Thursday, May 26, 2011
The Supreme Court ruled on Thursday in Camreta v. Greene that a prevailing official in a federal civil rights action can appeal the constitutional ruling of the lower court, but that the appeal was moot in this case.
The case involved state child protective service officers' interviews of a 9-year-old girl, S.G., about allegations that her father had sexually abused her. S.G.'s mother sued under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, claiming that the warrantless and permission-less interviews violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription on unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Ninth Circuit followed the two-step approach in Saucier v. Katz (2001) and Pearson v. Callahan (2009). Under Saucier, a court asks two questions: (1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right (the constitutional question), and (2) if so, whether that right was "clearly established" at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct (the qualified immunity question). Qualified immunity applies and protects an official unless the official's conduct violated such a right.
Pearson held that the sequence of the two-step process is flexible--that lower courts could, e.g., ask the second question first. If so, under Pearson, a lower court could also rule on the constitutional question, thus providing guidance to officials in their behavior and actions and advancing (not dodging) constitutional law in the area. Strictly speaking, the ruling on the constitutional question would be dicta (and under the avoidance principle, really shouldn't be at all--thus the "Pearson permission" that lower courts possess to rule on the constitutional question). But it would nevertheless be binding on officials, because it would reflect the lower court's judgment on the constitutional question--telling officials what is constitutional and what is not, and thus guiding their behavior.
This is exactly what the Ninth Circuit did. That court ruled that the officials enjoyed qualified immunity (because their interview did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights). But it also ruled that the interviews violated the Fourth Amendment. Thus the officials won on immunity but lost (sort of) on the constitutional question. The officers appealed; S.G.'s mother did not.
The Supreme Court, by Justice Kagan (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Alito) ruled that the officers could appeal, even though they won on qualified immunity. The appeal satisfied the federal statute conferring on the Court unqualified power to grant cert. on the petition "of any party." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(1). And it satisfied the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.
Moreover, the Court ruled that the constitutional question had now become moot: S.G. moved out of state and approached age 18, thus making a repeat of the interview unlikely in the extreme. And "[b]ecause mootness has frustrated [the officer's] ability to challenge the Court of Appeal's ruling that he must obtain a warrant before interviewing a suspected child abuse victim at school," op. at 18, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's constitutional ruling.
Justice Scalia concurred but wrote that he'd be willing to reconsider in an appropriate case whether "to end the extraordinary practice of ruling upon constitutional questions unnecessarily when the defendant possesses qualified immunity."
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred, but would have avoided the question whether the officers could appeal. Instead, they would simply have vacated the case in light of its mootness.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. Justice Kennedy argued that the Court's ruling wrongly treated dicta (the Ninth Circuit's constitutional ruling) as precedent, and he argued that an officer who won on qualified immunity could not appeal.
Four Justices thus joined an opinion to maintain the Pearson permission of lower courts to rule on the constitutional question, even if they ruled that an officer enjoyed qualified immunity. One of those, Justice Scalia, suggested that he would reconsider it in an appropriate case. Two others, Justices Sotomayor and Breyer, were silent on the question, but gave no suggestion whatsoever that they would reassess Pearson. Two others, Justices Kennedy and Thomas, objected that the Court wrongly treated the Pearson constitutional ruling as binding precedent in this case and suggested more generally that Pearson constitutional rulings raised difficulties, because they "could come to resemble declaratory judgments or injunctions" (and not just the obiter dicta they are).
The case likely leaves Pearson permission on solid ground, even if as many as three Justices may be willing to reconsider it, and even if it suggested that in some narrow class of cases (like this one) the constitutional question could become moot, thus undermining it.
May 26, 2011 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Fundamental Rights, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, Mootness, News, Opinion Analysis, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Sunday, May 1, 2011
The D.C. Circuit ruled on Friday that the Chamber of Commerce and the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) lacked associational standing to sue the Environmental Protection Agency to block its waiver of greenhouse gas emissions standards to California and other states. The court thus dismissed the case.
The plaintiffs' petition challenged the EPA's waiver, which allowed California and other states to adopt and enforce greenhouse gas emissions standards that exceeded the EPA's own standards. (The Clean Air Act prohibits states from adopting more restrictive standards but allows the EPA to grant waivers.)
But last April, the EPA and the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration jointly issued a national program of greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy standards for marketing years 2012 through 2016. The standards grew out of an agreement with the agencies, the State of California, and major automobile manufacturers. Under the agreement, California amended its regulations to deem compliance with the national standards compliance with its own standards for these years. (For years 2009 through 2011, California adjusted its standards to make compliance somewhat easier.)
As a condition of the agreement, major auto manufacturers and their trade associations agreed not to sue to contest the new national standards or the California waiver.
But that agreement (alone) didn't stop the Chamber of Commerce and NADA to challenge the regs and waiver on behalf of auto dealers.
The D.C. Circuit nevertheless ruled that they lacked standing. (The Chamber failed to allege that one of its members was affected and therefore lacked associational standing. NADA, however, identified allegedly injured members.) As to the years 2009 through 2011, the court ruled that the NADA failed to alleged with sufficient determinacy that manufacturers would adjust the "mix" of vehicles offered to dealers in waived states (thus affecting the dealers' sales) and that manufacturers would necessarily raise the price of vehicles (also affecting sales). Part of NADA's problem was that Ford planned to raise its emissions standards on its own, even before the EPA granted California's waiver, thus undercutting any causation and redressibility. (The two dealers that provided affidavits in support of standing sold Ford cars.)
