges and lawyers and ordinary people, until Heller seemed to many (and obviously most on the Court) like an inevitability. That process--and not raw legal argument, not some new and significant historical find, and certainly not a constitutional amendment--is how we got the individual right to keep and carry guns, according to Waldman.
Waldman, the president of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU, writes on the occasion of the release of his latest book, The Second Amendment: A Biography.
Waldman's piece in Politico is as much about the political process of constitutional change as it is about the Second Amendment. In that way, it's a how-to for anyone interested in influencing the direction of constitutional law outside the amendment process, and a healthy reminder that a well organized movement can still influence the direction of American constitutional law:
So how does legal change happen in America? We've seen some remarkably successful drives in recent years--think of the push for marriage equality, or to undo campaign finance laws. Law students might be taught that the court is moved by powerhouse legal arguments or subtle shifts in doctrine. The National Rifle Association's long crusade to bring its interpretation of the Constitution into the mainstream teaches a different lesson: Constitutional change is the product of public argument and political maneuvering. The pro-gun movement may have started with scholarship, but then it targeted public opinion and shifted the organs of government. By the time the issue reached the Supreme Court, the desired new doctrine fell like a ripe apple from a tree.
Cass Sunstein, writing over at the New Republic, called Richard Epstein's latest book, The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government, "passionate, learned, and committed," "a full-scale and full-throated defense of his unusual [libertarian] vision of the Constitution," and his "magnum opus." Sunstein also places Epstein at the center of Tea Party constitutionalism, "the man who made libertarians wrong about the Constitution." "Everyone knows who Rand Paul's father is, but in an intellectual sense it is Richard Epstein who is his daddy."
But Sunstein argues that Epstein is a "stranger in a strange land" in arguing about the Constitution--that he "is steeped not in American constitutional law but in Anglo-American common law." According to Sunstein, Epstein's views are more moral than doctrinal or historical (and certainly not originalist), and that he's "playing Dworkin's game" of reading the text through a moral lens:
Epstein is a moral reader. He objects that progressives ignore the constitutional text, and of course he cares about it, but he acknowledges that on many issues that matter, the text, standing alone, does not mandate his interpretation. Where the rubber hits the road, his real argument is not about Madison and Hamilton, the inevitable meaning of words, or the placement of commas; it is an emphatically moral one. Informed though it is by a certain strand in liberal thought, it reflects what he thinks morality requires. Of course other people think differently. There is an important lesson here about Tea Party constitutionalism as a whole, for the supposed project of "restoring" the original Constitution, or going back to the genius of the Founding generation, is often about twenty-first century political convictions, not about the recovery of history.