As to years 2012 through 2016, the court wrote that Ford planned to up its own standards, independent of federal regulation, and that the case was moot. Why moot? Because starting in 2012, manufacturers will have to comply with federal standards, and compliance with those standards will also satisfy California under the 2010 agreement. In other words, manufacturers will have to meet the federal standards, anyway, and their meeting the exact same California standards cannot possible harm dealers.
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
The Supreme Court yesterday ruled that the plaintiffs' procedural due process claim in Alvarez v. Smith was moot, after the parties resolved their property disputes during the course of the litigation.
The case involved the Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act ("DAFPA"), which authorizes local law enforcement to seize vehicles, aircraft, vessels, and money involved in certain drug crimes. Under DAFPA, authorities can hold property worth more than $20,000 for up to 97 days after the seizure and before the state's attorney files judicial forfeiture proceedings. Authorities can hold property worth less than $20,000 for up to 187 days before the state's attorney files forfeiture proceedings.
Six plaintiffs who had cars and cash seized under the DAFPA sued the Cook County State's Attorney under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, arguing that the DAFPA violated, on its face, the three-part procedural due process balancing test in U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property and Mathews v. Eldridge. The Seventh Circuit ruled for the plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court asked the parties to brief mootness, and, at oral argument, learned that the parties resolved the property dispute: the state returned all seized cars, and individual property owners either forfeited the cash or accepted the state's partial return as final. A unanimous Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they sought certification as a class (because plaintiffs did not appeal the denial of class certification) and the argument that the practice was "capable of repetition" while "evading review" (because the plaintiffs failed to show that they were likely again to be subject to the DAFPA, citing Los Angeles v. Lyons) and ruled the claim moot.
Justice Stevens filed a partial dissent in the case, arguing that the Court should not have vacated the Seventh Circuit's judgment.
Saturday, December 6, 2008
The Supreme Court announced on Friday that it will review the Fourth Circuit ruling in Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli upholding the president's authority under the AUMF to indefinitely detain a lawful U.S. resident who was both captured and detained in the U.S. as an enemy combatant, without criminal charges. I've posted before on the case here, here, here, and here; the NYT reports here; SCOTUSblog reports here.
Briefs won't be due until after President-Elect Obama's inauguration. Between his inauguration and briefing, Obama could (1) do nothing (and maintain the Bush administration position, supported by the Fourth Circuit, before the Supreme Court); (2) charge Al-Marri in an Article III court under federal criminal law, thus (maybe) mooting the case at the Supreme Court; (3) same as (2), but charge Al-Marri in a military tribunal; (4) reverse the Bush administration position in full and release Al-Marri, (maybe) mooting the case.
(Why "(maybe)" moot? Because it's a classic case of "capable of repitition but evading review." The last time something like this happened--Padilla v. Hanft--the Court denied cert. after Padilla was transferred to civilian custody after an adminsitration-favorable Fourth Circuit decision, rebuffing Padilla's claim that the controversey was capable of repitition but evading review. (Kennedy's opinion here; Ginsburg's here.) Here, the Court has already granted cert., knowing well that it won't hear the case until Obama is president; this could change things.)
(Another interesting issue: How much should--and how much will--the Bush administration defer to Obama's position in formulating strategy at the Court?)
Any of the first three options probably ensure that Al-Marri will remain in detention, at least until the case is decided or until he's served a sentence.
This is a significant--and tough--test for Obama. His decision will signal his position on executive authority in the war on terror in a deeply troubling and far-reaching case. It would be difficult for Obama to maintain the Bush administration's vast claims of executive authority here: The implications of the administration's position--and the Fourth Circuit's ruling--are staggering. But if he backtracks (and if this moots the case at the Supreme Court), the Fourth Circuit ruling stands, and he could be seen as weak on executive authority and weak on terror.
I'll update as we get more.
Thursday, October 9, 2008
The Court heard oral arguments yesterday in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, a case dealing with standing, ripeness, and mootness in a facial challenge to agency procedural rules. The plaintiffs originally brought two types of claims: Plaintiffs challenged the Forest Service's Burnt Ridge Project, a proposed timber sale in the Sequoia National Forest; and they challenged the validity of Forest Service regulations that exempt certain Forest Service actions, including the Burnt Ridge Project, from administrative notice, comment, and appeal procedures.
The parties settled the first set of claims, dealing with the Burnt Ridge Project. But the government then argued that plaintiffs' facial challenge of the Forest Service regulations was nonjusticiable: the plaintiffs lacked standing, claimed the government, because they merely alleged an inability to participate in governmental decisionmaking (and not a sufficient cognizable injury); and the claim was not ripe, because plaintiffs didn't wait for the Forest Service to apply the regulations in a concrete setting--that the case was a preenforcement challenge. Plaintiffs argued that they had standing and that their claim was ripe when filed (because of the their harm from the Burnt Ridge Project), and that it is ripe now (because the Forest Service continued to apply the regulations to other projects).
The argument transcript is here; check out pages 26 to 52 (the plaintiff-respondents' argument) for nice exchanges on standing. Several law professors filed an amicus, which puts the justiciability issues into particularly good focus.